No Backpay for Reemployment-List Violations Under Tennessee Tenure Act; Superintendent’s Final Authority Supports § 1983 Monell Liability and Carey Nominal Damages

Precedents Cited and Their Role

State-law framework and Tenure Act remedies

• Emory v. Memphis City Sch. Bd. of Educ., 514 S.W.3d 129 (Tenn. 2017): The Tennessee Supreme Court rejected court-created backpay remedies not expressly authorized by the Tenure Act (there, for failure to hold a hearing within 30 days). The Sixth Circuit leans heavily on Emory’s textualist approach: where the Act is silent on a monetary remedy, courts should not craft one.
• Thompson v. Memphis City Sch. Bd. of Educ., 395 S.W.3d 616 (Tenn. 2012): Awarded backpay where the teacher received none of the pre-termination procedures required by the Act; the court analogized the unlawful termination to a suspension without pay (for which the Act expressly provides full-salary relief if the teacher is vindicated). The Sixth Circuit reconciles Thompson by confining it to pre-termination procedural violations—i.e., situations functionally tantamount to suspensions without pay—not to post-ratification reemployment-list issues.
• Randall v. Hankins, 733 S.W.2d 871 (Tenn. 1987), and Lee v. Franklin Special Sch. Dist., 237 S.W.3d 322 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007): Both predate significant 2014 amendments to Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-511(b). Those cases hinged on earlier statutory language granting a “preferred” list with a “first vacancy” preference and Board-only determinations of fitness. The current statute removes “preferred” and “first vacancy” language and permits principals to refuse an excessed teacher, undermining the basis for Lee- and Randall-style backpay.
• Textual canons in Tennessee law: The court invokes the Tennessee Supreme Court’s directives in cases such as Recipient of Final Expunction Order… v. Rausch, 645 S.W.3d 160 (Tenn. 2022), Effler v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 614 S.W.3d 681 (Tenn. 2020), and Calaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509 (Tenn. 2005), emphasizing fidelity to statutory text and the presumption that omissions are intentional.

§ 1983 municipal liability and due process remedies

• Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986), City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988) (plurality), Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 988 F.2d 649 (6th Cir. 1993), Bible Believers v. Wayne Cnty., 805 F.3d 228 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc): Together establish that a single decision by an official with final policymaking authority can be “municipal policy” under Monell; final authority is determined by state/local law, policy, and custom.
• Lemaster v. Lawrence County, 65 F.4th 302 (6th Cir. 2023): Contrasts “rogue” actions outside an official’s authority with acts attributable to the municipality.
• Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978); Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986): Foundational for procedural-due-process damages: nominal damages are available without proof of actual injury; compensatory damages may include out-of-pocket loss, reputational harm, and mental anguish if proven and caused by the violation.
• Fields v. Henry County, 701 F.3d 180 (6th Cir. 2012): Sets out the three elements of a procedural-due-process claim: protected interest, deprivation, and inadequate process.
• Tercero v. Texas Southmost Coll. Dist., 989 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 2021): Persuasive authority recognizing “loss of career and business opportunities” as potentially compensable if caused by a due process violation.

Title VII retaliation framework

• McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): Burden-shifting approach applies to retaliation claims (prima facie case, legitimate reason, pretext).
• George v. Youngstown State Univ., 966 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2020); Yazdian v. ConMed, 793 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2015): Articulate pretext pathways.
• Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (2011); Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am., Inc., 686 F.3d 339 (6th Cir. 2012); Mys v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 886 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2018): Define and limit “cat’s paw” liability—requiring proximate causation between a biased non-decisionmaker’s animus and the ultimate adverse action.

Legal Reasoning

A. Tenure Act: No backpay for reemployment-list violations under current law

The court predicts, under Erie principles, how the Tennessee Supreme Court would treat remedies for violating the Tenure Act’s reemployment-list requirement (Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-511(b)(3)). Using Emory’s textualist guidance, it holds that because the Act does not expressly authorize backpay for reemployment-list noncompliance—and does expressly authorize backpay in other circumstances (e.g., vindicated suspensions, § 49-5-511(a)(3))—courts should not infer such a monetary remedy.

Unlike Thompson, which involved wholesale deprivation of pre-termination process and analogized to a suspension without pay, Williams’s termination was ratified in 2018, rendering it lawful from that point forward. Post-ratification exclusion from a list did not entitle her to continued salary. Earlier Court of Appeals cases (Randall and Lee) do not control in light of the 2014 amendments eliminating “preferred list” language, the “first vacancy” preference, and authorizing principals to refuse excessed teachers. The Sixth Circuit therefore affirms the district court’s refusal to award additional backpay beyond the pre-ratification period.

B. § 1983: Superintendent’s final authority, and the Carey nominal-damages rule

Monell/final policymaker. The Board’s written reduction-in-force policy assigns the Superintendent responsibility to “develop[] administrative rules and regulations to implement” the reemployment-list statute, to maintain the list, and to “ensur[e] compliance.” The Board provided no review mechanism over the Superintendent’s list-related decisions. Deposition and trial testimony confirmed that the HR designees managed the list at the Superintendent’s direction, and that the Superintendent decided not to add new names for years following Williams’s termination. Because these are not “rogue” acts but the acts of the final policymaker within delegated authority, they are attributable to the Board under § 1983.

Injury and nominal damages. The district court required Williams to prove that, but for her exclusion from the list, she would have been rehired. That was error. Procedural due process claims do not require proof of actual injury to establish a violation. Under Carey, a plaintiff who proves a denial of due process is entitled at least to nominal damages; compensatory damages are available if the plaintiff proves causation and actual injury, which may include “loss of chances” or hiring opportunities if supported by the record and causally linked. The Sixth Circuit therefore reverses and remands for the district court to decide the unresolved merits (deprivation and adequacy of process) and, if a violation is found, to determine the appropriate measure of damages (nominal versus compensatory).

Unresolved on remand. The panel leaves for the district court: (1) whether the delay/exclusion was a deprivation of a protected interest; and (2) whether the process provided was adequate. The concurrence underscores that the panel expresses no view on whether placement on the reemployment list is itself a protected property interest.

C. Title VII and TPPA: No pretext; cat’s paw not established

The Board offered a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason: the State revoked the grant, and the Superintendent, on recommendation of the Chief Academic Officer, eliminated the entire Adult Education Program. The record showed that Williams was the only full-time tenured teacher exclusively at Messick; other full-time teachers retained positions elsewhere in the district. This evenhanded program shutdown defeated the “no basis in fact” pretext theory.

The cat’s paw theory failed because there was no evidence that the asserted biases of the Messick principal and Labor Relations Director proximately caused the Superintendent’s decision to shutter the program or to issue Williams’s termination. The Superintendent testified he was unaware of Williams’s grant-reporting activities at the time and relied on academic leadership’s recommendation to close the program. Consequently, both the Title VII retaliation and the TPPA (which requires “sole cause”) claims failed.

Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

1) Tennessee Tenure Act practice

• No monetary remedy for list violations: Under the current statute, courts are unlikely to award backpay solely for failure to place an excessed teacher on the reemployment list. Remedies remain available for unlawful terminations (e.g., pre-ratification periods), but post-ratification list errors do not translate into salary awards absent express statutory authorization.
• Amendments matter: The 2014 changes stripping “preferred list” and “first vacancy” language, and empowering principals to refuse excessed teachers, substantially reduce the remedial leverage that teachers once had under pre-2014 law.
• Board ratification remains critical: Delays in board ratification can expose districts to backpay for the pre-ratification period. Timely compliance with § 49-5-511’s procedural requirements is essential.

2) § 1983 municipal liability and procedural due process

• Final policymaker exposure: School districts that assign a superintendent final and unreviewed authority to implement statutory employment processes (like reemployment lists) may face Monell liability when that authority is exercised in a way that deprives employees of protected interests without adequate process.
• Carey’s nominal damages rule reaffirmed: Courts cannot dispose of procedural-due-process claims for lack of “actual injury”; liability may attach with nominal damages even absent proof of compensable harm. Plaintiffs who can prove causation may still pursue compensatory damages for lost opportunities, reputational harm, or other tort-like injuries.
• Unsettled property-interest question: Whether a right to placement on the reemployment list constitutes a protected property interest under the Due Process Clause remains open in the Sixth Circuit (as flagged by the concurrence). Future cases will likely litigate this threshold question.

3) Title VII retaliation and programmatic closures

• Program eliminations are potent defenses: Where funding loss prompts across-the-board program shutdowns, plaintiffs must present evidence that the proffered reason is pretextual in fact, causation, or sufficiency, not merely that they were among those terminated.
• Cat’s paw requires proximate cause: Plaintiffs should build a record connecting a biased subordinate’s actions to the ultimate decisionmaker, with evidence that the bias materially influenced the termination decision, not only post-termination events like rehire efforts.
• Exhaustion matters: Failure-to-rehire retaliation theories typically require EEOC exhaustion distinct from termination claims; omissions can narrow the case significantly.