No Affirmative Duty to Itemize Copying Costs When Requiring Prepayment Under Ohio Public Records Act; Crisis-Precaution Form Not Shown to Be an Exempt “Medical Record”

1. Introduction

State ex rel. Mobley v. Banks, Interim Dir., Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2525 (Ohio July 7, 2026), is a public-records mandamus action arising from an inmate’s written request to the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”). Relator Alphonso Mobley Jr., incarcerated in an ODRC institution, sought paper copies of four categories of records: (1) emails between corrections officers concerning him, (2) a “Certificate of Disposal,” (3) an “Authorization for Crisis Precaution,” and (4) “Mental Health Protocol I-8.”

The institutional public-information officer and records custodian, Jason Ware, responded in three ways: (i) he agreed to provide the emails and protocol if Mobley paid copying costs in advance, (ii) he stated the crisis-precaution authorization was not a public record (asserting a medical-record exemption), and (iii) he sought the certificate of disposal “through OSC,” later learning no responsive certificate existed. Mobley did not pay, did not ask the cost, and did not continue the dialogue; he instead filed in the Supreme Court of Ohio seeking (a) a writ compelling production of all items and (b) statutory damages.

The central issues were: (1) whether the “Authorization for Crisis Precaution” qualifies as an exempt inmate “medical record” under R.C. 5120.21(C)(1); (2) whether ODRC complied with R.C. 149.43 by offering to provide certain records upon prepayment without proactively stating the copying costs; (3) whether Mobley proved the “Certificate of Disposal” exists; and (4) whether statutory damages should be awarded despite partial noncompliance.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court (DeWine, J.) granted the writ in part and denied it in part:

  • Writ granted as to the Authorization for Crisis Precaution: ODRC failed to carry its burden to prove the form is an exempt “medical record” under R.C. 5120.21(C)(1) because, even if it pertained to a medical condition, the evidence did not show it was “generated and maintained in the process of medical treatment.”
  • Writ denied as to the requested emails and Mental Health Protocol I-8: Ware complied with the Public Records Act by informing Mobley the records would be provided upon advance payment of copying costs. The Act imposes no affirmative duty on the public office to provide a statement of copying costs at the time it advises that prepayment is required; the requester must cooperate by following up (e.g., asking “How much?”).
  • Writ denied as to the Certificate of Disposal: Mobley failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the record exists and is maintained by ODRC.
  • Statutory damages denied: Although the exemption claim was incorrect, it was deemed reasonable and consistent with the public policy behind the medical-record protections, satisfying the statutory grounds to reduce/deny damages.

Kennedy, C.J. concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing the Public Records Act’s structure necessarily requires the custodian to communicate the copying and delivery costs when prepayment is required, relying on State ex rel. Ware v. Akron and State ex rel. Clark v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. Brunner, J. also would have granted the writ as to emails/protocol and awarded statutory damages.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Mandamus standards and Public Records Act framework

  • Wells v. Lakota Local Schools Bd. of Edn., 2024-Ohio-3316: Cited for the basic proposition that mandamus is a proper mechanism to compel compliance with the Public Records Act and for the statutory baseline that copies must be made available “at cost” and within a reasonable time.
  • State ex rel. McDougald v. Sehlmeyer, 2020-Ohio-4428: Plays a controlling role on the “copying costs” dispute. The court uses McDougald for both (i) the “clear legal right/duty” mandamus standard and (ii) the principle that when a custodian responds that copies are available upon payment, the requester who fails to follow up to learn the cost cannot show noncompliance. The majority explicitly “followed” McDougald and treated it as dispositive against Mobley’s argument that he was entitled to a cost statement without further inquiry.

B. Burdens and interpretive approach to exemptions

  • State ex rel. GateHouse Media Ohio Holdings II, Inc. v. Columbus Police Dept., 2025-Ohio-5243 and Welsh-Huggins v. Jefferson Cty. Prosecutor's Office, 2020-Ohio-5371: Used to assign the burden of proof to the public office when it withholds records under a statutory exemption, and to emphasize that the court’s task is to apply the enacted text fairly.
  • Stingray Pressure Pumping, L.L.C. v. Harris, 2023-Ohio-2598: Quoted (through GateHouse) for the “fair reading” approach—interpretation anchored in the statute’s plain language rather than a tilt toward disclosure or secrecy beyond what the legislature wrote.

C. Defining “medical record” and applying the two-prong test

  • State ex rel. Baker v. Treglia, 2025-Ohio-2816 and State ex rel. O'Shea & Assocs. Co., L.P.A. v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 2012-Ohio-115: These cases supply the key doctrinal tool: the “medical record” definition has two requirements—(1) it pertains to medical history/diagnosis/prognosis/condition, and (2) it is generated and maintained in the process of medical treatment. The court applied that framework and found ODRC’s showing failed on prong two.
  • State ex rel. Multimedia, Inc. v. Snowden, 1995-Ohio-248: Cited for the proposition that “medical” can include psychologists’ work—supporting ODRC’s argument in principle that mental-health-related materials might qualify, but ultimately not rescuing ODRC because the evidentiary link to “medical treatment” was missing.

D. Cooperation and requester obligations

  • State ex rel. Morgan v. Strickland, 2009-Ohio-1901 and State ex rel. DiFranco v. S. Euclid, 2015-Ohio-4914: These cases support the majority’s “cooperation” lens: the Act contemplates cooperative fulfillment, and requesters should inform the agency when they believe a response is incomplete or slow. The majority uses them to place a practical follow-up obligation on requesters once a custodian has timely indicated prepayment is required.

E. Cost-invoice discussions: limiting and distinguishing prior decisions

  • State ex rel. Ware v. Akron, 2021-Ohio-624: The court noted Akron’s criticism of failing to include invoices, but characterized the legal violation there as the nine-month delay in responding “within a reasonable period of time,” not as a standalone duty to proactively provide a cost statement in all circumstances.
  • State ex rel. Clark v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2025-Ohio-895: Distinguished on the facts: in Clark, the institution never affirmatively offered production upon payment in the way Ware did here. The majority treats “offering to provide upon payment” as materially different from nonresponsive or misdirecting communications and stresses that “offering upon payment” is not a denial.
  • State ex rel. Mayrides v. Whitehall, 62 Ohio App.3d 225 and State ex rel. Call v. Fragale, 2004-Ohio-6589: Addressed primarily to rebut the dissent’s position. Mayrides was distinguished because the requester explicitly asked for an estimate/bill in his initial request; Call was distinguished because it did not decide whether specifying costs up front is required as a matter of duty.

F. “No record exists” burden

  • State ex rel. Culgan v. Jefferson Cty. Prosecutor, 2024-Ohio-4715: Establishes the relator’s burden once the office attests no responsive records exist: the relator must prove existence and maintenance by clear and convincing evidence. Mobley offered no proof to counter ODRC’s nonexistence showing.

G. Statutory damages discretion/reduction

  • State ex rel. Meyers v. Myers, 2022-Ohio-1915: Used as a contrast point: where on-point case law makes denial unreasonable, courts may not reduce damages. Here, by contrast, the issue was novel and “a close call.”

H. Textual restraint: not adding duties not “written” into the statute

  • TWISM Ents., L.L.C., v. State Bd. of Registration for Professional Engineers & Surveyors, 2022-Ohio-4677 and Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Porterfield, 24 Ohio St.2d 24: These cases supply a broader methodological premise: courts should not imply statutory requirements that the legislature did not write. The majority uses them to reject the dissent’s proposed implied duty to proactively calculate and send a cost invoice.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The crisis-precaution form: why ODRC failed the exemption burden

The court’s analysis tracks the statutory definition of “medical record” in R.C. 5120.21(C)(1): it is not enough that a document relates to a medical condition; it must also be “generated and maintained in the process of medical treatment.” The court accepted that the form might “touch upon” medical history or condition (prong one), but focused on the lack of evidence for prong two.

Two facts were decisive:

  • The form was completed by a captain (non-medical staff), making it nonobvious on its face as “generated” in treatment as opposed to security observation/management.
  • ODRC did not submit evidence showing the constant watch necessarily led to or was part of actual medical/mental-health treatment (e.g., a subsequent behavioral-health evaluation or a protocol requiring such an evaluation before removal).

The court’s approach effectively requires agencies invoking medical-record exemptions for hybrid “security/clinical interface” forms to provide process evidence: how the document functions within treatment workflows, and whether it is maintained as part of treatment records rather than purely custody records.

B. Emails and protocol: compliance by conditional production and the “no affirmative duty” rule

The opinion squarely addresses a recurring public-records friction point: whether a custodian who invokes R.C. 149.43(B)(6) (prepayment allowed) must also proactively provide a copying-cost statement without prompting.

The majority’s rule is straightforward:

  • A timely response that records are available “at cost” and will be produced upon prepayment can be a “complete response” under State ex rel. McDougald v. Sehlmeyer.
  • The Public Records Act does not impose an affirmative duty to include a “statement of copying costs” at the time the custodian informs the requester that prepayment is required.
  • The statute anticipates a practical dialogue; therefore, a requester must cooperate by following up to clarify cost and logistics when needed.

Critically, the court framed the dissent’s position as an attempt to add an invoice-calculation duty not written into the statute. The majority treated its own reading as both textual and consistent with cooperation principles: the custodian must respond and offer production at cost; the requester must respond if he wants to proceed.

C. Certificate of disposal: nonexistence ends the mandamus claim

Once Ware attested (as relayed) that no responsive certificate exists due to retention/disposal rules, the burden shifted under State ex rel. Culgan v. Jefferson Cty. Prosecutor. Mobley did not produce evidence that such a certificate exists or is maintained by ODRC; mandamus cannot compel production of a nonexistent record.

D. Statutory damages: violation found, but damages denied as reasonable and policy-serving

The court recognized that the denial of the crisis-precaution form was a Public Records Act violation, but applied the statutory “safe harbor” concept: damages may be denied if a well-informed public office would not view the conduct as a failure and would view it as serving the relevant public policy. The court reasoned:

  • The exemption question was “a close call,” with no directly governing precedent, making the exemption assertion reasonable.
  • The policy behind R.C. 5120.21 is protecting sensitive inmate medical information and controlling direct inmate access; Ware’s instinct to treat the form as protected aligned with that policy, even though ODRC failed to prove the exemption’s elements on this record.

3.3 Impact

A. Public-records administration: strengthened reliance on McDougald for cost communications

The opinion solidifies a practical rule for Ohio custodians: a timely notice that records will be provided upon prepayment can satisfy R.C. 149.43(B) without an upfront cost invoice. It also places litigation risk on requesters who stop the process after a prepayment notice and do not follow up about the amount.

B. Prison records and medical-record exemptions: evidentiary rigor for “generated and maintained”

For ODRC and similarly situated agencies, the decision signals that asserting “medical record” for documents initiated by custody staff (even for suicidal ideation/constant-watch situations) requires proof that the document is part of the treatment process—e.g., integrated maintenance in clinical charts, required review by mental-health professionals, or mandated follow-on clinical assessment.

C. Statutory damages: agencies may avoid damages even when they lose, if the position is close and policy-aligned

The damages analysis may incentivize public offices to make policy-grounded exemption assertions while developing an evidentiary record. At the same time, it may reduce deterrence where the requester proves entitlement but the office’s mistake is deemed reasonable.

D. Doctrinal tension remains: majority vs. dissent on “invoice duty”

The partial dissents (especially Kennedy, C.J.) highlight an unresolved tension in Ohio public-records practice: whether Ware v. Akron and Clark imply a general duty to communicate costs when prepayment is required. The majority’s narrowing of those cases may influence future litigation over what counts as a “complete response,” particularly where the custodian’s communication is less clear than Ware’s here.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Mandamus: A court order compelling a public official to perform a clear legal duty. In public-records cases, it is used to compel production when the law clearly requires it.
  • Public record (Ohio): Government records are generally open unless a specific statutory exemption applies. The Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, governs access and timing.
  • Medical-record exemption (two-part test): A document is a “medical record” only if it (1) pertains to medical history/diagnosis/prognosis/condition and (2) was generated and maintained as part of medical treatment. Failing either prong defeats the exemption.
  • In camera review: The court privately reviews a disputed record (often under seal) to evaluate exemption claims without public disclosure.
  • Clear and convincing evidence: A high level of proof—more than “more likely than not,” less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
  • Statutory damages (public records): A monetary remedy available when a public office fails to comply with duties under the Public Records Act, but Ohio law allows reduction/denial when the office’s stance was reasonable and policy-serving.
  • Prepayment of copying costs: The Act allows offices to charge “at cost” and to require advance payment. Here, the majority held the office need not proactively supply the exact amount without a requester’s follow-up.

5. Conclusion

State ex rel. Mobley v. Banks, Interim Dir. yields two practical takeaways for Ohio public-records law. First, when an agency claims an inmate record is a “medical record,” it must prove not only that the document concerns a medical condition, but also that it was generated and maintained in the course of medical treatment; failing that evidentiary showing defeats the exemption and compels disclosure. Second, the Supreme Court of Ohio reaffirmed—by following State ex rel. McDougald v. Sehlmeyer—that the Public Records Act imposes no affirmative duty to provide an itemized copying-cost statement merely because the office requires prepayment; requesters must cooperate by following up to determine the amount. Even where the office violates the Act, statutory damages may be denied if the office’s position was reasonable and aligned with the policy of the asserted exemption.