No ADA/Section 504 Requirement for an IDEA-Style Manifestation Determination Before Denying Transfer Reenrollment; Title IX Claim Waived When Omitted from Statement of Claims

I. Introduction

E.W. v. Mt. Vernon Community School Corporation (7th Cir. Sept. 8, 2026) addresses how disability-accommodation duties under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act intersect with a public school district’s discretion—under Indiana law and its own transfer policy—to deny reenrollment to a nonresident “transfer” student who accumulates ten or more out-of-school suspension days in one school year.

The plaintiffs, E.W. (a minor proceeding pseudonymously) and her father B.W., alleged that the district denied E.W.’s ninth-grade transfer reenrollment because of her disability (depression and anxiety) and retaliated against the family for requesting disability-related procedures and accommodations. They also pleaded a Title IX sex-discrimination claim, tied in part to the school’s response to sexual harassment by a male student.

The key appellate issues were:

  • Whether the Title IX claim was properly dismissed as waived/abandoned due to noncompliance with local case-management requirements.
  • Whether the school failed to provide reasonable accommodations under the ADA/Section 504 by declining to hold a requested manifestation-determination meeting before denying transfer reenrollment.
  • Whether the reenrollment denial constituted retaliation for protected accommodation-related activity.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the school corporation.

  • Title IX: The claim was waived/abandoned because plaintiffs omitted it from the required statement of claims under the Southern District of Indiana’s local practice; dismissal for noncompliance was not an abuse of discretion.
  • ADA/Section 504 (failure to accommodate): Plaintiffs identified no authority requiring an IDEA-style manifestation-determination meeting as an ADA/Section 504 accommodation before denying transfer reenrollment. Independently, the record showed extensive accommodations via a Section 504 Plan and Safety Plan, negating deliberate indifference.
  • Retaliation: The district had a legitimate, non-pretextual reason—E.W.’s ten out-of-school suspension days (and absences)—expressly recognized by the Transfer Policy and Ind. Code § 20-26-11-32(i). Temporal proximity was insufficient given prior warnings and the disciplinary record, and plaintiffs did not show the school’s explanation was a lie.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Standards of review and summary judgment posture

  • Taylor v. Schwarzhuber, 132 F.4th 480 (7th Cir. 2025): Cited for the rule that on summary judgment the court views facts and inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. This framing mattered because plaintiffs argued the district court drew improper inferences (e.g., labeling absences “unexcused”).
  • Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2014): Reinforced de novo review of summary judgment with favorable inferences to the nonmovant.

2) Enforcing local rules and waiver/abandonment of claims

  • Hinterberger v. City of Indianapolis, 966 F.3d 523 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Friend v. Valley View Community School District 365U, 789 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2015)): Used to support the principle that district courts may require strict compliance with local rules and to set an abuse-of-discretion standard for dismissals based on procedural noncompliance.
  • Cichon v. Exelon Generation Co., 401 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2005): Provided the deference rationale—“considerable weight”—to how district courts apply their local rules.
  • Dysland v. Shetler Moving & Storage, Inc., No. 3:21-cv-00004, 2022 WL 18540516 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 7, 2022): Cited as an example of the Southern District of Indiana’s consistent practice treating claims omitted from the statement of claims as abandoned/waived.
  • Zemlick v. Burkhart, 164 F.4th 1004 (7th Cir. 2026): Confirmed the Seventh Circuit’s willingness to affirm that local practice; it functioned as the most direct appellate endorsement for affirmance here.

3) ADA/Section 504 alignment and the operative intent standard for damages

  • Radaszewski ex rel. Radaszewski v. Maram, 383 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 2004): Anchored the court’s approach of construing the ADA and Section 504 consistently due to near-identical protections.
  • A.J.T. ex rel. A.T. v. Osseo Area Schools Independent School District No. 279, 605 U.S. 335 (2025): The centerpiece for intent: in school disability-discrimination damages actions, plaintiffs must show deliberate indifference, not “ill will or animosity.” The opinion relied on A.J.T. to reject plaintiffs’ argument that the district court applied a heightened standard.
  • A.H. ex rel. Holzmueller v. Illinois High School Association, 881 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2018): Cited for the proposition that implementing regulations require reasonable accommodations, not any preferred accommodation. This supported the court’s refusal to treat a manifestation-determination meeting as mandatory under ADA/Section 504.

4) Retaliation framework under ADA/Section 504

  • Stanek v. St. Charles Community Unit School District No. 303, 783 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2015): Established that both statutes prohibit retaliation for exercising statutory rights.
  • Dickerson v. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 522, 657 F.3d 595 (7th Cir. 2011): Provided the direct/indirect proof structure and the burden-shifting sequence (protected activity → adverse action → causal connection → legitimate reason → pretext).
  • Cassimy v. Board of Education of Rockford Public Schools, District No. 205, 461 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 2006): Supported the move to the indirect method when there is no direct evidence of retaliation.
  • Koty v. DuPage County, Illinois, 900 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2018): Stated the three-element prima facie framework for retaliation and tied causation to “but-for” concepts.
  • Burton v. Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System, 851 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2017): Cited for the need to show pretext after the defendant offers a non-invidious reason.
  • Kotaska v. Federal Express Corp., 966 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2020): Used to emphasize but-for causation in the retaliation analysis.
  • Trahanas v. Northwestern University, 64 F.4th 842 (7th Cir. 2023): Supported that contacting an institution and asserting ADA rights qualifies as protected activity.

5) Timing, “suspicious timing,” and evidentiary rigor

  • Turner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2010): Invoked to show that even two months can be too attenuated to prove causation by timing alone; the court treated plaintiffs’ “less than a month” argument as insufficient given context.
  • Taylor-Novotny v. Health Alliance Medical Plans, Inc., 772 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 2014): Used for the principle that suspicious timing is “particularly weak” where protected activity follows warnings about the same conduct that led to the adverse action.
  • Friend v. Valley View Community School District 365U, 789 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2015): Cited (again) for the rule that unsupported factual assertions do not defeat summary judgment.
  • Novak v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 777 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 2015): Emphasized that pretext requires showing the stated reason is a mistruth—“a lie”—not merely debatable or imperfectly explained.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Title IX: procedural waiver via local case-management rules

The court did not reach Title IX’s merits. Instead, it treated omission from the required “statement of claims” as abandonment/waiver, consistent with the Southern District of Indiana’s established practice and Seventh Circuit deference to local-rule enforcement.

Two features made affirmance easier: (i) the school repeatedly flagged waiver (including in summary-judgment briefing), and (ii) plaintiffs did not seek relief from strict compliance.

2) ADA/Section 504: no entitlement to an IDEA procedure, and accommodations were extensive

Plaintiffs’ principal accommodation theory was procedural: the school should have convened a manifestation-determination meeting to assess whether misconduct/absences were disability-related before denying reenrollment. The panel rejected this as a matter of law because:

  • A manifestation determination is expressly identified as an IDEA procedure (the opinion cites 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(E)), and plaintiffs did not sue under IDEA.
  • Plaintiffs provided no ADA/Section 504 authority requiring that procedure as a “reasonable accommodation,” and the court found none.

The court then evaluated the concrete accommodations actually provided (Section 504 Plan and later amendments plus a Safety Plan) and concluded these measures constituted “reasonable modifications” under implementing regulations (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i) and § 41.53), defeating any inference of deliberate indifference under A.J.T.

Finally, the court treated causation/practicality as important: whatever the cause of E.W.’s absences, the record undisputedly showed ten out-of-school suspension days, which independently triggered the Transfer Policy’s eligibility bar.

3) Retaliation: legitimate statutory/policy basis and failure to show pretext

Even assuming protected activity and adverse action, plaintiffs had to show but-for causation and then pretext. The school’s stated reason—discipline and absences—was supported by:

  • The district’s Transfer Policy C125 (ten or more out-of-school suspension days; history of unexcused absences).
  • Ind. Code § 20-26-11-32(i) (authorizing denial/discontinuation when the student has been suspended for ten or more school days).

The court treated timing as insufficient in context, emphasizing that E.W.’s parents had been warned and E.W.’s disciplinary incidents continued. On pretext, the court emphasized that plaintiffs did not produce evidence that the school’s explanation was false; the ten suspension days alone were dispositive under the policy and statute.

C. Impact

1) Clarifying the boundary between ADA/Section 504 and IDEA procedures

The opinion signals that plaintiffs cannot automatically convert IDEA disciplinary safeguards (like manifestation determinations) into ADA/Section 504 “reasonable accommodations” without identifying a doctrinal basis requiring that procedural step. Practically, this limits attempts to repackage IDEA process claims as ADA/Section 504 damages actions when the suit is not brought under IDEA.

2) Transfer reenrollment as an “eligibility” decision with disability constraints—but not a blank check

The decision underscores that a public entity must make reasonable modifications, but a student must still meet “essential eligibility requirements” (the opinion quotes the ADA’s “qualified individual” definition). Where a neutral rule (here, the ten-suspension threshold) is clearly satisfied, reenrollment denial may stand absent evidence of deliberate indifference or discriminatory administration.

3) Litigation practice: local-rule compliance can be outcome-determinative

By affirming waiver of the Title IX claim, the opinion reinforces that claim-preservation requirements in case-management orders are not technicalities. In the Seventh Circuit (and particularly in the Southern District of Indiana), omitting a claim from the mandated statement of claims risks losing it entirely.

4) Retaliation: “suspicious timing” will not overcome documented, policy-grounded discipline

The panel’s use of timing precedents highlights that temporal proximity is weakest where the adverse action aligns with earlier warnings and continuing conduct. For schools, careful documentation of progressive discipline and policy triggers can be decisive; for plaintiffs, pretext requires evidence the reason is false, not merely unfair.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Section 504 Plan: A school-based plan providing accommodations so a student with a disability can access education comparably (e.g., breaks, testing modifications, counselor access). It is not the same as an IDEA IEP.
  • Reasonable accommodation / reasonable modification: Adjustments to rules/practices that enable access without fundamentally altering the program. The student is entitled to reasonable measures, not the accommodation of choice.
  • Deliberate indifference (A.J.T.): A demanding standard for damages—showing the school disregarded a strong likelihood that its actions would violate federally protected rights. It does not require hatred or animus.
  • Manifestation determination (IDEA): A specific IDEA procedure to determine whether misconduct is caused by, or substantially related to, the child’s disability. This opinion treats it as not automatically required under ADA/Section 504.
  • Pretext: In retaliation cases, it means the stated reason is a cover story—i.e., false. Showing the decision was harsh or debatable is not enough.
  • Summary judgment: A case can be decided without trial when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the moving party wins as a matter of law.

V. Conclusion

E.W. v. Mt. Vernon Community School Corporation crystallizes two practical rules in Seventh Circuit school litigation:

  • Procedure matters: claims omitted from a required statement of claims can be treated as waived, even if pleaded in the complaint.
  • ADA/Section 504 have limits: they require reasonable accommodations and forbid deliberate indifference, but they do not automatically import IDEA’s manifestation-determination process—especially where the school has implemented substantial accommodations and can point to a clear, non-pretextual policy-and-statute basis (here, ten out-of-school suspension days) for denying transfer reenrollment.