“No, I’m Willing to Listen” Is Not an Unequivocal Invocation of the Right to Remain Silent (and Rule 403 Redaction Requests Do Not Preserve Confrontation Clause Claims)

1. Introduction

This case arises from a cocaine-smuggling conspiracy in which bricks of cocaine were concealed in tubs of butter shipped from Haiti to Miami and then routed onward to Atlanta. After a controlled delivery and arrests, federal agents traced a Haitian contact’s coded message—listing drivers and quantities—to “Patizan,” later identified as defendant-appellant Amos Christolin.

Following his arrest, Christolin was advised of Miranda rights in Haitian Creole by Special Agent Jacque Philippe (a Haitian Creole “heritage learner”) using a Creole rights form. During the waiver exchange, Christolin responded to a question whether he was willing to speak with agents by saying: “No, I’m willing to listen!” Agents then clarified and continued; Christolin ultimately said “Yeah” and gave inculpatory statements.

On appeal, Christolin raised three principal issues:

• Whether “No, I’m willing to listen” was an unequivocal invocation of the right to remain silent requiring the interview to stop;
• Whether any waiver was unknowing or involuntary due to alleged limitations in SA Philippe’s Haitian Creole;
• Whether admitting SA Philippe’s translations through another agent (with a certified translation stipulated) violated the Confrontation Clause.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It held that:

• Christolin did not unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent by saying “No, I’m willing to listen,” and agents permissibly asked clarifying follow-up questions;
• His Miranda waiver was voluntary and knowing under the totality of circumstances, and SA Philippe’s translations were constitutionally sufficient;
• The Confrontation Clause argument was not preserved; review was for plain error, and any arguable error in presenting SA Philippe’s translation alongside the certified translation did not affect substantial rights.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Shape the Decision)

A. Invocation of the right to remain silent: clarity requirement

• Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966): Establishes the baseline warnings required before custodial interrogation and the suspect’s right to cut off questioning. Here, the court treated the dispute as one of invocation and waiver after warnings were given.
• Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994): Holds officers need not stop questioning when invocation is ambiguous or equivocal (in the counsel-invocation context), a principle the Eleventh Circuit applies to silence invocations as well.
• Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420 (11th Cir. 1994): Provides the Eleventh Circuit articulation: the suspect must communicate a desire to cut off questioning “with sufficient clarity” that a reasonable officer would understand it as an assertion of the right to remain silent.
• Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010): Reinforces the requirement that invocation be unambiguous; gives examples of “simple, unambiguous statements” sufficient to invoke (“I want to remain silent” / “I don’t want to talk”). The panel used Berghuis to frame what Christolin did not say.
• Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095 (11th Cir. 1995): Rejects a per se rule that a suspect’s “No” to “do you want to talk?” necessarily precludes further questioning. This precedent insulated the panel from treating the leading “No” in Christolin’s phrase as dispositive.
• United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141 (11th Cir. 2004): Explains ambiguity as “two reasonable, competing interpretations,” and holds certain “rights” language can be insufficient if followed by ambiguity. The court relied on Acosta to characterize “No, I’m willing to listen” as reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning.
• United States v. Washington, 462 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2006): A close factual analogue: after Miranda, the suspect said “I agree to listen.” The Eleventh Circuit found “no legal daylight” between “I agree to listen” and “No, I’m willing to listen,” and adopted Washington’s view that such language does not invoke the right to remain silent.
• Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1979): Authorizes clarifying questions to determine a suspect’s wishes when statements are unclear. The panel used Nash to justify agents’ follow-up clarification rather than immediate termination.

B. Validity of waiver: voluntariness + comprehension

• Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986): Supplies the canonical two-part test: (1) voluntariness (no coercion/overreaching), and (2) knowing and intelligent waiver (awareness of rights and consequences). The panel explicitly applied Burbine as the governing framework.
• United States v. Bernal-Benitez, 594 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2010): Lists totality-of-circumstances factors relevant to coercion (education, intelligence, length of detention, prolonged questioning, deprivation, etc.). Used to assess and reject claims of intimidation or coercion.
• Hall v. Thomas, 611 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2010): Emphasizes that even if voluntary, the prosecution must show the defendant understood the Miranda rights.
• Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986): Reaffirms that the Fifth Amendment voluntariness focus is “governmental coercion,” not merely internal limitations of the suspect. Helped the panel narrow voluntariness to police overreaching, which it found absent.
• United States v. Youte, 769 F. App'x 685 (11th Cir. 2019): Prior Eleventh Circuit case also involving SA Philippe’s Haitian Creole Miranda translations; held “inelegant” phrasing can still be constitutionally sufficient if it reasonably conveys the rights. The panel treated Youte as strongly supportive that SA Philippe’s translations here were adequate.
• Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285 (2017): Cited for the deference owed to plausible trial-court fact findings under clear-error review, supporting the district court’s view that no threatening tone or overreach occurred.

C. Confrontation Clause, translations, and error preservation

• United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2013): Holds an interpreter’s statements relaying what the defendant said can be “testimonial,” and admission through a different witness can violate the Confrontation Clause. Christolin leaned on Charles; the panel distinguished the posture (plain-error review; stipulation to certified translation; no showing of prejudice).
• Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004): Establishes that “testimonial” hearsay is inadmissible unless the declarant is unavailable and there was a prior opportunity to cross-examine. The opinion invoked Crawford largely through the district court’s discussion and the Criminal Handbook excerpt.
• United States v. Curbelo, 726 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2013): Discussed in the Handbook excerpt for the proposition that Confrontation concerns may be alleviated if another witness can attest to the translation’s accuracy—though the panel’s decision ultimately rested on preservation/plain-error and lack of prejudice.
• United States v. Stephens, 609 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1980): Establishes that counsel may waive confrontation rights by stipulating to admission of evidence. Here, the certified translation’s accuracy was stipulated, undercutting confrontation concerns as to that certified transcript.
• Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 589 U.S. 169 (2020): Discusses preservation under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51—either by asking for the action desired or by objecting and stating grounds. The court held Christolin’s Rule 403-based redaction request did not preserve a Confrontation Clause claim (because it did not state that constitutional ground).
• United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597 (2013) and United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993): Provide the plain-error standard, including the requirement that error affect substantial rights and, even then, discretionary correction only if fairness/integrity/public reputation is seriously affected.
• United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. 2009): Supplies the “substantial impact upon the verdict” formulation for prejudice from evidentiary error, applied to reject relief due to lack of material discrepancy and lack of articulated prejudice.
• United States v. Touray, 151 F.4th 1317 (11th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Horn, 129 F.4th 1275 (11th Cir. 2025): Cited by Christolin to argue preservation; the panel rejected that analogy because his objection was framed as confusion/duplication, not confrontation.
• United States v. Gari, 572 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2009) and United States v. Jiminez, 564 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2009): Set review standards for Confrontation Clause claims (de novo if preserved; plain error if not).
• United States v. Ford, 784 F.3d 1386 (11th Cir. 2015): Provides mixed standard for suppression rulings (clear error for facts; de novo for law application).

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Why “No, I’m willing to listen” was not an invocation

The court’s analysis treats invocation as a speech-act with legal consequences: to trigger the duty to stop questioning, the suspect must express a clear desire to cut off questioning. The phrase “I’m willing to listen” communicates receptivity to continued interaction, at least to hearing what agents have to say. Adding “No” at the front did not, in the panel’s view, convert the sentence into a clear refusal to speak; rather, it produced an ambiguous utterance: refusal to speak now versus willingness to listen and perhaps respond after clarification.

The panel then validates the officers’ approach: rather than pressing substantively, they clarified the suspect’s intent (“I am asking if you want to speak with us...”), explained the waiver-signature step, and reiterated he could stop at any time. That clarifying dialogue—endorsed by Nash v. Estelle—was central to affirmance.

B. Why the waiver was voluntary

On voluntariness, the opinion emphasizes the absence of “threatening tonality,” intimidation, deception, physical deprivation, or prolonged coercive conditions. Even if the phrasing felt directive, the court found the record showed clarification, not compulsion. This reasoning tracks Moran v. Burbine and Colorado v. Connelly: the constitutional concern is government overreaching, and the court found none.

C. Why the waiver was knowing despite translation concerns

The knowing/intelligent prong turned on whether the warnings “reasonably conveyed” the rights and whether Christolin understood he could remain silent, request counsel, and that statements could be used against him. The panel leaned on:

• Use of a Haitian Creole Miranda form and Christolin’s initials after each right;
• His repeated acknowledgments of understanding;
• Midstream clarification when he expressed confusion (“I don’t fully understand this...”), with SA Philippe re-explaining using an English form as an aid;
• Evidence that Christolin understood key English words in context (e.g., “Who uses this phone?” “Me.”), undermining the argument that isolated English terms defeated comprehension.

The court’s treatment of SA Philippe’s Haitian Creole ability is pragmatic: linguistic imperfections do not equal constitutional inadequacy so long as the warnings functionally communicate the required rights (consistent with United States v. Youte).

D. Confrontation Clause: preservation first, then prejudice

The opinion is notably rigorous about issue preservation. Christolin sought redaction primarily on the theory that dual translations were repetitive/duplicative/confusing (a classic Rule 403 frame). The court held that such a request does not preserve a distinct Sixth Amendment challenge unless the constitutional ground is articulated—an application of Holguin-Hernandez v. United States and Rule 51’s requirement to inform the court of the grounds for an objection when objecting, or to request the specific action on the relevant basis.

On the merits under plain-error review, the panel acknowledged a potential doctrinal tension: United States v. Charles labels translations testimonial, and SA Philippe did not testify. Still, the panel found no reversible plain error because:

• The certified translation’s accuracy was stipulated, and any confrontation problem as to that certified translation was thereby waived (per United States v. Stephens);
• The jury received a limiting instruction cautioning that SA Philippe’s contemporaneous remarks were not verbatim translations (even though the panel suggested the instruction might not perfectly frame hearsay/“truth” limitations);
• Most importantly, Christolin failed to show that any differences between SA Philippe’s translation and the certified translation had a substantial impact on the verdict, as required by United States v. Docampo.

3.3. Impact

Although “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the opinion’s reasoning is likely to be influential in three recurring litigation areas:

• Invocation-by-ambiguous phrasing in multilingual interrogations: The decision reinforces that statements indicating willingness to “listen” do not, without more, cut off questioning, and that agents may clarify rather than terminate—especially where the suspect’s phrasing plausibly reflects a desire to hear context before deciding.
• Translation adequacy under Miranda: The case underscores that courts will focus on functional comprehension rather than linguistic elegance, particularly where the suspect confirms understanding, initials a form, and confusion is addressed promptly.
• Trial objections: Rule 403 vs. Confrontation Clause: The opinion is a cautionary guide: a motion to redact for “duplicative/confusing” content will not preserve a Crawford/Charles confrontation claim. Practitioners must expressly raise the Sixth Amendment ground (and, often, hearsay) to avoid plain-error review.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Unequivocal invocation”: You must clearly say you want to stop talking (e.g., “I don’t want to talk,” “I want to remain silent”). If your words can reasonably mean more than one thing, police may keep going or ask clarifying questions.
• “Voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver”: “Voluntary” means no coercion or improper pressure by police. “Knowing and intelligent” means you understood the rights and what giving them up means.
• “Testimonial” (Confrontation Clause): Statements made for evidentiary use in a criminal case generally can’t be introduced through someone else unless the speaker can be cross-examined (subject to limited exceptions).
• “Preservation” and “plain error”: If you don’t raise the right legal reason at trial, appellate courts apply a much harder-to-win standard (plain error), requiring clear mistake plus actual prejudice.
• “Stipulation”: If the defense agrees that a transcript/translation is accurate, it can waive later confrontation arguments about that item.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Amos Christolin reaffirms a strict clarity rule for invoking the right to remain silent: saying “No, I’m willing to listen” is not a clear demand to stop interrogation, and officers may ask follow-up questions to clarify intent. The opinion also illustrates a pragmatic approach to multilingual Miranda administration—imperfect translation does not invalidate a waiver absent meaningful failure to convey rights or actual misunderstanding. Finally, the decision highlights the procedural discipline required to litigate Confrontation Clause issues: objections framed as Rule 403 “confusion/duplication” will not preserve a Sixth Amendment claim, leaving defendants to the steep hill of plain-error review.