NLRA § 161(2) Is a Venue Provision (Not Subject-Matter Jurisdiction) and § 161(5) Authorizes Nationwide Service for NLRB Subpoena Enforcement

I. Introduction

In Nat'l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Universal Smart Conts., LLC (2d Cir. Feb. 3, 2026), the Second Circuit reviewed an order from the Southern District of New York enforcing four NLRB administrative subpoenas duces tecum and awarding the NLRB attorneys’ fees and costs. The respondents—Universal Smart Contracts, LLC; Party Shuttle Tours, LLC; City Info Experts, LLC; and Charles Thomas Schmidt—challenged the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and venue, sought transfer to the Southern District of Texas, and contested both the entitlement to and the amount of fees and costs.

The subpoenas arose from a long-running NLRA matter stemming from the termination of New York City tour guide Fred Pflantzer by non-party New York Party Shuttle, LLC. After the Board’s merits and compliance determinations and Fifth Circuit review (N.Y. Party Shuttle, L.L.C. v. Nat'l Lab. Rels. Bd.), the NLRB pursued derivative-liability information to enforce the judgment. The central legal issues on appeal were: (1) whether 29 U.S.C. § 161(2)’s geographic language limits subject-matter jurisdiction or instead addresses venue; (2) whether the NLRA authorizes nationwide service and personal jurisdiction for subpoena enforcement; (3) whether service via an order to show cause (without a summons) is sufficient; (4) whether denial of transfer was an abuse of discretion; and (5) whether, and to what extent, the attorneys’ fee rulings were appealable.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit held:

  • Subject-matter jurisdiction: The district court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345; the geographic language in § 161(2) is not jurisdictional.
  • Venue: Venue was proper in the Southern District of New York because the relevant “inquiry” was “carried on” there within the meaning of § 161(2), notwithstanding the Contempt Branch’s involvement from Washington, D.C.
  • Personal jurisdiction: Service of the application and the district court’s order to show cause was procedurally adequate; § 161(5) authorizes nationwide service of process; and due process was satisfied because respondents were U.S. residents and failed to show extreme unfairness.
  • Transfer: The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying transfer to the Southern District of Texas under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
  • Fees and costs: The court affirmed the district court’s liability determination awarding fees and costs, but dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction the challenge to the later order fixing the amount because respondents did not file (or amend) a timely notice of appeal from that subsequent quantification order.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Jurisdictional labeling: separating “jurisdiction” from venue and remedial power

  • Boechler, P.C. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue: The court applied the Supreme Court’s rule that procedural requirements are not treated as jurisdictional absent a clear statement from Congress. This underwrote the Second Circuit’s refusal to treat § 161(2)’s geographic limitations as subject-matter jurisdiction.
  • Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't: Quoted for the proposition that “jurisdiction” has many meanings and that subject-matter jurisdiction concerns the court’s power to adjudicate a case. The Second Circuit used Steel Co. to explain that § 161(2)’s “jurisdiction” references are geographic (venue) and remedial (power to issue an enforcement order), not subject-matter jurisdiction.
  • United States v. Ortiz and Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick: These supported the idea that references to “jurisdiction” can denote geographic scope and do not necessarily speak to subject-matter jurisdiction.
  • Main St. Legal Servs., Inc. v. Nat'l Sec. Council: By analogy to FOIA’s enforcement provision, the court treated statutory “has jurisdiction to enjoin” language as conferring remedial authority, not subject-matter jurisdiction.
  • Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki and Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.: Cited to explain the Supreme Court’s modern discipline around “jurisdictional” terminology and to discount older “drive-by jurisdictional rulings.”
  • Nat'l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Line: The Second Circuit acknowledged that some courts have suggested § 161(2) is jurisdictional, but treated such authorities as largely predating the Supreme Court’s clarified approach.

2. Locating where an NLRB “inquiry is carried on” for § 161(2) venue

  • Nat'l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co.: Used as a key comparator on how to locate the “inquiry”—with the majority looking to the subject matter rather than an agency “command center,” and the dissent urging a broader view tied to the investigating office. The Second Circuit found venue proper under either framing given the Manhattan Regional Office’s role and the New York-centered underlying matter.

3. Service and personal jurisdiction in federal subpoena-enforcement proceedings

  • Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. and Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co.: Murphy Bros. supplied the principle that a summons or “other authority-asserting measure” is necessary; Mullane supported the constitutional sufficiency of notice reasonably calculated to apprise parties of proceedings. The order to show cause satisfied these functions.
  • Kidder, Peabody & Co. v. Maxus Energy Corp.: Central to the holding that § 161(5)’s “resides or may be found” language authorizes nationwide service of process, mirroring Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act.
  • Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A. and Mariash v. Morrill: These shaped the due process analysis where nationwide service exists: the relevant sovereign is the United States, and U.S. residency generally supplies the minimum contacts; forum-state contacts are not dispositive.
  • Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, and Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL (both 2012 and 2013 decisions): Used to articulate the “reasonableness” limitation—jurisdiction may still be unconstitutional if litigation is so gravely difficult and inconvenient as to be fundamentally unfair. The respondents’ conclusory burden arguments failed this standard.

4. Transfer and fee awards

  • N.Y. Marine & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc.: Provided the § 1404(a) transfer-factor framework and the “strong case for transfer” burden.
  • McDaniel v. County of Schenectady and D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener: Cited for abuse-of-discretion review of fee awards and transfer decisions.

5. Appellate jurisdiction over fee orders

  • O & G Indus., Inc. v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.: Established that a non-quantified fee award is not appealable until the amount is set.
  • Houbigant, Inc. v. IMG Fragrance Brands, LLC and Berlin v. Renaissance Rental Partners, LLC: Provided the doctrine that a premature notice of appeal can “ripen” once a final judgment enters, allowing review of the earlier liability determination.
  • United States v. Kwasnik: Supported the rule that a notice of appeal cannot encompass later orders resolving motions filed after the notice.
  • Bowles v. Russell: Reinforced the strict jurisdictional nature of the time limits to appeal; failure to timely appeal the quantification order barred review.
  • Marquez v. Silver: Cited for the court’s independent obligation to examine its own jurisdiction.

6. Forfeiture of undeveloped arguments

  • Palin v. N.Y. Times Co.: Used to deem forfeited any request for remand to litigate substantive subpoena objections where appellants did not develop the argument.

7. Underlying labor dispute and compliance lineage

  • N.Y. Party Shuttle, LLC & Fred Pflantzer: The foundational Board decision finding unlawful termination and ordering make-whole relief and reinstatement.
  • N.Y. Party Shuttle, LLC, No. 02-CA-073340, 2020 WL 5658307: The Board’s single-employer/affiliate liability compliance decision regarding backpay.
  • N.Y. Party Shuttle, L.L.C. v. Nat'l Lab. Rels. Bd.: Fifth Circuit review affirming most of the Board’s order and reducing the award.
  • N.Y. Party Shuttle, LLC Emp. & Fred Pflantzer an Individual, No. 02-CA-073340, 2012 WL 4174865: Noted as the underlying unfair-labor-practice hearing venue locus.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. § 161(2): venue constraint, not a subject-matter jurisdiction limit

The court’s most consequential analytic move is characterizing § 161(2)’s geographic clauses (“within the jurisdiction of which the inquiry is carried on” or where the contumacious person “is found or resides or transacts business”) as venue specifications rather than subject-matter jurisdiction. Applying the Supreme Court’s clear-statement approach, the Second Circuit treated “jurisdiction” in § 161(2) as (i) a geographic descriptor and (ii) a statement of remedial authority (“jurisdiction to issue” an enforcement order), neither of which speaks to the court’s adjudicatory power in the Article III/§ 1331 sense. Subject-matter jurisdiction instead lay under 28 U.S.C. § 1345 because the NLRB (a federal agency) brought the enforcement action.

2. What counts as an “inquiry” and where it is “carried on”

On venue, the court read the “inquiry” broadly to include the NLRB’s continuing effort not only to determine an NLRA violation, but also to enforce the resulting order—including derivative-liability proceedings aimed at identifying additional entities potentially responsible for compliance. The Manhattan Regional Office’s investigation, the New York-based employment events, and New York-based administrative proceedings anchored the inquiry in the Southern District of New York. The later involvement of the Contempt Branch in Washington, D.C., was treated as intra-agency cooperation that did not sever the Southern District’s connection to the ongoing inquiry.

3. Service without a summons: order to show cause as an “authority-asserting measure”

The court held that serving the enforcement application and the district court’s order to show cause sufficed for procedural service. Constitutionally, the order to show cause provided clear notice and a commanded response date. Procedurally, the court relied on Rule 81(a)(5), which allows deviation from the usual summons requirement where “otherwise provided” by court order in federal-agency subpoena proceedings; here, the district court authorized that method of service.

4. Nationwide service under § 161(5) and Fifth Amendment due process

The court interpreted § 161(5) to authorize nationwide service, following Kidder, Peabody & Co. v. Maxus Energy Corp.’s reading of similar “may be found” language. That statutory conclusion drove the constitutional analysis: because the United States is the relevant sovereign, the due process “minimum contacts” inquiry is satisfied for U.S.-resident defendants. The court then performed the additional “reasonableness” check and found appellants’ hardship arguments too conclusory to constitute a “compelling case” of unfairness.

5. Transfer denial and the streamlined nature of subpoena enforcement

Applying the § 1404(a) factors, the Second Circuit emphasized modern electronic document transfer and appellants’ failure to identify witnesses whose presence in New York would be required in a summary subpoena-enforcement proceeding. The court treated burden assertions without concrete detail as inadequate to overcome the deference generally accorded to the NLRB’s chosen forum and to the district court’s case-management discretion.

6. Fees: entitlement vs. amount, and appellate timing traps

The Second Circuit drew a clean line between (i) the district court’s initial decision that the NLRB was entitled to fees and costs and (ii) the later quantification order. It affirmed the entitlement ruling as within the district court’s discretion, pointing to Rules 37 and 45 (as applied via Rule 81(a)(5)) and to factual findings that appellants repeatedly attempted to evade service and had multiple opportunities to comply.

On appellate jurisdiction, the court applied a two-step doctrine: a premature notice of appeal from a nonfinal fee-liability ruling can ripen once the amount is fixed, but that ripening does not automatically capture the later, separate order that sets the amount when that order arises from a motion filed after the notice. Without a timely new or amended notice of appeal, statutory deadlines barred review of the quantification.

C. Impact

  • Clarified framework for § 161(2): Treating the “inquiry is carried on” language as venue—not subject-matter jurisdiction—reduces dismissals framed as “jurisdictional” and shifts disputes into waivable/improper-venue analysis rather than nonwaivable power-to-adjudicate arguments.
  • Broader venue stability for NLRB enforcement: The decision supports venue in the district tied to the originating regional office and underlying unfair-labor-practice events, even when later compliance/derivative-liability work is performed elsewhere in the agency (e.g., Washington, D.C.).
  • Nationwide service and personal jurisdiction for subpoena enforcement: By squarely holding that § 161(5) authorizes nationwide service, the opinion strengthens the NLRB’s ability to compel production from out-of-state individuals and entities without litigating forum-state contacts.
  • Practical confirmation of order-to-show-cause service: The ruling validates a common subpoena-enforcement procedure, reducing technical challenges based on the absence of a summons where a court order sets appearance obligations and notice.
  • Fee exposure for obstruction: Although the NLRA does not itself authorize fees, the opinion signals that district courts may use the Federal Rules to shift fees and costs where subpoena targets evade service or resist compliance without adequate justification.
  • Appellate practice warning: Parties must file a new or amended notice of appeal after the fee amount is set; appealing only the initial entitlement ruling risks forfeiting any challenge to the actual dollar figure.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Subject-matter jurisdiction vs. venue: Subject-matter jurisdiction asks whether a federal court has power to hear the type of case at all; venue asks which federal district is the proper place to litigate. The court held § 161(2) addresses the latter.
  • Personal jurisdiction with nationwide service: When Congress authorizes nationwide service, the constitutional “minimum contacts” focus shifts from the forum state (New York) to the United States as a whole. U.S. residents ordinarily satisfy that baseline.
  • Order to show cause as process: A summons is the usual document commanding a defendant to appear. In special proceedings like agency subpoena enforcement, a court order to show cause can serve the same function if it provides notice and a response date.
  • Ripening of a premature notice of appeal: If you appeal too early (before a fee amount is set), the appeal may become valid later once the final order is entered. But that does not automatically let you challenge later, separate orders unless you timely file (or amend) a notice of appeal for them.
  • Derivative liability (as used here): The NLRB sought documents to assess whether parties other than the original employer could be responsible for satisfying the Board’s judgment (e.g., affiliates/successors/single-employer theories), as part of ongoing enforcement.

V. Conclusion

Nat'l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Universal Smart Conts., LLC delivers a structured set of enforcement-friendly rulings: § 161(2)’s geography is a venue rule, not a bar to subject-matter jurisdiction; the “inquiry” can remain anchored in the originating district despite later intra-agency involvement elsewhere; § 161(5) authorizes nationwide service supporting personal jurisdiction over U.S.-resident respondents; and fee liability may be imposed under the Federal Rules for evasive noncompliance. Equally important, the opinion underscores a strict appellate-jurisdiction principle: a party that wishes to challenge the amount of a fee award must timely appeal the quantification order, not merely the earlier entitlement ruling.