Nexus to Political Opinion in Domestic-Violence Asylum Claims Requires Evidence of Persecutor’s Imputation; Police Reporting Alone Is Insufficient (Second Circuit Summary Order)

1. Introduction

In Marquez-Serrano v. Bondi (2d Cir. Mar. 2, 2026) (summary order), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied a petition for review filed by Wendy Marquez-Serrano and her child, natives and citizens of Honduras, challenging a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision that affirmed an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) relief.

The central question that survived to judicial review was narrow: whether Marquez-Serrano proved the required nexus between harm (domestic-partner abuse) and a protected ground—specifically an actual or imputed political opinion framed as opposition to gender inequality and mistreatment of women in Honduras.

Other potential theories did not reach the merits in the Second Circuit because the petitioner did not brief them: she did not address her proposed “particular social group” theories or CAT claim, resulting in abandonment.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit denied the petition for review and held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination that Marquez-Serrano failed to establish a nexus between the abuse and a political opinion (actual or imputed).

Although the BIA acknowledged an IJ phrasing error—requiring that political opinion be “the” central reason rather than “one” central reason—the BIA concluded (and the Second Circuit agreed) that the claim failed anyway because the record contained no evidence that the abuser believed Marquez-Serrano held “ideals regarding gender inequality,” or otherwise attributed a political belief to her.

The court also rejected an argument that the BIA was required to remand because the Department of Homeland Security did not file an opposing brief on administrative appeal, noting the argument was inadequately developed and, in any event, unsupported by any rule.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005): Used for the review posture—when the BIA affirms but modifies, the court reviews the IJ decision as modified by the BIA, excluding grounds the BIA did not rely on. This framing narrowed the appellate inquiry to the political-opinion nexus issue actually preserved.
  • Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018): Cited for standards of review: factual findings under substantial evidence; legal questions and application of law to fact de novo. The panel applied substantial-evidence review to the BIA’s motive/nexus determination.
  • Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103, 105-06, 114-15 (2d Cir. 2022): Reinforced that the “one central reason” nexus standard applies not only to asylum but also to withholding of removal in the Second Circuit. This meant the nexus failure defeated both forms of relief.
  • Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 196-97 (2d Cir. 2014): Cited for two key propositions: (1) the applicant bears the burden to establish the protected ground and the nexus; and (2) nexus “depends on the views and motives of the persecutor.” The court used this to emphasize that generalized societal conditions cannot substitute for proof of the abuser’s motive.
  • Garcia-Aranda v. Garland, 53 F.4th 752, 757 (2d Cir. 2022): Provided the mixed-motive framework: even if multiple motives exist, a protected ground must be “at least one of the central reasons,” not a minor one. Here, the court found there was no evidentiary basis that political opinion was even a motive, central or otherwise.
  • Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 2005): The core nexus authority relied on: an applicant must show (directly or circumstantially) that the persecutor’s motive to persecute arises from the applicant’s political belief, not merely from the persecutor’s own views. The panel used it to reject “broader context” evidence absent proof of what the abuser attributed to the applicant. The case also supplied the rule that a “single conclusory sentence” is insufficient to raise an argument (used to dispose of the remand claim).
  • Chun Gao v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir. 2005): Confirmed that imputed political opinion qualifies even if the imputation is inaccurate. The problem for petitioner was evidentiary: there was no showing of imputation at all.
  • Zelaya-Moreno v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 190, 201 (2d Cir. 2021): Cited to caution that disapproval of harmful conditions does not necessarily amount to a “political opinion.” In this case, the panel treated the claimed political-opinion framing (opposition to gender inequality) as insufficiently connected to the abuser’s motive on this record.
  • Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d Cir. 2023): Applied to deem claims abandoned when not adequately presented in the petitioner’s brief—here, the particular social group and CAT issues.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

  1. Issue narrowing and waiver. The panel treated the political-opinion nexus as “the only issue” because the petitioner did not brief alternative grounds (particular social group; CAT), invoking abandonment principles under Debique v. Garland.
  2. The governing nexus test is persecutor-focused. Under the asylum/withholding statutes and Second Circuit precedent, the applicant must show that a protected ground is (for asylum and, per Quituizaca v. Garland, withholding) “one central reason” for the persecution. Critically, under Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales and Paloka v. Holder, the question turns on the persecutor’s motive—what the abuser believed about the applicant and why he targeted her.
  3. The IJ’s “the central reason” error was immaterial on this record. The BIA recognized that the IJ misstated the standard as “the” central reason (too strict) instead of “one” central reason, but concluded the claim failed because there was no evidence of political-opinion attribution by the abuser at all. The Second Circuit agreed: even under the correct standard, there was no evidentiary basis to compel a nexus finding.
  4. Police reporting did not establish imputation. The petitioner argued her political opinion was shown by reporting the abuse to police. The panel found two evidentiary gaps:
    • The abuse began before any report, which undercut the idea the report caused the abuse.
    • Even if abuse continued afterward, the petitioner did not testify that the abuser knew about the police report—preventing an inference that he targeted her because of an attributed political stance.
  5. “Broader context” evidence could not substitute for motive proof. The petitioner relied on articles describing gender violence in Honduras. The court treated this as inadequate because it did not show the particular abuser imputed to her “ideals regarding gender inequality” or otherwise attacked her for a political belief, as required by Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales.
  6. Procedural remand argument rejected. The court rejected the claim that lack of a DHS opposition brief required remand: it was under-argued (a single sentence) and inconsistent with the BIA’s own rules stating response briefs are optional and the absence of opposition does not automatically sustain an appeal.

3.3. Impact

Although the disposition is a nonprecedential summary order, it reflects a consistent Second Circuit approach to nexus in domestic-violence claims framed as political opinion:

  • Record evidence of the persecutor’s motive is decisive. General evidence of country conditions—however severe—will not establish nexus without evidence tying the persecutor’s conduct to a protected ground attributed to the applicant.
  • “Imputed political opinion” remains viable but evidentiary demanding. The court reaffirmed the doctrinal availability of imputed political opinion while underscoring that applicants must prove the imputation occurred (e.g., statements by the abuser, threats referencing the applicant’s “ideas,” retaliation explicitly linked to reporting/advocacy, or other circumstantial indicators).
  • Mixed-motive framing cannot cure absence of any protected-ground motive. Citing Garcia-Aranda v. Garland, the panel treated “one central reason” as meaningful only if there is some protected-ground motive in the first place.
  • Appellate briefing choices can forfeit relief pathways. The abandonment finding under Debique v. Garland highlights that petitioners must continue to press all potentially viable theories (e.g., particular social group and CAT) on judicial review, not just before the agency.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Nexus”: The causal link required between the harm and a protected reason (race, religion, nationality, particular social group, political opinion). It is not enough to show harm occurred; the applicant must show why it occurred.
  • “One central reason”: The protected ground must be a major reason for the persecution, not a trivial or incidental one. It need not be the only reason.
  • “Imputed political opinion”: Protection can apply if the persecutor believes the applicant holds a political view and targets them for that belief—even if the applicant does not actually hold it.
  • “Substantial evidence” review: The court defers to the agency’s factual findings unless the record would compel any reasonable adjudicator to reach the opposite conclusion.
  • “Abandonment/waiver” on petition for review: If an argument is not adequately raised and developed in the appellate brief, the court treats it as forfeited.

5. Conclusion

Marquez-Serrano v. Bondi reinforces a core asylum principle in the political-opinion context: even where domestic violence reflects broader gender-based oppression, an applicant must still prove—through record evidence—that the particular persecutor targeted the applicant because of an actual or imputed political belief. Reporting abuse to police and citing country-wide patterns of gender violence may support the narrative, but without evidence the abuser knew of and retaliated for the report or otherwise attributed a political stance to the applicant, the nexus requirement fails—defeating both asylum and, under Second Circuit law, withholding of removal.