NEPA Does Not Reach State-Built Immigration Detention Projects Absent Final Federal Agency Action and More-Than-Minimal Federal Funding and Control

I. Introduction

Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (11th Cir. Apr. 21, 2026) addresses whether the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) can be invoked to halt a detention facility constructed by the State of Florida—using state money and state personnel—when federal immigration authorities later inspected the site for compliance and began using it to detain noncitizens.

The plaintiffs—Friends of the Everglades, Inc. and the Center for Biological Diversity, joined by intervenor-plaintiff Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida—sued federal officials (DHS/ICE) and state officials, alleging that construction and use of the facility in the Everglades required NEPA review and that the failure to conduct that review violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The district court entered a preliminary injunction that (i) halted additional construction and required partial removal/undoing of work, and (ii) barred bringing additional detainees to the facility.

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the injunction and remanded, holding that plaintiffs had not shown (1) a reviewable final agency action under the APA, or (2) a major Federal action under NEPA for the facility’s construction; and further held that the portion of the injunction restricting detention violated 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The panel (Chief Judge William Pryor, joined by Judge Brasher) vacated the preliminary injunction for three core reasons:

  1. No “final agency action” under the APA: Florida constructed the facility; plaintiffs could not identify a discrete, final federal agency action beyond an alleged “decision not to perform NEPA review,” which—standing alone—is not final agency action.
  2. No “major Federal action” for construction under NEPA: Applying the 2023 NEPA amendments, the court held that to convert a non-federal project into a NEPA-covered “major Federal action,” plaintiffs must show both more-than-minimal federal funding and more-than-minimal federal control. Plaintiffs failed at least the control prong because Florida retained authority over construction decisions.
  3. Statutory bar to injunctions restraining immigration detention operations: The district court’s order preventing federal officials from bringing additional detainees to the facility “enjoin[ed] or restrain[ed]” covered detention statutes and thus violated 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1).

Judge Abudu dissented, arguing the majority under-deferred to the district court’s factual findings, understated federal involvement, and improperly minimized the federal government’s control and responsibility over immigration detention.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) NEPA’s procedural character and limits

  • Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle County, 145 S. Ct. 1497 (2025): The court leaned on the Supreme Court’s recent reminder that NEPA is a “procedural cross-check, not a substantive roadblock,” framing NEPA as an information-forcing statute rather than a tool to halt projects absent the triggering conditions. This orientation made the panel less receptive to expanding NEPA’s reach to state-initiated construction.
  • Ouachita Watch League v. Jacobs, 463 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2006): Cited for the proposition that NEPA is typically enforced via the APA (NEPA provides no independent cause of action), reinforcing the threshold requirement of identifying a reviewable “final agency action.”

2) Final agency action under the APA: discreteness and finality

  • Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55 (2004) and Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990): The court relied on these cases for the “discrete agency action” requirement and rejection of programmatic challenges. They informed the court’s refusal to treat “the overall situation” (federal use of a state-built facility) as a single reviewable action.
  • Biden v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. 2528 (2022): Used to underscore that courts may not infer an “abstract decision” untethered to a specific “agency statement” implementing it. This supported the court’s holding that plaintiffs could not stitch together multiple federal interactions into a single final action.
  • Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993): Quoted for the key proposition that an agency’s failure to prepare an EIS, “by itself,” is not enough to trigger APA review absent identifiable substantive agency action.
  • Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 324 F.3d 726 (D.C. Cir. 2003): Cited to show that an agency “request” does not constitute final agency action because it does not itself determine legal rights or obligations.
  • Rattlesnake Coal. v. EPA, 509 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2007): Deployed to emphasize that even appropriations do not create reviewable final action until an agency actually decides to disburse funds—supporting the court’s reasoning that anticipated reimbursement did not equal final funding action.
  • Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), Zafar v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 461 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2006), and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii): These authorities were used to suggest that the decision to enter into a § 287(g) agreement “appears” committed to agency discretion and may be jurisdictionally shielded, helping explain why the panel declined to treat § 287(g) participation as the needed “final agency action.”
  • Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Adm'r for Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 161 F.4th 765 (11th Cir. 2025) and Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Norton, 324 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2003): Cited for the Eleventh Circuit’s view that final agency action is treated as “jurisdictional” in this circuit, reinforcing the gatekeeping nature of the finality inquiry at the preliminary injunction stage.
  • Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2006): Acknowledged as contrary authority on whether APA “final agency action” is truly jurisdictional, but the panel treated the dispute as ultimately irrelevant to the outcome (no likelihood of success either way).

3) “Major Federal action,” federalization of state projects, and anti-segmentation

  • United States v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 28 F.3d 1563 (11th Cir. 1994): Central to the holding on federal control: a project cannot be treated as federal “when the state agencies retain their state law authority” over key decisions. The panel used this to conclude DHS could not “control the outcome” of Florida’s construction choices.
  • Atlanta Coal. on Transp. Crisis, Inc. v. Atlanta Reg'l Comm'n, 599 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1972)): Cited for the proposition that adopting federal standards does not itself “transform a state or local project into a federal one.” This supported the panel’s view that Florida’s compliance with federal detention standards did not “federalize” construction.
  • Okeelanta Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 132 F.4th 1320 (11th Cir. 2025): Invoked for the anti-segmentation doctrine, but then limited: the panel rejected using anti-segmentation to aggregate federal operational involvement with non-federal construction.
  • Big Bend Conservation All. v. FERC, 896 F.3d 418 (D.C. Cir. 2018): Used to supply the limiting principle: anti-segmentation does not require aggregation of federal and non-federal actions—preventing “bootstrapping.”
  • Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012): Cited to acknowledge that consultation and cooperation between federal and state officials is a feature of immigration enforcement, supporting the panel’s premise that state assistance does not automatically become a federally controlled “major Federal action.”

4) Statutory bar on injunctions restraining immigration detention statutes

  • Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999): Recognized as controlling Supreme Court authority on § 1252(f)(1)’s stripping of district court authority to enjoin covered immigration provisions except as applied to an individual alien.
  • Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, 142 S. Ct. 2057 (2022): Key to the panel’s reasoning that § 1252(f)(1) applies “regardless of the nature of the action or claim,” defeating arguments that an injunction styled as NEPA relief escapes the bar if it restrains detention operations.
  • Texas v. Department of Homeland Security, 123 F.4th 186 (5th Cir. 2024): Addressed and rejected as inconsistent with Aleman Gonzalez to the extent it suggested § 1252(f)(1) depends on the claim’s statutory source rather than the injunction’s operational effect.

5) Preliminary injunction standards and standards of review

  • Vital Pharms., Inc. v. Alfieri, 23 F.4th 1282 (11th Cir. 2022) and Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc): Framed preliminary injunctions as “extraordinary and drastic,” and emphasized that failure on any prerequisite—especially likelihood of success—defeats relief.
  • Upside Foods Inc. v. Comm'r, Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., No. 24-13640 (11th Cir. Mar. 23, 2026), and Hylton v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 992 F.3d 1154 (11th Cir. 2021): Used to set the review framework (abuse of discretion for injunction; de novo for legal conclusions and statutory interpretation).
  • United States v. Barsoum, 763 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2014): Cited for the proposition that application of law to fact is reviewed de novo as a “legal conclusion” in this context.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) APA finality as the first gate: no discrete, consummated federal action

Because NEPA claims proceed through the APA, the panel treated identification of a discrete “final agency action” as the indispensable first step. The plaintiffs’ theory—“the decision not to issue an EIS/EA and then construct a detention camp”—collapsed because, as the panel saw it, the “construction” component was Florida’s act, while the “no NEPA review” component was not a reviewable final action on its own.

The panel’s finality analysis turns on a strict separation between:

  • State construction decisions (site selection, scale, materials, pace, and continuation), and
  • Federal operational decisions (inspection for detention standards; transporting detainees; coordinating detention).

Without a federal “agency statement” or other discrete consummated action implementing a decision to build or fund the facility, the plaintiffs could not satisfy the APA’s case-by-case finality requirement as articulated in Norton, Lujan, and Biden.

2) The 2023 NEPA amendments: “no or minimal” funding OR “no or minimal” involvement

The most precedent-setting portion of the opinion is its construction of the 2023 amendments codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4336e(10)(B)(i). The panel reads the “or” as disjunctive: a non-federal action is excluded from “major Federal action” if it has either (i) no or minimal federal funding or (ii) no or minimal federal involvement where the federal agency cannot control the outcome.

From that premise, the panel derives a practical rule:

To “federalize” a non-federal project for NEPA purposes post-2023, a challenger must show both more-than-minimal federal funding and more-than-minimal federal control/involvement sufficient to let the federal agency control the project’s outcome.

Applying that rule, the panel held the plaintiffs failed at least on control: Florida retained ultimate authority over construction and could halt or repurpose the site. Federal standards governing the facility’s acceptability for detention did not amount to federal control over the construction project itself.

3) Anti-segmentation cannot combine ineligible federal and state actions into a NEPA trigger

The district court treated the facility’s construction and subsequent operations as a single integrated “major Federal action,” in part through anti-segmentation logic. The panel rejected that approach as “bootstrapping,” relying on Big Bend Conservation All. v. FERC to hold that anti-segmentation does not require aggregation of federal and non-federal actions to create NEPA coverage that otherwise does not exist.

4) Independent constraint: § 1252(f)(1) bars detention-restricting injunctions even if styled as NEPA compliance

Separately, the panel held that the injunction’s prohibition on “bringing any additional persons” to the facility directly restrained the Secretary’s authority under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a), 1231(a)(2), and 1231(g)(1) to detain and to arrange places of detention.

Under Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, the bar applies “regardless of the nature of the action or claim”; therefore, a NEPA/APA label does not save an injunction whose operative effect is to restrain statutory detention operations on a non-individualized basis.

C. Impact

  • NEPA “federalization” narrowed post-2023: The opinion is a significant Eleventh Circuit application of the Fiscal Responsibility Act’s NEPA amendments. Its “both funding and control” requirement—derived from the “or” in § 4336e(10)(B)(i)—makes it harder to treat state-built projects as “major Federal actions” when federal involvement is operational, indirect, or contingent.
  • APA finality as a practical choke point: Plaintiffs seeking NEPA relief against projects enabled by federal-state coordination must identify a discrete, consummated federal action (e.g., a binding approval, permit, grant award, or contract) rather than relying on informal coordination, inspections, or anticipated reimbursement.
  • Immigration-litigation remedial limits reinforced: The holding on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) underscores that district courts cannot use generally applicable injunctions to shut down or constrain detention operations, even indirectly through other statutory claims, except as applied to an individual alien.
  • Strategic effects on governmental design: The decision may incentivize states to fund and control construction themselves (even for federally used facilities) to avoid NEPA-triggering “major Federal action” findings, while leaving federal agencies to manage operations within statutory bounds.
  • Limits of the holding: The panel vacated a preliminary injunction; it did not foreclose NEPA/APA claims if later events create final federal action (e.g., actual federal funding disbursement, a federal contract for construction, or a federal permit/approval that legally conditions or controls construction).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

NEPA (National Environmental Policy Act)
A statute requiring federal agencies to study and disclose significant environmental impacts of certain federal actions (often via an Environmental Assessment (EA) or Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)). It generally does not force a particular substantive outcome; it forces a documented decision process.
APA “final agency action”
The APA allows courts to review only agency actions that are (i) the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process and (ii) have legal consequences. Mere inaction (like not preparing an EIS) usually is not reviewable unless tied to a specific, discrete, final federal act (like issuing a permit or awarding a grant).
“Major Federal action”
The category of actions that triggers NEPA review. After the 2023 amendments, this case interprets NEPA to exclude non-federal projects that have either minimal federal funding or minimal federal involvement without federal ability to control outcomes.
Federal “control” vs. federal “standards”
Setting conditions for use (e.g., detention standards) is not the same as controlling the underlying construction decisions (site, size, materials, continuation). This opinion treats control over construction outcomes as the relevant “control” for a construction-based NEPA challenge.
Anti-segmentation
A NEPA doctrine preventing agencies from slicing a single federal project into smaller parts to avoid finding significant impact. Here, the court held it cannot be used to combine a state project with federal operational involvement to manufacture NEPA coverage.
§ 287(g) agreements (8 U.S.C. § 1357(g))
Agreements allowing the federal government to delegate certain immigration enforcement functions to state/local officers under federal supervision. The majority treated these agreements as insufficient to establish NEPA-triggering federal control over state construction.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1)
A statute that removes district courts’ authority to issue broad injunctions that “enjoin or restrain” certain immigration detention/removal provisions, except in an individual alien’s case. The court held it barred the injunction’s ban on bringing additional detainees to the facility.

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision establishes a restrictive framework for NEPA challenges to state-built projects used for federal purposes, especially after the 2023 NEPA amendments: challengers must identify a discrete, final federal agency action under the APA and, for a non-federal project, must show both more-than-minimal federal funding and more-than-minimal federal control over the project’s outcome to trigger NEPA.

Independently, the opinion reinforces the strength of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) as a remedial barrier: even if plaintiffs plead NEPA/APA violations, courts may not issue classwide or programmatic injunctions that restrain immigration detention operations.