Negligent Entrustment in Mississippi Requires Supplier Control and a Causally Linked, Foreseeable Risk—Not Mere Title or Past Rehab Status

1. Introduction

In Rig Masters, Inc. v. Colenberg (Miss. June 11, 2026), the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed (on interlocutory appeal) a circuit court order denying summary judgment to Rig Masters, Inc. on a wrongful-death plaintiff’s claim of negligent entrustment. The underlying tragedy was a fatal head-on collision involving a truck driven by Thomas Sturdivant, a former Rig Masters employee, that resulted in the death of Isaac Pearl Colenberg.

The key issues were whether Rig Masters could be liable for negligent entrustment after it sold the truck to Sturdivant—despite the title still being in Rig Masters’ name at the time of the accident—and whether Rig Masters knew or should have known Sturdivant posed an unreasonable risk (allegedly due to substance-abuse issues).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court reversed the denial of summary judgment and remanded for entry of summary judgment in Rig Masters’ favor on negligent entrustment. It held that the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case because the record did not show: (i) Rig Masters knew or should have known Sturdivant would use the truck in a manner involving an unreasonable risk; (ii) Rig Masters retained the requisite control over the truck after sale; or (iii) any alleged substance abuse had a direct correlation to the accident (i.e., was a proximate cause).

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Summary-judgment framework

  • Lakeland Premier Women's Clinic, PLLC v. Jackson, 426 So. 3d 1062 (Miss. 2025): confirmed de novo review of summary-judgment rulings.
  • United Emergency Servs. of Miss., Inc. v. Miller ex rel. Reed, 414 So. 3d 66 (Miss. 2025), quoting Hardaway v. Howard Indus., Inc., 378 So. 3d 946 (Miss. 2024): evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
  • City of Jackson v. Maxie ex rel. M.Y., 412 So. 3d 1156 (Miss. 2025), quoting Anderson v. Wiggins, 331 So. 3d 1 (Miss. 2020): movant bears the burden to show no genuine issue of material fact.
  • Williams v. City of Batesville, 313 So. 3d 479 (Miss. 2021): nonmovant must produce specific facts, not rest on pleadings.
  • Sligh v. First Nat'l Bank of Holmes Cnty., 735 So. 2d 963 (Miss. 1999), citing Wilbourn v. Stennett, Wilkinson & Ward, 687 So. 2d 1205 (Miss. 1996): summary judgment is mandated when proof fails on an essential element.

2) Negligent entrustment elements, “control,” and causation

  • Sligh v. First Nat'l Bank of Holmes Cnty., 735 So. 2d 963 (Miss. 1999): anchored Mississippi’s negligent-entrustment doctrine to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 and emphasized the “paramount requirement” of the defendant’s right to control the vehicle.
  • Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 308: the Court treated them as in pari materia and read them together; § 308’s “under the control of the actor” language supplied the control requirement. The Court highlighted comment a to § 308: control means the user’s entitlement depends on the actor’s consent and can be prevented by withholding consent.
  • Broadwater v. Dorsey, 688 A.2d 436 (Md. 1997), citing State v. Bricker, 581 A.2d 9 (Md. 1990): cited for the proposition that §§ 390 and 308 must be read together; Mississippi reaffirmed that approach.
  • Sullivan v. Tupelo Furniture Mkt., Inc. (Guardianship of Garvin), 127 So. 3d 197 (Miss. 2013): required a “direct correlation” between the known risky conduct and the harm; also held substance-abuse history matters only if it is a proximate cause.
  • Penn-Star Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 368 So. 3d 1245 (Miss. 2023) (quoting Bullock Bros. Trucking Co. v. Carley, 930 So. 2d 1259 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005)): recited the baseline three-part negligent-entrustment formulation (supply, knowledge of unreasonable risk, harm). The Court in this case built on that by expressly adding control and direct-correlation requirements.
  • Laurel Yamaha, Inc. v. Freeman, 956 So. 2d 897 (Miss. 2007): reiterated that “absent the right to control, no action lies for negligent entrustment.”
  • Out-of-state authority reinforcing that title is not the same as control: Lopez v. Langer, 761 P.2d 1225 (Idaho 1988); Green v. Harris, 70 P.3d 866 (Okla. 2003); Neary v. McDonald, 956 P.2d 1205 (Alaska 1998); Zedella v. Gibson, 650 N.E.2d 1000 (Ill. 1995). These cases supported the Court’s conclusion that negligent entrustment is about the ability to prevent use, not formal ownership alone.
  • Savage v. LaGrange, 815 So. 2d 485 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002): the plaintiff relied on Savage (employer supplied vehicle to employee with substance-abuse issues), but the Court distinguished it on its unusual facts (father/son relationship, known alcohol-related driving history, suspended license).
  • Davis v. Seymour, 868 So. 2d 1061 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004): cited through Guardianship of Garvin for the proximate-cause limitation on substance-abuse-based entrustment theories.
  • Statutory context for post-sale title/tag obligations: Miss. Code Ann. § 63-21-31(2) (Rev. 2022) and Miss. Code Ann. § 63-21-69 (Rev. 2022) (noting the later amendment discussed in the opinion). The Court used these statutes to underscore that the buyer bears responsibility to apply for title and tag after delivery.
  • In pari materia concept: Brown v. State, 102 So. 3d 1087 (Miss. 2012) (citing Leasy v. Zollicoffer, 389 So. 2d 1378 (Miss. 1980)): cited by analogy for reading related provisions harmoniously—here, Restatement sections rather than statutes.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Mississippi’s clarified negligent-entrustment elements

The Court restated negligent entrustment through Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 but emphasized that § 390 is a “special application” of § 308, and therefore control is essential. It then articulated a five-part showing required to proceed:

  1. the defendant supplied the chattel for the third party’s use;
  2. the supplier knew or should have known the third party would use it in a manner involving an unreasonable risk of harm;
  3. harm resulted from the use of the chattel;
  4. the chattel was under the control of the supplier; and
  5. the risky conduct of which the supplier was (or should have been) aware had a direct correlation to the cause of the harm.

Although prior Mississippi cases discussed these concepts, the opinion’s doctrinal significance lies in its explicit bundling of “control” and “direct correlation” as required components of the prima facie case, not merely background considerations.

2) Knowledge of risk: rehab residence alone was not enough

The plaintiff argued Rig Masters should have known Sturdivant was an incompetent driver because he was living at a rehabilitation center and allegedly battling methamphetamine addiction. The Court found the record did not support knowledge (or reason to know) of an unreasonable driving risk at the time of sale: Sturdivant had no shown history of accidents, reckless driving, or drug-related driving citations, and the more suggestive facts (a post-detention statement about recovery and discovery of a glass pipe) arose after the truck had already been sold.

The Court also expressed a policy concern: treating rehab participation as meaningful proof of dangerousness would be prejudicial and could deter recovery efforts.

3) Control: title, plates, and insurance did not equal the right to prevent use

Even though the accident report listed Rig Masters as owner (because title registration had not been changed), the Court framed the dispositive question as control—whether Sturdivant could use the truck only with Rig Masters’ consent and whether Rig Masters could prevent use by withholding consent.

On the undisputed practical realities (Sturdivant had paid for the truck, possessed it, and held the title for nearly a month), Rig Masters lacked a superior right to control day-to-day use. Sturdivant’s failure to comply with title/tag requirements did not resurrect control in the seller. The Court also credited evidence of Rig Masters’ intent to relinquish control (delivery of title; email to insurer to remove the truck from its policy), and it distinguished Savage v. LaGrange as involving ongoing parental dominion and a documented record of alcohol-related driving issues.

4) Direct correlation/proximate cause: no evidence of impairment at the time of the crash

Relying on Sullivan v. Tupelo Furniture Mkt., Inc. (Guardianship of Garvin), the Court held that even if a history of substance abuse exists, it supports negligent entrustment only if it was a proximate cause of the accident. Here, the responding officer reported no suspected drug or alcohol use, and the record contained no admissible evidence contradicting that finding (the plaintiff’s proffered first-responder affidavit was excluded by the trial court). Without evidence of impairment, the alleged substance-abuse theory could not supply the required causal link.

C. Impact

  • Sharper pleading and proof requirements: Plaintiffs must now be prepared—at summary judgment—to produce evidence not only of “supply” and “harm,” but also of (a) the supplier’s right to prevent use and (b) a causal nexus between the known risk and the injury.
  • Vehicle-sale cases: The decision substantially limits negligent-entrustment exposure for sellers after a completed sale where the buyer has possession, even if administrative formalities (title registration, tag, insurance paperwork) lag behind. Title in the seller’s name is not treated as dispositive of “control.”
  • Substance-abuse allegations: The opinion signals that generalized suspicions or post-sale evidence will rarely suffice to show knowledge at the time of entrustment, and that impairment or a causally connected driving-related history is critical to survive summary judgment.
  • Doctrinal consolidation: By explicitly reading Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 together with § 308, the Court reinforces “control” as a structural element of negligent entrustment rather than a peripheral factor.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Negligent entrustment: Liability for giving someone a dangerous tool (here, a vehicle) when you know—or should know—they are likely to use it dangerously.
  • “Control” (for negligent entrustment): Not just whose name is on the title; it is whether the alleged entrustor had the practical/legal power to say “no” and thereby prevent the person from using the vehicle.
  • In pari materia: A rule of interpretation meaning related legal texts on the same subject should be read together so they work harmoniously. Here, the Court applied the idea to Restatement sections (§§ 390 and 308).
  • Direct correlation / proximate cause: The risky trait (e.g., substance abuse) must be connected to what actually caused the crash. A past issue, without evidence it contributed to the accident, is not enough.
  • Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling that ends a claim when the evidence cannot support a required element even if all reasonable inferences favor the nonmoving party.

5. Conclusion

Rig Masters, Inc. v. Colenberg tightens Mississippi negligent-entrustment doctrine around two core limitations: (1) the supplier must have had a genuine right to control the chattel at the relevant time (the power to withhold consent and prevent use), and (2) the plaintiff must show a causally linked unreasonable risk that the supplier knew or should have known about—mere title irregularities or generalized substance-abuse allegations, without evidence of impairment or accident causation, will not do. The opinion is likely to be cited as a key summary-judgment roadmap in negligent-entrustment cases involving post-sale accidents and alleged driver impairment.