Narrow CBA Arbitration Clauses Cover Only Discipline Within the Contract’s Defined “Corrective Action” Purpose (PREA-Based Terminations Nonarbitrable)

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from a public-sector labor dispute over whether a particular termination must proceed to arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Juvenile Justice Probation Officers Association (JJPOA) sought to arbitrate the termination of bargaining-unit employee Ali Heidarshahi by Clark County and its Department of Juvenile Justice Services (DJJS).

The termination followed a background-check process triggered by a conditional promotion and governed by the federal Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) regulatory framework. Clark County terminated Heidarshahi under 28 C.F.R. § 115.317(g) (material omissions or materially false information as grounds for termination).

The central issue was arbitrability: whether this PREA-based termination fell within a CBA arbitration clause that—though it referenced “terminations”—did so only as part of a defined category of “corrective actions” intended to help an employee overcome a substantiated deficiency in behavior or work performance.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order staying arbitration. The Court held:

• The CBA’s arbitration clause was narrow, not broad.
• Under the CBA’s own definitions, only terminations that qualify as “corrective actions” (implemented to assist an employee in overcoming a substantiated deficiency in behavior or work performance) are arbitrable.
• A termination implemented pursuant to PREA regulations—here, 28 C.F.R. § 115.317(g)—is not implemented for the CBA’s corrective-action purpose and therefore falls outside the clause’s four corners.
• The Court’s review was limited to arbitrability; it did not decide whether the PREA termination was substantively proper.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The opinion’s reasoning is built on a standard “who decides arbitrability” framework, a scope-based approach to the presumption of arbitration, and conventional contract-interpretation principles.

• Principal Inus. v. Harrison, 132 Nev. 9, 16, 366 P.3d 688, 693 (2016)
  Role in this opinion: Establishes that when the parties do not clearly delegate arbitrability to the arbitrator, the court decides arbitrability. This anchored the Court’s authority to determine whether the dispute fit within the CBA clause.
• SR Constr., Inc. v. Peek Bros. Constr., Inc., 138 Nev. 414, 417-20, 510 P.3d 794, 798-800 (2022)
  Role in this opinion: Serves as the primary Nevada template for (i) determining whether a clause is narrow or broad, (ii) scaling the presumption of arbitrability to the clause’s scope, and (iii) applying the “positive assurance” standard to narrow clauses by focusing on the “four corners.” The Court repeatedly invoked SR Constr. to justify both its classification of the clause as narrow and its conclusion that the PREA termination was outside it.
• Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, Local No. 1285 v. City of Las Vegas, 112 Nev. 1319, 1323-24, 929 P.2d 954, 957 (1996)
  Role in this opinion: Supplies Nevada’s articulation of the presumption in favor of arbitration and the “positive assurance” formulation: arbitration should be ordered unless it can be said with positive assurance that the clause is not susceptible to covering the dispute. The Court applied that test but concluded the clause could not be stretched to encompass a PREA-based termination.
• AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986)
  Role in this opinion: Reinforces the general labor-arbitration presumption that disputes arising under an agreement with an arbitration clause are presumptively arbitrable. The Nevada Supreme Court used this federal anchor while emphasizing that the presumption’s strength depends on clause scope.
• Redrock Valley Ranch, LLC v. Washoe County, 127 Nev. 451, 460, 254 P.3d 641, 647-48 (2011)
  Role in this opinion: Provides the proposition that contract interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo—supporting plenary review of the CBA’s definitions.
• Musser v. Bank of Am., 114 Nev. 945, 949, 964 P.2d 51, 54 (1998) (quoting Royal Indem. Co. v. Special Serv. Supply Co., 82 Nev. 148, 150, 413 P.2d 500, 502 (1966))
  Role in this opinion: Drives the canon that every contract word should be given effect if possible. This mattered because the Court refused to treat the word “termination” in isolation; it read “termination” through the CBA’s defined term “corrective actions,” including the stated corrective purpose.
• Virgin Valley Water Dist. v. Paradise Canyon, LLC, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 19, 567 P.3d 962, 969 (2025)
  Role in this opinion: Clarifies that ambiguity requires terms to be reasonably susceptible to multiple interpretations, not merely disputed. The Court treated the CBA’s definitional structure as sufficiently determinate to decide scope.
• Rerto Club v. Young Inv. Co., 64 Nev. 312, 323, 182 P.2d 1011, 1016 (1947)
  Role in this opinion: Supports the principle that ordinary meaning applies absent clear evidence of a different intent—while highlighting that parties may define terms differently. The Court emphasized the parties’ chosen definitions (“discipline” and “corrective actions”) as controlling.

The Court also cited a treatise—1 Thomas H. Oehmke & Joan M. Bovins, Commercial Arbitration—to articulate how narrow clauses diminish (but do not eliminate) the presumption of arbitrability and confine analysis to the clause’s “four corners.”

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps: (1) who decides arbitrability, (2) classification of the clause as narrow, and (3) application of the clause’s defined scope to the disputed termination.

1. Courts decide arbitrability absent delegation. Applying Principal Inus. v. Harrison, the Court confirmed that because the parties did not “clearly agree to delegate” arbitrability, the judiciary must determine whether the dispute falls within the arbitration clause.
2. The CBA clause is narrow because it targets a defined subset of disputes. Using SR Constr., Inc. v. Peek Bros. Constr., Inc. and Oehmke’s framework, the Court found “narrow, precise language”: arbitration was limited to grievances about (a) interpretation and application of express CBA terms and (b) disciplinary matters defined as “corrective actions.”
3. “Termination” is arbitrable only when it is a “corrective action” as defined—i.e., implemented to assist the employee. The Court treated the definitional chain as decisive:

   discipline → defined as corrective actions → defined as actions implemented to assist an employee in overcoming a substantiated deficiency related to behavior or work performance (with “terminations” listed among formal actions).

   A “termination,” therefore, is grievable/arbitrable only when it is implemented for that corrective, performance- or behavior-remediation purpose. The Court then contrasted that contractual purpose with PREA’s statutory and regulatory objectives—“zero tolerance” and prevention of sexual abuse and harassment in juvenile facilities—implemented through mandatory screening, ongoing disclosure obligations, and 28 C.F.R. § 115.317(g)’s termination authorization for material omissions or false information.

On that comparison, the Court’s conclusion was categorical: even if a PREA termination might overlap factually with employee conduct, it is not an action “implemented to assist an employee” in overcoming a deficiency. Accordingly, the clause was “not susceptible” to covering the dispute, satisfying the “positive assurance” standard for denying arbitration under a narrow clause.

3.3 Impact

The decision is likely to influence Nevada labor and arbitration practice in several ways:

• Definitional “purpose clauses” can control arbitrability. Parties that define discipline as “corrective” and tie it to assisting an employee may unintentionally exclude removals that are regulatory, mandatory, or mission-protective rather than remedial.
• Regulatory-termination carve-outs may be enforced even without explicit exclusions. The County prevailed without a clause expressly excluding PREA matters; it relied on the CBA’s internal definition. Employers may argue that other non-remedial separations—e.g., statutory disqualifications, license loss, background-check disqualifiers—are similarly outside “corrective” discipline clauses.
• Drafting consequences for unions and public employers. If parties want arbitration of terminations broadly, they may need to avoid—or carefully expand—language tying “discipline” to “assisting” the employee, or expressly include regulatory/statutory terminations within the grievance-arbitration scope.
• PREA compliance and labor procedure may collide. For juvenile detention agencies, this opinion signals that PREA-driven removals for material omissions/false information can be litigated in court (or challenged through other administrative mechanisms), but may not be reachable through arbitration when the CBA is framed as corrective/remedial.
• Reinforces “arbitrability, not merits” discipline in arbitration litigation. The Court re-emphasized that a stay-arbitration appeal is not a vehicle to decide whether the termination was proper under PREA—narrowing what parties can obtain at the threshold stage.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Arbitrability: The gatekeeping question of whether a dispute must be decided by an arbitrator under the contract. It is distinct from who should win.
• Delegation of arbitrability: Parties can agree that an arbitrator (not a court) decides arbitrability. Without a clear delegation, courts decide it.
• Broad vs. narrow arbitration clause: A broad clause covers a wide range of disputes connected to the relationship; a narrow clause covers only enumerated categories. Narrow clauses create a weaker presumption of arbitration.
• Presumption of arbitrability: A judicial thumb on the scale favoring arbitration when the clause could reasonably cover the dispute. It does not allow courts to rewrite a narrow clause.
• “Four corners” approach: Interpreting the clause by its text and definitions as written, rather than importing external notions of fairness or typical practice.
• Corrective action (as used here): Not every disciplinary measure; only those intended to help the employee overcome a substantiated deficiency in behavior or work performance.
• PREA termination under 28 C.F.R. § 115.317(g): A termination grounded in protecting facility residents and enforcing truthful disclosure in hiring/promotion contexts—conceptually different from progressive discipline intended to remediate performance.

5. Conclusion

JUVENILE JUSTICE PROB. OFFICERS ASSOC. v. CLARK CNTY. (CIVIL) strengthens a practical Nevada rule for labor arbitration: even with a strong pro-arbitration policy, narrow CBA clauses are enforced as written, and the presumption favoring arbitration cannot extend a clause beyond its defined purpose. Where a CBA restricts arbitrable discipline to “corrective actions” designed to assist an employee in overcoming deficiencies, a termination imposed pursuant to PREA’s regulatory hiring and disclosure regime is outside the arbitration obligation. The opinion thus underscores that precision in CBA definitions can determine the forum—and that parties seeking broader arbitral review must draft for it expressly.