Date: Feb 13, 2026

MVRA Restitution May Be Based on a County Assessor’s Updated “Fair Cash Value” as a Reasonable Proxy for Fair Market Value

I. Introduction

United States v. Hemingway (10th Cir. Feb. 10, 2026) addresses a recurring restitution problem under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA): how to measure the “value” of destroyed property when competing valuation methodologies produce widely divergent numbers.

After a jury trial, Gunnar Mathew Hemingway was convicted of arson in Indian Country under 18 U.S.C. §§ 81, 1151, 1153, arising from a fire that destroyed a mobile home in Hugo, Oklahoma (within the Choctaw Nation Reservation). He was acquitted of homicide- and firearm-related counts. The district court imposed a custodial sentence and ordered restitution, including $21,086 for the destroyed mobile home.

On appeal, the sole issue relevant here was amount: whether the district court abused its discretion by adopting a valuation that Hemingway claimed was “inflated,” instead of a much lower figure derived from a prior tax assessment.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the restitution order. It held that the district court acted within its discretion by using fair market value as the MVRA measure of loss and by crediting evidence that supported a $21,086 valuation.

Specifically, the district court relied on testimony from the Choctaw County Assessor that the county’s older system had assessed properties “extremely below value” and that, under a newer valuation system, the mobile home would have carried a “fair cash value” of $21,086. The panel concluded this was a permissible, evidence-supported basis for a “reasonable estimate” of value.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

United States v. Howard, 887 F.3d 1072, 1078 (10th Cir. 2018)
The court invoked Howard for the principle that a district court has discretion to select an appropriate valuation method under the MVRA and that “fair market value” is a recognized method. The panel also used Howard to reject the notion that a large spread between valuation methods alone establishes abuse of discretion; valuation is context-dependent.
United States v. Julian, 242 F.3d 1245, 1248 (10th Cir. 2001)
Cited to support the deference owed when the district court’s valuation choice is supported by record evidence. The panel used Julian to reinforce that an appellate court will not displace a supported valuation simply because a defendant proposes a competing number.
United States v. Parker, 553 F.3d 1309, 1323-24 (10th Cir. 2009)
Parker supplies the review framework (“legality” de novo; factual findings clear error; amount abuse of discretion) and the critical constraint: restitution may not exceed “actual loss.” The panel relied on Parker to frame the appellate task and to underscore that only overcompensation (not mere disagreement) amounts to reversible error.
In re Nat. Gas Royalties Qui Tam Litig., 845 F.3d 1010, 1017 (10th Cir. 2017)
Cited for the content of “abuse of discretion”—reversal requires a “definite and firm conviction” of clear error of judgment. The panel used this to reject speculative attacks on the assessor’s methodology.
United States v. Landers, 564 F.3d 1217, 1224 (10th Cir. 2009)
Provides the familiar gloss that abuse of discretion includes rulings that are arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable—standards the panel concluded were not met.
United States v. James, 564 F.3d 1237, 1243, 1246 (10th Cir. 2009)
Two core MVRA propositions come from James: (1) restitution cannot exceed actual loss, and (2) because “value” is not statutorily defined, the district court may choose “the best measure of value” in the circumstances. The opinion uses James to validate methodological flexibility while preserving the “actual loss” ceiling.
United States v. Ferdman, 779 F.3d 1129, 1133 (10th Cir. 2015)
Quoted to emphasize causation and limitation: the MVRA allows recovery only for losses “actually caused” by the offense. This supported the panel’s focus on the mobile home’s value as the relevant loss measure.
United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377-78 (1946)
Cited by analogy for the economic point that market value fluctuates with “general demand,” bolstering the panel’s rejection of Hemingway’s assumption that value could only decrease absent improvements.
United States v. Wilfong, 551 F.3d 1182, 1186 (10th Cir. 2008)
Supports the “reasonable estimate” approach to restitution calculation. The court used Wilfong to hold that the district court was not required to produce appraisal-level precision.
United States v. De Vaughn, 694 F.3d 1141, 1155 (10th Cir. 2012)
Applied to dispose of Hemingway’s Oklahoma constitutional argument: inadequately briefed issues are waived. The court thus avoided reaching the merits of how state ad valorem caps interact (if at all) with federal MVRA valuation.
Icon at Norman Apartments, LP v. Warr, 577 P.3d 259, 261-62 (Okla. 2025)
Used only as background on Oklahoma’s constitutional cap for homestead valuation increases. The panel treated this as beside the point (and, in any event, insufficiently developed on appeal).
Fair Market Value, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024)
Cited to support the understanding of “fair market value” as a market-sensitive concept, which can incorporate macroeconomic changes.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory framework and the valuation question

The MVRA requires restitution for certain property crimes in an amount tied to the “value” of property when return is impossible. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(A)-(B). Because the mobile home was destroyed, § 3663A(b)(1)(B) required Hemingway to pay the greater of: (i) the property’s value on the date of loss, or (ii) its value on the date of sentencing. The government bore the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e).

The MVRA does not define “value,” and Tenth Circuit law (notably United States v. James) leaves districts courts discretion to choose the best measure in context, so long as the award does not exceed actual loss.

2. Why “fair market value” was permissible here

The district court explicitly treated the restitution award as the mobile home’s fair market value, a choice the panel held was squarely within permissible discretion under United States v. Howard. The court also implicitly accepted that fair market value can be estimated from non-traditional sources (here, a county assessor’s valuation system), as long as the result is grounded in record evidence and constitutes a reasonable estimate.

3. Why reliance on the assessor’s “new system” was not an abuse of discretion

Hemingway’s core claim was that the district court should have used the county’s older 2020 assessment ($5,298) rather than the assessor’s “new system” output ($21,086). The panel rejected this for several reasons:

Evidence-supported credibility choice: The assessor testified the prior system assessed properties “extremely below value” and the new system was more accurate. Appellate courts typically do not second-guess such credibility and evidentiary weighing absent clear error or irrationality.
Market value may rise without improvements: Relying on Petty Motor Co. and the general concept of fair market value, the panel explained that market-driven changes (demand, costs, broader conditions) can affect value even if the owner made no improvements.
Speculation is not a rebuttal: Hemingway argued the new system was designed to exploit pandemic inflation and raise revenues, but offered no concrete evidence undermining admissibility or reliability. Under the abuse-of-discretion lens (as framed by In re Nat. Gas Royalties Qui Tam Litig. and Landers), speculative attacks did not show “clear error of judgment.”
Reasonable estimate is enough: Citing Wilfong and Parker, the panel emphasized that restitution calculation is “an inexact science.” The question was not whether $21,086 was the only defensible number, but whether it was a reasonable, record-supported estimate of actual loss.

4. Rejection of ancillary challenges

Land value not included: Hemingway suggested the valuation might have included land, but the assessor repeatedly clarified the $21,086 figure reflected only the mobile home’s value. The panel treated this as resolved by the record.
Oklahoma 3% cap argument waived: Hemingway invoked Okla. Const. art. X § 8B, but did not explain with “sufficient specificity” how that state tax limitation controlled federal MVRA restitution valuation. Under United States v. De Vaughn, inadequate briefing resulted in waiver.
Timing gap between sentencing and restitution hearing: The court noted the restitution hearing occurred after sentencing, but Hemingway did not raise an argument about that gap; and the panel suggested the inputs underlying the assessor’s valuation would not materially differ between the two dates.

C. Impact

Although designated as a nonprecedential “Order and Judgment,” the decision is a meaningful data point in MVRA practice in the Tenth Circuit, particularly for destroyed real or quasi-real property (manufactured homes) where formal appraisals are absent and the record contains conflicting valuation sources.

Key practical implications:

Assessor valuations can be persuasive evidence of “value”: A county assessor’s testimony and system-generated “fair cash value” can support an MVRA award when the district court treats it as a proxy for fair market value and the record supports reliability.
Older tax assessments are not automatically “actual value”: Defendants cannot assume a prior low assessment binds the federal court’s MVRA valuation, especially where evidence suggests systematic undervaluation.
Macro conditions (inflation, materials costs) may legitimately influence market value: The panel’s reasoning indicates that “actual loss” is not frozen to an owner’s last tax bill or purchase price; it may reflect market conditions at the relevant statutory date(s).
State tax caps are not self-executing limits on federal restitution: The decision signals that any attempt to import state ad valorem constraints into MVRA valuation must be clearly developed, legally anchored, and properly briefed—or it will be waived.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA): A federal statute requiring courts to order restitution for certain crimes, including many property offenses, to make victims whole for their actual losses.
“Value” under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(B): The statute requires payment of the greater of the property’s value on the date of loss or on the date of sentencing, but does not define “value.” Courts therefore choose an appropriate valuation method (e.g., fair market value, replacement cost) depending on the circumstances.
Fair market value vs. replacement cost: Fair market value is what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller in the market. Replacement cost is what it would cost to replace the item with a similar new one. They can differ substantially, especially for older property.
Tax assessment (“fair cash value”): A value assigned by a government assessor primarily for taxation. It may or may not match fair market value, but it can be probative if supported by testimony about the method and its relationship to real-world sales.
Burden of proof: preponderance of the evidence: The government must show the loss amount is more likely than not correct—lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Standards of review: clear error and abuse of discretion: Appellate courts defer heavily to district courts on factfinding and on discretionary judgments like valuation methodology. Reversal requires more than a plausible alternative; it requires a clear mistake or an unreasonable judgment.
Indian Country jurisdiction: Certain crimes committed in “Indian Country” fall under federal jurisdiction (here, arson under 18 U.S.C. §§ 81, 1151, 1153).

V. Conclusion

United States v. Hemingway reinforces three practical MVRA lessons. First, district courts retain broad discretion to select a valuation method—including fair market value—so long as the award reflects actual loss. Second, a court may credit a county assessor’s updated valuation (“fair cash value”) as a reasonable proxy for market value when supported by testimony and record evidence, even if it is substantially higher than an older assessment. Third, speculative challenges and underdeveloped legal theories (such as importing state tax caps into federal restitution) will not carry the heavy burden required to show abuse of discretion on appeal.