Multi-County Plea Agreements Require Each Prosecutor’s Actual Authority and Consent

Precedents Cited

Plea agreements as contracts; standard of review

• Montano v. State, 2019 WY 34, ¶ 13, 437 P.3d 838, 842 (Wyo. 2019) (citing Nordwall v. State, 2015 WY 144, ¶ 13, 361 P.3d 836, 839 (Wyo. 2015)): The Court relied on these cases for two baseline propositions: (i) whether the State breached a plea agreement is reviewed de novo; and (ii) plea agreements are analyzed under general contract principles.
• Mendoza v. State, 2016 WY 31, ¶ 26, 368 P.3d 886, 895 (Wyo. 2016): Reinforced that plea agreements are treated as contracts, anchoring the Court’s move from criminal-procedure framing to contract/agency framing.

Statutory interpretation methodology

• Herrick v. Jackson Hole Airport Bd., 2019 WY 118, ¶ 17, 452 P.3d 1276, 1281 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Wyo. Jet Ctr., LLC v. Jackson Hole Airport Bd., 2019 WY 6, ¶ 11, 432 P.3d 910, 915 (Wyo. 2019)): Provided the de novo standard for statutory interpretation.
• Bird v. Lampert, 2021 WY 11, ¶ 8, 479 P.3d 382, 384 (Wyo. 2021): Supplied the “plain meaning” approach to discerning legislative intent.
• Wyoming Jet Ctr., ¶ 12, 432 P.3d at 915: Supported adopting the “most likely, most reasonable” reading consistent with statutory design and purpose.
• Wyo. Dep't of Revenue v. PacifiCorp, 2025 WY 126, ¶ 36, 580 P.3d 491, 501 (Wyo. 2025): The Court used this to justify reading the statutory scheme in pari materia and giving effect to every clause—particularly the “change of venue” clause in the district attorney statute.

Venue and multi-county criminal administration context

• Anderson v. State, 2014 WY 74, ¶¶ 32-33, 327 P.3d 89, 98-99 (Wyo. 2014): Cited to illustrate real-world multi-county complexities (a “crime on wheels”) and to support the Court’s broader point that Wyoming criminal practice sometimes requires cross-county coordination.

Freedom of contract and enforceability limits

• Nuhome Invest., LLC v. Weller, 2003 WY 171, ¶ 10, 81 P.3d 940, 945 (Wyo. 2003): The Court invoked this to emphasize that contracts are generally enforced unless contrary to law/public policy—supporting the conclusion that multi-jurisdiction plea agreements are not per se unlawful.
• Gibbs v. State, 2008 WY 79, ¶ 10, 187 P.3d 862, 865 (Wyo. 2008): Reinforced that general contract principles guide government obligations under plea agreements.
• Jones v. Young, 2025 WY 130, ¶ 25, 580 P.3d 1026, 1034 (Wyo. 2025): Used for the Court’s reluctance to interfere with freedom of contract, which undercut the State’s argument that prosecutors’ geographic jurisdiction necessarily bars cross-county plea bargaining.

Agency doctrine (consent, authority, and scope)

• Aisenbrey v. State, 2024 WY 131, ¶ 14, 560 P.3d 283, 286 (Wyo. 2024): Reaffirmed the contract framework for plea agreements.
• Peterson v. Meritain Health, Inc., 2022 WY 54, ¶ 33, 508 P.3d 696, 708 (Wyo. 2022) (quoting Hamilton v. Natrona Cnty. Educ. Ass'n, 901 P.2d 381, 386 (Wyo. 1995)): Cited for the proposition that agency existence and scope are typically questions of fact, but can be decided as a matter of law if the record presents no factual dispute.
• True v. Hi-Plains Elevator Mach., Inc., 577 P.2d 991, 999 (Wyo. 1978): Central to the Court’s holding that consent is essential to agency and cannot simply be presumed.
• Redco Const. v. Profile Properties, LLC, 2012 WY 24, ¶ 38, 271 P.3d 408, 418-19 (Wyo. 2012): Used to describe agency as empowerment to act on another’s behalf.
• Austin v. Kaness, 950 P.2d 561, 564 (Wyo. 1997): The Court cited this for the definition of agency as consent to act on another’s behalf and “subject to his control,” and for “no presumption of agency.”
• Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. W.N. McMurry Const. Co., 2010 WY 57, ¶ 39, 230 P.3d 312, 326 (Wyo. 2010): Provided the taxonomy of express actual authority (written/oral permission) and implied actual authority (course of dealing/surrounding circumstances).

Single sovereign and procedural identity; limits of that concept

• Crebs v. State, 2020 WY 136, ¶¶ 23-26, 474 P.3d 1136, 1143-45 (Wyo. 2020): Cited to show the Court has used Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-1-106(b) (“all prosecutions” carried on in the name of the State) to resolve procedural questions (speedy trial timing), not to confer cross-county contracting authority.
• Webster v. State, 2016 WY 76, ¶ 13, 376 P.3d 488, 492-93 (Wyo. 2016): Similarly used § 7-1-106(b) in a res judicata/party-identity context, but not as a vehicle for agency/authority across prosecutorial offices.

Persuasive federal authority on enforcing government promises

• United States v. Lilly, 810 F.3d 1205, 1211 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2000)): The Court adopted the principle that a defendant seeking to enforce a plea promise must show the promisor had actual authority to make that promise. This provided a clear, administrable rule for multi-actor government bargaining disputes.

Nonparty cannot breach a contract

• Peterson, ¶ 22, 508 P.3d at 705: Used for the general contract principle that a non-party to a contract cannot be sued for breach—supporting the Court’s conclusion that Crook County could not have breached Campbell County’s plea agreement.

Legal Reasoning

1) Statutory “jurisdiction” does not create a categorical bar to cross-county plea bargaining

The State’s principal statutory argument relied on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-302(b) (county attorney duties where no district attorney office exists) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-1-804(a) (district attorney “exclusive jurisdiction”) to claim county attorneys cannot bind each other because their authority is confined to their counties.

The Court rejected that reading as too narrow, emphasizing § 9-1-804(a)(i)’s explicit clause permitting prosecution “in other counties upon a change of venue.” Applying the in pari materia method (from Wyo. Dep't of Revenue v. PacifiCorp), the Court read the “exclusive jurisdiction” phrase in context: it describes responsibility for cases “arising” in a district, but does not eliminate scenarios where prosecutors operate outside their home counties in recognized ways.

The Court also pointed to a broader ecosystem of statutes and rules anticipating cross-county action or cooperation (e.g., special prosecutor substitution, joinder/transfer/change of venue rules, and requested assistance provisions), reinforcing that Wyoming’s structure contemplates inter-county coordination.

2) Statutory silence plus contract principles: multi-jurisdiction plea agreements are permissible if consensual

The Court found it significant that neither the county attorney statute nor the district attorney statute speaks directly to joint plea agreements. From that silence—and given Wyoming’s general enforcement of contracts absent illegality or public-policy conflict (per Nuhome Invest., LLC v. Weller) and reluctance to restrict freedom of contract (per Jones v. Young)—the Court concluded there is no per se prohibition on prosecutors voluntarily entering multi-jurisdiction plea agreements.

This portion of the opinion establishes an important framing: the problem is not “multi-county pleas are invalid,” but rather “who had authority to make the promise.”

3) The controlling rule: actual authority (consent) is required to bind another prosecutor

Having confirmed permissibility in principle, the Court turned to agency. Wells argued that because all prosecutions are carried on in the name of the same sovereign (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-1-106(b)), the Campbell County Attorney, as an agent of the State, could bind the State—including its prosecutorial arm in Crook County.

The Court called this a non sequitur. Section 7-1-106(b) establishes the “single sovereign” concept for procedural identity and similar issues (as in Crebs v. State and Webster v. State), but does not confer inter-office contracting authority. Under Wyoming agency law, consent is essential and agency is not presumed (True v. Hi-Plains Elevator Mach., Inc.; Austin v. Kaness).

Applying Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. W.N. McMurry Const. Co., the Court held:

• No express actual authority: Crook County did not provide written or oral permission for Campbell County to bargain on Crook County’s behalf.
• No implied actual authority: no course of dealings or surrounding circumstances suggested joint bargaining or authorization.

The Court then adopted the enforcement principle from United States v. Lilly (quoting United States v. Flemmi): to specifically enforce a plea promise against the government actor(s) allegedly bound, the defendant must show the promisor had actual authority to make that promise. Wells could not do so regarding Crook County.

4) No breach by Crook County as a nonparty

Because Crook County was not a party to the Campbell County plea agreement, Crook County could not breach it. The Court relied on the general rule stated in Peterson v. Meritain Health, Inc. that a non-party cannot be sued for breach of contract.

Impact

• Clear enforceability rule for global resolutions: Defendants and counsel cannot rely on “concurrent with another county’s case” language unless the other county’s prosecutor has authorized or consented to that term. A concurrency promise is only as strong as the promisor’s authority.
• Blueprint for valid multi-county plea deals: The opinion implicitly encourages “global” pleas, but only with explicit coordination—e.g., signatures by each relevant prosecutor, a written inter-county agreement, or a clear record of authorization.
• Limits on “single sovereign” arguments: The decision narrows attempts to use Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-1-106(b) as a shortcut for proving statewide prosecutorial agency power across offices for contracting purposes.
• Probation revocations remain locally controlled: Even where a later case is sentenced “concurrently” in another county, probation revocation disposition in the original county is not constrained absent that county’s participation in the bargain.
• Remedial implications: Where cross-county promises are made without authority, the likely remedies shift away from “specific performance against the other county” and toward challenges directed at the bargain actually struck (e.g., plea validity, voluntariness, or relief in the sentencing county)—though those questions were not litigated here.