Date: Apr 10, 2026

Mukhtar v. Lambrecht: Mootness in APA/Mandamus Immigration Suits Once USCIS Reopens and Issues a New Decision (and the Plaintiff Does Not Amend)

1. Introduction

In Mukhtar v. Lambrecht (10th Cir. Apr. 8, 2026), Plaintiff-Appellant Aziza Mukhtar challenged USCIS’s July 9, 2020 denial of her Form I-485 application to adjust status to lawful permanent resident. She sued federal immigration officials seeking principally an order to set aside the denial and to compel USCIS to issue a new decision.

While the case was pending, USCIS reopened the application on its own initiative, issued a Request for Evidence (RFE) for a new and properly completed Form I-693 medical exam, and later issued a May 10, 2024 denial when Plaintiff did not respond with the requested evidence by the regulatory deadline.

The central issues on appeal were: (i) whether USCIS acted ultra vires in reopening the application; (ii) whether the reopening and new decision rendered the case moot given the relief pleaded; and (iii) whether the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception prevented mootness.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. It held that:

USCIS’s sua sponte reopening was authorized under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(5)(ii) and was not ultra vires, because USCIS gave Plaintiff more than the required opportunity to submit a response before issuing an unfavorable decision.
The suit became moot once USCIS did what the complaint asked—set aside the challenged denial by reopening and issued a new decision. Any challenge to the May 2024 denial required an amended complaint, which Plaintiff did not file.
The “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception did not apply because Plaintiff had ample opportunity to seek judicial review of the May 2024 decision (including by amending in the existing case or filing a new action).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Jurisdiction, Standard of Review, and Mootness Framework

Trackwell v. U.S. Gov't and U.S. West, Inc. v. Tristani: cited for the de novo standard of review of Rule 12(b)(1) dismissals. These cases anchor the panel’s posture that mootness is a pure jurisdictional question reviewed without deference.
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation and Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259 v. Disability Rights Ctr. of Kan.: cited for the proposition that federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over moot cases, emphasizing mootness as an Article III limitation rather than a merits disposition.
R.M. Inv. Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv.: reinforces that “questions of mootness” are reviewed de novo, supporting the appellate court’s independent evaluation of whether any live controversy remained.

What “Moot” Means and How to Evaluate It

Brown v. Buhman, relying on Chafin v. Chafin and Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc.: supplies the modern articulation that a case is moot when issues are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome, and that continued disagreement about legality does not preserve jurisdiction absent a live dispute over the plaintiff’s rights. The opinion uses these authorities to reject the idea that Plaintiff’s continuing objections to USCIS’s approach could keep the case alive.
Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of Agric.: quoted via Brown v. Buhman for the “real world effect” test—whether a present determination will have some effect outside the courtroom. Once USCIS had issued a new decision, a ruling about the superseded July 2020 denial could not change Plaintiff’s current legal position.
Smith v. Becerra and Prison Legal News v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons: provide the “claim-by-claim” / “each form of relief sought” method of evaluating mootness. The panel applies this approach by matching the complaint’s requested relief (set aside and require a new decision) to USCIS’s intervening actions (reopen and issue a new decision).

Attorneys’ Fees Do Not Preserve the Merits

Fleming v. Gutierrez, quoting Dahlem v. Bd. of Educ. of Denver Pub. Schs. and citing Citizens for Responsible Gov't State Pol. Action Comm. v. Davidson: supports the rule that a request for attorneys’ fees does not keep an otherwise moot case alive. The panel further notes that, absent a filed fee motion and a district-court ruling, any fee dispute is not a final decision for appellate review.

Catch-All Prayer for “Other Relief” Does Not Cure Mootness

WildEarth Guardians v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo.: cited for the proposition that broad residual prayers for relief (“any other relief deemed proper”) do not preserve a live controversy when the concrete relief sought is already obtained.

Exceptions to Mootness: Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review

Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc.: provides the two-part test for the exception: (1) inherently too short in duration to be fully litigated; and (2) reasonable expectation the same party will face the same action again. The court focuses on the first element—no inherent time-limitation prevented full litigation because Plaintiff could challenge the new denial through normal litigation channels.
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Rsrv.: used to stress that if an issue does not have an “inherent problem of limited duration,” it does not “evade review” in a way that warrants the exception.
Purpose Built Fams. Found., Inc. v. United States: cited for the related proposition that even likely recurrence does not trigger the exception when the plaintiff will have “ample opportunity” for review in due course. This bolsters the panel’s emphasis on procedural availability (amendment/new suit) over Plaintiff’s characterization of agency behavior.

Waiver/Forfeiture of Arguments

Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc. and Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.: support the holding that Plaintiff waived/forfeited any “voluntary cessation” mootness-exception argument by not raising it adequately in the district court and by only mentioning it in passing on appeal.

Authorities Referenced on USCIS Reopening and Procedure

6801 Realty Co., LLC v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs.: cited as persuasive support that USCIS may reopen and proceed under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(5)(ii) by requesting additional evidence and waiting for a response.
RELX, Inc. v. Baran: distinguished as not supporting Plaintiff’s ultra vires theory; the panel notes it concerns final agency action rather than the legality of sua sponte reopening.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(1) USCIS’s Sua Sponte Reopening Was Not Ultra Vires

The court treats Plaintiff’s ultra vires argument as turning on compliance with 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(5)(ii), which allows a Service officer to reopen on the officer’s own motion and requires notice and at least 30 days for a brief when the new decision may be unfavorable. USCIS reopened, issued an RFE, and gave Plaintiff 87 days to respond—well beyond the regulatory minimum.

The opinion also situates the RFE deadline within 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(8)(iv), which caps RFE response time at twelve weeks and bars extensions. USCIS’s refusal to “abate” the deadline was thus characterized as regulatory compliance, not procedural gamesmanship.

(2) The Case Became Moot Because the Complaint Sought Only a New Decision on the 2020 Denial

Applying the claim-by-claim and relief-specific approach, the panel matches the complaint’s operative request—set aside the July 2020 denial and direct USCIS to issue a new decision— to what USCIS did: it reopened and issued the May 2024 decision.

The key doctrinal move is the court’s insistence on pleading alignment: the only agency action challenged in the complaint was the July 2020 denial. Once superseded by reopening and a new denial, there was no effective court order the district court could issue as to the 2020 decision. If Plaintiff wanted merits review of the May 2024 denial, the proper step was to amend—not to litigate the new denial through opposition briefing to a mootness motion.

(3) Attorneys’ Fees and “Other Relief” Did Not Keep the Case Alive

The panel treats Plaintiff’s EAJA request as collateral: it may support a later fee dispute, but it cannot supply Article III jurisdiction over an otherwise moot merits claim. Additionally, the absence of a district court fee ruling meant there was no fee determination properly before the appellate court. The catch-all prayer for relief is similarly insufficient under circuit precedent.

(4) No “Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review” Exception

Plaintiff argued that repeated RFEs and dismissal “on that ground” would recur and evade review. The court rejects this because the challenged conduct was not inherently time-limited: Plaintiff could challenge the May 2024 denial in a fresh action or could have sought to amend while the case was pending. The availability of ordinary judicial review defeated the “evading review” requirement.

3.3 Impact

Clear mooting rule for “new decision” complaints: In immigration APA/mandamus litigation where the complaint seeks an order requiring USCIS to “issue a new decision,” USCIS can moot the case by reopening and issuing that new decision. Litigants must anticipate this and plead broader relief or be prepared to amend quickly once a superseding decision issues.
Procedural discipline in agency-review cases: The opinion reinforces that federal courts adjudicate the legality of specific challenged agency actions; new agency actions generally require updated pleadings rather than being folded into the old case informally.
Limits on mootness exceptions in benefits adjudications: The court signals skepticism that “capable of repetition yet evading review” fits routine benefits processes (RFEs, denials, reopenings), because such decisions typically remain reviewable through standard litigation pathways.
Validation of USCIS’s sua sponte reopening mechanics: By holding that compliance with § 103.5(a)(5)(ii) was satisfied via an RFE and sufficient response time, the decision may be cited by the government to defend reopenings that occur during pending litigation—especially where plaintiffs frame reopenings as jurisdictional “usurpation.”

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Mootness: A federal court can only decide a live dispute. If events during the lawsuit give the plaintiff everything the complaint asked for (or otherwise remove any effective remedy), the court loses power to decide the merits.
“Claim-by-claim” and “each form of relief sought”: Courts assess mootness by looking at each request in the complaint (injunction, declaration, etc.). If none of those requests can still change anything in practice, the case is moot.
Ultra vires: Latin for “beyond the powers.” Here it meant Plaintiff claimed USCIS lacked legal authority to reopen her application while litigation was pending. The court disagreed because the governing regulation expressly allows sua sponte reopening if procedural requirements are met.
Request for Evidence (RFE): A formal USCIS notice asking for missing or additional documentation needed to adjudicate an application. Under 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(8)(iv), USCIS must set a deadline and cannot extend it beyond the maximum allowed.
Capable of repetition yet evading review: A narrow exception that applies when an action ends too quickly for courts to decide it, and the same plaintiff is likely to face it again. The court held it didn’t apply because Plaintiff could still seek review of the new denial through normal procedures.

5. Conclusion

Mukhtar v. Lambrecht crystallizes a practical jurisdictional rule in immigration adjudication challenges: when a plaintiff sues to set aside a USCIS denial and to compel a new decision, and USCIS reopens and issues that new decision, the case becomes moot unless the plaintiff amends to challenge the new final action. The opinion also confirms USCIS’s authority to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(5)(ii) when it provides the required response opportunity, and it narrows the runway for invoking mootness exceptions in ordinary benefits adjudications that remain readily reviewable through standard litigation steps.