Mukantagara v. Noem: District-Court Jurisdiction Survives § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) for the Nondiscretionary Eligibility Step in Refugee-Status Terminations Under § 1157(c)(4)

Introduction

In Mukantagara v. Noem (10th Cir. Jan. 12, 2026), Agnes Mukantagara and her son, Ebenezer Shyaka, challenged U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (USCIS) termination of Mukantagara’s refugee status. USCIS terminated her status under 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4) after concluding she had participated in the Rwandan genocide, rendering her ineligible for refugee status at admission due to the “persecutor bar” in the refugee definition, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).

The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that the Immigration and Nationality Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provision for discretionary agency actions, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), barred review. The Tenth Circuit reversed, framing refugee-status termination as a two-step process: a nondiscretionary statutory eligibility determination followed by a discretionary termination decision.

The core issue was narrow but consequential: whether § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars district-court review of USCIS’s threshold determination that a person “was not in fact a refugee” at the time of admission, when that finding is a prerequisite to termination under § 1157(c)(4).

Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit held that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not apply to challenges targeting the first-step eligibility determination under § 1157(c)(4). The court interpreted § 1157(c)(4) as establishing:

  1. Step One (nondiscretionary): USCIS must determine whether the noncitizen “was not in fact a refugee” within § 1101(a)(42) at the time of admission.
  2. Step Two (discretionary): If step one is satisfied, USCIS has statutory discretion whether to terminate refugee status.

Because step one is a nondiscretionary statutory predicate, the district court retains jurisdiction to review that determination (including via an APA suit), notwithstanding § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). The case was remanded for further proceedings, and the Tenth Circuit expressly declined to address other APA-related defenses and merits arguments the district court did not reach.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Channeling vs. Stripping: The Case’s Procedural Backdrop

The court situated the dispute within the INA’s broader framework controlling where and when immigration-related claims may be reviewed. In the earlier appeal, Mukantagara v. DHS, 67 F.4th 1113 (10th Cir. 2023), the Tenth Circuit held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)—a channeling provision—did not force this challenge into a petition for review of a removal order because termination of refugee status by USCIS was not “part of removal proceedings.” That analysis drew on the Supreme Court’s caution against overreading channeling provisions in Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrim. Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999).

2) Interpreting § 1157(c)(4) as a Two-Step Scheme

The court’s interpretive approach is grounded in ordinary statutory-reading principles (e.g., Smith v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 73 F.4th 815 (10th Cir. 2023)), reading the sentence as a whole (citing Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)). The Tenth Circuit emphasized that “may” language can describe discretion at one point in a process without converting an antecedent statutory prerequisite into a discretionary one.

For the proposition that immigration statutes often require a nondiscretionary “eligibility” step before discretionary relief, the court relied on Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024). It also cited decisions describing refugee-status termination as conditioned on a finding that the person did not qualify as a refugee at entry: Maiwand v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2007); Kaganovich v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2006); Romanishyn v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 455 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2006).

3) Reviewability of Nondiscretionary Eligibility Determinations Under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)

The court found persuasive two circuit authorities construing § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) not to bar review of statutory eligibility determinations even when the overall decision includes a discretionary component:

  • Mejia Rodriguez v. DHS, 562 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 2009) (Temporary Protected Status): district courts retain jurisdiction to review USCIS’s “non-discretionary, statutory eligibility decisions.”
  • Hosseini v. Johnson, 826 F.3d 354 (6th Cir. 2016) (refugee adjustment under § 1159(b)): eligibility determinations are “non-discretionary” and reviewable despite § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).

The opinion acknowledged a contrary suggestion in Abuzeid v. Mayorkas, 62 F.4th 578 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (questioning whether Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (2022) undermines Hosseini v. Johnson), but rejected that as inapposite because Patel v. Garland interpreted a different subsection (§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)).

4) Why Patel Does Not Control: (i) vs. (ii)

The government urged Patel v. Garland as sweeping broadly enough to foreclose review of threshold determinations. The Tenth Circuit declined, emphasizing textual differences:

  • Patel v. Garland interpreted § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which bars review of “any judgment regarding the granting of relief” for enumerated forms of relief.
  • This case concerns § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which covers only decisions whose authority is “specified ... to be in the discretion” of the agency—language the court read as narrowing jurisdiction-stripping to truly discretionary actions.

The court used Alzaben v. Garland, 66 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2023) to underscore that Patel’s reading of (i) does not “directly address” (ii). It acknowledged the government’s reliance on Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010) (noting subsection (i) can be “instructive” for the catchall), but invoked the Supreme Court’s warning that neighboring provisions with “distinct language” do not “necessarily travel together,” citing Slack Techs., LLC v. Pirani, 598 U.S. 759 (2023).

The opinion also noted that even after Patel, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed review of “a non-discretionary determination that is a statutory predicate” to discretion in Bouarfa v. Sec'y DHS, 75 F.4th 1157 (11th Cir. 2023) (citing Mejia Rodriguez v. DHS).

5) Why Bouarfa (2024) Does Not Control: Threshold Conditions Matter

The government also invoked Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, 604 U.S. 6 (2024), where the Supreme Court held § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) barred review of visa revocation under 8 U.S.C. § 1155. The Tenth Circuit distinguished it on the precise ground emphasized by the Supreme Court: § 1155 contains “no conditions” and “no threshold requirements” the agency must satisfy; it is “a quintessential grant of discretion.”

The court further pointed out that Bouarfa v. Mayorkas expressly declined to “resolve whether § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) strips ... jurisdiction to review threshold determinations.” That reservation left room for the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that § 1157(c)(4) does contain a threshold condition (“not in fact a refugee at admission”) that is reviewable.

Consistent with earlier Tenth Circuit treatment of § 1155 as discretionary, the opinion cited Hamilton v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 2007) and Green v. Napolitano, 627 F.3d 1341 (10th Cir. 2010).

6) Recent § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) Cases About Process Discretion, Not Eligibility

Finally, the opinion rejected the government’s reliance on cases addressing USCIS’s discretion in administering adjustment-of-status processing rather than deciding statutory eligibility: Geda v. Dir. USCIS, 126 F.4th 835 (3d Cir. 2025); Cheejati v. Blinken, 106 F.4th 388 (5th Cir. 2024); Thigulla v. Jaddou, 94 F.4th 770 (8th Cir. 2024). Those cases did not involve a threshold eligibility finding of the sort at issue here—and Geda v. Dir. USCIS itself distinguished processing discretion from eligibility determinations.

Legal Reasoning

The Tenth Circuit’s reasoning proceeds in three linked moves:

  1. Statutory structure: Section 1157(c)(4) is not a single, undifferentiated discretionary “termination decision.” It is triggered only “if” the agency determines a past statutory fact—whether the person was “not in fact a refugee” at admission. That antecedent determination functions as an eligibility gate.
  2. Text of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii): Jurisdiction is stripped only for decisions whose authority is “specified” by statute to be in the agency’s discretion. An eligibility gate defined by statute is not “specified” to be discretionary merely because a later decision (termination) is phrased permissively (“may be terminated”).
  3. Two-step reviewability principle: Where immigration schemes have an eligibility step followed by a discretionary step, courts may review the eligibility step under (ii). The court treated Mejia Rodriguez v. DHS and Hosseini v. Johnson as persuasive analogues.

A notable doctrinal point is the court’s handling of the agency’s own regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 207.9, which provides refugee status “will be terminated” after an adverse step-one finding. The panel held this does not change the (ii) inquiry because, under Kucana v. Holder, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies “only when the statute itself” specifies discretion; regulations cannot expand jurisdiction-stripping by converting a statutory “may” into an administrative “will.”

Impact

1) Restored pathway for APA challenges to refugee-status termination predicates.
The immediate effect is jurisdictional: noncitizens (and derivative family members) may litigate in district court whether USCIS correctly found they “were not in fact a refugee” at admission for purposes of § 1157(c)(4). The Tenth Circuit did not decide the APA merits or whether other APA limitations (finality, committed-to-agency-discretion doctrines, etc.) apply; it only held the district court is not barred by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) from hearing the threshold question.

2) A clarified boundary for § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) after Patel and Bouarfa.
The decision draws a sharp textual line: Patel v. Garland broadens (i) through “any judgment” and “regarding,” but does not automatically broaden (ii), which is constrained by “specified ... to be in the discretion.” And Bouarfa v. Mayorkas is confined to statutes like § 1155 that have no threshold conditions. This will likely influence future litigation trying to analogize eligibility findings to discretionary judgments.

3) Practical consequences in removal and derivative-status contexts.
By enabling judicial review of the predicate finding that triggers refugee-status termination, the decision may affect collateral consequences (including derivative family members’ status) and strategic sequencing with removal proceedings. Here, the court noted parallel proceedings were abated pending this jurisdictional outcome, highlighting how refugee-status termination litigation can intersect with asylum, removal, and derivative “aging out” disputes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Subject-matter jurisdiction: the court’s power to hear a type of case. If Congress “strips” jurisdiction, courts must dismiss even strong claims.
  • Jurisdiction-stripping under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii): courts cannot review certain immigration decisions only when Congress has specified that the decision is within the agency’s discretion.
  • Eligibility determination vs. discretionary decision: an eligibility step asks whether statutory criteria are met (a rule-bound inquiry). A discretionary step asks whether to grant/terminate even if criteria are met (a choice-based inquiry).
  • “Two-step” immigration frameworks: many INA provisions require (1) eligibility, then (2) discretion. Courts are more likely to review step (1), unless a different jurisdiction-stripping rule explicitly covers it.
  • Persecutor bar: a statutory exclusion from refugee status for those who participated in persecution; if it applies at admission, the person was “not in fact a refugee” under § 1101(a)(42).
  • APA suit: a lawsuit under the Administrative Procedure Act challenging unlawful federal agency action. This case decides only that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not bar jurisdiction over the step-one issue; other APA hurdles may remain on remand.

Conclusion

Mukantagara v. Noem establishes, in the Tenth Circuit, that refugee-status termination under 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4) contains a reviewable, nondiscretionary threshold determination—whether the person was “not in fact a refugee” at admission—and that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not strip district courts of jurisdiction to review that predicate finding. The court carefully limited Patel v. Garland to § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and distinguished Bouarfa v. Mayorkas as involving a statute lacking any threshold requirements. The decision reopens federal-court scrutiny of the statutory basis for refugee-status terminations while leaving for remand the separate questions of APA reviewability and the merits of USCIS’s determination.