MRTMA Supersedes State Probation Conditions That Incorporate Federal Marijuana Prohibitions

Introduction

In People of Michigan v. Danielle Heaven-Leah Hess (Mich Sup Ct, July 6, 2026), the Michigan Supreme Court addressed a rapidly recurring conflict: whether Michigan courts may forbid Michigan Regulation and Taxation of Marihuana Act (MRTMA)-compliant adult recreational marijuana use as a condition of probation simply because federal law still criminalizes recreational marijuana possession and use under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA).

The case arose after Danielle Heaven-Leah Hess pleaded guilty to third-degree retail fraud for stealing clothing from Meijer and received probation under the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act (HYTA). The district court imposed a probation term barring marijuana use/possession without stating any individualized reason. Hess later tested positive for marijuana and incurred probation violations, prompting her motion to (i) amend probation to permit MRTMA-compliant use, (ii) vacate the first violation, and (iii) dismiss the second violation.

The key legal issues were:

  • Whether MCL 771.3(1)(a) (a mandatory probation condition requiring probationers not violate federal law) effectively requires sentencing courts to prohibit MRTMA-compliant marijuana use.
  • Whether federal CSA illegality preempts MRTMA’s immunity provisions, and, if not, whether the MRTMA displaces inconsistent state-law probation rules.

Summary of the Opinion

In a unanimous opinion by Justice Welch, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held:

  • A trial court may not prohibit MRTMA-compliant marijuana use as a probation condition solely because such use violates federal law.
  • The Court of Appeals failed to apply the preemption analysis from Ter Beek v City of Wyoming, under which the CSA does not preempt state marijuana laws that merely provide state-law immunity and do not obstruct federal enforcement.
  • The probation act is inconsistent with the MRTMA to the extent MCL 771.3(1)(a) incorporates federal marijuana prohibitions in a way that would impose “penalty” on MRTMA-compliant conduct; under MCL 333.27954(5), the MRTMA controls.

The Court remanded to the trial court to reconsider Hess’s motion (amending probation, vacating the first violation, dismissing the second) consistent with the new rule. The Court expressly did not decide whether and when courts may restrict MRTMA-compliant use as a discretionary, individually tailored probation condition.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Federal preemption framework and marijuana immunities

Ter Beek v City of Wyoming, 495 Mich 1; 846 NW2d 531 (2014), is the opinion’s linchpin. There, the Court held the CSA did not preempt the MMMA’s limited state-law immunity because:

  • State immunity from state arrest/prosecution/penalty does not “purport to prohibit federal criminalization of, or punishment for,” the same conduct.
  • The MMMA did not make it impossible to comply with federal law, nor did it obstruct federal purposes; it did not interfere with federal enforcement.

Hess extends that logic to the MRTMA because the Court viewed the MMMA and MRTMA as closely parallel voter-enacted schemes with similarly sweeping immunity language. The Court treated Ter Beek v City of Wyoming as controlling in method, then applied the same “positive conflict” inquiry (21 USC 903) to conclude: the CSA does not preempt MCL 333.27955(1).

The Court also cited United States v Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop, 532 US 483 (2001), to describe the CSA’s general prohibition framework—supporting the premise that federal illegality exists, but not establishing preemption of state-law immunity.

2) Interpreting voter initiatives and harmonizing related statutes

The Court grounded its interpretive approach to voter-enacted statutes in:

  • People v Hartwick, 498 Mich 192; 870 NW2d 37 (2015) (electorate intent; plain language; judicial restraint).
  • Michigan v McQueen, 493 Mich 135; 828 NW2d 644 (2013) (plain language as the most reliable evidence of intent).
  • Schmidt v Dep't of Ed, 441 Mich 236; 490 NW2d 584 (1992) (special emphasis on judicial restraint).

It also invoked the “one system” principle for related statutes: Int'l Business Machines Corp v Dep't of Treasury, 496 Mich 642; 852 NW2d 865 (2014) (opinion by VIVIANO, J.), quoting Rathbun v Michigan, 284 Mich 521; 280 NW 35 (1938). This justified using MMMA caselaw to interpret the MRTMA, given the shared subject matter and similar text.

The opinion referenced People v Armstrong to summarize the MMMA/MRTMA divide: the MMMA concerns medicinal marijuana; the MRTMA legalized nonmedicinal adult use—while acknowledging the MRTMA does not legalize all marijuana conduct under all circumstances.

3) Conflicts between marijuana initiatives and other Michigan statutes

The Court analogized to People v Koon, 494 Mich 1; 832 NW2d 724 (2013), where the MMMA controlled over a conflicting Michigan Vehicle Code provision. That case supported the interpretive move central to Hess: when the MRTMA declares inconsistent state laws inapplicable to permitted conduct (MCL 333.27954(5)), courts must honor that directive.

4) Probation conditions: discretion, lawfulness, and tailoring

The Court relied on the probation-law framework expressed in several Court of Appeals decisions:

  • People v Zujko, 282 Mich App 520; 765 NW2d 897 (2009) (abuse-of-discretion review for probation conditions).
  • People v Breeding, 284 Mich App 471; 772 NW2d 810 (2009) (abuse-of-discretion review for probation revocation; probation as grace).
  • People v Houston, 237 Mich App 707; 604 NW2d 706 (1999), citing People v Gonyo, 173 Mich App 716; 434 NW2d 223 (1988) (probation discretion must be guided by what is lawfully and logically related to rehabilitation; unlawful conditions must be vacated).
  • People v Graber, 128 Mich App 185; 339 NW2d 866 (1983) (even unusual conditions can be upheld if justified by the record and tailored to risk/need).

Finally, the Court flagged but did not resolve the implications of People v Thue, 336 Mich App 35; 969 NW2d 346 (2021), which had held that probation provisions allowing a court to prohibit a probationer’s MMMA-compliant marijuana use impermissibly conflict with the MMMA, and that revocation for MMMA-compliant use is a “penalty.” Hess expressly declined to decide whether Thue means courts can never limit MMMA-compliant use, whether Thue is correct, or whether such reasoning extends to the MRTMA.

The Court also referenced the procedural companion case People v Lopez-Hernandez to explain why it did not address discretionary MRTMA restrictions here.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Step 1: Identify the Court of Appeals’ theory and its consequence.
    The Court of Appeals treated MCL 771.3(1)(a) (no violations of federal law) plus CSA illegality as effectively making a marijuana ban a mandatory probation term—even for non-marijuana-related crimes and without individualized reasons.
  2. Step 2: Apply Ter Beek’s preemption analysis to the MRTMA.
    Using Ter Beek’s “positive conflict” test (21 USC 903), the Court held the CSA does not preempt MCL 333.27955(1) because: (a) the MRTMA grants state-law immunity from state “arrest, prosecution, or penalty,” but does not negate federal criminalization; and (b) the MRTMA does not obstruct federal objectives because it does not interfere with federal enforcement of the CSA.
  3. Step 3: Determine which state law controls when state provisions conflict.
    Because the CSA does not preempt the MRTMA, the Court turned to the MRTMA’s internal conflicts clause: MCL 333.27954(5) (“All other laws inconsistent with this act do not apply to conduct that is permitted by this act.”). The Court found inconsistency because the probation act’s incorporation of federal marijuana prohibitions would impose “penalty” for MRTMA-compliant conduct, contrary to:
    • MCL 333.27952 (intent to “prevent arrest and penalty” for adult personal possession/cultivation; directive to interpret accordingly), and
    • MCL 333.27955(1) (MRTMA-compliant acts are not grounds for “penalty in any manner” or denial of “any other right or privilege”).
  4. Step 4: Announce a narrow holding and preserve the discretionary question.
    The Court drew a line: a probation condition cannot be justified solely by CSA illegality. But the Court left open whether courts may sometimes restrict MRTMA-compliant use under MCL 771.3(3) as a discretionary, individualized, rehabilitation-related condition.

Impact

  • Ends “federal-law-only” marijuana bans as automatic probation boilerplate.
    After Hess, Michigan courts cannot treat the CSA as a universal shortcut to prohibit MRTMA-compliant adult recreational use for every probationer.
  • Strengthens MRTMA’s “penalty” and “right or privilege” protections in the probation context.
    The decision frames a court-imposed probation abstinence term—when based only on federal illegality—as an MRTMA-inconsistent “penalty” or denial of a “right or privilege.”
  • Redirects litigation to tailoring and record-based justification.
    Because the Court left open discretionary restrictions, future cases will likely focus on whether marijuana limitations are individually tailored under MCL 771.3(11), rehabilitation-related under People v Houston, and supported by the record (as in People v Graber), rather than justified categorically by federal law.
  • Promotes doctrinal symmetry between MMMA and MRTMA.
    By extending Ter Beek v City of Wyoming from the MMMA to the MRTMA, the Court signals that Michigan’s voter-enacted marijuana immunities will generally be analyzed through the same preemption lens, absent meaningful textual differences.
  • Creates pressure to clarify Thue’s reach.
    Hess’s explicit reservation about People v Thue invites future review: whether there are any circumstances permitting restriction of MMMA- or MRTMA-compliant use, and how to reconcile marijuana immunities with probation supervision goals.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Federal “preemption” (in this case): Federal law can override state law when they conflict in certain ways. Here, the question was whether the CSA overrides the MRTMA. The Court said no because Michigan’s law does not block federal enforcement—it only removes state penalties for MRTMA-compliant conduct.
  • “Positive conflict” (21 USC 903): A direct clash such that the two laws “cannot consistently stand together.” The Court held a federal ban and a state decision not to punish under state law can coexist: a person can still be federally prosecutable even if Michigan does not punish them.
  • MRTMA “immunity” and “penalty in any manner”: The MRTMA broadly protects MRTMA-compliant conduct from state-law consequences—arrest, prosecution, or “penalty.” The Court treated a probation violation/revocation grounded solely in federal illegality as the kind of state “penalty” the MRTMA was designed to prevent.
  • Mandatory vs discretionary probation conditions: Some probation terms are required by statute (e.g., not violating laws). Others are discretionary and must be justified and tailored. Hess holds that the “do not violate federal law” term cannot be used to automatically import federal marijuana prohibition in a manner inconsistent with the MRTMA.
  • What the Court did not decide: Whether a court can prohibit MRTMA-compliant use for individualized reasons (e.g., tied to the offense, treatment needs, public safety, or demonstrated risk) under MCL 771.3(3) and MCL 771.3(11).

Conclusion

People v Hess establishes that Michigan courts may not bar MRTMA-compliant adult recreational marijuana use on probation solely because it remains illegal under the federal CSA. Applying Ter Beek v City of Wyoming, the Court held the CSA does not preempt the MRTMA’s state-law immunity, and it further held that the MRTMA displaces inconsistent state probation rules to the extent those rules would impose a state “penalty” for MRTMA-permitted conduct.

The decision is both narrow and consequential: it blocks categorical, federal-law-driven probation prohibitions, while leaving open the next battleground—when, if ever, MRTMA-compliant marijuana limits can be imposed as a truly discretionary, individualized, rehabilitation-related condition supported by the record.