Mosti v. Tullis: Qualified Immunity for Taking an Actively Resisting, Handcuffed Suspect to the Ground Where Video Does Not Show Clearly Excessive Force
1. Introduction
Mosti v. Tullis (5th Cir. Mar. 10, 2026) is an unpublished Fifth Circuit decision
arising from an encounter outside a concert at the Cynthia Woods Pavilion. After Edgar Mosti—highly
intoxicated—directed obscenities and racial slurs at officers, he was arrested for public intoxication.
During the arrest, a struggle occurred. While being led away in handcuffs, Mosti pulled away; he and
Detective Gregory Tullis then went to the ground. Body-camera video captured the incident.
Mosti sued for excessive force (and initially other claims and other officers). The case narrowed to one claim:
whether Detective Tullis used excessive force when Mosti fell—allegedly because Tullis intentionally “swept”
Mosti’s legs. The district court granted summary judgment on qualified immunity, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
The central legal issues were: (1) whether the force used in taking Mosti to the ground was “clearly excessive”
and “clearly unreasonable” under Fifth Circuit excessive-force doctrine; and (2) whether any alleged unlawfulness
was “clearly established,” particularly given the body-camera footage and the suspect’s resistance.
2. Summary of the Opinion
The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Detective Tullis on qualified immunity. Viewing the facts “in the
light depicted by the video[],” the court held that—even assuming Tullis intentionally tripped Mosti—Tullis’s
conduct was objectively reasonable in response to Mosti’s active resistance, including pulling away while
handcuffed. The video did not show “clearly excessive” force that was “clearly unreasonable.”
The court further rejected Mosti’s attempts to rely on cases involving passive, compliant, or helpless suspects,
distinguishing those precedents as factually inapposite.
3. Analysis
A. Precedents Cited
Appellate posture and affirmance authority
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Gilbert v. Donahoe, 751 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. 2014): The court invoked the rule that it may
“affirm on any ground supported by the record” if raised below. This frames the appellate discretion
underlying the affirmance, reinforcing that qualified immunity can be upheld on any record-supported rationale.
Qualified immunity framework
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Cass v. City of Abilene, 814 F.3d 721 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam): Supplies the general
principle that qualified immunity protects officials unless they violate clearly established rights.
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Rich v. Palko, 920 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2019): Provides the two-step burden on the plaintiff
at summary judgment—show a constitutional violation and that it was clearly established at the time.
In Mosti, this burden framing is decisive: even if a plaintiff alleges a trip, he must still
demonstrate objective excessiveness and a clearly established prohibition under closely matching precedent.
Fifth Circuit excessive-force elements and fact intensity
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Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam): The opinion uses
Deville’s three-part formulation—(1) injury, (2) resulting directly and only from force that was
clearly excessive, and (3) clearly unreasonable. The court treated prongs (2) and (3) as the real dispute.
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Salazar v. Molina, 37 F.4th 278 (5th Cir. 2022): Emphasizes that the excessive-force inquiry is
“fact-intensive,” supporting the court’s insistence on granular attention to resistance and timing.
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Joseph on behalf of Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2020): Contributes the
resistance-focused lens: “timing, amount, and form” of resistance are “key.” The court used this concept to
characterize Mosti as actively resisting even while handcuffed—an important factual pivot away from cases
involving passive suspects.
“Clearly established” law and the need for fact-specific precedent
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Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100 (2018) (per curiam): Supplies the Supreme Court’s directive that
officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless precedent “squarely governs the specific facts at issue.”
This is the doctrinal backbone for the court’s rejection of Mosti’s analogies to materially different
excessive-force cases.
Video evidence as the controlling factual frame
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Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 2012): Used for two related propositions:
(1) where video “significantly aids” understanding and is undisputed, the court views facts as depicted; and
(2) as a comparator supporting the reasonableness of taking a resisting suspect to the ground.
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Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007): Via Poole, anchors the “light depicted by the video”
standard. This substantially narrows the plaintiff’s ability to manufacture a factual dispute inconsistent
with the recording.
Objective reasonableness; subjective intent deemphasized
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Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839 (5th Cir. 2009): Cited for the proposition that subjective intent
does not control; the inquiry is what a reasonable officer could do in the circumstances. This supports the
court’s key move: even if the “trip” was purposeful, it can still be reasonable given resistance.
Permissible escalation in response to noncompliance
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Buehler v. Dear, 27 F.4th 969 (5th Cir. 2022): The court relies on the “measured and ascending”
force concept—officers may reasonably increase force to gain control when a suspect is noncompliant.
Authorities invoked by Mosti and distinguished by the panel
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Doss v. Helpenstell, 626 Fed. App'x. 453 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished): Distinguished
because it involved repeated punches against a motorist who passively held the steering wheel.
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Ramirez v. Martinez, 716 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 2013): Distinguished because the suspect was passively
handcuffed and lying facedown when tased.
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Newman v. Guedre, 703 F.3d 757 (5th Cir. 2012): Distinguished because officers beat and tased a
suspect who was not actively resisting.
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Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 2009): Distinguished factually as involving force
viewed as grossly disproportionate during a minor traffic-stop scenario.
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Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730 (5th Cir. 2000): Distinguished as involving severe
injury (broken arm and shoulder damage) associated with tackling and arm manipulation beyond what was shown
in Mosti.
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Hanks v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2017): Distinguished because the officer struck an unarmed
suspect from behind amid confusion, with the court characterizing that suspect as not comparable to Mosti’s
active resistance.
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Craig v. Martin, 26 F.4th 699 (5th Cir. 2022): Mentioned in the footnote to reject waiver and to
show that Tullis had argued justification for “some force” even if the fall were intentional.
The distinguishing theme is consistent: Mosti’s cited cases largely involve force used against passive,
subdued, or non-resisting individuals, whereas the video in Mosti depicts continuing resistance,
including a handcuffed pull-away and a lunge that created a physical control problem for officers.
B. Legal Reasoning
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Start with the qualified-immunity burden. Under Rich v. Palko and Cass v. City of Abilene,
Mosti had to show both a constitutional violation and clearly established law.
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Apply the Fifth Circuit’s excessive-force test. Using Deville v. Marcantel,
the court accepted injury and focused on whether the challenged force was “clearly excessive” and “clearly unreasonable.”
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Fix the facts via video. Under Poole v. City of Shreveport and Scott v. Harris,
the panel treated the bodycam footage as the governing depiction of disputed events.
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Assess resistance with “granularity.” Relying on Salazar v. Molina and
Joseph on behalf of Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, the panel treated the timing and nature of Mosti’s resistance
as critical: intoxication, verbal aggression, struggle during cuffing, and continued physical noncompliance after cuffing.
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Hold that taking him to the ground was objectively reasonable—even if intentional.
With Manis v. Lawson minimizing subjective intent, and Buehler v. Dear supporting “measured and ascending”
responses to noncompliance, the court concluded a reasonable officer could decide to bring Mosti prone to regain control.
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Reject “clearly established” analogies that do not match the facts. Under Kisela v. Hughes,
Mosti needed precedent that “squarely governs” the scenario. The panel found his cited cases inapt because they involved
passive or already-subdued suspects or grossly disproportionate force, unlike the resistance shown on the video here.
A notable feature of the reasoning is the court’s willingness to assume arguendo the plaintiff’s characterization
(an intentional “trip”) and still grant qualified immunity based on objective reasonableness in the resistance context.
That analytical move narrows the case to a single controlling question: whether the video depicts clearly excessive and
clearly unreasonable force. The panel concluded it does not.
C. Impact
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Reinforcement of video-centered adjudication at summary judgment. By foregrounding
Poole/Scott, the decision underscores that where bodycam footage is undisputed, plaintiffs must
overcome the “light depicted by the video” framing—reducing the practical room for disputes based on testimony alone.
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Resistance after handcuffing remains legally significant. The opinion treats handcuffs
as not dispositive; a handcuffed suspect can still present an active-resistance or control risk justifying a takedown.
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Intentionality is not a shortcut around qualified immunity. Even if a plaintiff persuades a court
that force was deliberate, Mosti emphasizes that objective reasonableness remains the core inquiry.
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Fact matching for “clearly established” law is demanding. The opinion illustrates the continuing
strength of Kisela in the Fifth Circuit: broad statements that “tripping a handcuffed person is excessive”
will not suffice without closely aligned precedent involving similar resistance and circumstances.
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Doctrinal signal despite nonpublication. Although “not designated for publication,” the decision
reflects an evaluative pattern likely to influence litigants and district courts: takedowns in response to active
resistance—particularly when captured on video—often fall within qualified-immunity protection absent extreme force or
clear precedent.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Qualified immunity
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A doctrine shielding government officials from personal liability unless they violated a constitutional right that was
clearly established at the time. In practice, it requires plaintiffs to produce closely applicable precedent or an
obvious constitutional violation.
- “Clearly established” law
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A requirement that prior cases have put the constitutional question “beyond debate,” typically by addressing materially
similar facts. Under Kisela v. Hughes, courts look for precedent that “squarely governs” the scenario.
- Excessive force (Fifth Circuit formulation)
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Under Deville v. Marcantel, the plaintiff must show injury caused by force that was both “clearly excessive”
and “clearly unreasonable” in the situation the officer faced.
- Objective reasonableness vs. subjective intent
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Under Manis v. Lawson, courts focus on what a reasonable officer could do under the circumstances, not what the
officer subjectively intended. That is why an intentional act (like an alleged trip) can still be lawful if objectively
reasonable.
- Video controls the factual view at summary judgment
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Under Scott v. Harris (as applied through Poole v. City of Shreveport), when a video clearly depicts the
event and is undisputed, courts adopt the video’s depiction rather than a conflicting narrative.
- “Measured and ascending” force
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A description (from Buehler v. Dear) of escalating police force in steps in response to continued resistance,
rather than jumping immediately to extreme measures.
5. Conclusion
Mosti v. Tullis affirms qualified immunity in a bodycam-documented arrest where a highly intoxicated suspect
resisted before and after handcuffing and was taken to the ground during that resistance. Applying the Fifth Circuit’s
excessive-force framework (Deville) and Supreme Court guidance on specificity (Kisela), the court held that
the video does not show clearly excessive, clearly unreasonable force—and that Mosti’s reliance on passive-suspect cases
could not clearly establish a violation on these facts.
The decision’s broader significance lies in its tight coupling of (1) resistance-sensitive reasonableness,
(2) the controlling force of video evidence at summary judgment, and (3) the demanding, fact-specific nature of
“clearly established” law in qualified-immunity analysis.