Mootness Remand Under FRAP 12.1(b): Vacatur of a Preliminary Injunction to Eliminate Appellate Jurisdiction

Introduction

American Academy of Pediatrics v. James Uthmeier (7th Cir. Sept. 14, 2026) is an en banc Seventh Circuit disposition that ends not with a merits ruling, but with a procedural directive designed to close a now-moot appeal. The Plaintiff-Appellee, the American Academy of Pediatrics (the “Academy”), had obtained a preliminary injunction in the Northern District of Illinois restraining Florida’s Attorney General from litigating certain Florida-law claims in Florida state court. After the Academy moved to dismiss its federal complaint and the district court granted that motion, the district court indicated it was willing to vacate its previously entered preliminary injunction.

The central issues before the Seventh Circuit were therefore jurisdictional and remedial: (1) what the appellate court should do when the underlying controversy has become moot during appeal, and (2) how to facilitate vacatur of an extant preliminary injunction so that no appealable order remains. Beneath that narrow procedural surface, multiple opinions highlight a continuing institutional dispute about Younger abstention, its “bad-faith” exception, federalism, and the role of federal courts in restraining state enforcement litigation—though the court’s operative action deliberately avoids deciding those questions.

Summary of the Opinion

The court (per curiam) grants a remand so the district court may vacate its preliminary injunction. Citing FED. R. APP. P. 12.1(b) and Chicago Headline Club v. Noem, 168 F.4th 1033, 1039–42 (7th Cir. 2026), the Seventh Circuit gives the district court “permission” to vacate on remand. The court explains the consequence: once the injunction is vacated, “there will no longer be an appealable order,” and the appeal will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Separate writings agree on the necessary procedural endpoint (mootness, vacatur, dismissal), but diverge sharply on whether the en banc court should also have used the occasion to condemn—or defend—the district court’s earlier reliance on the “bad-faith” exception to Younger abstention. Judge Hamilton (joined by Judge Jackson-Akiwumi) urges restraint in a moot case. Judge Kolar emphasizes the tension between federalism and constitutional rights, and notes the open question of how to limit Younger’s bad-faith exception. Judge Scudder (joined by Chief Judge Brennan and Judges St. Eve and Kirsch) concurs in dismissal but dissents from the court’s choice not to say more, arguing the preliminary injunction was an extraordinary intrusion on state sovereignty and should be criticized as inconsistent with the narrowness of the bad-faith exception.

Analysis

1) The Procedural Holding: Remand to Enable Vacatur Under Rule 12.1(b) in a Moot Appeal

The operative rule-like takeaway is practical and jurisdictional: when a case becomes moot on appeal (here, following the plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of its complaint and the district court’s stated willingness to vacate), the appellate court may remand under FED. R. APP. P. 12.1(b) to allow the district court to vacate the preliminary injunction; once vacated, the appellate court will lack jurisdiction because there is no longer an appealable order.

The per curiam order uses the same procedural mechanism emphasized in Chicago Headline Club v. Noem, 168 F.4th 1033, 1039–42 (7th Cir. 2026) (per curiam): a limited remand so the district court can take action (here, vacatur) that the appellate posture otherwise complicates. The court’s decision is tightly framed around conserving Article III jurisdiction and avoiding advisory merits rulings.

2) Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Competing Views)

A. Mootness, sequencing, and what courts may still do

  • Chicago Headline Club v. Noem, 168 F.4th 1033, 1039–42 (7th Cir. 2026) (per curiam)
    Directly supports the court’s use of Rule 12.1(b) to permit district-court action (vacatur) that will remove the appealable order and terminate appellate jurisdiction. It supplies the immediate procedural template.
  • Sinochem Intern. Co. v. Malaysia Intern. Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (citing Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 433–34 (1975))
    Invoked by Judge Scudder to argue the en banc court could have addressed the propriety of Younger abstention and vacated the injunction itself even while jurisdictional questions loomed—i.e., that some threshold or “non-merits” determinations can be resolved without full Article III adjudication.

B. Younger abstention and the “bad-faith” exception: the submerged merits dispute

  • Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)
    The anchor precedent for abstention from interfering with state enforcement proceedings, grounded in federalism and comity. Judge Hamilton and Judge Kolar emphasize that Younger includes a “bad-faith” safety valve (“good-faith attempts” to enforce), while Judge Scudder stresses the narrowness of any exception and the constitutional costs of federal injunctions against state litigation.
  • Dombrowski v. Pfister, 389 U.S. 479, 487–89 (1965) (as described in Judge Kolar’s concurrence) and Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 492 (1965) (as cited in Judge Scudder’s dissent)
    Treated as the historical root and exemplar for federal injunctive intervention against bad-faith state action. Judge Kolar uses Dombrowski to show why the exception exists; Judge Scudder uses it to argue the exception is (and should remain) extraordinarily rare and fact-bound.
  • Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 602 (1975)
    Cited by Judge Scudder for the proposition that the bad-faith exception is “narrow,” supporting his critique that the district court’s injunction exceeded proper bounds.
  • Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. v. McCarty, 270 F.3d 536 (7th Cir. 2001)
    Cited by Judge Hamilton as an example of a related exception (“flagrantly and patently” unconstitutional) being applied to overcome Younger abstention—used to show exceptions are real, even if rarely invoked.
  • Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375, 1382–83 (5th Cir. 1979)
    Another example cited by Judge Hamilton to show lower federal courts have applied bad-faith principles to protect federal rights, reinforcing his point that the exception is not a “dead letter.”
  • Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460 (1974)
    Cited by Judge Scudder to underscore parity and comity: state proceedings ordinarily provide a “vehicle” to vindicate federal constitutional rights, undercutting the need for federal injunctive interference.

C. The vacated motions-panel decision and its shadow

  • American Academy of Pediatrics v. Uthmeier, 178 F.4th 1113 (7th Cir. 2026) (vacated on en banc vote)
    Judge Hamilton references the (vacated) motions-panel treatment of the stay request, noting it aired the issues “provisionally.” Judge Scudder references his prior dissenting views. The en banc court’s per curiam order, however, refuses to convert that provisional debate into binding law in a moot case.
  • American Academy of Pediatrics v. Uthmeier, 2026 WL 1552734, *17–25 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 2026)
    Judge Hamilton describes the district court’s “detailed and sound factual findings” supporting bad faith, using this to justify why the exception can apply and why deference to district-court fact-finding matters—though the en banc court does not adopt those findings as part of a merits disposition.

D. How narrowly to read Supreme Court precedent and the “disfavored judicial activity” analogy

  • City of Timber Lake v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 10 F.3d 554, 557 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting McCoy v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991)), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 910 (1992); and Jones v. St. Paul Companies, Inc., 495 F.3d 888, 893 (8th Cir. 2007)
    Judge Kolar cites these authorities to resist “cabin[ing]” Dombrowski strictly to its facts as a general method of precedent. The point is methodological: the limiting principle for the bad-faith exception must be justified in a manner consistent with ordinary stare decisis practice.
  • Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 491 (2022)
    Used by Judge Kolar as an analogy: sometimes the Supreme Court later characterizes certain expansions as “disfavored judicial activity.” He contrasts that with the bad-faith exception, observing the Court has not similarly labeled Dombrowski/Younger bad-faith doctrine as disfavored—even if it has not applied it in decades.

E. Modern examples of alleged bad-faith enforcement and “heckler’s veto” through litigation

  • Yelp Inc. v. Paxton, 137 F.4th 944, 951–52 (9th Cir. 2025); Netflix, Inc. v. Babin, 88 F.4th 1080, 1099–1100 (5th Cir. 2023)
    Judge Kolar cites these as contemporary signals that bad-faith allegations may be increasing, possibly raising anew the importance of a workable limiting principle for the exception.
  • LG Display Co. v. Madigan, 665 F.3d 768, 770 (7th Cir. 2011)
    Cited by Judge Kolar to illustrate that prosecutors (including state attorneys general) wield significant civil enforcement tools, increasing the potential for enforcement litigation to impose burdens even outside criminal prosecution.

F. Structural constitutional premises about state courts

  • Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 346 (1816)
    Cited by Judge Scudder to reinforce parity: state judges are presumed capable of adjudicating federal constitutional defenses, supporting his view that federal injunctions preventing state adjudication are extraordinary.

3) Legal Reasoning

A. The court’s controlling logic: eliminate the appealable order

The per curiam order is built on a straightforward jurisdictional chain:

  1. The Academy voluntarily dismissed its complaint in the district court, and the dismissal was granted.
  2. The district court indicated it was willing to vacate the preliminary injunction it previously entered.
  3. The Seventh Circuit remands with permission to vacate under FED. R. APP. P. 12.1(b).
  4. Once vacatur occurs, there is no longer an appealable injunction order.
  5. Absent an appealable order, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction, so the appeal will be dismissed.

This reasoning serves two institutional goals: (i) it respects Article III’s limitation to live cases and controversies, and (ii) it prevents the federal courts from issuing an advisory opinion on Younger doctrine in a case rendered moot by a party’s strategic litigation choice.

B. The fault line: whether to add merits commentary in a moot case

The separate writings expose an internal debate about judicial role:

  • Restraint (Hamilton): Once moot, the court should “resist the temptation” to debate the merits. Even if federalism is implicated, so too are First Amendment rights; and the bad-faith exception is a “critical feature” of Younger—but these are best resolved in a live controversy with full en banc consideration.
  • Balancing and uncertainty (Kolar): The opinion highlights the need for a limiting principle that preserves federalism without extinguishing the bad-faith safety valve. Judge Kolar points to the Supreme Court’s long nonuse of the exception and to modern enforcement dynamics, including the possibility of a “heckler’s veto” achieved through costly litigation.
  • Condemnation of the injunction (Scudder): Even while agreeing the case is moot and the injunction must be vacated, Judge Scudder argues the court should have said plainly that the injunction was an impermissible intrusion—given the narrowness of the bad-faith exception (Huffman), the Supreme Court’s historical rarity in applying it (Dombrowski), and the constitutional design presuming state-court competence (Steffel, Martin).

4) Impact

A. Immediate doctrinal impact: procedural roadmap for closing moot injunction appeals

The decision’s direct precedential value is procedural: it reinforces, alongside Chicago Headline Club v. Noem, an efficient pathway for handling moot appeals involving injunctions—use a limited remand under Rule 12.1(b), permit district-court vacatur, then dismiss for lack of jurisdiction once the appealable order disappears.

B. Indirect impact: visible pressure on Younger’s “bad-faith” exception

Although the court does not decide the scope of the bad-faith exception, the opinions collectively signal that the Seventh Circuit is actively contesting (i) how “alive” the exception remains, (ii) what factual predicates can satisfy it, and (iii) how to reconcile it with the federalism core of Younger. Future litigants should expect:

  • Closer scrutiny of district-court findings of bad faith and the standard of review arguments highlighted by Judge Hamilton.
  • Renewed emphasis on the rarity/narrowness arguments advanced by Judge Scudder, including comparisons to Dombrowski.
  • More attention to modern civil enforcement dynamics and litigation-burden theories flagged by Judge Kolar (including “heckler’s veto” framing).

C. Strategic litigation behavior: voluntary dismissal and vacatur as a merits-avoidance mechanism

Judge Scudder frames the Academy’s dismissal as “strategic and calculated,” and worries that the court’s silence could impose future “constitutional expense.” Even without adopting that characterization, the decision illustrates a recurring phenomenon: parties can sometimes end appellate merits review by mooting the case and seeking vacatur. The Seventh Circuit’s approach here prioritizes jurisdictional cleanliness over using the moment to articulate structural limits on federal injunctive power.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Mootness: A case becomes moot when events make it impossible for a court to grant effective relief on the dispute as framed. Federal courts generally cannot decide moot cases because Article III requires a live controversy.
  • Preliminary injunction: A temporary court order entered early in a case to preserve the status quo or prevent harm while the case is litigated. It is typically appealable immediately, which is why its existence matters for appellate jurisdiction.
  • Vacatur: An order nullifying a prior judicial order. Here, vacating the preliminary injunction removes the appealable decision the Seventh Circuit would otherwise review.
  • Rule 12.1(b) remand (indicative ruling procedure): A mechanism allowing a district court to act (or signal willingness to act) on a matter while an appeal is pending, with the appellate court remanding for that limited purpose.
  • Younger abstention: A doctrine directing federal courts, in many circumstances, not to enjoin or interfere with ongoing state enforcement proceedings—reflecting federalism and respect for state courts.
  • Bad-faith exception to Younger: A narrow safety valve permitting federal intervention when state enforcement is pursued in “bad faith” (e.g., harassment or lack of a legitimate enforcement purpose), because federalism does not require federal courts to stand aside in the face of abusive enforcement tactics.
  • Federalism and comity: Structural principles recognizing states as sovereigns and state courts as co-equal adjudicators of federal rights. The debate here is how to protect constitutional rights without unduly displacing state adjudicative authority.
  • “Heckler’s veto” (via litigation burden): A situation where the cost and burden of enforcement litigation itself suppresses speech or association, even if the target might ultimately win on the merits. Judge Kolar suggests expensive civil enforcement can function this way in some contexts.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s controlling action in American Academy of Pediatrics v. James Uthmeier is a procedural precedent: when an appeal becomes moot and the district court is willing to vacate a preliminary injunction, the appellate court may remand under FED. R. APP. P. 12.1(b) to permit vacatur; once vacated, the absence of an appealable order requires dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

The deeper significance lies in what the court declined to do. The separate writings frame an unresolved and increasingly salient doctrinal tension: Younger’s federalism-protective core versus the constitutional necessity of a meaningful bad-faith safety valve—especially where First Amendment rights are asserted and where modern civil enforcement can impose punitive burdens. The en banc court chose jurisdictional minimalism. The opinions ensure, however, that the next live case presenting similar facts will arrive with the Seventh Circuit already sharply divided on how exceptional “bad faith” must be before a federal court may enjoin state enforcement litigation.