Mootness on Appeal When Post-Injunction Events Eliminate the Project’s Viability

Introduction

Gotion, Inc. v. Green Charter Township (6th Cir. Feb. 25, 2026) arises from a high-profile economic-development dispute in Michigan. Green Charter Township (the “Township”) entered a Development Agreement with Gotion, Inc. (“Gotion”) under which the Township committed to assist Gotion—“to the extent legally permissible”—in obtaining permits and other authorizations needed to build a battery component manufacturing plant (the “Project”) within Township boundaries.

After a recall election replaced the Township Board with officials campaigning against the Project, the new Board allegedly took steps to undermine the Development Agreement, including rescinding supportive resolutions and taking actions that stalled site-plan review. Gotion sued in federal court for breach of contract and sought declaratory and injunctive relief compelling Township compliance. The district court granted a preliminary injunction. The Township appealed.

While that interlocutory appeal was pending, Michigan deemed Gotion in default under state funding agreements central to the Project’s feasibility. Gotion ultimately acknowledged that the Project was “no longer viable.” The Sixth Circuit therefore did not reach the merits of the injunction’s propriety; it treated the case as a jurisdictional Article III matter: whether a live controversy remained as to prospective relief.

Key Issues

  • Article III mootness on interlocutory appeal: Do post-judgment developments that kill a project eliminate a live controversy over an injunction that presupposes the project will proceed?
  • Forward-looking relief and imminence: Can a plaintiff preserve an injunction with only a “speck of hope” that the project might revive?
  • Exceptions to mootness: Do “voluntary cessation” or “capable of repetition yet evading review” apply when the project has collapsed due to funding default and abandonment?

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit dismissed the Township’s appeal as moot and remanded. The court held that Gotion’s claim for injunctive relief (and the appeal centered on the preliminary injunction) became moot after Michigan determined Gotion had defaulted on state grant obligations and demanded repayment, and after Gotion conceded the Project was “no longer viable.”

Because the injunction required Township assistance for a plant that Gotion had no current plans (and, practically, no capacity) to build without the state funding, the injunction would “lack any practical effect.” The court rejected reliance on speculative future revival and found no applicable mootness exceptions. It expressly left for remand any issues about Gotion’s stated intent to pursue monetary damages via an amended complaint.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Article III’s bar on advisory opinions and the core mootness inquiry

  • Resurrection Sch. v. Hertel, 35 F.4th 524 (6th Cir. 2022) (en banc)
    Role in the opinion: The court uses this as its leading Sixth Circuit statement of mootness doctrine: federal courts cannot decide questions that cannot affect the parties’ rights; intervening events can moot claims; and courts must dismiss for lack of jurisdiction when mootness arises. The panel also cites it for articulation of mootness exceptions (voluntary cessation; capable of repetition yet evading review).
  • DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974)
    Role in the opinion: Quoted via Resurrection Sch. for the foundational constitutional principle that courts cannot decide cases that no longer affect litigants’ rights—i.e., no advisory opinions.
  • Ohio v. EPA, 969 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2020)
    Role in the opinion: Provides the operative framing for mootness through intervening events (“events during the pendency” can moot a case) and, critically here, the “practical effect” formulation: if relief would not change anything tangible for the parties, the claim is moot. The opinion also uses Ohio v. EPA for the “reasonably likely to recur” standard when evaluating whether the risk of future harm is sufficient to avoid mootness.
  • Coal. for Gov't Procurement v. Fed. Prison Indus., 365 F.3d 435 (6th Cir. 2004)
    Role in the opinion: Supplies the “test for mootness”: whether the relief sought would “make a difference to the legal interests of the parties.” The panel uses it to translate Article III into a concrete remedial question: does an injunction still matter if the project is dead?

2) Mootness in the appellate posture and dismissal as the required remedy

  • Pavia v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 154 F.4th 407 (6th Cir. 2025)
    Role in the opinion: Cited for the proposition that once an appeal is moot, the appellate court “must dismiss ... for lack of jurisdiction.” This reinforces that mootness is not discretionary; it is jurisdictional.
  • N.Y. St. Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. City of New York, 590 U.S. 336 (2020) (per curiam)
    Role in the opinion: Used by analogy to justify remand for further proceedings after a mootness determination on the appealed relief, leaving remaining issues for the district court rather than deciding them in the first instance.

3) Forward-looking injunctive relief requires a non-speculative, imminent risk

  • TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021)
    Role in the opinion: Provides a modern Supreme Court articulation of prospective standing for injunctive relief: a plaintiff must face a risk of future harm that is “sufficiently imminent and substantial.” The panel uses this to reject Gotion’s contention that an injunction remains justified by a “speck of hope” that the Project might proceed.
  • Weiss v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Interior, 459 F. App'x 497 (6th Cir. 2012)
    Role in the opinion: A practical mootness analogue: a claim to enjoin construction becomes moot once the project is already built and operating. Here, the court flips the factual posture but applies the same principle: you cannot enjoin (or compel assistance for) activity that is no longer meaningfully in prospect.

4) Exceptions to mootness and why they failed

  • Speech First, Inc. v. Schlissel, 939 F.3d 756 (6th Cir. 2019)
    Role in the opinion: Cited via Resurrection Sch. for the “voluntary cessation” doctrine—mootness only if there is no reasonable expectation the violation will recur. The court finds the doctrine inapplicable because the mooting event was not the Township’s cessation; it was the Project’s collapse due to state funding default and abandonment.
  • Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007)
    Role in the opinion: Provides the two-part test for “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” The panel concludes there is no reasonable expectation that Gotion will again be subject to the same action because the Project is no longer viable and repayment has been demanded.

Legal Reasoning

  1. The appealed relief was prospective and project-dependent.
    The preliminary injunction compelled the Township to comply with contractual obligations designed to enable a specific industrial development—helping obtain permits, facilitating approvals, and otherwise supporting the Project’s advancement.
  2. Intervening events removed the factual predicate for meaningful injunctive relief.
    Michigan issued a default notice asserting that Gotion had abandoned the Project (no eligible activities for 120 days), allowed a cure period, and later demanded return of $23.7 million. Gotion conceded that the state funding (up to $175 million) was “central” and admitted the Project was “no longer viable.” The court treated that concession as decisive: compelling Township support for a project Gotion cannot now proceed with would not alter the parties’ real-world legal interests.
  3. “Speck of hope” is not an Article III anchor.
    Gotion argued that the injunction still mattered because the Township might continue obstructing “any speck of hope” that the Project could proceed. The court measured this against TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez: forward-looking relief requires a sufficiently imminent and substantial risk of future harm. A speculative possibility of project resurrection—without concrete plans or restored funding—was deemed insufficient.
  4. Classic mootness exceptions did not fit.
    The Township did not “voluntarily cease” the challenged conduct; Gotion itself attributed ongoing obstruction to the Township. Nor was the dispute “capable of repetition yet evading review,” because the same complaining party (Gotion) was not reasonably likely to face the same dispute again as to this Project in this Township.
  5. Jurisdictional consequence: dismissal of the appeal and remand.
    Because mootness eliminated appellate jurisdiction, dismissal was mandatory. The court remanded and expressly did not decide whether Gotion may amend to pursue monetary damages.

Impact

Although designated “not recommended for publication,” the decision is still instructive as a roadmap for how the Sixth Circuit will treat interlocutory appeals from preliminary injunctions when the underlying project or status quo has irreversibly changed.

  • Project-dependent injunctions are uniquely vulnerable to mootness. Where an injunction is geared toward enabling a discrete development, intervening financing failures, regulatory terminations, or abandonment can strip the injunction of “practical effect,” mooting appellate review.
  • Concessions about viability matter. The court relied heavily on Gotion’s admissions that the Project was “no longer viable.” Future litigants should expect that statements about inability to proceed can be treated as dispositive of prospective-relief justiciability.
  • Speculative revival will not preserve Article III jurisdiction. The “speck of hope” language is a cautionary marker: plaintiffs must articulate concrete, near-term pathways to resumed activity (funding, approvals, timelines) to keep injunction claims live.
  • Remedial pivot: damages vs. injunction. The opinion highlights a common litigation arc: when prospective relief becomes impossible or irrelevant, the controversy may continue only as a damages dispute. The Sixth Circuit signals that such reconfiguration belongs in the district court on remand, not on the mooted interlocutory appeal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Article III “mootness”
Federal courts can only decide live disputes. If events make it impossible for a court to grant effective relief, the claim becomes moot and must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Preliminary injunction
A temporary court order issued early in a case to prevent irreparable harm and preserve the status quo (or, sometimes, to compel action) while the merits are litigated. It is immediately appealable, but the appeal still requires a live controversy.
“Practical effect” test
Even if a court could write an order, the question is whether that order would matter in reality—i.e., would it change the parties’ legal interests in a meaningful way. If not, the case is moot.
Forward-looking (injunctive) standing
To get an injunction, a plaintiff must show a real and imminent threat of future harm. A remote or speculative possibility is not enough.
Voluntary cessation
A defendant cannot moot a case simply by stopping challenged conduct if it could easily resume it. But this exception does not apply when the case becomes moot for reasons other than the defendant’s strategic cessation.
Capable of repetition yet evading review
Some disputes end too quickly to be fully litigated but are likely to recur for the same party. Courts can hear such cases despite mootness—but only if recurrence is reasonably expected.
Event of default (in grant agreements)
A contractual trigger (e.g., missing deadlines, ceasing activity) that allows the grantor to freeze funds, terminate the agreement, or demand repayment—here, a key factual development that ended the Project’s viability.

Conclusion

Gotion, Inc. v. Green Charter Township stands for a straightforward but powerful jurisdictional rule: when intervening events (here, state funding default and the plaintiff’s concession that the Project is “no longer viable”) eliminate the real-world utility of an injunction, the claim for injunctive relief becomes moot, and the appellate court must dismiss the appeal and remand.

The opinion underscores that federal injunctions are not vehicles for preserving abstract leverage or speculative future possibilities; they require a live, imminent controversy capable of meaningful judicial redress. When the underlying project collapses, the litigation—if it continues at all—must typically shift from prospective remedies to retrospective ones, such as damages, to be addressed on remand.