Mootness of Interlocutory Appeals After Preliminary Injunction Expiration, and the Tenth Circuit’s Usual Refusal to Vacate

Case: Edwards Lifesciences LLC & Edwards Lifesciences Corporation v. Michael Thompson
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date: August 10, 2026
Disposition: Appeal dismissed as moot; no vacatur of the district court’s preliminary-injunction order

I. Introduction

This appeal arose from an employment dispute between Edwards Lifesciences (the employer) and Michael Thompson (a cardiac medical device salesperson). After Thompson left Edwards to join competitor Abbott—this time to sell a competing product—Edwards sued in the District of Colorado alleging (i) breach of non-competition and non-solicitation provisions (each lasting 18 months post-employment) and (ii) breach of an indefinite non-disclosure provision, alongside federal and state trade secret misappropriation claims.

While the merits case proceeded, Edwards obtained a preliminary injunction enforcing the restrictive covenants through the end of the 18-month periods, set to expire January 15, 2026. Thompson took an interlocutory appeal challenging that preliminary injunction, arguing that the district court erred in assessing likely success on the merits, irreparable harm, and the injunction’s breadth.

The key appellate issue ultimately became jurisdictional: once the preliminary injunction expired by its own terms during the appeal, was there still a live Article III controversy permitting review—and if not, should the Tenth Circuit vacate the district court’s order?

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit dismissed Thompson’s appeal as moot because the preliminary injunction expired while the appeal was pending, meaning the court could no longer grant effective relief as to the only order under review.

The court rejected Thompson’s attempt to keep the appeal alive by reframing the dispute around the district court’s preliminary view of what constitutes a “trade secret,” explaining that preliminary-injunction findings are nonfinal and nonpreclusive, and that any definitive “trade secret” determination must be reviewed after final judgment.

The court also declined to apply the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception, reasoning that recurrence was uncertain and, in any event, future review was unlikely to be evaded—particularly given that any renewed injunction would not be tethered to the now-expired non-compete/non-solicitation periods.

Finally, the court followed its “usual practice” for interlocutory mootness and refused to vacate the district court’s preliminary-injunction order, dismissing the appeal without disturbing the now-expired injunction.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

• Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Okla. v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, 327 F.3d 1019 (10th Cir. 2003)
  Cited for the foundational principle that constitutional mootness is rooted in Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement. The panel uses it to frame mootness as a jurisdictional limit, not a discretionary doctrine.
• Prier v. Steed, 456 F.3d 1209 (10th Cir. 2006)
  Supplies the operational rule: when events during appeal render issues no longer live, the appellate court must dismiss for mootness. This supports dismissal once the injunction’s effective period has passed.
• Fleming v. Gutierrez, 785 F.3d 442 (10th Cir. 2015)
  This is the opinion’s central anchor. It provides two key propositions: (1) an interlocutory appeal from a preliminary injunction becomes moot when the injunction’s time period has passed; and (2) in interlocutory mootness, the “usual practice” is dismissal without vacatur. The panel applies Fleming directly to both mootness and the vacatur request.
• Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (1981)
  Used to distinguish preliminary-injunction “likelihood of success” assessments from final merits determinations. The panel relies on Camenisch to rebut Thompson’s argument that the district court’s preliminary “trade secret” discussion creates ongoing legal harm: preliminary findings are not binding at trial and have no preclusive effect.
• Rio Grande Found. v. Oliver, 57 F.4th 1147 (10th Cir. 2023)
  Provides the modern Tenth Circuit articulation of the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception, including the need for a “reasonable expectation” of recurrence and the “evading review” requirement.
• Marks v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 976 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir. 2020)
  Quoted (via Rio Grande) for the “reasonable expectation”/“same injury” recurrence standard. The panel invokes this to question whether any future injunction would truly replicate the same injury because the non-compete and non-solicit covenants have expired, changing the landscape for any renewed relief.
• In re Tax Refund Litig., 915 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1990)
  Quoted (via Fleming) for the “usual practice” proposition that interlocutory mootness typically results in dismissal without vacatur, reinforcing the Tenth Circuit’s refusal to erase the district court’s preliminary order.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Why the appeal became moot

The court treats mootness as a strict Article III jurisdictional constraint: if no effective relief can be granted, there is no “live” controversy for a federal court to decide. Here, the preliminary injunction expired on January 15, 2026 by its own terms. Once expired, Thompson was no longer constrained by the injunction, and an appellate decision reversing or narrowing it would be purely advisory.

Critically, the panel identifies the “sole ground for appeal” as the preliminary injunction itself—not the still-pending merits litigation and not the ongoing contract duties in the abstract. This framing matters: an appellate court’s interlocutory jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 reaches the injunction order, not a general supervisory role over the district court’s handling of the remaining dispute.

2. Why the “trade secrets” reframing did not save jurisdiction

Thompson attempted to pivot from “the injunction is wrong” to “the district court interpreted ‘trade secrets’ too broadly, and that interpretation continues to harm me because the non-disclosure clause is perpetual.” The panel rejects this on two grounds:

• No continuing injunction-based restraint: whatever the ongoing non-disclosure obligations, they exist independent of the now-expired preliminary injunction. An appellate court cannot revive jurisdiction over an expired interlocutory order by pointing to separate, continuing contractual duties.
• Nonfinality and nonpreclusion: under Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, preliminary-injunction findings are not binding at trial. The district court’s discussion of trade secrets was part of a predictive “likelihood of success” analysis—not a definitive merits adjudication. Therefore, any alleged “legal error” embedded in preliminary reasoning is not yet reviewable in the absence of a final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

The court also treats Thompson’s asserted dilemma—operate and risk later liability—as an ordinary feature of litigation risk, not a jurisdiction-creating injury attributable to an expired injunction.

3. Why “capable of repetition, yet evading review” did not apply

The exception requires (i) a reasonable expectation that the same injury will recur and (ii) that it will evade review due to its inherently short duration. The panel indicates the exception likely fails on both prongs:

• Recurrence is uncertain: with the non-compete and non-solicitation provisions expired, any new injunction would necessarily have different terms (likely focused only on non-disclosure), undermining the “same injury” requirement.
• Future review is unlikely to be evaded: the prior expiration date tracked the 18-month restrictive-covenant period. With those covenants no longer enforceable, there is “no reason to think” a new injunction would expire before trial. The panel also notes Thompson’s delay and late request to expedite, suggesting the prior “evading review” problem was not inherent.

4. Why the court refused vacatur

Thompson requested vacatur of the district court’s preliminary-injunction order upon a mootness dismissal. The panel follows Fleming v. Gutierrez, which characterizes the “usual practice” in interlocutory mootness as dismissal without vacatur. The key factual premise is that the injunction expired automatically; the court sees no equitable need to erase the order.

C. Impact

Although labeled “not binding precedent,” the decision reinforces a clear and frequently consequential procedural rule for litigants in the Tenth Circuit: an interlocutory appeal from a preliminary injunction ordinarily becomes moot once the injunction expires, and dismissal typically will not be accompanied by vacatur.

The opinion also signals litigation-management lessons for parties seeking appellate review of time-limited injunctions:

• Timing matters: delays in noticing appeal, briefing, or moving to expedite can undermine arguments that an issue “evades review.”
• Doctrinal discipline: appellate courts will resist attempts to convert an interlocutory injunction appeal into a vehicle for advisory guidance on nonfinal merits issues (such as the precise scope of “trade secrets”) absent a final judgment.
• Vacatur is not automatic: even where an appeal becomes moot, the Tenth Circuit’s default approach in the preliminary-injunction context is to leave the district court’s order intact.

For employment and trade secret litigation in particular, the opinion underscores that disputes over confidential-information scope and “trade secret” status are typically reviewed meaningfully only after final adjudication, not through expired preliminary relief—unless a party can show a continuing live restraint or meet the narrow mootness exceptions.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Mootness (Article III): Federal courts can only decide disputes where their decision can still change something for the parties. If the challenged order expires and nothing remains to fix, the case is moot.
• Preliminary injunction: A temporary order meant to preserve the status quo while the case is litigated. It is based on predictions (e.g., “likely to succeed”), not final merits findings.
• Interlocutory appeal: An appeal taken before final judgment, permitted for certain orders like injunctions (here under 28 U.S.C. § 1292). It does not open the door to full merits review of the entire case.
• No preclusive effect of preliminary findings: What a court says in granting a preliminary injunction generally does not bind the court at trial (Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch).
• “Capable of repetition, yet evading review”: A narrow exception allowing courts to decide an otherwise moot case if (i) the same harm will likely happen again to the same party and (ii) it will end too quickly to be reviewed in time.
• Vacatur: An appellate court order erasing the lower court’s decision. In the Tenth Circuit’s interlocutory-injunction setting, the “usual practice” is dismissal without vacatur when the appeal becomes moot.

V. Conclusion

Edwards Lifesciences v. Thompson is a procedural decision emphasizing that once a preliminary injunction expires, an interlocutory appeal challenging it is ordinarily moot because the appellate court can no longer grant effective relief. The Tenth Circuit further clarified that dissatisfaction with a district court’s preliminary discussion (here, of “trade secrets”) does not create appellate jurisdiction where the merits remain pending and unfinalized, especially given that preliminary findings carry no preclusive effect under Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch.

The decision’s most enduring practical rule is twofold: time-limited preliminary injunction appeals must be pursued with urgency to avoid mootness, and when mootness occurs, the Tenth Circuit will generally dismiss without vacating the expired order.