Mootness of Injunction Appeals When DHS Rescinds Reinstatement and a New Final Removal Order Supersedes the Dispute

1. Introduction

Arguello v. Mullin (10th Cir. June 15, 2026) concerns a Venezuelan citizen, Ricardo Jose Perea Arguello, who sought emergency injunctive relief to prevent removal under a reinstated prior removal order while his protection claims (asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT) were pending. The defendants were the Secretary of Homeland Security (substituted under Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2)), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Todd Lyons.

The key appellate question became jurisdictional rather than substantive: whether the appeal from the district court’s denial of a temporary restraining order (TRO) remained a live case or controversy after (i) Arguello’s asylum application was denied (via pretermission) in reopened immigration proceedings and (ii) DHS rescinded its notice of intent to reinstate the prior removal order.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot, holding it could no longer grant “effectual relief” because the challenged reinstatement posture had been overtaken by events: DHS rescinded the reinstatement notice and an immigration judge entered a separate, final, enforceable removal order that Arguello did not appeal within the statutory/regulatory deadlines.

The court also rejected Arguello’s attempt to invoke the voluntary cessation exception, concluding (1) there was no reasonable expectation DHS would reinstate the rescinded order given the new final removal order and (2) rescission eradicated any continuing effects of the challenged action.

Finally, although the appeal’s dismissal mooted review of the district court’s TRO ruling, the panel declined to vacate the district court’s order sua sponte, noting no party requested vacatur and weighing the equities under circuit practice.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The panel’s reasoning is an application of established Article III mootness doctrine, heavily grounded in prior Tenth Circuit and Supreme Court authority:

  • Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016): Used for the core proposition that federal courts lack jurisdiction over moot appeals and for the formulation that intervening events eliminating a plaintiff’s stake require dismissal. It also supplies the framework for treating government “self-correction” as supporting mootness absent “clear showings” of likely reversion.
  • Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096 (10th Cir. 2010): Quoted for mootness as a threshold jurisdictional issue and for the voluntary cessation test. The panel relied on it to articulate the two-prong standard (no reasonable expectation of recurrence; effects eradicated) and to explain the government-favorable lens when cessation appears genuine.
  • Disability Law Ctr. v. Millcreek Health Ctr., 428 F.3d 992 (10th Cir. 2005): Cited (via Rio Grande Silvery Minnow) for the constitutional predicate that a live controversy is required for jurisdiction.
  • In re Overland Park Fin. Corp., 236 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2001): Supplies the standard that a case is moot when it is impossible to grant any effectual relief.
  • Schell v. OXY USA Inc., 814 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2016): Used for the practical test: whether a decision would affect the parties’ rights now or has more than speculative future effects; and, for injunctive claims, whether relief would alter future conduct. It is also cited in the vacatur discussion (declining vacatur under similar circumstances).
  • Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153 (2016): Quoted (via Brown) on loss of personal stake at any point mooting the action.
  • Dias v. City and County of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2009) and O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974): Cited to emphasize that past exposure to allegedly illegal conduct does not sustain injunctive jurisdiction without continuing present adverse effects—central to the court’s conclusion that the rescinded reinstatement order created no ongoing injury.
  • Chihuahuan Grasslands Alliance v. Kempthorne, 545 F.3d 884 (10th Cir. 2008) and County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979): Provide the doctrinal lineage for the voluntary cessation exception and its two-part test.
  • Smith v. Becerra, 44 F.4th 1238 (10th Cir. 2022) and Prison Legal News v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 944 F.3d 868 (10th Cir. 2019): Cited for the “could not reasonably be expected to recur” standard (not absolute impossibility) in voluntary cessation analysis.
  • Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000): Cited for the “heavy burden” on the party asserting mootness under voluntary cessation.
  • Ghailani v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 2017): Provides the principle that the government receives a good-faith presumption; courts are more likely to trust public officials not to resume challenged conduct, making government cessation more readily mooting.
  • United States v. Muhtorov, 20 F.4th 558 (10th Cir. 2021) and Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395 (1975): Used to reject Arguello’s request that the court “review and correct” legal determinations as an impermissible advisory opinion when the underlying order can no longer affect rights.
  • Hutchinson v. Hahn, 402 F. App'x 391 (10th Cir. 2010) (and Fed. R. Evid. 201): Supports taking judicial notice of immigration records in closely related matters.
  • Gunter v. Pulsipher, No. 19-4060, 2020 WL 1488164 (10th Cir. Jan. 15, 2020): Cited as an example of granting in forma pauperis status while dismissing for lack of jurisdiction.

B. Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning proceeds in three steps:

  1. No effectual relief remained. Arguello’s district-court TRO request aimed to stop removal “pending adjudication” of his protection claims. During the appeal, he reopened proceedings, presented the application, and received an immigration judge decision (the court treated this sequence as satisfying the “pending adjudication” premise, at least functionally). More importantly, the reinstatement notice that was the focus of his TRO theory was rescinded, leaving no operative reinstatement-based removal posture for the court to enjoin.
  2. The court refused to issue an advisory opinion. Arguello sought an appellate declaration that DHS lacked authority to treat his parole as an “illegal reentry” under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). Because the reinstatement instrument had been rescinded and could no longer affect his rights, a ruling on that question would not provide concrete relief and would amount to an advisory opinion (barred by Article III).
  3. Voluntary cessation did not save jurisdiction. Applying Rio Grande Silvery Minnow and related authority, the court found:
    • No reasonable expectation of recurrence: DHS had a separate final removal order (unappealed and thus enforceable), making return to the rescinded reinstatement route implausible; and absent evidence of “reluctant submission,” the government’s rescission was presumed genuine.
    • Effects eradicated: The panel found no lingering legal consequences from reinstatement once rescinded, including rejecting a claimed custody distinction.

Vacatur. The court addressed (even though not requested) whether to vacate the district court order. It declined to do so, emphasizing that mootness was attributable “at least in part” to both DHS’s rescission and Arguello’s pursuit/receipt of the relief sought, and citing Schell v. OXY USA Inc. for declining vacatur on similar equitable grounds.

C. Impact

Although designated “not binding precedent” (except under law-of-the-case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel), the decision is practically important in immigration-related emergency litigation and appellate practice:

  • Fast-moving immigration posture can moot TRO appeals. If DHS rescinds a reinstatement notice and removal proceeds under a different, final order, appellate courts may lack power to address the merits of reinstatement-based challenges.
  • Reinstatement legality disputes may become non-justiciable once the reinstatement instrument is withdrawn. The opinion underscores that litigants cannot preserve jurisdiction by reframing the requested relief as “correcting” legal analysis when no operative order remains.
  • Government rescission is likely to moot absent evidence of strategic manipulation. The court’s reliance on the government good-faith presumption (via Ghailani v. Sessions and Brown v. Buhman) signals that challengers need concrete evidence of likely recurrence to invoke voluntary cessation.
  • Vacatur is not automatic. Even when an appeal becomes moot, litigants should affirmatively request vacatur if they want to avoid potential downstream persuasive or preclusive effects of an unreviewed district court order.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Temporary restraining order (TRO): A short-term emergency court order meant to preserve the status quo until a fuller hearing can be held.
  • Reinstatement of a removal order (8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)): A mechanism allowing DHS to “reinstate” a prior removal order when an alien reenters illegally, typically limiting reopening and many forms of relief.
  • Parole: Permission to physically enter or remain in the U.S. temporarily, without formal “admission.” Arguello’s merits theory (never reached) was that parole made his return “legal” for reinstatement purposes.
  • Pretermission: A procedural denial without reaching the full merits—here, the immigration court treated Arguello as ineligible to apply for asylum in the U.S. due to asylum cooperative agreement regulations (8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(h)(1)-(3) (2026)).
  • Mootness: If events eliminate the possibility of a court providing meaningful relief, the Constitution requires dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
  • Voluntary cessation exception: A case is not moot merely because a defendant stops the challenged conduct, if it could reasonably restart and the effects have not been fully cured. Courts apply it cautiously when the government is the defendant.
  • Advisory opinion: A ruling on a legal question that no longer affects the parties’ rights; federal courts generally cannot issue these.
  • Vacatur: An appellate remedy that wipes out a lower court decision when appellate review becomes impossible; it is discretionary and equitable, not automatic.

5. Conclusion

Arguello v. Mullin reinforces a practical jurisdictional rule: when DHS rescinds the specific reinstatement action being challenged and the noncitizen is instead subject to a separate final removal order, an appeal seeking injunctive relief against the reinstatement-based removal becomes moot because no effectual relief remains and any merits ruling would be advisory. The decision also illustrates the Tenth Circuit’s reluctance to apply voluntary cessation against the government absent concrete indicators of likely recurrence, and it signals that vacatur will not be granted sua sponte where equities do not strongly favor it.