Disability-Accommodation Notice in Higher Education: Requests Must Be Routed Through the Designated Office; “Open and Obvious” Knowledge Is Narrow for Mental Disabilities

I. Introduction

Jennifer Molosso, a nursing student at the University of Louisiana at Monroe’s Kitty DeGree School of Nursing, alleged she had ADHD and depression and needed testing accommodations. After repeated course failures and a reinstatement subject to a “learning contract,” she again failed two nursing courses (NURS 4066 and NURS 4067) and was dismissed.

She sued the Board of Supervisors University of Louisiana System d/b/a University of Louisiana at Monroe, along with Provost Mark Arant and Dean Donald Simpson, alleging (among other claims) disability discrimination and a failure-to-accommodate theory under the Rehabilitation Act.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit confronted two central questions: (1) whether summary judgment was proper on her failure-to-accommodate claim—specifically whether the university had the required knowledge of her “consequential limitations”; and (2) whether the district court abused its discretion by denying relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) to extend discovery or defer summary judgment to allow further discovery (notably comparator evidence).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit affirmed. It held that Molosso failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact on the Rehabilitation Act “knowledge” element because:

  • Her limitations and need for accommodation were not “open, obvious, and apparent”, particularly given the mental/behavioral nature of ADHD-related limitations; and
  • Even if she discussed ADHD and academic struggles with faculty, she did not request accommodations through the university’s designated office (the Counseling Center), as required by circuit precedent.

The court also held the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rule 56(d) relief because Molosso did not show the necessary diligence in pursuing discovery after multiple extensions and after receiving supplemental productions.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

1) Summary judgment framework and appellate limits

  • Am. Fam. Life Assur. Co. of Columbus v. Biles, 714 F.3d 887 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam): supplied the de novo review standard for summary judgment and the abuse-of-discretion standard for Rule 56(d).
  • Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986): provided the “reasonable jury” articulation for what constitutes a genuine dispute of material fact.
  • Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1992): limited the appellate record to arguments and evidence presented to the district court when it ruled.
  • In re Chamber of Com. of United States of Am., 105 F.4th 297 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008)): stated the governing abuse-of-discretion formulation for reviewing case-management and discovery rulings.

2) Elements of a Rehabilitation Act failure-to-accommodate claim

  • Smith v. Harris Cnty., 956 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584 (5th Cir. 2015)): supplied the three elements, emphasizing element (2): the disability and its “consequential limitations” must be known to the covered entity.
  • Cadena v. El Paso Cnty., 946 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Windham v. Harris Cnty., 875 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2017)): explained that element (2) can be satisfied either by a request for accommodation or where the limitation is “open and obvious.”

3) The “open and obvious” exception—narrow, especially for mental disabilities

  • Windham v. Harris Cnty., 875 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2017): the controlling “open, obvious, and apparent” framework; the plaintiff must show the disability, resulting limitation, and necessary accommodation were all obvious.
  • J.W. v. Paley, 81 F.4th 440 (5th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2658 (2024): reinforced that, with mental disabilities, limitations and accommodations often are not obvious; also stressed the distinction between knowledge of a disability and knowledge of resulting limitations/accommodations.
  • Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 93 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 1996): rejected an ADA “clairvoyance” expectation; in the “amorphous world of mental disability,” the burden ordinarily remains on the individual to identify limitations and request accommodations in specific terms.
  • Jin Choi v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at S. A., 633 F. App’x 214 (5th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (quoting Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc.): used to illustrate why behaviors like “freezing” during an exam are not reliably diagnostic of an accommodation-triggering limitation.

Applying these cases, the court treated Molosso’s evidence—faculty awareness of struggles, disclosure of ADHD, and a single observed “freeze” during a timed exam—as insufficient to make the disability-related limitation and the need for a specific accommodation “open and obvious.”

4) Requests must go through the proper university channel

  • Pickett v. Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 37 F.4th 1013 (5th Cir. 2022): the centerpiece for the higher-education process rule. The court quoted Pickett’s reasoning that a student must bring the request to the designated office rather than making a verbal request to an advisor/professor; otherwise institutions face “an alternative, undocumented process” that undermines orderly handling and interactivity.
  • Windham v. Harris Cnty. (quoting Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc.): reiterated that “mere knowledge of the disability is not enough”; the entity must understand the limitations resulting from it.

The Fifth Circuit treated ULM’s Counseling Center as the functional analogue of the centralized accommodation office in Pickett. Because the record showed the syllabus contained Counseling Center contact information and directions for students needing accommodations, Molosso’s claim that she was unaware of the process did not create a material fact dispute.

5) Interactive process doctrine—triggered by a proper request

  • E.E.O.C. v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., LLP, 570 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Tobin v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 100 (1st Cir. 2005)): defined the “interactive process” as a meaningful dialogue to find an accommodation.
  • Clark v. Champion Nat’l Sec., Inc., 952 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2020): used for the proposition that without a request, the failure-to-engage-in-interactive-process theory cannot proceed.

The court rejected Molosso’s “interactive process” argument because, under these precedents, the duty arises only after the individual requests accommodations through the proper mechanism.

6) Rule 56(d) discovery relief—favored but conditioned on diligence

  • Roby v. Livingston, 600 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoted in Am. Fam. Life Assur. Co. of Columbus v. Biles): recognized Rule 56(d) motions are broadly favored to protect nonmovants from premature summary judgment.
  • Bailey v. KS Mgmt. Servs., L.L.C., 35 F.4th 397 (5th Cir. 2022): imposed two requirements—additional discovery must likely create a genuine issue of material fact, and the movant must have diligently pursued discovery.
  • McKay v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 751 F.3d 694 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev. B.V., 213 F.3d 841 (5th Cir. 2000)): emphasized district court discretion over discovery management.
  • Dominick v. Mayorkas, 52 F.4th 992 (5th Cir. 2022): provided a close diligence comparison; waiting until just before a response deadline to pursue discovery supported denial of Rule 56(d) relief.
  • Beattie v. Madison Sch. Dist., 254 F.3d 595 (5th Cir. 2001): warned that a party who suspends discovery does so “at [her] own risk.”

Relying heavily on Dominick and Beattie, the court agreed with the district court’s assessment that multiple extensions and counsel’s delay in acting after the supplemental production undercut a showing of diligence.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Element (2) is the gatekeeper. The panel treated the “known consequential limitations” requirement as a strict notice rule: the entity must know not merely “ADHD exists,” but how it limits the plaintiff in the relevant context and that an accommodation is needed.
  2. “Open and obvious” is not satisfied by academic difficulty or isolated behavior. The court reasoned that struggling with assignments, test anxiety, or “freezing” can have nondisability causes, so these indicators do not make the disability-related limitation and required accommodation apparent—particularly for mental conditions.
  3. Higher education may require students to use a centralized accommodations process. Following Pickett, the court credited institutional process interests: accommodations are meant to be documented and coordinated, not handled ad hoc by individual professors.
  4. Written notice matters. The presence of Counseling Center information in the syllabus undercut Molosso’s attempt to distinguish Pickett on the ground that she was not directed to the correct office.
  5. Rule 56(d) turns on diligence as much as need. Even though Rule 56(d) is “liberally granted,” the panel treated counsel’s timing and case-management choices as dispositive against relief.

C. Impact

Although unpublished (and thus not binding precedent under circuit rules), the opinion reinforces two practical rules that will predictably influence district court case-management and merits rulings within the Fifth Circuit:

  • Students must route accommodation requests through the designated office. Faculty awareness of a diagnosis or struggles—without a formal request through the university’s established channel—will often be insufficient to establish institutional knowledge under the Rehabilitation Act/ADA framework.
  • Mental-disability “obviousness” arguments face a steep climb. The court’s reliance on Taylor/J.W. and its treatment of “freezing” and generalized struggles suggests limited receptivity to inferring needed accommodations from ambiguous academic behaviors.
  • Rule 56(d) is not a cure for slow discovery. The diligence requirement, as applied, signals that parties must actively pursue depositions and document review promptly after productions and must seek relief early rather than near response deadlines.

For universities, the decision supports maintaining and publicizing a centralized accommodations process (syllabi, websites, orientation materials) and resisting attempts to impute institutional knowledge based on informal faculty conversations. For plaintiffs, it underscores that preserving a failure-to-accommodate claim typically requires a documented request through the correct office and prompt discovery activity if litigation follows.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Failure to accommodate” (Rehabilitation Act): A claim that an entity covered by federal disability law failed to provide reasonable changes (e.g., extended time) so a qualified person with a disability can access a program.
  • “Consequential limitations”: The functional restrictions caused by the disability in the relevant setting (e.g., difficulty completing timed exams), not merely the diagnosis label.
  • “Open and obvious” limitation: A narrow exception allowing knowledge to be inferred without a request, but only when the disability, the limitation, and the needed accommodation are all apparent.
  • “Interactive process”: The back-and-forth dialogue to identify an effective accommodation; under the cited Fifth Circuit cases, it typically begins after a request is made.
  • Rule 56(d): A mechanism to postpone or defeat summary judgment when the nonmovant cannot yet present essential facts—but it requires showing both (i) the discovery sought is material and (ii) the party acted diligently.
  • Comparator evidence (in discrimination cases): Information about similarly situated individuals (e.g., other students) used to show differential treatment; here, discovery disputes referenced FERPA-based objections.

V. Conclusion

Molosso affirms summary judgment where a student did not create a fact dispute that the university knew her disability’s consequential limitations and need for accommodation. The Fifth Circuit’s core takeaway is procedural and substantive: in a higher-education setting with a centralized accommodations office, informal disclosures to or discussions with faculty generally will not substitute for a direct accommodation request through the designated channel, and “open and obvious” knowledge is especially limited for mental disabilities. The decision also underscores that Rule 56(d) relief—while favored—will be denied absent clear diligence in pursuing discovery.