Missouri Referendum Power Extends to Congressional Redistricting Acts: “Any Act of the General Assembly” Means Any Act

1. Introduction

In von Glahn vs. Hoskins (Mo. banc Sept. 3, 2026), the Supreme Court of Missouri (en banc) decided a single, consequential constitutional question: whether the Missouri Constitution permits a referendum on a congressional redistricting act enacted by the General Assembly—House Bill 1 (“HB 1”).

The parties were Richard von Glahn, a referendum proponent and Missouri voter, as appellant, and Secretary of State Denny Hoskins (in his official capacity), as respondent, along with intervening political committees defending HB 1. The referendum petition (2026-R004) was timely filed and had sufficient signatures; the Secretary nevertheless issued a “Certificate of Insufficiency” on the ground that the Constitution does not authorize a referendum on congressional redistricting. The circuit court upheld the Secretary’s certification decision. The Supreme Court reversed.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that the plain language of article III, section 49 authorizes a referendum on “any act of the general assembly,” and congressional redistricting enacted by statute is a legislative act. No constitutional exception removes HB 1 from the referendum power. Accordingly, the referendum petition was “legal, sufficient, and timely.”

Applying article III, section 52(b) (as reaffirmed in Maggard v. State), the Court concluded HB 1 never took effect because a sufficient referendum petition was filed before HB 1’s effective date. The Court ordered the Secretary to certify the petition sufficient, place it on the November 2026 ballot, and take all steps necessary to do so. The Court also enjoined implementation of HB 1 unless and until voters approve it, meaning the 2022 congressional map remains the only map in effect for the 2026 general election.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Missouri cases shaping the referendum framework and redistricting’s “legislative” character

  • Maggard v. State, 733 S.W.3d 411 (Mo. banc 2026): Provided the operative rule for the status of HB 1 upon a sufficient referendum petition—if the petition is “legal, sufficient, and timely,” the act is “referred to the people” and “shall take effect” only if approved by voters. von Glahn expressly “reaffirms” Maggard and uses it to resolve the practical question of what map governs the 2026 election.
  • State ex rel. Carroll v. Becker, 45 S.W.2d 533 (Mo. banc 1932): Stands for the proposition that congressional redistricting by the General Assembly “is a legislative act.” That characterization is pivotal because article III, section 49 reaches “any act of the general assembly.”
  • Preisler v. Hearnes, 362 S.W.2d 552 (Mo. banc 1962): Dicta recognized that voters have a remedy for even “valid redistricting” through initiative and referendum. The Court uses this to show Missouri precedent has long assumed congressional redistricting is not categorically insulated from referendum.
  • State ex rel. Moore v. Toberman, 250 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. banc 1952): Though addressing timing/supplementation issues, it articulated a broad referendum “intendment”: all laws are referable unless declared non-referable, if petitions are duly filed before the effective date. The Court draws on this to reinforce the default referability of legislation under Missouri’s constitutional structure.

B. Missouri cases limiting exceptions to referendum (emergency clauses and appropriations)

  • Inter-City Fire Prot. Dist. of Jackson Cnty. v. Gambrell, 231 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. banc 1950): Used to reject the Secretary’s attempt to invoke the “immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety” exception. The Court relied on Gambrell for two points: (1) an emergency clause is required; and (2) even with such a clause, whether an act qualifies is a judicial question.
  • Heinkel v. Toberman, 226 S.W.2d 1012 (Mo. banc 1950), and State ex rel. Harvey v. Linville, 300 S.W. 1066 (Mo. 1927): These cases constrain the “maintenance of state institutions” exception by tying it to “laws making appropriations.” The Court applied that reasoning to conclude the exception does not reach HB 1, which is not an appropriations act.

C. U.S. Supreme Court elections-law authority confirming referenda are constitutionally permissible for congressional maps

  • Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrandt, 241 U.S. 565 (1916): Central federal authority rejecting an Elections Clause challenge to a state referendum applied to congressional redistricting. The Court analogized Missouri’s article III, section 49 language to the Ohio provision upheld in Hildebrandt.
  • Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920): Cited for its description of Hildebrandt and the accepted proposition that referendum provisions can apply to congressional districting legislation.
  • Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 576 U.S. 787 (2015): Cited for recognizing referenda as part of a state’s legislative power in the redistricting context; the dissent’s “back to the drawing board” formulation is used to illustrate that referendum rejection does not abolish legislative authority—it simply rejects a particular enactment.
  • Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1 (2023): Confirmed that redistricting is a legislative function performed according to state lawmaking procedures, which may include a referendum and gubernatorial veto. This undercuts any claim that congressional redistricting must be insulated from state constitutional lawmaking constraints.

D. Administrative-law and justiciability constraints on the Secretary’s certification decision

  • Mesker Bros. Indus., Inc. v. Leachman, 529 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. 1975): Cited to emphasize that an attorney general’s opinion is not binding on courts or citizens. This supported the Court’s critique of the Secretary’s attachment and incorporation-by-reference of an attorney general “opinion” into the certificate.
  • Graves v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., Div. of Prob. & Parole, 630 S.W.3d 769 (Mo. banc 2021): Invoked to reject requests for an advisory opinion; the Court confined itself to the concrete constitutional question presented by the certificate’s stated basis for insufficiency.
  • No Bans on Choice v. Ashcroft, 638 S.W.3d 484 (Mo. banc 2022): Used for constitutional chronology—statutory deadlines enacted long after the constitutional referendum right cannot dilute the constitution’s plain grant of power.
  • NAACP Mo. State Conf. v. Kehoe, 734 S.W.3d 338 (Mo. banc 2026): Reinforced the same Maggard framework about whether HB 1 is in effect depending on ultimate petition sufficiency after review.

E. Other cited authorities (intervention, federal case posture, and ballot summary)

  • Committee for Educational Equality v. State, 294 S.W.3d 477 (Mo. banc 2009), and Toder v. Hoskins, 730 S.W.3d 129 (Mo. App. 2026): Cited in a portion the Court declined to decide (intervention). They remain relevant as signals of skepticism toward redundant interventions where the state can adequately defend its interests.
  • Mo. Gen. Assembly v. Von Glahn, No. 4:25-CV-1535-ZMB, 2025 WL 3514277 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2025): Not binding but used to highlight that election disruption risk was foreseeable and that the Secretary had early notice of the constitutional issue yet delayed certification.
  • People Not Politicians v. Hoskins, 736 S.W.3d 518 (Mo. App. 2026): Cited for the ballot summary statement to be used, showing the Court’s remedial focus on timely ballot administration.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

  1. Textual default rule: “any act of the general assembly” is referable. The Court treated article III, section 49 as a broad reservation of popular power, with referendum as the default and exceptions requiring constitutional grounding. HB 1 is an “act,” and congressional redistricting is “legislative.”
  2. No applicable constitutional exception. The Court rejected each proposed exception under article III, section 52(a):
    • Immediate preservation: HB 1 had no emergency clause; the Court refused to rewrite “public peace, health or safety” into a categorical exemption for “election laws,” especially for an optional mid-decade map where the 2022 map remained available.
    • Maintenance of state institutions: the exception is tied to appropriations; HB 1 was not an appropriations bill.
  3. Structural inference from explicit exclusions elsewhere. Article III, sections 3(i) and 7(h) expressly bar referendum for commission-drawn state legislative “redistricting plan[s].” The Court reasoned that the absence of a similar exclusion for congressional redistricting “by law” in section 45 underscores that the general referendum power in section 49 governs congressional redistricting acts.
  4. Secretary’s review is narrow; reasons must be stated; unstated theories are waived. Under section 116.120.1 and 116.150.2, the Secretary must examine compliance with the Missouri Constitution and chapter 116 and must state the reason for insufficiency in the certificate. The Court treated the certificate’s single stated reason as the only preserved issue. Attempts to expand the dispute (including federal-law hypotheticals and election-administration concerns) were outside the certification scope, waived, or would require an advisory opinion.
  5. Consequences of a sufficient petition: the act is frozen and not effective. Following Maggard and article III, section 52(b), the Court held HB 1 “never took effect,” and the prior 2022 map remains operative unless and until voters approve HB 1.
  6. Robust remedial posture under Rule 84.14. The Court not only reversed but entered judgment compelling certification and ballot placement and enjoining implementation of HB 1, imposing a concrete election-administration deadline (before September 8, 2026) and clarifying that the Secretary (and those acting in concert) may not implement the HB 1 map unless voters approve it.

3.3 Impact

  • Direct rule: Missouri’s referendum power reaches congressional redistricting acts enacted by the General Assembly, absent an explicit constitutional exception.
  • Election administration: When a sufficient referendum petition is filed before an act’s effective date, the act is suspended and cannot be treated as governing law pending the vote—here, the Court emphatically restored the 2022 map as the only lawful map for 2026.
  • Constraints on executive election officials: Certification decisions must be grounded in the constitutional and statutory criteria the legislature authorized; certificates must state reasons; and litigants can leverage waiver principles to confine post hoc justifications.
  • Redistricting politics and litigation: The decision increases the practical significance of referendum strategy in Missouri congressional mapping and signals that courts will police attempts to create extra-textual “redistricting is special” carveouts from the people’s reserved lawmaking powers.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Referendum (Missouri): A vote in which the people approve or reject a law passed by the legislature. Under article III, section 49, it applies to “any act” unless the constitution provides an exception.
  • “Legal, sufficient, and timely” petition: If the petition meets constitutional and statutory requirements and is filed within the allowed time, the challenged law is “referred to the people” and does not take effect unless approved. (Article III, section 52(b); Maggard v. State.)
  • Emergency clause requirement: To claim an act is necessary for “immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety,” Missouri requires an emergency clause; even then, courts can review whether the emergency is real. (Article III, section 29; Inter-City Fire Prot. Dist. of Jackson Cnty. v. Gambrell.)
  • Appropriations exception: Article III, section 52(a) exempts certain appropriations laws from referendum; it does not broadly exempt any law that relates to governmental functions. (As emphasized through Heinkel v. Toberman and State ex rel. Harvey v. Linville.)
  • Advisory opinion: Courts do not issue abstract guidance about hypothetical scenarios; they decide concrete disputes based on preserved issues. (Graves v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., Div. of Prob. & Parole.)

5. Conclusion

von Glahn vs. Hoskins establishes a clear Missouri constitutional rule: a congressional redistricting statute is an “act of the general assembly” subject to referendum under article III, section 49, and no article III, section 52(a) exception applies absent the constitution’s specific conditions. The decision also reinforces process discipline—statewide initiative/referendum administration must track the limited grounds authorized by statute and must be justified in the certificate itself.

Most importantly, the Court connects this textual holding to concrete electoral consequences: once a sufficient referendum petition is filed before an act’s effective date, the act is suspended and cannot be implemented. Here, that means HB 1 is not and has never been in force, the 2022 congressional map governs the 2026 election, and Missouri voters—not executive officials—will decide HB 1’s fate at the ballot box.