Mis-Captioned “Motion to Compel” Seeking Extra-FAA Relief Forfeits Interlocutory Review; Orders Maintaining a Stay/Directing Arbitration Are Unappealable Under FAA § 16(b)

1. Introduction

This published Fourth Circuit decision addresses a recurring procedural flashpoint in arbitration litigation: whether an interlocutory appeal lies under 9 U.S.C. § 16 when a district court has already stayed the case and sent the parties to arbitration, and a party later files a “renewed” motion styled as one to compel arbitration—while substantively seeking additional relief (here, an order requiring payment of AAA initiation fees).

The underlying dispute arose from a “mass arbitration” filed in February 2024 by 31 former employees against Geneva Enterprises, LLC and AV Automotive, LLC (collectively “Geneva”) before the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), asserting wage-related claims under the Virginia Wage Payment Act and (for one claimant) the Fair Labor Standards Act. Geneva disputed arbitrability as to some employees and asserted unmet “conditions precedent,” refused to pay AAA initiation fees, and sought to enjoin the arbitration via a Virginia state-court action that was removed to federal court.

The district court’s June 2024 Order denied Geneva’s request to enjoin the arbitration and stayed the federal action pending arbitration. When Geneva still refused to pay AAA fees and the AAA suggested claimants could advance fees and later seek recoupment, the former employees returned to court with a “Combined Motion to Lift Stay and Renewed Motion to Compel Arbitration,” principally seeking an order directing Geneva to pay initiation fees. The district court’s March 2025 Order denied that motion on the ground that the matter had “already been referred to arbitration and the case stayed.” The former employees pursued an interlocutory appeal.

2. Summary of the Opinion

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Result)

1) The court’s “independent obligation” to police jurisdiction

• Est. of Cunningham v. Mayor & City Council of Balt. and B.P.J. v. W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. were cited to reinforce that appellate courts must independently confirm jurisdiction even if parties brief merits issues.
• In re Search Warrants Issued Feb. 18, 2022 (citing Wideman v. Innovative Fibers LLC) supplied the foundational framing: federal courts may act only when the Constitution and a statute permit it.
• Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist. and Polk v. Montgomery Cnty., Md. underscored that parties cannot confer jurisdiction by consent or concession.

2) The “final judgment rule,” and the limited statutory carveouts

• United States v. Carrington provided the general “final decision” baseline under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
• Cobbledick v. United States and Flanagan v. United States explained the systemic rationale for limiting piecemeal appeals: avoiding interruption of district court proceedings and appellate docket congestion.
• Against that background, the FAA’s appeal provisions are treated as a narrow, text-driven exception.

3) FAA § 16: appealability turns on what the order actually does

• In re Pisgah Contractors, Inc. was central. It states the Fourth Circuit typically has jurisdiction over interlocutory orders denying motions to compel arbitration, but generally lacks jurisdiction over interlocutory orders compelling arbitration or directing it to proceed (and it recognizes two limited exceptions).
• The panel applied 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(1)-(2) to conclude the March 2025 Order was (i) an order “granting a stay” and (ii) an order “directing arbitration to proceed,” both expressly non-appealable interlocutory orders.

4) Substance over caption: preventing jurisdictional “gamesmanship”

• Dillon v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A. supplied a default caution that courts “generally do not look beyond the caption,” but still allows scrutiny when warranted.
• Wheeling Hosp., Inc. v. Health Plan of the Upper Ohio Valley, Inc. provided the operative rule: where a motion is “mis-captioned” to take advantage of FAA interlocutory review, and the movant seeks relief beyond the FAA, the party “forfeit[s]” interlocutory review under § 16(a).
• Applying Wheeling Hosp., Inc., the court treated the former employees’ request for an order forcing Geneva to pay AAA initiation fees as “far more relief” than a pure FAA motion to compel arbitration—thus not qualifying for § 16(a) review.

5) “Final decision” exception rejected; embedded vs. independent actions

• Humphrey v. Prudential Sec., Inc. defined when an arbitration order is “final”: it must arise from a proceeding where “the sole issue” is arbitrability (an “independent” action), not an “embedded” action where arbitrability is one issue among others.
• The panel rejected the employees’ attempt (raised at oral argument) to invoke the “final decision” exception from In re Pisgah Contractors, Inc., holding the March 2025 Order did not “represent[] a final decision with respect to arbitration.”

6) Why the court refused to reach district court subject-matter jurisdiction

• Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, and Mitchell v. Maurer were cited for the usual principle that appellate courts must assure themselves of the lower court’s jurisdiction.
• Di Biase v. SPX Corp. illustrated the proper sequence: only after confirming appellate jurisdiction (there, under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)) may an appellate court address the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
• In re Delaney supplied the limiting principle applied here: if the court of appeals lacks appellate jurisdiction, it “must dismiss the appeal.”
• Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp. was referenced to emphasize that any § 1331 subject-matter jurisdiction challenge should be addressed by the district court “in the first instance.”
• Al Shimari v. CACI Intern., Inc. was invoked to warn against turning non-appealable interlocutory postures into vehicles for premature review, which would “swallow the general rule” of one appeal after final judgment.

B. Legal Reasoning

The opinion’s reasoning is a strict, sequential jurisdictional analysis:

1. Start with the statutory text governing interlocutory arbitration appeals. The court contrasted § 16(a) (permitting appeals from orders “denying a petition under section 4 … to order arbitration to proceed”) with § 16(b) (barring appeals from interlocutory orders “granting a stay,” “directing arbitration to proceed,” “compelling arbitration,” or “refusing to enjoin” arbitration).
2. Characterize the March 2025 Order by its practical effect, not the appellant’s framing. The district court refused to lift the stay and explained the case was already referred to arbitration. The Fourth Circuit treated that as an order continuing a stay and directing arbitration to proceed—squarely within § 16(b)(1)-(2).
3. Reject jurisdictional bootstrapping by “renewing” a motion to compel. Even though the district court “denied” the Renewed Motion, the denial occurred precisely because arbitration had already been set in motion by the earlier order. Allowing an interlocutory appeal in that circumstance would effectively permit appeal of unappealable pro-arbitration orders simply by refiling motions.
4. Apply the mis-captioning doctrine to the motion’s requested relief. The former employees did not merely seek a § 4 order compelling arbitration; they sought an additional directive—forcing Geneva to pay AAA initiation fees. The panel treated that as relief “not provided for by the FAA,” triggering Wheeling Hosp., Inc. and forfeiting access to § 16(a) interlocutory review.
5. Stop once appellate jurisdiction fails. Because appellate jurisdiction was absent, the panel held it was not empowered to decide the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.

C. Impact

The decision’s practical effects are likely to be significant in high-volume employment arbitration and “mass arbitration” contexts:

• Fee-payment disputes will not easily generate interlocutory appellate review. Parties seeking judicial intervention over arbitration-administration mechanics (like initiation fees) cannot assume they can package that request inside a “motion to compel” and obtain immediate appeal if denied.
• Orders maintaining stays and sending parties to arbitration are insulated from immediate appeal. The ruling reinforces Congress’s design in § 16(b): pro-arbitration, case-staying orders ordinarily proceed without interlocutory appellate interruption.
• Litigation strategy must account for the “embedded action” constraint. If the arbitration issue is embedded among other claims, parties may be unable to invoke “final decision” appealability; they may need to await final judgment, seek certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (not used here), or pursue relief within the arbitral forum.
• Jurisdictional sequencing is tightened. The opinion discourages attempts to obtain early appellate consideration of a district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction by attaching such arguments to an interlocutory arbitration appeal that itself is unauthorized.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Interlocutory appeal: an appeal taken before the district court has entered a final judgment resolving the case. Most orders are not immediately appealable.
• FAA § 16(a) vs. § 16(b): § 16(a) allows certain immediate appeals (notably, when arbitration is denied). § 16(b) forbids immediate appeals when arbitration is allowed/compelled or the case is stayed pending arbitration.
• “Directing arbitration to proceed” / “granting a stay”: If the district court’s order keeps the lawsuit paused and sends the parties to arbitration, Congress generally barred immediate appellate review of that decision.
• Mis-captioned motion: labeling a motion as a “motion to compel arbitration” cannot create appealability if the motion’s substance seeks additional relief (e.g., fee-shifting directives) or is functionally an attempt to appeal an unappealable pro-arbitration order.
• Embedded vs. independent action: In an “independent” action, arbitrability is the only issue; in an “embedded” action, arbitrability is one among multiple issues. Finality (and thus appealability) is harder to establish in embedded actions.
• Subject-matter jurisdiction vs. appellate jurisdiction: A district court’s power to hear a case (subject-matter jurisdiction) is distinct from an appellate court’s power to hear an appeal (appellate jurisdiction). If appellate jurisdiction is missing, the appellate court generally cannot reach any other issue.

5. Conclusion

Geneva Enterprises, LLC v. Aaron Chavez reaffirms a strict reading of the FAA’s appellate-jurisdiction scheme: when a district court’s order maintains a stay and effectively directs arbitration to proceed, 9 U.S.C. § 16(b) blocks interlocutory review. The court further cautions that litigants cannot manufacture § 16(a) jurisdiction by captioning a motion as one to compel arbitration while substantively seeking extra-FAA relief—here, an order compelling payment of AAA initiation fees. Finally, the decision emphasizes jurisdictional sequencing: absent appellate jurisdiction, the court of appeals must dismiss and cannot reach the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.