2. Background and Sentencing Proceedings
The distribution organization and Vizcaino’s role
Vizcaino worked for approximately two months as a street-level distributor in a Boston-area fentanyl and cocaine organization led by Yulial Cuello-Reynoso. Cuello-Reynoso and others received customers’ telephone orders and relayed delivery instructions to distributors. Those distributors used organization-supplied cars stocked with a day’s drugs, delivered user-level quantities, and collected payments.
Vizcaino was one of thirteen distributors with approximately equal culpability. All thirteen were less culpable than the eleven other charged co-conspirators. Intercepted telephone calls and drugs recovered when police stopped Vizcaino’s car formed the basis for attributing to him approximately 310.2 grams of fentanyl, 94 grams of crack cocaine, and 55 grams of powder cocaine.
On October 15, 2025, Vizcaino pleaded guilty without a plea agreement to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute forty grams or more of fentanyl, violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(B)(vi).
The disputed role adjustment
Probation recommended a two-level minor-participant adjustment under § 3B1.2(b), emphasizing that Vizcaino acted under Cuello-Reynoso’s direction rather than independently choosing orders or delivery locations. With that adjustment, probation calculated an offense level of twenty-one and a Guidelines Sentencing Range of thirty-seven to forty-six months.
Vizcaino initially sought the larger, four-level adjustment for a minimal participant under § 3B1.2(a), but withdrew that objection and supported probation’s recommendation. The government opposed any mitigating-role adjustment.
The district court rejected the two-level reduction. It concluded that Vizcaino had not established entitlement under the traditional comparative-culpability approach and interpreted the new drug-specific provision as unavailable because he possessed more than user-level quantities and occupied a paid position within the organization’s business model.
Effect of the disputed adjustment
| Calculation |
Offense level |
Guidelines range |
| Probation’s recommendation, including the adjustment |
21 |
37–46 months |
| District court’s calculation, excluding the adjustment |
23 |
46–57 months |
The court ultimately varied downward and imposed thirty-six months’ imprisonment.
4. Analysis
A. The amendment’s function-centered approach
Amendment 833, effective November 1, 2025, added the provision at issue. The Sentencing Commission explained that an earlier, 2015 amendment had not produced a sustained increase in mitigating-role adjustments in drug cases. The new amendment sought to encourage broader use of § 3B1.2 and expand the circumstances in which reductions are warranted.
Section 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(ii) states that a two-level adjustment is “generally warranted” when the defendant’s primary function was performing a low-level trafficking function. It gives examples, including distributing user-level quantities for little or no compensation or acting primarily for reasons other than profit, such as a relationship, threats, or fear.
Crucially, the provision makes the adjustment available regardless of whether the offense involved additional participants and regardless of whether the defendant was substantially less culpable than the average participant. The adjustment’s extent remains dependent on the totality of the circumstances.
This changes the inquiry’s emphasis. A defendant’s position relative to co-participants is no longer an indispensable eligibility condition under this drug-specific provision. Courts must examine what the defendant predominantly did, rather than merely determine whether enough other participants were more culpable.
B. Precedents cited and their influence
United States v. Arias-Mercedes, 901 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2018)
The government invoked United States v. Arias-Mercedes for the traditional rule that a defendant seeking a mitigating-role adjustment must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant was substantially less culpable than the average participant in the relevant criminal activity.
That precedent framed the dispute over direct application of § 3B1.2. The new provision, however, expressly removes comparative culpability as a necessary condition for the drug-specific route at issue. The opinion therefore does not overrule United States v. Arias-Mercedes; it recognizes that the amended guideline supplies a distinct basis for relief. Because resentencing was required on that basis, the court did not decide the separate direct-application dispute.
United States v. Guía-Sendeme, 134 F.4th 611 (1st Cir. 2025)
United States v. Guía-Sendeme served two purposes. First, it illustrated the pre-amendment comparative-culpability framework that could make adjustments difficult for defendants belonging to a large group of similarly culpable, low-level participants.
Second, it supplied guidance on when a Guidelines-calculation error may be harmless. Here, the district court had not stated that it would impose the same sentence if the adjustment applied. The First Circuit therefore could not conclude that the erroneous calculation left the sentence unaffected.
United States v. Walker, 89 F.4th 173 (1st Cir. 2023)
The court cited United States v. Walker both for the earlier comparative framework and for the proposition that some conspiracies may have no participant who qualifies for a minor-role adjustment. That qualification prevents a mistaken inference that every criminal organization must have someone entitled to a reduction.
Nevertheless, the First Circuit found it unclear why this conspiracy would present such a case, given Vizcaino’s low-level function and the amendment’s expanded scope. The court also relied on United States v. Walker in concluding that resentencing was necessary because the record did not establish that the Guidelines error had no effect.
United States v. De la Cruz-Gutiérrez, 881 F.3d 221 (1st Cir. 2018)
Cited through United States v. Walker, United States v. De la Cruz-Gutiérrez illustrated a situation in which participants were “equal partners in the criminal activity” and a mitigating-role adjustment was denied.
Its relevance is limiting rather than controlling. Equal culpability can matter under the traditional framework, but it cannot be imported as a categorical obstacle where the amended drug guideline expressly dispenses with the requirement that the defendant be substantially less culpable than the average participant.
United States v. Daniells, 79 F.4th 57 (1st Cir. 2023)
United States v. Daniells established the applicable standard of review: appellate courts review a guideline’s legal meaning and scope de novo. The district court’s statements defined classes of defendants it believed the provision excluded. Those were interpretive conclusions, not merely factual assessments.
This distinction allowed the First Circuit to correct the legal boundaries of the inquiry while leaving the ultimate, fact-sensitive sentencing determination to the district court on remand.
Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59 (2001)
The government relied on Buford v. United States to argue for deferential review of a fact-bound Guidelines application, even where the underlying facts were undisputed.
The First Circuit distinguished that principle rather than rejecting it. The problem here was not simply how the district court weighed Vizcaino’s circumstances. It was the court’s antecedent legal conclusion that particular circumstances placed him outside the provision’s reach. Deference to factual application does not insulate an incorrect interpretation.
C. Distribution quantities cannot be replaced with possession quantities
The district court read “distributing controlled substances in user-level quantities” as excluding someone carrying enough drugs for multiple customers. The First Circuit rejected that reading because the text addresses the quantities distributed, not the distributor’s aggregate inventory.
A delivery worker may carry a substantial supply while making only small, retail-level transfers. The stock carried in the vehicle does not, standing alone, change the character of each delivery.
The holding nevertheless preserves the relevance of quantity. Possession of a larger amount may inform the overall assessment of the defendant’s function and responsibility. What it cannot do is automatically end the inquiry.
D. Illustrative examples are not exclusive eligibility conditions
The district court also understood the provision as directed toward people who fell into, or were pushed into, distribution rather than those hired to perform an established commercial role. The First Circuit found no categorical distinction of that kind in the guideline.
The Commission expressly described the examples as illustrative rather than definitive because trafficking organizations involve many different functions. Accordingly, compensation, profit motivation, and freedom of choice may bear on the analysis, but they are not independently disqualifying.
The government argued that Vizcaino had invited an exclusive focus on the examples. The court rejected that contention because his submissions also emphasized broader functional considerations: his short involvement, lowest-level trafficking duties, lack of participation in stash-house activities or drug packaging, and use of an organization-provided car.
E. The required inquiry remains individualized
The opinion identifies the governing question without prescribing a mechanical checklist: what was the defendant’s primary trafficking function, considered in context? It highlights several potentially relevant circumstances:
- The defendant’s actual tasks and decision-making authority.
- The duration and scope of participation.
- Whether the defendant packaged drugs, accessed stash houses, or supplied transportation.
- The quantities possessed and the quantities delivered to customers.
- Compensation, motivation, and the surrounding organizational structure.
These considerations are not new mandatory elements. Nor does the opinion guarantee relief to anyone occupying the organization’s lowest rank. Rather, the district court must apply the correct legal framework before exercising its fact-sensitive judgment.
F. A downward variance did not cure the Guidelines error
Vizcaino’s thirty-six-month sentence was one month below the bottom of the range that would have applied with the disputed adjustment. That numerical overlap did not establish harmlessness.
The district court never said it would impose the same sentence under the lower range, and the government did not argue that the error was harmless. The First Circuit could not assume that beginning from a different Guidelines range would leave the ultimate sentence unchanged.