Minor Land Divisions Are LLUPA-Reviewable “Other Similar Applications” When Used as a De Facto Subdivision

1. Introduction

This case arose from competing views of how Idaho’s Local Land Use Planning Act (“LLUPA”), Idaho Code §§ 67-6501 to 67-6529, interacts with county-created “minor land division” (“MLD”) procedures.

Parties and setting. Tricore Investment, LLC (“Tricore”) acquired shoreline tracts along Priest Lake and pursued a development plan. Neighboring landowners and the Priest Lake Cabin Owners’ Association (collectively, “Appellants”) challenged Bonner County approvals of two MLDs—MLD 0143-21 and MLD 0144-21—each creating four lots on contiguous, commonly owned property.

Central issue. The Appellants alleged the two four-lot MLDs were a segmented “de facto subdivision” totaling eight lots, designed to avoid subdivision scrutiny and related procedural protections. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding LLUPA does not authorize judicial review of MLD approvals. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Idaho Supreme Court held that the challenged MLD approvals were subject to judicial review under Idaho Code § 67-6521(1)(a)(i). The Court interpreted the statute’s phrase “and such other similar applications required or authorized pursuant to this chapter” as a genuine residual clause, not limited to the specific application types expressly named elsewhere in LLUPA.

Applying that interpretation, the Court concluded:

• The two MLD applications were “similar” to a subdivision in substance because, when viewed together, they divided contiguous land under common ownership into eight lots and served the same development/sale objectives as a subdivision.
• The MLD process was “authorized” under LLUPA because Bonner County created it pursuant to LLUPA authority (including the ordinance’s express statement tethering it to Title 67, Chapter 65).
• The district court therefore erred in dismissing for lack of jurisdiction; the matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with LLUPA.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• City of Ririe v. Gilgen (170 Idaho 619, 625, 515 P.3d 255, 261 (2022))
  Cited for the standard of review: subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. This framed the Supreme Court’s willingness to independently reassess the district court’s LLUPA-jurisdiction conclusion.
• City of Idaho Falls v. H-K Contractors, Inc. (163 Idaho 579, 582, 416 P.3d 951, 954 (2018)) and Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty. Fire & Rescue (148 Idaho 391, 398, 224 P.3d 458, 465 (2008))
  These decisions supplied the Court’s textualist framework: when statutory language is plain and unambiguous, it must be applied as written, without resort to construction.
• JK Homes, LLC v. Brizzee (174 Idaho 307, 310, 554 P.3d 568, 571 (2024)) (quoting Friends of Farm to Mkt. v. Valley Cnty. (137 Idaho 192, 197, 46 P.3d 9, 14 (2002)))
  Used for the canon against surplusage: statutes should be construed so no part is rendered superfluous. This was central to rejecting the narrow reading that would drain meaning from “such other similar applications.”
• State v. Smalley (164 Idaho 780, 784, 435 P.3d 1100, 1104 (2019))
  Reinforced the same anti-surplusage principle in a concrete way: courts reject interpretations that make modifiers (here, “similar” and “other”) meaningless.
• Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep't of Admin. (155 Idaho 55, 61, 305 P.3d 499, 505 (2013))
  Provided the anti-circumvention maxim—one may not “do indirectly what . . . is prevented by law from doing directly.” The Court used this principle to underscore why substance matters when multiple filings combine to achieve what a single subdivision application would have triggered.
• Tricore Investments, LLC v. Est. of Warren ex rel. Warren (168 Idaho 596, 485 P.3d 92 (2021))
  Not a rule-driving precedent here, but referenced to clarify the party name inconsistency in prior litigation involving Tricore.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The “other similar applications” clause is a true residual clause

The Court began with the text of Idaho Code § 67-6521(1)(a)(i), which allows judicial review of local decisions on “an application for a subdivision, variance, special use permit and such other similar applications required or authorized pursuant to this chapter.”

Rejecting the district court/Tricore position that “similar applications” must be only those expressly enumerated elsewhere in LLUPA, the Court reasoned:

• “Such,” “other,” and “similar” (as defined in Black’s Law Dictionary and Merriam-Webster) collectively point to applications not listed that share substantive characteristics with listed land-use approvals.
• Limiting “similar applications” to applications already listed in LLUPA would make the residual phrase superfluous, violating the canon applied in JK Homes, LLC v. Brizzee and State v. Smalley.

B. “Authorized pursuant to this chapter” is not limited to applications expressly named in LLUPA

A key move in the opinion is its definition of “authorized”: an application is “authorized” if the local government created it under legal authority derived from LLUPA—not only if LLUPA expressly labels it.

The Court linked MLDs to LLUPA authorization through:

• Ordinance tethering: Bonner County Ordinance 557 stated MLD provisions were “adopted pursuant to the authority granted at Chapter 65, Title 67, Idaho Code.”
• Policy overlap: MLDs implicate the same public-policy concerns LLUPA recognizes for subdivisions (e.g., service delivery impacts, environmental protection, hazards), referencing Idaho Code § 67-6513 and the purposes in Idaho Code § 67-6502.
• Process similarity: Bonner County’s MLD review required findings of ordinance compliance and BOCC approval (e.g., B.C.R.C. § 12-661), mirroring the discretionary, property-rights-affecting character of statutory subdivision decisionmaking (e.g., Idaho Code § 67-6519; final approval conceptually tied to Idaho Code § 67-6504).

C. Substance-over-form: two four-lot MLDs can function as one subdivision-like land division

Even though each MLD alone fell below the five-lot “subdivision” threshold in Idaho Code § 50-1301(18), the Court evaluated the substance of what Tricore did:

• The two MLD applications were filed simultaneously by the same applicant.
• They involved contiguous property under common ownership.
• Together, they divided the land into eight lots, mirroring the practical effect of a subdivision.
• The record included a stark acknowledgement from the County’s attorney that Tricore “100 percent” was trying to avoid subdivision requirements—supporting the Court’s anti-circumvention framing under Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep't of Admin..

The Court did not hold that every MLD is necessarily a “subdivision.” Instead, it held these MLDs were reviewable under LLUPA because they were (i) “similar” to a subdivision in practical effect and (ii) “authorized” under LLUPA authority.

3.3 Impact

• Expanded LLUPA reviewability for locally created land-division categories.
  Counties and cities that create “expedited” or “lesser” land-division procedures under LLUPA authority should expect that approvals may still be judicially reviewable if they are similar to subdivisions/variances/special use permits in substance.
• Anti-segmentation signal.
  The decision discourages segmenting a larger land division into multiple smaller applications to evade statutory thresholds and the procedural protections typically associated with subdivision review.
• Procedural consequences on remand.
  Because the Court held LLUPA applies, the remanded proceedings must grapple with LLUPA’s procedural framework—most notably the written decision requirements identified in Idaho Code § 67-6535 (which the district court initially relied upon before reversing itself).
• Litigation and ordinance-drafting effects.
  Local governments may respond by expressly regulating contiguous/successive MLD filings, clarifying aggregation rules, and ensuring that decision records satisfy LLUPA if their processes are rooted in LLUPA authority.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• LLUPA (Local Land Use Planning Act): Idaho’s statewide framework that authorizes and structures local land-use decisionmaking and provides a pathway to judicial review for certain local land-use decisions.
• Subject matter jurisdiction: The court’s power to hear the kind of case presented. Here, the district court believed LLUPA did not cover MLD approvals, so it dismissed; the Supreme Court held LLUPA did cover these approvals, so the court had power to review them.
• Residual clause (“such other similar applications”): A “catch-all” phrase following a list, designed to include unlisted items that share the same essential characteristics as the listed ones.
• “Authorized pursuant to this chapter”: Not limited to applications named in LLUPA; includes local application types created under LLUPA-granted authority (especially where an ordinance expressly states it is adopted under Title 67, Chapter 65).
• De facto subdivision / segmentation: Splitting a project into smaller filings to avoid hitting a legal threshold (e.g., two four-lot filings to avoid the five-lot subdivision definition in Idaho Code § 50-1301(18)).
• “Deemed denied” (Idaho Code § 67-6535(2)(b)): If a governing body does not act on a reconsideration request within the statutory time, the request is treated as denied automatically, allowing the challenger to proceed to judicial review.

5. Conclusion

Budig v. Bonner County clarifies that LLUPA’s judicial review provision in Idaho Code § 67-6521(1)(a)(i) reaches beyond expressly labeled subdivisions, variances, and special use permits. When a county creates an application type under LLUPA authority—and that application is similar in substance to the listed categories—its approval is reviewable. Applied here, two contiguous, simultaneously filed four-lot MLD approvals functioned as an eight-lot subdivision-like action and therefore could not be insulated from LLUPA review by labeling alone. The case returns to the district court for proceedings consistent with LLUPA’s requirements.