Date: Apr 21, 2026

Minnesota Requires Warrants for Google Location Data and Bars Geofence Warrants that Delegate Step-Two Expansion Decisions to Police

Introduction

Case: State of Minnesota v. Ivan Contreras-Sanchez
Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota
Date: April 15, 2026

This decision addresses, for the first time in Minnesota, the constitutionality of a “geofence warrant”—a warrant served on a technology company (here, Google) compelling disclosure of device-location data for devices present within specified geographic coordinates during a specified time window. Law enforcement used a three-step geofence process to identify a device repeatedly located over a rural culvert where Manuel Mandujano’s body was found, then ultimately identified that device as belonging to Ivan Contreras-Sanchez, who later admitted involvement in the murder.

The central issues were whether accessing Google-stored location data is a “search” under Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution; whether geofence warrants are categorically forbidden as general warrants; whether the application established probable cause; and whether the warrant was sufficiently particular given its staged structure—especially the “step two” expansion outside the initial geofence.

Summary of the Opinion

Search: Cell phone users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their location data stored by Google; government access to it is a search under Article I, Section 10.
No categorical ban: Geofence warrants are not per se unconstitutional general warrants.
Probable cause: The application established a “fair probability” that Google’s servers contained evidence; probable cause did not require a nexus for every person within the geofence.
Particularity failure: The geofence warrant was insufficiently particular because it gave police unchecked discretion to decide which device IDs would be subjected to additional, expanded location searches in step two (outside the geofence and beyond the initial time/data scope), without judicial review.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed and remanded to the court of appeals to consider issues it had not reached—specifically, whether a good-faith exception applies and whether any constitutional error was harmless.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Minnesota constitutional independence and enhanced protections

State v. Leonard, 943 N.W.2d 149 (Minn. 2020): A cornerstone of the court’s state-constitutional reasoning. Leonard held that warrantless inspection of hotel guest registries was a search under Article I, Section 10 because registries create “highly sensitive location information.” The court leveraged Leonard to (a) recognize location data as uniquely privacy-sensitive, and (b) resist broad application of the third-party doctrine to such data.
State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 2005), and Ascher v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183 (Minn. 1994): Cited via State v. Leonard to reinforce Minnesota’s history of providing “greater protection” than the Fourth Amendment against suspicionless law enforcement conduct.
Ascher v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183 (Minn. 1994), and Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983): Used to justify deciding the case on independent state grounds without awaiting federal resolution, and to explain how state constitutional rulings can insulate outcomes from federal review when based on adequate and independent state law.
State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. 1985): Reinforces the court’s duty to safeguard rights under the Minnesota Constitution independently, while acknowledging federal precedent may be “persuasive” where text is parallel.
State v. Westrom, 6 N.W.3d 145 (Minn. 2024), and State v. Johnson, 813 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2012): Provide the governing Minnesota framework: a search occurs when government intrudes on a reasonable expectation of privacy; generally, reasonableness hinges on a valid warrant.
State v. Sardina-Padilla, 7 N.W.3d 585 (Minn. 2024): Used to highlight Minnesota’s concern with broad searches of electronic data and to contextualize how breadth can sometimes be tolerated if greater specificity is not possible—an idea the court later contrasts with step-two discretion.
In re B.H., 946 N.W.2d 860 (Minn. 2020): Cited for the proposition that location tracking reveals sensitive associations, supporting the conclusion that Google location data is deeply revealing.

2) Federal “reasonable expectation of privacy” and location-tracking jurisprudence as persuasive support

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967): Supplies the foundational idea that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, and anchors the expectation-of-privacy framework used as persuasive analog in the state constitutional analysis.
Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018): The primary federal analog. Though Minnesota resolves the question under Article I, Section 10, the court uses Carpenter to support two key propositions: (a) location records provide an “intimate window” into life and associations, and (b) the third-party doctrine should not automatically defeat privacy in comprehensive location data.
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012): Used through Carpenter to support the privacy interest in “the whole of [one’s] physical movements,” helping frame why Google-stored location history is qualitatively different from ordinary business records.
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014): Supports the practical premise that cell phones are ubiquitous and “indispensable,” bolstering the court’s probable-cause inference that perpetrators likely carried phones and the broader privacy sensitivity of phone-derived data.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), and United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948): Cited via Carpenter to underscore the constitutional aversion to “too permeating police surveillance.”
Third-party doctrine cases Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), and United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976): Used (as in Carpenter) to show why limited transactional metadata differs from comprehensive location chronicles—thus limiting third-party doctrine’s reach.

3) Particularity, general warrants, and the limits on executive discretion

State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163 (Minn. 2007): Defines general warrants as those that specify only an offense and leave decisions about whom/where to search to executing officials—directly relevant to the geofence “general warrant” debate.
City of Golden Valley v. Wiebesick, 899 N.W.2d 152 (Minn. 2017): Reinforces the prohibition on exploratory rummaging; used to explain why discretion must be cabined.
State v. McNeilly, 6 N.W.3d 161 (Minn. 2024): Central to the court’s particularity analysis: particularity must appear in the warrant itself, not merely in supporting documents; and nothing should be left to officer discretion as to what is seized.
State v. Bradford, 618 N.W.2d 782 (Minn. 2000): Emphasizes that particularity prevents general or exploratory searches.
State v. Miller, 666 N.W.2d 703 (Minn. 2003): Supplies deference principles when reviewing issuing-judge determinations of particularity.
Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979): Cited to explain that warrants need not specify the precise manner of execution—relevant to rejecting the argument that Google’s operational need to split time windows proves a lack of particularity.

4) Probable cause doctrine and “nexus” arguments

State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265 (Minn. 1985), and Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983): Supply the “fair probability” totality-of-the-circumstances probable-cause standard.
State v. Wiggins, 4 N.W.3d 138 (Minn. 2024), and State v. Lester, 874 N.W.2d 768 (Minn. 2016): Reinforce deference to issuing judges and use of reasonable inferences/common sense in probable cause determinations.
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), and Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978): Frame the dispute over whether probable cause must be “particularized” to each person whose information is incidentally swept in. The court distinguishes Ybarra (searches of persons) and relies on Zurcher to uphold warrants for “things” in places where evidence is likely found, even if third parties are affected.

5) Emerging geofence caselaw and the Chatrie backdrop

Chatrie v. United States, 136 F.4th 100 (4th Cir. 2025), cert. granted, No. 25-112, 2026 WL 120676 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2026): The Minnesota court declines to wait for U.S. Supreme Court resolution, but flags that the federal outcome may matter on remand for Fourth Amendment questions.
United States v. Chatrie, 590 F. Supp. 3d 901 (E.D. Va. 2022), aff'd on other grounds, 107 F.4th 319 (4th Cir. 2024), aff'd en banc, 136 F.4th 100 (4th Cir. 2025): Cited for practical realities of Google “opt-in” prompts, relevant to voluntariness/third-party doctrine analysis.
United States v. Smith, 110 F.4th 817 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied sub nom., Smith v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 356 (mem.) (2025): Cited for the precision of geofence data (often more precise than CSLI/GPS) and skepticism that anonymization meaningfully resolves privacy concerns.
In re Search of Info. that is Stored at Premises Controlled by Google LLC (Info. Stored at Google), 579 F. Supp. 3d 62 (D.D.C. 2021): Cited for the proposition that Google may collect/store location data even when users attempt to opt out, supporting the view that “choice” is not always meaningful.
United States v. Rhine, 652 F. Supp. 3d 38 (D.D.C. 2023): Cited to rebut the claim that geofences are general warrants simply because Google must search a broader dataset to produce responsive results; the constitutional focus is what the government is authorized to obtain.

6) Remedies and appellate procedure

State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239 (Minn. 2007), and State v. Leonard, 943 N.W.2d 149 (Minn. 2020): Support the court’s practice of deciding under the Minnesota Constitution and not reaching Fourth Amendment issues once a state constitutional violation is found.
Dupey v. State, 868 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 2015), and State v. Ross, 732 N.W.2d 274 (Minn. 2007): Support remand to the court of appeals to address remedy questions it did not reach (good-faith exception, harmless error).

7) The dissent’s cautionary authorities

The dissent (joined by a second justice) argues the court should have stayed the case pending Chatrie v. United States and questions whether the majority truly rests on adequate and independent state grounds, invoking: City of Golden Valley v. Wiebesick, 899 N.W.2d 152 (Minn. 2017); Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 2005); State v. Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 2020); Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). Although not adopted by the majority, these citations frame the institutional debate: when state courts should move first in a developing surveillance-technology area.

Legal Reasoning

1) Accessing Google-stored location history is a “search” under Article I, Section 10

The court’s central move is to treat Google location data as “highly sensitive location information” akin to, but more revealing than, the hotel registry in State v. Leonard. Where a registry captures a limited “snapshot,” Google location history can function as a retrospective “chronology” of movement capable of exposing intimate associations and private life activities.

The court rejects two state arguments:

Third-party doctrine: Even if Minnesota were to recognize a broad third-party doctrine, the court holds it does not apply to this category of sensitive location information. Sharing data with Google does not equate to consent for “unrestricted access” by the government, and the “opt-in” nature of location history is treated as practically illusory in many cases.
Anonymization: “Anonymous” device IDs do not eliminate privacy interests because cross-referencing can identify individuals; moreover, Minnesota’s constitutional balance favors protection even against “minimally intrusive” suspicionless surveillance.

2) Geofence warrants are not categorically unconstitutional general warrants

The court rejects a per se rule, emphasizing that some geofence warrants can be drafted so narrowly (time, geography, and procedural safeguards) that they effectively target a single unknown suspect rather than enabling “exploratory rummaging.” It adopts a case-by-case approach rather than invalidating the investigative tool entirely.

3) Probable cause: “fair probability” that evidence would be found on Google’s servers

The court holds probable cause existed because: a homicide occurred; an informant indicated perpetrators had cell phones; cell phones are commonly carried; and Google stores location information for users across many products. Importantly, the court rejects the claim that probable cause must be “particularized” to each person whose device data might be incidentally swept in. Distinguishing Ybarra v. Illinois (searches of persons), it relies on Zurcher v. Stanford Daily to allow warrants for “things” at a place where evidence is likely found, even if third-party privacy is burdened.

4) Particularity: step-two expansion cannot be left to unchecked police discretion

The decisive constitutional flaw is not the initial geofence box or the broad date range, but the staged “expansion” mechanism in step two. The warrant allowed police to: (a) decide which device IDs were “relevant,” and then (b) “upon demand” compel Google to produce additional location history outside the geofence (and without geographic limits) for 60 minutes before and after each device’s presence—without requiring a judge to review that expansion decision.

The court’s reasoning is classic particularity doctrine applied to modern data practice: the warrant must constrain what is seized so that “nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant” (State v. McNeilly). Here, the warrant delegated the key decision—who gets subjected to expanded surveillance—to investigators, creating the modern analogue of the general exploratory search.

Notably, the court emphasizes that officers in fact acted narrowly (seeking step-two data for only one device ID), but constitutional validity turns on the authority granted by the warrant, not the restraint shown in a particular execution.

Impact

1) A clear Minnesota constitutional rule for geofences: staged expansion requires judicial control

Minnesota now recognizes that Google-stored location data is protected by Article I, Section 10, meaning geofence practices generally require warrants. More critically, a geofence warrant must not give police “unchecked discretion” at the expansion stage. Future Minnesota warrants will likely need one (or more) of the following structural fixes:

Sequential warrants: a first warrant for anonymized geofence returns and a second (and possibly third) warrant to expand beyond the fence and/or to unmask identity—each supported by judicial findings rather than officer “demand.”
Ex ante constraints: if step-two expansion is included in a single warrant, it must include objective, judge-reviewable selection criteria that meaningfully limit officer discretion, not simply “relevance” to an investigation.
Geographic and temporal limits on expansion: the court signals discomfort with unlimited geography once outside the fence; future warrants may need bounded “path-of-travel” corridors or other limiting principles.

2) Law enforcement practices and evidentiary consequences

Investigators can still use geofences, but Minnesota courts will scrutinize the step that turns a reverse-location sweep into person-targeted tracking. The remand places real weight on remedy questions (good-faith, harmless error), meaning the ultimate suppression outcome in this prosecution is not decided here—but the constitutional rule is.

3) Federal-state divergence risk

Because the court decides under the Minnesota Constitution and avoids the Fourth Amendment question, Minnesota may end up with stricter constraints than the federal baseline, depending on how the U.S. Supreme Court resolves Chatrie v. United States. The opinion expressly contemplates that federal developments could matter on remand for Fourth Amendment analysis, but Minnesota’s independent state rule on particularity and privacy in Google location data will continue to govern Minnesota searches.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Geofence warrant: A warrant that asks a provider (like Google) for device-location records for all devices present within a geographic “fence” during a time range—often used when police do not know a suspect’s identity.
Third-party doctrine: A doctrine that can reduce privacy expectations in information voluntarily shared with others. Minnesota limits its use for sensitive location information, reasoning that sharing with a company does not equal consent for unrestricted government access to intimate movement history.
Probable cause (“fair probability”): Not certainty—just a reasonable likelihood, based on the total circumstances, that evidence will be found in the place to be searched (here, Google’s servers).
Particularity: The warrant must specify what may be searched and seized so officers are not free to decide for themselves whose information gets examined more deeply. In this case, the flaw was letting police choose which device IDs would be subjected to expanded location surveillance without returning to a judge.
General warrant: A warrant that is so open-ended it permits broad rummaging and leaves core search decisions to the executing officer. Minnesota rejects a categorical “all geofences are general warrants” claim, but finds this warrant’s step-two discretion created an unconstitutional lack of particularity.
Good-faith exception / harmless error: Even if a warrant is unconstitutional, evidence may sometimes still be admitted if police reasonably relied on the warrant (good faith) or if the constitutional error did not affect the verdict (harmless error). The court remanded for the court of appeals to decide these issues.

Conclusion

State of Minnesota v. Ivan Contreras-Sanchez establishes a major Minnesota constitutional rule for digital surveillance: Google-stored location history is protected by a reasonable expectation of privacy, and geofence warrants—while not categorically forbidden—must be drafted so that investigators cannot unilaterally decide which devices will be subjected to expanded, more invasive location tracking. The decision preserves geofences as a tool, but forces judicial supervision at the moment the search shifts from a bounded geographic query to individualized movement profiling—an adaptation of traditional particularity doctrine to modern, provider-held location archives.