Millette v. Burger: “Currently Pending” Limits Special-Judge Authority; No Reassignment, No Power to Act

1. Introduction

Case: Millette v. Burger, Supreme Court of Mississippi (June 11, 2026).
Posture: Interlocutory appeal challenging whether a special judge had authority to enter an order in a circuit-court case.
Parties: Appellant Samuel Martin Millette, III (defendant below) versus multiple plaintiffs led by Marcus Deshawn Burger and related entities, and numerous other defendants.

The underlying litigation concerns alleged misuse, misappropriation, and conflicts of interest relating to “Mockingbird Cannabis LLC,” described as a Mississippi medical-marijuana manufacturer. While the merits were not reached, the case became a vehicle for a threshold judicial-administration issue: whether Special Judge Barry W. Ford could act in a case that had been assigned to Circuit Judge Debra Gibbs when there was no case-specific reassignment order and the Chief Justice’s appointment order limited the special judge to cases “currently pending” at the time of appointment.

The immediate dispute arose when, after Millette filed motions to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings, Special Judge Ford—without a hearing—entered an order granting plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint. Millette challenged Ford’s authority to enter any order at all in this case.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that Special Judge Ford lacked authority to enter the October 2, 2024 order granting leave to amend because the Chief Justice’s February 21, 2024 appointment order authorized Ford only to assist with cases “currently pending” in the Seventh Circuit Court District, Subdistrict Two as of February 21, 2024. The case at issue was filed July 3, 2024—months later—and therefore fell outside the appointment’s scope.

The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings before the properly assigned circuit-court judge. Any remaining issue raised in Millette’s petition was deemed moot.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. State ex rel. Hood, 363 So. 3d 617, 621 (Miss. 2019)
    Role in the opinion: Cited for the standard that questions of law are reviewed de novo. This framed the appellate lens: the Supreme Court treated the special-judge authority question as a pure legal issue, not a discretionary call owed deference.
  • Miss. Dep't of Revenue v. Hotel & Rest. Supply, 192 So. 3d 942, 945 (Miss. 2016)
    Role in the opinion: Quoted within the Safeco parenthetical, reinforcing the same de novo standard. The Court used these authorities to justify independent interpretation of the appointment order and Mississippi Code Section 9-1-105(2).
  • Butler v. Watson (In re Initiative Measure No. 65), 338 So. 3d 599, 615 (Miss. 2021)
    Role in the opinion: Mentioned in a factual footnote describing the medical-marijuana regulatory backdrop referenced in the amended complaint. It did not drive the legal holding, but contextualized the parties’ narrative about delays and alleged misconduct.

Notably, the Court’s decisive reasoning depended less on common-law precedent and more on statutory interpretation and close reading of a Chief Justice appointment order.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The controlling legal authority: Mississippi Code Section 9-1-105(2)

The Court centered its analysis on Mississippi Code Section 9-1-105(2), which authorizes the Chief Justice (with advice and consent) to appoint a special judge “on a temporary basis” for emergencies or overcrowded dockets, and permits the Chief Justice to assign the special judge to: (i) particular cases, (ii) a particular type of case, or (iii) a particular portion of the court’s docket.

B. Interpreting the appointment order’s phrase “currently pending”

The key interpretive dispute was whether “currently pending” should be read as:

  • Temporal limitation (Millette’s view): only cases pending on the date of the appointment order (February 21, 2024).
  • Functional/ongoing authority (plaintiffs’ view): akin to “so pending,” implying authority continues until docket strain is alleviated and would include later-filed cases.

The Court adopted the temporal limitation reading. Its reasoning had three main steps:

  1. Textual focus on “temporary basis”: The statute’s express temporariness undercut plaintiffs’ interpretation, which the Court said could become effectively indefinite. The Court reinforced this point by referencing dictionary definitions distinguishing “temporary” from “indefinite.”
  2. Order-structure and comparison to earlier orders: The plaintiffs argued that the February 21 order’s lack of restrictive language implied broader authority, but the Court emphasized that earlier orders (June 27, 2023 and November 20, 2023) had assigned Ford to identified “particular cases,” while the February 21 order instead defined a “portion of the docket” as those “currently pending.”
  3. Statutory fit: The Court harmonized the February 21 order with the statute’s menu of assignment types by classifying it as an assignment to a “particular portion of the court’s docket”—specifically, cases pending as of February 21, 2024.

C. The practical consequence: no authority without proper assignment

Because the case was filed on July 3, 2024, it was not within the set of cases “currently pending” on February 21, 2024. As a result, Judge Ford “had no authority” to grant leave to amend “or to consider any motions filed in this case.” The Court therefore reversed and remanded for proceedings before the “properly assigned” circuit judge.

D. Mootness of remaining issues

After resolving the authority question, the Court declared Millette’s remaining interlocutory issue moot. The logic is straightforward: once the challenged order is reversed for want of authority, any subsidiary disputes tied to that order’s validity or timing cease to present a live controversy in the same procedural posture.

3.3. Impact

A. Administrative clarity and enforceable limits on special-judge power

The decision signals that Mississippi appellate courts will enforce the exact scope of special-judge appointment language—particularly when the order defines the assignment by time (“currently pending”) rather than by subject matter or by enumerated case list. Courts and administrators should expect heightened scrutiny of whether a matter is truly within the special judge’s delegated “portion of the docket.”

B. Litigant strategy: early challenges to judicial authority

Parties now have stronger footing to challenge rulings issued by special judges where the appointment order does not clearly cover the case. This may increase:

  • requests for production/verification of reassignment documentation;
  • interlocutory petitions when authority is uncertain; and
  • pressure on trial courts to memorialize reassignments in clear, case-specific orders.

C. Case-management implications

For docket-relief efforts, the ruling encourages the Chief Justice and requesting judges to draft appointment orders with precision—e.g., explicitly addressing whether the assignment includes future-filed cases during a defined time window, or only cases pending as of a certain date. Absent such clarity, the “currently pending” phrasing may be treated as a firm cutoff.

D. Remedy signals: orders entered without authority are vulnerable

Although the Court did not use “void” terminology explicitly, its holding that Ford had “no authority” to enter the order indicates that actions taken outside the appointment’s scope are subject to reversal on jurisdictional/authority grounds, independent of the merits of the procedural ruling (here, leave to amend).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Interlocutory appeal: An appeal taken before the case ends, typically permitted only for important threshold issues. Here, the Supreme Court allowed review mid-case to resolve whether the acting judge had authority.
  • Special judge (temporary assignment): A judge appointed to help a court manage emergencies or an overcrowded docket. The special judge’s power depends on the scope of the appointment order.
  • “Currently pending”: As used here, the Court interpreted it as a time-based limitation—cases already on the docket at the time the appointment order was entered.
  • De novo review: The appellate court decides the legal issue fresh, without deferring to the trial court.
  • Mootness: Once the main ruling is reversed and there is no longer a live dispute over the remaining point in that posture, the court will not decide it.

5. Conclusion

Millette v. Burger establishes a clear, administrable rule: when a special-judge appointment order authorizes action only in cases “currently pending,” that authority is limited to cases already pending on the date of the order, and a special judge may not enter orders in later-filed cases absent a proper reassignment within the appointment’s scope. The decision reinforces that docket-management tools under Mississippi Code Section 9-1-105(2) are powerful but bounded—and that the legitimacy of trial-court orders depends on faithful adherence to the exact terms of judicial assignment.