Michigan PWDCRA: Temporary “Compassion” Restructuring Does Not Redefine Job Duties or Create a Permanent Accommodation Obligation

1. Introduction

After more than two decades as an operator at a Midland, Michigan chemical facility, Robert Koscielski developed serious balance and coordination problems and was ultimately diagnosed with Central Pontine Myelinolysis (CPM). His neurologist imposed extensive work restrictions (initially framed as restrictions, later confirmed as permanent), including limitations on lifting, climbing, forklift driving, wearing protective respiratory equipment (including SCBA), and working anything other than day shift.

DDP Specialty Electronic Materials temporarily placed Koscielski into a “restructured” role focused largely on desk/computer and planning-type work while it remained uncertain whether his condition would improve. When DDP later received medical confirmation that the restrictions were permanent, it concluded Koscielski could not perform the duties of his operator role (and later, of other positions he applied for), and it ended his employment.

Koscielski sued under Michigan’s PWDCRA alleging (i) disability discrimination and (ii) failure to accommodate. The core legal issue was threshold and dispositive: whether CPM constituted a “disability” under the PWDCRA’s employment definition—meaning, among other things, that the condition was “unrelated to” his “ability to perform” the job “with or without accommodation.”

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for DDP. The court held that Koscielski could not meet the PWDCRA’s threshold “disability” requirement for employment claims because undisputed evidence showed his condition prevented him from performing the duties of:

• his job as a special-resins operator; and
• the technical-advisor positions for which he applied.

Crucially, the court rejected Koscielski’s theory that DDP had a legal obligation to continue the special, restructured role it had voluntarily created and maintained for months. The PWDCRA sets minimum protections; it does not penalize an employer for temporarily going beyond those minimums by converting a compassionate, temporary arrangement into a permanent legal duty.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Peden v. City of Detroit

This decision is the opinion’s anchor. The court relied on Peden v. City of Detroit to explain the PWDCRA’s distinctive structure: for employment claims, “disability” includes the requirement that the impairment be “unrelated” to job performance—i.e., it “does not prevent” performance of job duties “with or without accommodation.” The panel used Peden in three key ways:

• Threshold gatekeeping: The court treated “unrelated to ability” as a threshold element, not merely part of the merits of discrimination/accommodation. If the plaintiff cannot perform the job’s duties even with accommodation, the PWDCRA’s employment protections do not apply.
• Deference on job duties: The court invoked Peden for the rule that courts must give “substantial deference” to the employer’s judgment about a job’s “scope” and “duties,” with the employer’s view not “dispositive” but overcome only by “sufficient evidence” of unreasonableness.
• Floor-not-ceiling principle: The court cited Peden (including its discussion that accommodating beyond the statute should not create added legal exposure) to reject the argument that DDP’s temporary restructuring redefined the operator job’s duties or created a permanent accommodation obligation.

Rourk v. Oakwood Hosp. Corp.

The court cited Rourk v. Oakwood Hosp. Corp. for the PWDCRA accommodation framework and limits, particularly the proposition (later echoed through other authority) that the statute does not require an employer to transfer an employee to a different position as an accommodation.

Spraggins v. Third Jud. Cir. of Mich.

The panel used Spraggins v. Third Jud. Cir. of Mich. to structure the analysis into two practical questions under the PWDCRA: (1) what are the job’s “duties,” and (2) can the plaintiff perform those duties with or without accommodation?

Pemberton v. Bell's Brewery, Inc.

The court relied on Pemberton v. Bell's Brewery, Inc. for statutory limits on “restructuring”: Michigan law may require restructuring of only “minor or infrequent duties,” not a job’s “primary” duties, and it does not require creating or offering a new position. This precedent directly supported the conclusion that DDP’s restructured role was effectively an altogether different job, not a required accommodation.

Smith v. Newport Utils.

Smith v. Newport Utils. was cited for the standard of review (de novo) and later to clarify that, even under ADA principles, an “interactive process” failure is not a standalone violation absent proof that a reasonable accommodation existed.

EEOC v. Ford Motor Co.

The court cited EEOC v. Ford Motor Co. to rebut the notion that “job duties/essential functions” cannot be resolved at summary judgment, and to support the point that interactive-process disputes do not matter if the plaintiff cannot show an accommodation that would allow performance of the job’s duties.

Rorrer v. City of Stow

The court distinguished Rorrer v. City of Stow as an ADA case relied on by Koscielski for the proposition that essential-function disputes are typically for a jury. The panel emphasized the doctrinal mismatch: Michigan’s PWDCRA uses “duties” and applies “substantial deference” to the employer’s description, cautioning against importing ADA frameworks wholesale.

Johnson v. Cleveland City Sch. Dist.

Johnson v. Cleveland City Sch. Dist. supported the point that an employer may take medical restrictions “at face value” when assessing capability to perform job duties, even if the employee believes he can do more.

Viet v. Le

Viet v. Le supplied the summary-judgment formulation: whether a “rational trier of fact” could find for the nonmovant. The panel used it to conclude that no rational factfinder could treat a stray, conclusory email as outweighing objective job requirements and consistent testimony about physical demands.

Wagner v. Sherwin-Williams Co. and Banks v. Brown-Forman Corp.

The court cited Wagner v. Sherwin-Williams Co. and Banks v. Brown-Forman Corp. (order) as reinforcing the broader principle that employers are not punished for temporary, generous accommodations—supporting the rejection of Koscielski’s attempt to convert a temporary arrangement into a permanent legal obligation.

Koscielski v. DDP Specialty Elec. Materials US, Inc., 2025 WL 952474 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2025)

The panel’s affirmance validated the district court’s framing: because Koscielski could not perform the relevant job duties with or without accommodation, he failed to establish the PWDCRA’s “disability” element for employment claims, entitling DDP to summary judgment on both discrimination and accommodation theories.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) The PWDCRA’s “disability” definition does dispositive work

Unlike the ADA’s typical focus on whether an individual is a “qualified individual” able to perform “essential functions,” the PWDCRA builds job-performance capability into the definition of “disability” for employment claims: the impairment must be “unrelated to” the ability to perform job duties “with or without accommodation.” The panel treated this as a threshold filter: if the plaintiff cannot perform the job’s duties even with accommodation, he is not “disabled” for purposes of the Act’s employment protections, and both discrimination and accommodation claims fail.

(b) Defining “duties”: substantial deference to the employer

The court began with DDP’s official job descriptions for special-resins operator and technical advisor, both of which included significant physical and safety-related requirements: climbing ladders/stairs, lifting, bending/squatting, forklift driving, and wearing respirators/SCBA, along with shift coverage expectations.

Koscielski offered no “sufficient evidence” that DDP’s description was unreasonable. On the contrary, his own testimony and other witnesses confirmed he performed those physical tasks before becoming ill, and that those tasks were understood to be part of the role.

(c) Applying the restrictions: inability to perform multiple undisputed duties

Given Dr. Cote’s restrictions and Koscielski’s admissions, the court found it undisputed that he could not perform multiple listed duties (notably including forklift driving and SCBA use, among others). The court also rejected reliance on self-devised workarounds because they did not address all required duties.

(d) The restructured job: voluntary assistance is not a permanent legal mandate

Koscielski’s central theory was that, because DDP allowed him to work for months in a modified/restructured role that avoided many operator duties, DDP effectively had to continue that arrangement. The court rejected this as “atextual,” warning that it would deter employers from offering temporary, above-minimum solutions during uncertain medical periods. The PWDCRA, as construed through Michigan authority, does not require employers to:

• eliminate primary duties (only “minor or infrequent duties” may be subject to restructuring);
• create an altogether new job; or
• transfer an employee into a different role as an accommodation.

(e) “Interactive process” arguments did not salvage the claim

The panel found no Michigan-law source for an “interactive process” requirement, and in any event held that—even under the ADA—failure to engage in the process is not a standalone violation without evidence of a reasonable accommodation that would permit performance of the job’s duties. Because Koscielski could not identify such an accommodation, process-based arguments could not defeat summary judgment.

3.3 Impact

This opinion is likely to be cited in three recurring situations:

• Temporary light-duty/modified-duty programs: Employers can more confidently offer temporary, above-minimum accommodations without fearing that doing so will judicially “lock in” the temporary arrangement as a permanent legal requirement.
• Duty-definition disputes under PWDCRA: Litigants should expect courts to give substantial weight to formal job descriptions and consistent testimony about physical/safety requirements, and to resist importing the ADA’s “essential functions” regulatory apparatus as controlling.
• Process-focused claims: Plaintiffs will face difficulty opposing summary judgment by arguing about the adequacy of accommodation discussions unless they can identify a concrete accommodation that enables performance of the job’s duties.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Unrelated to … ability to perform” (PWDCRA): In employment cases, Michigan defines “disability” to exclude impairments that prevent performing the job’s duties, even if the impairment substantially limits major life activities. If you cannot do the job (with or without accommodation), the statute’s employment protections do not attach.
• “Duties” vs. ADA “essential functions”: The ADA asks whether the employee can perform “essential functions.” The PWDCRA speaks in terms of “duties” and, per Michigan authority, gives “substantial deference” to the employer’s description of those duties.
• Reasonable accommodation and “undue hardship”: The statute requires accommodations only if they allow performance of the job’s requirements and do not impose undue hardship. It does not require removing primary duties, creating a new position, or transferring the employee.
• Summary judgment: A court may decide a case without trial if no genuine dispute of material fact exists. Here, the record was treated as undisputed that key physical/safety duties could not be performed.
• “Interactive process”: A structured back-and-forth used in ADA practice to identify accommodations. The court emphasized that, even where recognized, process arguments do not win without an actual workable accommodation that would enable performance.

5. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision reinforces the PWDCRA’s distinctive threshold requirement: for employment claims, a plaintiff must show the impairment is “unrelated” to job performance—meaning the plaintiff can perform the job’s duties with or without accommodation. The court afforded substantial deference to DDP’s identification of operator and advisor duties, found undisputed evidence that Koscielski could not perform multiple required physical/safety duties, and rejected the effort to convert a temporary, compassionate restructuring into a permanent statutory obligation. The opinion’s practical message is clear: Michigan disability law encourages, rather than penalizes, temporary employer flexibility—but it does not compel employers to permanently transform or replace a job when the employee cannot perform its duties.