Michigan No-Fault PIP: MCL 500.3113(a) Requires an “Unlawful Taking,” Not Merely Unlawful Operation

1. Introduction

In SWOOPE v CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE MIDWEST (Mich Sup Ct, decided March 10, 2026), the Michigan Supreme Court addressed the scope of the no-fault act’s disqualification provision in MCL 500.3113(a), which bars personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits in certain circumstances involving a vehicle “taken unlawfully.”

Plaintiff Carlonda N. Swoope was injured in a Detroit collision while driving a friend’s car after taking the keys and vehicle without first obtaining permission. Plaintiff also lacked a valid driver’s license and had no auto insurance. She sought PIP benefits through the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan (MACP), which assigned the claim to defendant Citizens Insurance Company of the Midwest.

The key legal issue became whether plaintiff was disqualified under MCL 500.3113(a)—and, more precisely, whether the statute turns on (i) unlawful operation (driving without a license) or instead (ii) unlawful taking (how possession of the vehicle was obtained).

2. Summary of the Opinion

In a unanimous opinion by Justice Bolden, the Court held that the Court of Appeals misinterpreted MCL 500.3113(a) by treating plaintiff’s unlicensed driving as dispositive. The Supreme Court clarified that:

  • The statutory inquiry under MCL 500.3113(a) centers on whether the vehicle was “taken unlawfully”, not whether it was operated unlawfully.
  • “Taken unlawfully” is a distinct concept tied to the acquisition of possession, as interpreted in Spectrum Health Hosps v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich and Rambin v Allstate Ins Co.
  • The Court of Appeals’ reliance on dicta from Ahmed v Tokio Marine America Ins Co was erroneous; to the extent Ahmed suggested otherwise, it was “wrongly decided.”

The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for that court to address the alternative question it had not properly decided: whether plaintiff’s conduct amounted to an unlawful taking and whether she “knew or should have known” it was unlawfully taken.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Spectrum Health Hosps v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich, 492 Mich 503 (2012)

Spectrum Health is the Court’s foundational interpretation of “taken unlawfully” under the pre-2014 version of MCL 500.3113(a). The Court held the phrase “readily embraces” situations where someone gains possession of a vehicle “contrary to Michigan law,” including non-larcenous misconduct (not limited to “stealing”). Critically, Spectrum Health ties disqualification to the taking/possession event, including violations of the Michigan Penal Code such as the “joyriding” statutes (MCL 750.413 and MCL 750.414).

In Swoope, the Court uses Spectrum Health to reaffirm that “taken unlawfully” is about how possession was obtained, not about subsequent driving conduct.

Rambin v Allstate Ins Co, 495 Mich 316 (2014)

Rambin refined the Spectrum Health framework by addressing mens rea in the joyriding context and emphasizing the relevance of the driver’s knowledge/intent when the taking is not over the owner’s express prohibition (e.g., a claimed loan from a third party). It held that MCL 750.414 includes a knowledge component and that a claimant may present evidence they did not knowingly lack authority.

Swoope relies on Rambin to underscore the statute’s focus on circumstances “at the time the vehicle was taken,” and to distinguish “taking” from later “operation.” The Court also echoes Rambin’s caution that “use” evidence may be relevant only insofar as it informs knowledge/intent about the taking—not because unlawful driving itself triggers disqualification.

Monaco v Home-Owners Ins Co, 317 Mich App 738 (2016)

Although Monaco applied the pre-amendment statute, it is cited approvingly for the conceptual separation between “taking” and “operation.” There, an unlicensed minor’s driving was unlawful under the Vehicle Code, but because she had her mother’s permission, the vehicle was not “taken unlawfully.” Swoope adopts Monaco’s key distinction: “taking” and “use” are not interchangeable for MCL 500.3113(a).

Ahmed v Tokio Marine America Ins Co, 337 Mich App 1 (2021)

Ahmed correctly stated the amended statute’s three-part structure: the claimant is disqualified if they are willingly operating/using a vehicle that was unlawfully taken and they knew or should have known it was unlawfully taken. However, the Court of Appeals in Swoope v Citizens Ins Co of the Midwest, 350 Mich App 104 (2024) relied on Ahmed dicta suggesting that “any violation of the criminal law that leads to a taking” constitutes an “unlawful taking.”

The Supreme Court rejected that extension. In Swoope, the Court holds that conflating unlawful operation (driving without a license) with unlawful taking misreads MCL 500.3113(a). It expressly states: “To the extent that Ahmed concluded otherwise, it was wrongly decided.”

Swoope v Citizens Ins Co of the Midwest, 350 Mich App 104 (2024)

The Supreme Court reversed this decision for conducting the wrong inquiry. The Court of Appeals treated plaintiff’s lack of a valid license (and criminal penalties under MCL 257.901) as establishing disqualification. The Supreme Court held this was legal error because MCL 500.3113(a) requires an unlawful taking (possession gained unlawfully), not merely unlawful operation.

Methodology/interpretive precedents

  • Ray v Swager, 501 Mich 52 (2017) (de novo review of summary disposition decisions).
  • American Civil Liberties Union of Mich v Calhoun Co Sheriff's Office, 509 Mich 1 (2022) (plain text controls; if unambiguous, no further construction).
  • Krohn v Home-Owners Ins Co, 490 Mich 145 (2011) and Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109 (1999) (statutory interpretation and summary disposition standards), with Wade v Dep't of Corrections, 439 Mich 158 (1992) quoted for (C)(8) sufficiency.
  • Bush v Shabahang, 484 Mich 156 (2009) and Lawrence Baking Co v Unemployment Compensation Comm, 308 Mich 198 (1944) (amendment implies change or clarification).
  • Yang v Everest Nat'l Ins Co, 507 Mich 314 (2021), quoting McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180 (2010), quoting People v Powell, 280 Mich 699 (1937) (legislature presumed to adopt judicially interpreted meanings).
  • Auditor General v McLaulin, 83 Mich 352 (1890) (courts should not add words the Legislature did not include).

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) The statute’s grammar and focus: “taken unlawfully”

The Court reads the amended text of MCL 500.3113(a) as making disqualification depend on a vehicle that “was taken unlawfully,” coupled with the claimant’s knowledge (“knew or should have known”) and the claimant’s willing operation/use at the time of the accident. The Court’s central move is to treat “taken unlawfully” as a term of art anchored by prior judicial construction in Spectrum Health and Rambin.

(b) Continuity after the 2014 amendment

The Legislature changed other components in 2014 PA 489—replacing the old “reasonable belief” safe harbor with a “knew or should have known” disqualifier and adding “willingly operating” language—but it did not change “taken unlawfully.” Under MCL 8.3u and interpretive presumptions in Yang/McCormick, the Court treats the phrase as a continuation of its judicially interpreted meaning: a possession-gaining event “contrary to Michigan law.”

(c) Separating “taking” from “operation”

The Supreme Court emphasizes that “operate” and “use” are different concepts from “take.” Driving without a license may be unlawful under the Vehicle Code, but it does not answer whether the driver gained possession unlawfully. The Court stresses that, had the Legislature wanted to bar PIP for those who “unlawfully took, operated, or used” a vehicle, it could have said so; courts may not rewrite the statute to reach that result.

(d) Correcting the Court of Appeals’ analytic error

The Court of Appeals treated plaintiff’s license status as effectively establishing an unlawful taking. The Supreme Court rejects that approach: unlawful operation “provides no insight” into whether possession was unlawfully obtained. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reverses and remands for the proper inquiry: whether plaintiff’s permissionless borrowing constituted an unlawful taking and whether she knew/should have known of that unlawfulness.

3.3. Impact

  • Narrowing of disqualification arguments: Insurers (including MACP-assigned insurers) may no longer rely on “illegal driving” (e.g., no license) as a shortcut to MCL 500.3113(a) disqualification. The litigation focus must return to the acquisition of possession.
  • Re-centering factual disputes: Cases involving “borrowing without permission,” ambiguous consent, or implied authority will more often present fact questions about the taking and the claimant’s knowledge, potentially limiting early dismissal based solely on traffic/Vehicle Code illegality.
  • Constraint on Ahmed’s dicta: The Court signals that lower courts should not expand “unlawful taking” to mean any criminal illegality contemporaneous with driving. This clarification may alter how rental-agreement cases, excluded-driver cases, and “permission” disputes are framed.
  • Doctrinal stability for “taken unlawfully”: By anchoring the amended statute to Spectrum Health and Rambin, the Court strengthens continuity: “taken unlawfully” remains a possession-based inquiry, even after significant 2014 textual changes.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • PIP benefits: Michigan no-fault benefits that pay certain medical and related losses regardless of fault, subject to statutory exclusions.
  • Michigan Assigned Claims Plan (MACP): A mechanism allowing certain uninsured/ineligible claimants to seek PIP; the plan assigns the claim to an insurer to handle.
  • Summary disposition (MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10)): (C)(8) challenges whether the complaint states a legally valid claim; (C)(10) challenges whether evidence shows a genuine factual dispute requiring trial.
  • “Taken unlawfully” vs. “operated unlawfully”: “Taken” concerns how the driver got possession (permission/authority and related criminal-law concepts). “Operated” concerns how the car was driven and whether that driving violated traffic laws. Swoope holds that MCL 500.3113(a) turns on the former, not the latter.
  • Mens rea: The mental state required for certain crimes (e.g., knowingly acting without authority). Rambin recognized knowledge can matter where authority is disputed.
  • Dicta: A judicial statement not necessary to the decision; it may be persuasive but is not binding. Here, dicta in Ahmed was improperly elevated into a rule by the Court of Appeals.

5. Conclusion

Swoope establishes a clear and controlling clarification of MCL 500.3113(a): the disqualification from Michigan no-fault PIP benefits depends on whether the vehicle was taken unlawfully (a possession-based inquiry) and on the claimant’s knowledge, not on whether the claimant was operating the vehicle unlawfully (such as driving without a license). The decision reaffirms the continuing force of Spectrum Health Hosps v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich and Rambin v Allstate Ins Co under the amended statutory text, curbs expansion of “unlawful taking” through traffic-law violations, and redirects courts to the fact-specific circumstances surrounding how the claimant obtained the vehicle in the first place.