3. Analysis: Legal Reasoning and Precedents
A. Summary judgment and the significance of assumed facts
The court reviewed the judgment de novo, applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). Under Puskas v. Delaware County, 56 F.4th 1088 (6th Cir. 2023), appellate review of summary judgment is independent. Driscoll v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 173 F.4th 794 (6th Cir. 2026), required the court to view the evidence and reasonable inferences favorably to GSL.
The court did not need to resolve every factual disagreement. It assumed, without deciding, that GSL’s comparator was similarly situated and that valid building permits had been issued. Those assumptions still did not establish the missing legal elements. This approach is important: the affirmance did not depend on rejecting GSL’s account of the telephone call or definitively distinguishing its neighbor’s project.
B. Equal protection: a prior exception does not compel repetition
The governing precedents
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000), supplies the foundational class-of-one principle: intentional differential treatment of similarly situated persons, without a rational basis, can violate equal protection even when no protected class is involved. Green Genie, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 63 F.4th 521 (6th Cir. 2023), identifies that theory alongside discrimination burdening fundamental rights or targeting suspect classes and recognizes direct or circumstantial proof of intentional discrimination. Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591 (2008), supplies the class-of-one terminology; the court did not use it to categorically exclude land-use claims.
For circumstantial proof, Rockwood Auto Parts, Inc. v. Monroe County, 155 F.4th 557 (6th Cir. 2025), requires comparators similarly situated in all material respects. EJS Props., LLC v. City of Toledo, 698 F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 2012), qualifies that requirement: relevant similarity, rather than exact identity, is the proper inquiry. Here, however, the court bypassed that issue by assuming similarity.
The decisive authorities concerned rational basis. TriHealth, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, Hamilton Cnty., 430 F.3d 783 (6th Cir. 2005), emphasizes the plaintiff’s heavy burden. Andrews v. City of Mentor, 11 F.4th 462 (6th Cir. 2021), identifies two possible routes: negate every conceivable justification or demonstrate animus. Rockwood Auto Parts, Inc. v. Monroe County reinforces the presumption of validity and permits rational speculation unsupported by empirical proof.
Why the comparator did not establish irrationality
GSL relied on SW North America, which owned adjoining property and had received a building permit in approximately 2017 before obtaining county septic approval. GSL argued that the Township’s refusal to extend the same accommodation to it demonstrated unconstitutional unequal treatment.
The court rejected that inference as insufficient. The Township had a legitimate interest in ensuring adequate sewage disposal, an interest supported by Calvert Invs., Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson Cnty. Metro. Sewer Dist., 847 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1988). GSL’s approved design depended on septic facilities that the county had not authorized. The Township could rationally require either septic approval or an enforceable commitment to provide a public-sewer alternative.
The earlier permit did not eliminate that justification. The Township characterized SW North America’s approval as an administrative mistake. Evidence supported the possibility that a former coordinator had issued it contrary to policy, while the relevant ordinance required documentation of outside-agency approval before engineering approval. Although GSL disputed an official’s claimed lack of knowledge, the record did not exclude the possibility of an oversight.
The resulting principle is limited but consequential: one earlier departure from a valid permitting requirement does not necessarily make later enforcement unconstitutional. Equal protection does not automatically require a municipality to perpetuate a prior mistake. A different record—such as a sustained pattern of selective exceptions—could present a materially different question.
GSL’s proposed rear-property sewer connection did not alter the analysis because it identified no materially comparable request that the Township had granted. A disagreement about an engineering solution was not, by itself, proof of differential treatment.
Animus and the role of decisionmaking authority
Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth, 692 F.3d 452 (6th Cir. 2012), defines animus as ill will, antagonism, or hostility and requires that it be directed at the plaintiff rather than merely at the proposed development. GSL pointed to irritated responses from the Township’s attorney, Carol Rosati, and engineering consultant, Leslie Zawada, after its representative emailed the entire board.
The court accepted that those communications showed frustration and possibly personal hostility. It nevertheless found no reasonable basis for concluding that such feelings motivated the permitting decision. Neither adviser had final authority to issue building permits. The record also did not show that Rosati’s feelings displaced her professional judgment; the court invoked ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2 to emphasize counsel’s obligation to follow client decisions.
The principal analogy was Rockwood Auto Parts v. Monroe County, the shortened case title used in the opinion’s later discussion of the same precedent. There, alleged hostility by a sheriff did not establish that the actual contract decisionmaker acted from animus. The precedent also distinguished personal malice from negative assessments connected to official responsibilities, such as concerns about professionalism.
Applied here, concerns about communication practices and possible Open Meetings Act problems remained connected to official duties. The important evidentiary lesson is the need for a causal link between hostility and governmental action. The opinion should not be read as establishing that an adviser’s influence can never matter, or that criticism-related hostility is always constitutionally harmless.
C. Procedural due process: permits alone did not create vested rights
The federal framework
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005), recognizes procedural and substantive dimensions of due process. For procedural claims, Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990), requires fair procedures before deprivation of a protected interest. Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230 (2023), frames the inquiry as deprivation of a protected interest through state action accompanied by inadequate process.
The threshold question is whether an interest exists. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998), explains that the Constitution protects property rather than creating it. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), looks to independent sources, including state law, for legitimate entitlements. Williams v. City of Detroit, 54 F.4th 895 (6th Cir. 2022), likewise requires a legitimate entitlement or justifiable expectation, not a unilateral hope.
Michigan’s substantial-construction requirement
The opinion combines three Michigan decisions:
- Dingeman Advert., Inc. v. Algoma Township, 223 N.W.2d 689 (Mich. 1974), requires a lawful building permit.
- City of Lansing v. Dawley, 225 N.W. 500 (Mich. 1929), additionally requires work of a substantial character toward construction.
- Bevan v. Brandon Township, 475 N.W.2d 37 (Mich. 1991), focuses on tangible changes through excavation and construction rather than the amount spent in anticipation of development.
These requirements defeated GSL’s claim even on the assumption that permits had been validly issued. GSL identified no substantial construction between the alleged issuance and withdrawal. A statement that permits were ready for collection therefore did not establish the asserted vested right.
Seguin v. City of Sterling Heights, 968 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1992), supports treating this as a strict Michigan rule that courts have not relaxed. Schubiner v. West Bloomfield Township, 351 N.W.2d 214 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984), illustrates its practical severity: more than $100,000 spent on surveys, demolition, and stump removal after site-plan approval did not establish vested rights where construction had not begun.
Commercial reliance and vested development rights are therefore distinct. Expenditures, contractual deadlines, and preliminary approvals may be economically significant without establishing the particular property entitlement required for this constitutional claim.
Why the court did not evaluate procedural adequacy
Sharp v. Lindsey, 285 F.3d 479 (6th Cir. 2002), describes due process as flexible. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), requires a meaningful opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time. Those principles would have governed the procedure inquiry had GSL established a protected interest.
Because it did not, the court never needed to decide what hearing or review procedure should have accompanied the alleged permit withdrawal. Nor did it conclusively decide whether permits had actually issued or were lawful. Its holding concerns the claimed vested development entitlement, not the existence of GSL’s ownership interest in the land generally.
D. Substantive due process: enforcing rational requirements is not arbitrary
Zinermon v. Burch distinguishes substantive due process as protection against certain wrongful governmental actions regardless of procedural fairness. Golf Vill. N., LLC v. City of Powell, 42 F.4th 593 (6th Cir. 2022), requires both a protected interest and arbitrary or capricious deprivation.
In the land-use context, White Oak Prop. Dev., LLC v. Washington Township, 606 F.3d 842 (6th Cir. 2010), focuses on arbitrary or irrational treatment. Warren v. City of Athens, 411 F.3d 697 (6th Cir. 2005), sets a demanding threshold: a decision must lack a foundation in reason and amount to an arbitrary or irrational exercise of power.
Even putting aside GSL’s missing property interest, its claim failed. Section 15-10(b) of the Township Code required necessary outside-agency permits and a preconstruction meeting before construction. GSL had not satisfied those requirements and did not challenge the ordinance itself as irrational. Officials did not act arbitrarily merely by enforcing it.
Speculative-building status and pending litigation
GSL also challenged denial of speculative-building status, a designation allowing the property to be marketed as preapproved for tax-abatement consideration. Township guidelines made applicants with pending litigation against the Township ineligible for tax abatements. The court treated that existing ineligibility as a rational explanation for denying the designation.
This part of the holding requires care. The separate First Amendment retaliation claim concerning that application had been settled. The court therefore did not decide whether withholding benefits because an applicant sued the Township violated the First Amendment right to petition. Its substantive-due-process conclusion does not establish that litigation-based eligibility restrictions necessarily survive every constitutional challenge.
E. First Amendment retaliation: permissible regulation of communication methods
The retaliation framework
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), supports application of First Amendment protection against state action. Lozman v. Riviera Beach, 585 U.S. 87 (2018), recognizes the prohibition against retaliation for protected speech. Under DeVooght v. City of Warren, 157 F.4th 893 (6th Cir. 2025), a plaintiff must establish protected speech, an adverse action likely to deter a person of ordinary firmness, and a substantial or motivating causal connection.
Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cautions that those elements operate differently across settings. Holzemer v. City of Memphis, 621 F.3d 512 (6th Cir. 2010), similarly emphasizes context. Here, the relevant context was a directive concerning simultaneous communication with a public board, rather than a general prohibition on criticizing officials.
Content neutrality, tailoring, and alternative channels
The parties did not dispute GSL’s general right to communicate with government officials. The court nevertheless held that this right did not include an unrestricted entitlement to use the particular method at issue.
Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981), establishes that speech rights do not guarantee communication at every time and place or in every desired manner. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984), permits content-neutral time, place, or manner restrictions that are narrowly tailored to a significant governmental interest and leave ample alternative channels.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), supplied much of the operative analysis. A restriction is content neutral when it is not adopted because officials disagree with the message. Narrow tailoring does not require the least restrictive conceivable method, but the restriction must not be substantially broader than necessary. Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2008), adds that alternative channels need not be optimal if they permit the speaker to reach the intended audience.
The court found all three requirements satisfied:
- Content neutrality: Rosati objected to communicating with the board “in this fashion,” not to the substance of GSL’s complaints.
- A significant interest and narrow tailoring: The Township sought to avoid potential Open Meetings Act problems, and the directive addressed simultaneous board-wide email rather than all contact.
- Alternative channels: GSL remained able to contact Township officials and individual board members.
Actual illegality was not required
Michigan Compiled Laws § 15.263(3) requires deliberations by a quorum of a public body to occur at a meeting open to the public. GSL relied on Ryant v. Cleveland Township, 608 N.W.2d 101 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000), to argue that its email resembled a chance gathering rather than a statutory meeting.
The Sixth Circuit did not hold that GSL’s email actually violated the Act. Instead, drawing on Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg, 409 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 2005), and Ward v. Rock Against Racism, it held that a narrowly tailored, content-neutral restriction could serve the legitimate objective of avoiding potential liability without proof of an actual violation.
The analytical framing matters. The court resolved the retaliation claim at the protected-speech stage by treating the disputed communication method as permissibly restricted. It did not separately decide chilling effect or retaliatory causation. The decision should not be generalized into permission to punish criticism, suppress a viewpoint, or impose a blanket ban on constituent contact.