MHRA § 213.065 “Sex” in Public Accommodations Means Biological Sex, Not Gender Identity (and Bostock Does Not Control Bathrooms/Locker Rooms)

1. Introduction

This decision returns to the Missouri Supreme Court after the earlier pleading-stage ruling in R.M.A. ex rel. Appleberry v. Blue Springs, R-IV School District, 568 S.W.3d 420 (Mo. banc 2019) (“R.M.A. I”). R.M.A., a female-to-male transgender student, alleged the Blue Springs R-IV School District unlawfully discriminated in a place of public accommodation under the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), § 213.065, by denying him access to boys’ restrooms and locker rooms during the 2013–2014 and 2014–2015 school years.

After a jury verdict for R.M.A. (compensatory and punitive damages), the circuit court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) for the District, concluding the trial evidence showed exclusion based on female genitalia rather than “male sex” as pleaded and submitted to the jury. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, but on a broader and precedentially significant ground: it supplied a legal definition of “sex” for § 213.065 public-accommodation claims and rejected extending federal Title VII reasoning (Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia) to school bathrooms/locker rooms under the MHRA.

Key issue: whether, as a matter of law and proof, R.M.A. made a submissible case that his “male sex” (as the MHRA uses “sex”) was a contributing factor in the District’s denial of access to male-designated facilities.

2. Summary of the Opinion

• The Court holds that “sex” in MHRA § 213.065 (public accommodations) carries its “plain and ordinary meaning” as biological sex (male or female), not gender identity.
• The Court treats the meaning of “sex” as a question of law and relies on dictionary usage and legislative history, including repeated unsuccessful bills to add gender identity and sexual orientation to § 213.065.
• Because the case was pleaded and instructed as discrimination based on R.M.A.’s male sex, and the only evidence showed the District acted because R.M.A. had female genitalia (i.e., traits associated with female sex), there was no probative evidence that “male sex” was a contributing factor. JNOV was therefore proper.
• The Court rejects reliance on Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, emphasizing (a) it is a Title VII employment case, not a public-accommodations case, (b) MHRA use of federal law is only as “consistent with Missouri law,” and (c) Bostock expressly disclaimed deciding bathrooms/locker rooms.
• The Court also rejects challenges to the verdict director’s phrasing and scope, holding the jury instructions were not improperly limited.
• R.M.A. is not a prevailing party; appellate attorney fees under § 213.111.2 are denied.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The opinion is notable for weaving together (i) Missouri procedural standards for JNOV and submissibility, (ii) Missouri’s “plain meaning” statutory interpretation doctrine, and (iii) MHRA cases governing when and how federal precedent is used. The most influential cited authorities include:

• R.M.A. ex rel. Appleberry v. Blue Springs, R-IV School District (“R.M.A. I”): The earlier case held that at the motion-to-dismiss stage R.M.A. pleaded ultimate facts for § 213.065 discrimination. The present opinion distinguishes pleading from proof and relies on “R.M.A. I” to emphasize the case was brought as discrimination based on being male, not an undefined “sex” claim untethered to male/female.
• Clevenger v. Oliver Ins. Agency, Inc.: Supplies the controlling JNOV test (“complete absence of probative fact”) and the lens for reviewing evidence favorably to the verdict while still requiring proof on each element.
• State v. Johnson, Laut v. City of Arnold, Howard v. City of Kan. City, State v. Milazzo (quoting United Pharmacal Co. of Mo. v. Mo. Bd. of Pharmacy), and Turner v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton (quoting Winston v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, Lawrence Cnty., Miller): These authorities frame statutory interpretation as a judicial duty to apply text as written, using reasonable plain-meaning analysis without substituting policy preferences for legislative choices.
• Hudson v. Joplin Reg'l Stockyards, Inc.: Reinforces the method of consulting dictionaries when a statutory term is undefined, supporting the Court’s move to define “sex” in § 213.065 by ordinary meaning.
• Matthews v. Harley-Davidson and Lampley v. Mo. Comm'n on Hum. Rts. (as well as Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights): These MHRA decisions are used to cabin the role of federal law. The Court quotes the principle that federal precedent guides only when “consistent with Missouri law,” and emphasizes that employment-law guidance does not automatically control public-accommodations claims.
• Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia: The principal federal case invoked by the dissents. The majority addresses it in depth to explain why its Title VII holding does not define “sex” for MHRA public accommodations and why its bathroom/locker room carve-out undercuts the dissent’s use of it.
• State ex rel. Hawley v. Pilot Travels Ctrs., LLC (and intermediate appellate cases such as Schmidt v. Dart Bein, LC, Cupit v. Dry Basement, Inc., Gipson v. Fox): These appear in the discussion rejecting a procedural contention about JNOV timing under Rule 78.06, emphasizing finality principles and waiver.
• The majority also references out-of-state decisions declining to apply Bostock outside their statutory contexts: Doe v. Catholic Relief Servs., Vroegh v. Iowa Dep't of Corr., and State v. Loe, as support for an approach centered on legislative intent.

The dissents cite additional Missouri and federal standards governing JNOV/new trial discretion and discrimination-proof frameworks (e.g., Klotz v. St. Anthony's Med. Ctr., Newsome v. Kan. City, Mo. Sch. Dist., Tharp v. St. Luke's Surgicenter-Lee's Summit, LLC, Farrow v. Saint Francis Med. Ctr., Cox v. Kan. City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins), but the majority’s holding turns primarily on statutory meaning and the mismatch between the pleaded/instructed theory (“male sex”) and the proof.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in a deliberate sequence that effectively determines the case:

1. Identify the required elements and the narrowed dispute. The Court accepts that R.M.A. proved denial of access to male-designated facilities and pursued damages, and frames the dispositive question as whether there was evidence that R.M.A.’s male sex was a “contributing factor” in the denial. This framing is driven by how the claim was pleaded (“legal sex is male”) and how the verdict director submitted the claim (“male sex”).
2. Define “sex” in § 213.065 as a matter of law. Because the MHRA does not define “sex,” the Court uses dictionary meaning and concludes “sex” refers to biological classification (male/female). The Court treats “legal sex” as a misnomer for statutory purposes and warns against conflating “sex” with “gender.”
3. Confirm that definition with legislative history (legislative inaction). The Court cites repeated unsuccessful proposals to amend § 213.065 to add “gender identity” and “sexual orientation” (SB 172 (2019); SB 945 (2020); HB 984 (2021); SB 711 (2022); SB 60 (2023); SB 787 (2024)). From this, the Court infers legislative intent to maintain the biological-sex baseline for public accommodations.
4. Reject Bostock as controlling in this context. Even accepting that Missouri courts may look to federal decisions, the majority stresses: (a) Bostock is about Title VII employment discrimination, (b) the MHRA context here is public accommodations, and (c) Bostock expressly did “not purport to address bathrooms, locker rooms.” The Court adds that sex is relevant to sex-separated restrooms, unlike employment decisions where sex should not be relevant, making the majority’s statutory and policy context materially different from Bostock.
5. Apply the legal definition to the trial proof and affirm JNOV. With “sex” defined as biological sex, the Court holds the evidence showed denial due to female genitalia—traits associated with female sex. Therefore, the Court concludes there was no probative evidence that R.M.A.’s male sex (as pleaded/instructed) contributed to the decision.
6. Instructional issues do not rescue the verdict. The Court rejects R.M.A.’s argument that the verdict director should have used “sex” rather than “male sex” and should have described “public facilities” rather than “males’ restrooms and locker room facilities,” reasoning this would depart from the submitted theory and the specific facilities at issue.

3.3 Impact

This opinion establishes (or, at minimum, cements as a controlling construction) a categorical interpretive rule for MHRA public accommodations: “sex” in § 213.065 means biological sex, and the Court will not extend Bostock’s Title VII logic to restroom/locker room access under the MHRA absent legislative action.

Likely downstream effects include:

• Claim framing becomes outcome-determinative. Plaintiffs must align pleadings, instructions, and proof to the Court’s biological-sex definition. Claims framed as discrimination based on “male sex” or “female sex” will be tested against evidence of biological classification, not legal-document markers or identity-based concepts.
• Limits on using amended documents as proxies for § 213.065 “sex.” The majority treats “legal sex” as analytically distinct from statutory “sex” and underscores § 193.215.9’s surgical-procedure language, creating friction between administrative/legal designations and MHRA proof requirements.
• Reduced role for federal employment precedents in MHRA public-accommodation disputes. The decision draws a sharper boundary between MHRA employment guidance and MHRA public-accommodations interpretation, even when the protected characteristic word (“sex”) is the same.
• Legislative pressure point. By grounding its holding in both plain meaning and repeated rejected amendments, the Court signals that any expansion to cover gender identity in public accommodations must come from the General Assembly, not judicial interpretation.
• Instructional and submissibility scrutiny in high-salience cases. The Court’s willingness to affirm JNOV despite a plaintiff’s favorable jury verdict indicates close appellate policing of “contributing factor” proof when the pleaded protected-class basis and the factual impetus for the challenged action diverge.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Public accommodation (§ 213.065): Places and facilities open to the public. The Court reiterates that school restrooms and locker rooms qualify as public accommodations.
• “Contributing factor” (MHRA causation): The protected trait need not be the only reason for the adverse action, but it must play some role. Here, because the claim was submitted as discrimination based on “male sex,” the Court demanded evidence that being biologically male contributed to the denial.
• Submissible case: A plaintiff has a submissible case when there is evidence supporting each required element so a reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff. Without that minimum evidence on any element, the case cannot stand.
• JNOV (judgment notwithstanding the verdict): A post-verdict ruling that sets aside the jury’s decision because the evidence legally cannot support it. Missouri describes it as proper only when there is a “complete absence of probative fact” to support the verdict (as emphasized via Clevenger v. Oliver Ins. Agency, Inc.).
• Plain-meaning statutory interpretation: When a statute does not define a term, courts often use ordinary dictionary meaning to determine what the legislature meant. The Court did so here for “sex.”
• Legislative inaction: The Court treated repeated failures to amend § 213.065 to add “gender identity” as evidence the legislature did not intend the existing word “sex” to cover gender identity in public accommodations.
• Sex vs. gender (as used by the majority): The majority treats “sex” as biological classification and warns that “legal sex” and “gender” are not interchangeable for § 213.065 analysis.

5. Conclusion

The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed JNOV for the School District, not by reweighing the jury’s assessment of witness credibility, but by first defining “sex” in MHRA § 213.065 (public accommodations) as biological sex and then holding the proof did not match the pleaded and instructed theory of discrimination “because of male sex.” The Court also declined to import Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia into Missouri public-accommodation restroom/locker-room disputes, emphasizing statutory context, Missouri’s “consistency” limitation on federal guidance, and Bostock’s express bathroom/locker-room disclaimer.

The central takeaway is precedential and practical: in MHRA public-accommodation litigation, the meaning of “sex” is now judicially fixed to biological sex, and plaintiffs must ensure their theory, instructions, and evidence align with that construction—or risk post-verdict defeat as a matter of law.