“Meet ASTM D6751” Unambiguously Requires Technical Compliance for RIN Generation and BMC Credits; Brady Does Not Extend to Impeachment of Non-Testifying Warrant Affiants

1. Introduction

In United States v. Ben Wootton (consolidated with the appeal of Race Miner), the Third Circuit affirmed convictions arising from allegedly false submissions to two federal programs: (1) the EPA’s Renewable Fuel Standard (“RFS”) program, which generates tradable Renewable Identification Numbers (“RINs”) for qualifying renewable fuel; and (2) the IRS’s Biodiesel Mixture Credit (“BMC”) program, which provides credits/subsidies for qualifying biodiesel mixtures.

The core factual dispute was whether Keystone Biofuels, led first by Miner and then by Wootton, generated RINs and claimed BMC credits for biodiesel that was “off-spec”—i.e., not meeting the technical requirements of ASTM D6751. The key legal dispute was timing: whether “meet ASTM D6751” could reasonably be read—via ASTM D6751 § 1.2’s “time and place of delivery” language—as allowing post-delivery compliance by agreement, such that the jury needed an instruction under an intervening Third Circuit decision, United States v. Harra.

Defendants also sought a new trial on the independent ground that the Government suppressed impeaching material about two EPA agents under Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. United States.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • No instructional error (Harra): The court held that the regulatory/statutory requirement that biodiesel “meet ASTM D6751” was unambiguous for both the RFS and the BMC contexts. Therefore, United States v. Harra did not require a jury instruction allowing the jury to choose among reasonable interpretations, and no new trial was warranted.
  • No acquittal for insufficient evidence: Because the “meet ASTM D6751” requirement was unambiguous, Defendants’ sufficiency argument—premised on proving an agreement for post-delivery compliance—failed.
  • No Brady violation: Impeachment material related to the testifying agent (Salak) was deemed immaterial in context; as to the non-testifying agent (Ferrante), the court held Brady does not require disclosure of impeachment material about a search-warrant affiant who does not testify at trial, distinguishing Brady/Giglio from the doctrine in Franks v. Delaware.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

A. Ambiguity, falsity, and jury instructions: United States v. Harra

The opinion’s central legal framework came from United States v. Harra, which held that when the Government prosecutes false statements premised on an ambiguous regulatory requirement, the Government must prove falsity under each objectively reasonable interpretation, unless the Government shows its reading is the only reasonable one. The Harra court also divided labor: whether a requirement is ambiguous is a legal gatekeeping question for the court, while whether an interpretation is reasonable is for the jury.

Here, the Third Circuit used Harra as a screening device, not as a defendant-friendly rule automatically triggering instructions. The panel held there was no ambiguity to send to the jury, so Harra did not compel a special instruction about ASTM D6751 § 1.2 or timing.

B. General verdict risk on alternative theories: United States v. Syme

Counts Two and Nine were submitted on multiple theories of falsity, and the jury returned a general guilty verdict. Citing United States v. Syme, the court acknowledged the rule that a conviction must be vacated if it may rest on a legally invalid theory. The court avoided that problem by holding the challenged “off-spec” theory was not legally invalid (because the ASTM requirement was unambiguous).

C. Standards of review: United States v. Piekarsky, United States v. Hendrickson

The court relied on United States v. Piekarsky for de novo review of legally incorrect jury-instruction claims and on United States v. Hendrickson for de novo review of sufficiency challenges—standards that enabled the panel to resolve the “ambiguity” question definitively as a matter of law.

D. Brady/Giglio materiality and appellate posture: Brady, Giglio, United States v. Walker, United States v. Thornton, United States v. Pflaumer, United States v. Georgiou, Simmons v. Beard

The court applied the familiar Brady/Giglio structure: suppression + favorability (including impeachment) + materiality. It cited:

  • Brady v. Maryland (suppression of favorable evidence)
  • Giglio v. United States (impeachment evidence as Brady material when material)
  • United States v. Walker (materiality as whether evidence would “sufficiently undermine confidence in the verdict”)
  • United States v. Thornton (review: legal conclusions de novo; factual findings clear error)
  • United States v. Pflaumer (deference to trial court’s perspective on materiality, tempered here because a different judge resolved the Brady motion)
  • United States v. Georgiou (cumulative impeachment is less likely to be material)
  • Simmons v. Beard (importance of the witness to the Government’s case bears on materiality)

These authorities drove the court’s conclusion that even if the Salak material could impeach him, it did not matter enough in the overall evidentiary picture to undermine confidence in the verdict.

E. Brady’s reach vs warrant litigation: Mays v. City of Dayton, United States v. Banks, and Franks v. Delaware

As to Ferrante (a search-warrant affiant who did not testify), the court relied on Mays v. City of Dayton and United States v. Banks for the proposition that Brady/Giglio duties do not extend to impeachment evidence relevant only to the warrant-application stage. It reinforced the conceptual boundary with Franks v. Delaware, which addresses falsehoods/omissions in warrant affidavits—not trial impeachment.

This portion of the opinion is notable because it states a clean limiting principle: Brady is about trial fairness and verdict reliability; challenges to warrant affidavits run through Franks-type mechanisms rather than Brady’s impeachment-disclosure doctrine.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Why “meet ASTM D6751” was treated as unambiguous (RFS counts)

The pivotal interpretive move was the court’s separation of: (i) ASTM D6751’s technical requirements (Section 4 and Table 1), from (ii) ASTM D6751 § 1.2’s commercial timing default (“time and place of delivery,” with contractual flexibility).

The panel reasoned that:

  • The RFS regulation defines biodiesel as “a mono-alkyl ester that meets ASTM D6751.”
  • Section 1.2 does not itself set technical specifications that a fuel can “meet”; it sets a default expectation about when specifications apply, and permits contracting around that timing.
  • Therefore, § 1.2 does not create multiple reasonable meanings of the regulatory requirement “meet ASTM D6751.”
  • Under the court’s reading, “meet ASTM D6751” requires the fuel’s actual compliance with the technical standards, and the RFS context relevant to falsity was the time of RIN generation.

Having found no ambiguity, the court concluded Harra did not require the district court to instruct the jury about Defendants’ alternative timing theory.

B. The BMC counts: “meet the requirements of ASTM D6751” and the certificate language

The court found the BMC context even clearer because:

  • The Internal Revenue Code defines biodiesel as fuel that “meet[s] … the requirements of ASTM D6751,” and ASTM Section 4 is expressly titled “Requirements.”
  • Keystone’s required “Certificate for Biodiesel” tracked that same “meets the requirements” language.

In other words, even if § 1.2 could affect private delivery terms, the statutory and certification language made the compliance representation a technical one: meeting ASTM D6751’s requirements as a condition of the credit claim.

C. Sufficiency of evidence falls with the ambiguity premise

Defendants’ sufficiency challenge depended on the idea that the Government had to negate a post-delivery compliance agreement. Once the court held the obligation to “meet ASTM D6751” was unambiguous in the relevant way, the asserted evidentiary gap ceased to be legally relevant—so acquittal was denied.

D. Brady/Giglio: materiality and witness centrality

The court treated Salak’s withheld performance-related and honesty-related material as potential impeachment but not material, emphasizing two points:

  • Legal interpretation testimony: The court concluded Salak’s program-interpretation testimony aligned with the law as the panel construed it, reducing the likelihood that impeaching him would change the outcome.
  • Non-centrality / cumulative posture on off-spec proof: Insiders with firsthand knowledge testified that Keystone’s fuel was not up to ASTM standards; Salak was not the “key witness” on whether the fuel was off-spec. Defendants also had the underlying materials for the calendar exhibit and could challenge discrepancies directly.

As to Ferrante, the court adopted a categorical limit: Brady does not entitle defendants to impeachment disclosures about a non-testifying warrant affiant, because that information does not bear on the trial evidence presented to the jury (and thus does not bear on verdict reliability in the Brady sense).

3.3. Impact

Although labeled “NONPRECEDENTIAL,” the opinion is practically significant in three ways:

  1. Narrowing Harra’s reach in ASTM-linked prosecutions: The decision illustrates that Harra is triggered only when there is genuine legal ambiguity in the operative requirement. Where the rule is framed as “meet ASTM [standard],” the court may treat the relevant meaning as straightforward technical compliance, resisting efforts to import timing flexibility from ASTM’s scope/delivery clauses.
  2. Stabilizing RFS and tax-credit enforcement theories: The court’s approach supports enforcement premised on whether fuel actually meets incorporated ASTM technical requirements at the compliance-relevant moment (RIN generation; BMC claim), rather than on private contracting arrangements.
  3. Brady boundary-setting for warrant affiants: The court endorsed a clear distinction between Brady/Giglio trial-disclosure obligations and Franks-type warrant challenges, potentially influencing how litigants frame requests for agent-discipline material when the agent does not testify.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

RINs (Renewable Identification Numbers)
Tradable credits generated when renewable fuel is produced and properly reported to the EPA. Fuel refiners buy them to meet regulatory obligations.
ASTM D6751
An industry technical standard for biodiesel. The “real” technical pass/fail criteria are in its requirements section and table of testable properties.
“Off-spec” fuel
Fuel that does not satisfy ASTM D6751’s technical specifications (e.g., failing a required test threshold).
Regulatory ambiguity under Harra
If a regulation is genuinely capable of multiple objectively reasonable interpretations, the Government must prove a statement is false under all reasonable interpretations (or prove its interpretation is the only reasonable one). If the court finds no ambiguity, Harra does not require a jury instruction on competing meanings.
Brady vs Giglio
Brady covers suppressed favorable evidence; Giglio clarifies that favorable evidence includes impeachment material. But a new trial is required only if the suppressed material is “material,” i.e., it undermines confidence in the verdict.
Brady vs Franks
Brady is about evidence affecting trial fairness and the verdict. Franks addresses whether a search warrant was supported by an affidavit containing intentional/reckless falsehoods or material omissions—an issue typically litigated via suppression motions rather than trial impeachment.

5. Conclusion

The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions by holding that “meet ASTM D6751” is not the kind of ambiguous requirement that triggers United States v. Harra—at least where defendants rely on ASTM D6751 § 1.2’s delivery-timing language rather than on competing interpretations of the technical specifications themselves. It also reinforced a pragmatic Brady materiality analysis: impeachment of a non-central witness (or impeachment that does not meaningfully affect the core proof) will not justify a new trial, and Brady does not extend to impeachment information about a non-testifying search-warrant affiant—an arena addressed instead by Franks v. Delaware.