“Meet ASTM D6751” Means Technical Compliance for RIN Generation and Biodiesel Tax Credits; Brady/Giglio Does Not Require Impeachment Disclosures for Non‑Testifying Warrant Affiants

I. Introduction

This Third Circuit decision concerns two related federal incentive programs—(1) the EPA’s Renewable Fuel Standard (“RFS”) program, which allows producers to generate valuable Renewable Identification Numbers (“RINs”) for qualifying renewable fuels, and (2) the IRS’s Biodiesel Mixture Credit (“BMC”) program, which provides tax credits/subsidies for qualifying biodiesel mixtures.

Defendants Race Miner (founder of Keystone Biofuels, Inc.) and Ben Wootton (his successor) were convicted of: (i) conspiracy to make false statements to the EPA (18 U.S.C. § 371 with 18 U.S.C. § 1001 as the object), (ii) conspiracy to defraud the IRS (also under 18 U.S.C. § 371), (iii) six counts of false statements to the EPA (18 U.S.C. § 1001), and (iv) aiding and abetting the preparation/presentation of a false BMC claim (26 U.S.C. § 7206(2)).

The appeals raised three principal issues:

• Jury instructions after an intervening legal development: whether United States v. Harra (3d Cir. 2021) required an ambiguity-based instruction about what it means for biodiesel to “meet ASTM D6751,” particularly given ASTM D6751 § 1.2’s “time and place of delivery” language.
• Sufficiency of the evidence: whether the Government failed to prove lack of an agreement permitting post-delivery compliance under ASTM D6751 § 1.2.
• Brady/Giglio: whether the Government suppressed impeaching information about two EPA agents—one who testified (Daniel Salak) and one who did not but signed a key search-warrant affidavit (Charles Ferrante).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed all convictions and affirmed the district court’s denial of a Brady-based motion for a new trial. The panel held:

• No instructional error under United States v. Harra: the relevant “meet ASTM D6751” requirements were unambiguous for both the RFS (EPA) and BMC (IRS) schemes; therefore the district court was not required to instruct the jury to consider competing “reasonable interpretations.”
• No acquittal warranted: defendants’ sufficiency argument depended on the premise of regulatory ambiguity; with no ambiguity, the premise failed.
• No Brady/Giglio violation: (i) impeachment evidence about Salak was immaterial given the role and correctness of his testimony and the availability of other evidence, and (ii) Brady/Giglio does not extend to impeachment information regarding a non-testifying warrant affiant such as Ferrante.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Intervening law on ambiguity and false-statement prosecutions: United States v. Harra

The defendants’ central appellate theory was built on United States v. Harra, 985 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2021). Harra addresses a recurrent problem in regulatory prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1001: when an alleged false statement turns on whether a defendant complied with an ambiguous regulatory requirement.

In Harra, the Third Circuit held that where the Government’s falsity theory depends on an ambiguous regulation or guidance, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement is false under each objectively reasonable interpretation. The Government can do so by proving either: (1) its interpretation is the only reasonable one, or (2) the defendant’s statement is false under all reasonable interpretations.

Harra also allocates roles: the trial court acts as “gatekeeper” on the legal question of whether a regulation is ambiguous; the jury decides whether an interpretation is reasonable (if ambiguity exists).

How Harra influenced this decision: the panel treated Harra as the governing framework but concluded that Harra’s special proof/instructional requirements never triggered because there was no legal ambiguity in the “meet ASTM D6751” requirement in the first place.

2. Instructional-review baseline: United States v. Piekarsky

The court cited United States v. Piekarsky, 687 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. 2012) for the standard of review: legal correctness of jury instructions is reviewed de novo. This matters because defendants framed the issue as a legal error resulting from post-trial change in law.

3. General verdicts and alternate theories: United States v. Syme

Counts Two and Nine were submitted on multiple “theories of falsity” and the jury returned a general verdict. The panel cited United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2002) for the rule that if one of multiple alternative theories supporting a count is legally invalid, the conviction must be vacated and remanded for a new trial without the invalid theory.

How Syme influenced this decision: it forced the court to ensure the “off-spec fuel” theory was legally valid. The court’s conclusion that “meet ASTM D6751” is unambiguous preserved the validity of that theory, avoiding a Syme problem.

4. Sufficiency review: United States v. Hendrickson

For sufficiency challenges, the panel cited United States v. Hendrickson, 949 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 2020). The court reviewed the sufficiency claim de novo but rejected it because it relied on the same ambiguity premise the panel had already rejected as a matter of law.

5. Brady/Giglio framework and “materiality” in the Third Circuit

The panel’s Brady analysis draws from a suite of precedents:

• Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963): due process requires disclosure of exculpatory evidence.
• Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972): impeachment evidence is treated as Brady material; suppression violates due process when the information is material.
• United States v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 1993): appellate review—legal conclusions de novo; factual findings for clear error.
• United States v. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985): deference to the trial court’s assessment of materiality, based on its perspective at trial (with a caveat where the deciding judge differs from the trial judge).
• United States v. Walker, 657 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2011): materiality assessed by whether the suppression “sufficiently undermine[s] confidence in the verdict.”
• United States v. Georgiou, 777 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2015): cumulative impeachment tends to reduce materiality.
• Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2009): the importance of the witness to the Government’s case affects materiality.

How these cases influenced this decision: the panel treated “materiality” as the decisive filter. Even if Salak-related items were impeaching, the panel found them not material because they would not likely change the outcome given other evidence and the legal correctness of the Government’s interpretation.

6. Brady vs. warrant-stage challenges: Mays v. City of Dayton, Franks v. Delaware, and United States v. Banks

On Ferrante (the non-testifying search-warrant affiant), the court cited:

• Mays v. City of Dayton, 134 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 1998): explains the distinction between Brady disclosure obligations and warrant-affidavit challenges under Franks v. Delaware.
• Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978): establishes a procedure to challenge a search warrant based on deliberate or reckless false statements/omissions in the affidavit that are material to probable cause.
• United States v. Banks, 104 F.4th 496 (4th Cir. 2024): notes the absence of a general rule applying Brady/Giglio to evidence bearing solely on the warrant-application stage rather than trial evidence.

How these cases influenced this decision: they provided the doctrinal path to reject the Ferrante Brady claim categorically: impeachment material about a non-testifying warrant affiant is not Brady material because it is not trial impeachment evidence; the appropriate vehicle is a Franks challenge (if the affidavit is alleged to be false or misleading).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The court’s gatekeeping move under Harra: “no ambiguity”

The opinion’s pivotal step is its conclusion that there is no legal ambiguity in the phrase “meet ASTM D6751” as used in:

• the RFS regulatory definition: “Biodiesel means a mono-alkyl ester that meets ASTM D6751” (40 C.F.R. § 80.1401 (2010)); and
• the BMC statutory definition: biodiesel is fuel that “meet[s] … the requirements of” ASTM D6751 (e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 40A(d)(1)(B) (2008)), reinforced by the required “Certificate for Biodiesel” language certifying the fuel “meets the requirements” of ASTM D6751.

Defendants attempted to manufacture ambiguity by importing ASTM D6751 § 1.2, which states (in “Scope”) that specification requirements apply “at the time and place of delivery,” but may be applied “at other points … when provided by agreement between the purchaser and the supplier.”

The panel rejected this, reasoning as follows:

• ASTM D6751’s technical specifications are located in § 4 (“Requirements”) and Table 1 (test methods and acceptable ranges).
• Section 1.2 is not itself a technical standard a fuel can “meet”; instead, it is a commercial default about when specifications are typically measured (“time and place of delivery”) and it allows contracting parties to choose different timing by agreement.
• Therefore, § 1.2 does not alter what it means for the product to “meet ASTM D6751”; it addresses only a possible timing arrangement between buyer and seller.
• Because the regulation and statute require the fuel to “meet” ASTM D6751’s technical requirements, the defendants’ proposed “post-delivery compliance agreement” theory does not introduce an alternative reasonable interpretation of the legal requirement itself.

On that basis, Harra’s ambiguity-dependent burden (falsity under all reasonable interpretations) never attached, and the district court did not err by declining to instruct the jury on ASTM D6751 § 1.2.

2. The timing concept the court implicitly adopts: compliance must exist at the operative governmental act

Although defendants’ argument focused on post-delivery compliance, the court centered the operative legal moments:

• RFS/RIN generation: the court held that the fuel must actually comply with ASTM D6751’s technical requirements “upon RIN generation.”
• BMC credit claim: the court held the fuel must be up-to-spec “prior to claiming a credit,” consistent with statutory language and the certificate’s “meets the requirements” statement.

Practically, the court treated “meet ASTM D6751” as a product-quality condition precedent to accessing the program benefits (RINs and credits), rather than a flexible commercial term dependent on private contracting.

3. Collapsing the sufficiency challenge into the legal holding

Defendants’ sufficiency claim argued the Government did not prove the fuel was “not subject to an agreement for post-delivery compliance.” But because the court held that such an agreement is legally irrelevant to whether the fuel “meets ASTM D6751” for program purposes, the evidence about agreements did not matter. The sufficiency claim therefore failed as a matter of the governing legal standard.

4. Brady/Giglio: materiality, cumulativeness, and the witness’s role

The Brady/Giglio dispute split between:

• Salak (testifying agent): Suppressed material included items that could impeach honesty and performance—poor judgment, ignoring legal advice, and a tendency to pursue investigations based on “his own interpretation of the regulations.”
• Ferrante (non-testifying affiant): Suppressed impeachment information about the agent who signed a key search-warrant affidavit.

Salak: The panel acknowledged much of the suppressed Salak material was impeaching, but found it immaterial for two principal reasons:

• Legal-testimony angle: The purported impeachment (e.g., ignoring legal advice) would not undermine confidence in the verdict because the court itself concluded the Government’s interpretation of the RFS/BMC ASTM requirement was correct as a matter of law.
• Investigative-summary angle: To the extent Salak summarized testing/delivery dates using a calendar exhibit, defendants had the underlying source material and could identify discrepancies. More importantly, Salak was not the key “off-spec” witness; “Keystone insiders with firsthand knowledge” testified the fuel was not up to ASTM standards, reducing Salak’s centrality under Simmons v. Beard and making additional impeachment more cumulative under United States v. Georgiou.

Ferrante: The panel treated Ferrante as outside Brady’s impeachment scope because he did not testify at trial. The opinion drew a line between:

• Brady/Giglio duties concerning evidence relevant to guilt/innocence and trial witness credibility; and
• challenges to the integrity of a warrant affidavit, which are governed by Franks v. Delaware.

On this reasoning, the court affirmed the district court’s finding of no Brady violation as to Ferrante.

C. Impact

1. Regulated-industry false-statement cases after Harra: narrowing “ambiguity” arguments

Even though this is labeled “NONPRECEDENTIAL,” it illustrates a practical constraint on Harra-based defenses in environmental and tax cases: not every cross-referenced technical standard and its ancillary provisions create an “ambiguity” that forces the Government to prove falsity under all reasonable interpretations.

Specifically, the opinion draws a functional distinction between:

• Substantive technical requirements (ASTM D6751 § 4 and Table 1), which define what it means for fuel to “meet” the standard; and
• Commercial timing/default provisions (ASTM D6751 § 1.2), which may govern buyer-seller expectations but do not, in the court’s view, rewrite the regulatory/statutory condition for receiving federal program benefits.

For future cases, defendants invoking Harra will likely need to show that the alleged falsity turns on genuinely competing interpretations of the legal requirement, not simply on business practices or contract flexibility surrounding measurement and delivery.

2. Program-integrity enforcement in RFS and biodiesel tax credits

The court’s approach reinforces the Government’s ability to prosecute “off-spec” fuel submissions as straightforward false statements, by treating ASTM compliance as a prerequisite at the time of RIN generation and at the time of claiming credits. This reduces room for arguments that “curing” nonconforming fuel later (or allocating risk by contract) can retroactively validate a RIN or a tax credit claim.

3. Brady/Giglio boundaries: trial impeachment vs. pretrial warrant issues

The Ferrante holding signals a strict separation between Brady/Giglio and warrant-affidavit disputes:

• If a defendant seeks to attack probable cause based on affiant credibility or alleged falsehoods/omissions, the doctrinal route is typically a Franks motion.
• Brady/Giglio, as applied here, is oriented toward evidence that bears on guilt/innocence at trial, particularly the credibility of trial witnesses whose reliability could be determinative.

This distinction can shape defense strategy: litigate warrant integrity through Franks early, rather than recasting affiant impeachment as Brady material after conviction.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• RINs (Renewable Identification Numbers): credits generated by renewable fuel producers under EPA rules; they can be sold and used by refiners to satisfy regulatory obligations. In this case, generating a RIN required reporting that biodiesel “meets ASTM D6751.”
• ASTM D6751: an industry technical standard for biodiesel quality. The opinion focuses on the difference between ASTM’s (a) technical “Requirements” (§ 4 and Table 1) and (b) a “Scope” statement (§ 1.2) about when quality specs are typically applied in commercial delivery.
• “Ambiguity” under United States v. Harra: if a regulation is genuinely ambiguous, the Government must prove falsity under all reasonable interpretations (or prove its interpretation is the only reasonable one). If the court finds no ambiguity as a matter of law, Harra does not require special jury instructions.
• General verdict / alternative theories: when a jury returns “guilty” without specifying which theory it relied on, and one theory is legally invalid, courts may have to reverse because the conviction could rest on the invalid theory (the concern addressed by United States v. Syme).
• Brady/Giglio “materiality”: even if the Government failed to disclose impeaching evidence, a new trial is required only if the evidence is likely significant enough to undermine confidence in the verdict—often evaluated by the importance of the witness and whether the impeachment would be cumulative.
• Franks hearing: a procedure to challenge a search warrant by showing the affidavit included deliberate/reckless falsehoods or omissions that were material to probable cause. The opinion treats affiant impeachment as fitting this bucket rather than Brady.

V. Conclusion

The Third Circuit affirmed convictions stemming from alleged misrepresentations that biodiesel was “up-to-spec” under ASTM D6751 for both EPA RIN generation and IRS biodiesel tax credits. Applying United States v. Harra, the panel concluded there was no legal ambiguity: ASTM D6751 § 1.2’s delivery-timing language does not alter the unambiguous requirement that biodiesel comply with ASTM’s technical “Requirements” (§ 4 and Table 1) at the relevant program moments (RIN generation and credit claiming). The opinion also reinforces Brady/Giglio’s materiality limits and draws a sharp line between trial-impeachment disclosures (Salak) and warrant-stage affiant credibility (Ferrante), which the court associates with Franks v. Delaware rather than Brady.