MDLEA Stateless-Vessel Jurisdiction: A “Request” for Nationality Need Not Use Magic Words, and U.S. Coast Guard Operations May Be Conducted from a Partner Nation’s Ship

1. Introduction

This unpublished, consolidated Eleventh Circuit decision affirms the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”) convictions of Yesid Degoberto Epieyu Epieyu, Manuel Melo, and Ivan Escobosa Diaz for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine on a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction, in violation of 46 U.S.C. §§ 70506(b), 70503(a)(1).

The key issues were (i) whether multiple constitutional attacks on the MDLEA could succeed (vagueness, Miranda-based due process, “high seas” limits in an Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”), and lack of nexus to the United States), and (ii) whether statutory MDLEA jurisdiction existed—particularly whether the Coast Guard’s nationality inquiry satisfied 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B) and whether the interdiction’s use of a Dutch naval vessel undermined U.S. jurisdiction.

The court held the constitutional challenges were foreclosed by binding precedent and that statutory jurisdiction was satisfied because the master failed to make a claim of nationality after a sufficient “request,” rendering the craft a “vessel without nationality.”

2. Summary of the Opinion

A U.S. maritime patrol aircraft spotted a go-fast vessel north of Aruba on a known trafficking route. A Dutch ship, HNLMS HOLLAND, carrying a U.S. Coast Guard law-enforcement team, pursued. The go-fast vessel jettisoned packages and fled. After warning shots and disabling fire, Coast Guard officers boarded and questioned the crew.

The interpreter asked the identified master, Epieyu Epieyu: “What is the nationality of your ship or vessel?” The master did not claim nationality for the vessel (he only said he was Colombian). The Coast Guard treated the craft as stateless, recovered roughly 1,486 kilograms of cocaine, and the defendants were prosecuted in the Southern District of Florida.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed: (i) all constitutional challenges were barred by precedent; (ii) MDLEA jurisdiction existed under § 70502(d)(1)(B) because the Coast Guard made a sufficient “request” for nationality; and (iii) use of a Dutch ship in a joint operation did not defeat jurisdiction where U.S. officers conducted the law-enforcement actions.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008): The court relied on Archer’s prior-panel-precedent rule to dispose of the defendants’ constitutional theories. Archer supplies the institutional reason the panel could not revisit settled MDLEA holdings absent Supreme Court or en banc change.
  • United States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2023): Controlled the vagueness and Miranda-based arguments. Gruezo rejected the claim that § 70502(d)(1)(B) is vague and held that Miranda warnings are not required during routine interdictions on the high seas; it also treated certain as-applied Miranda claims as waived by a guilty plea.
  • United States v. Mena, 863 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1989) and United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982): Cited (through Gruezo) to show the Eleventh Circuit’s longstanding rejection of vagueness challenges to MDLEA-style jurisdictional provisions concerning statelessness and nationality claims.
  • Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and United States v. Rioseco, 845 F.2d 299 (11th Cir. 1988): Rioseco (invoked via Gruezo) anchors the rule that routine Coast Guard boarding and inspection does not normally amount to custody requiring Miranda warnings; the panel treated the interdiction questioning here as falling within that doctrinal lane.
  • United States v. Castillo, 899 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2018): Used (via Gruezo) for the guilty-plea waiver principle—case-related constitutional objections to pre-plea government conduct are generally foreclosed by a valid guilty plea.
  • Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174 (2018) and United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002): The opinion distinguished what survives a guilty plea: under Class, defendants can still mount certain constitutional challenges to the statute of conviction; under Cotton, jurisdictional arguments are not waived.
  • United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024): Controlled the “EEZ is not the high seas” argument. Alfonso held that an EEZ is part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes and that international law does not limit Congress’s Felonies Clause power in the way defendants urged.
  • United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 269 (2025): Cited to reinforce Alfonso’s rule against EEZ-based constitutional challenges and to reiterate that nexus arguments remain foreclosed.
  • United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014) and United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020): Campbell foreclosed the claim that due process or the Felonies Clause requires a U.S. nexus for MDLEA prosecutions. Cabezas-Montano supplied the burden framing for MDLEA jurisdiction (government must satisfy the jurisdictional requirement).
  • United States v. De La Garza, 516 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2008): The panel used De La Garza’s characterization of MDLEA jurisdiction as a “congressionally imposed limit on courts’ subject matter jurisdiction,” shaping the court’s approach to the statutory “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” inquiry.
  • United States v. Guerro, 789 F. App'x 742 (11th Cir. 2019): Defendants cited this non-published decision to argue for a rigid “questioning procedure.” The court distinguished it: Guerro turned on the absence of any request for nationality, whereas here the Coast Guard asked a direct nationality question.
  • United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024): Also supplied the standard-of-review statements applied in this appeal (de novo for jurisdictional dismissal denial; plain error for constitutional challenges first raised on appeal), though the panel ultimately resolved issues on binding-precedent grounds.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

  1. Constitutional challenges were rejected as foreclosed, not re-litigated on the merits. The panel’s constitutional analysis is primarily an application of vertical (Supreme Court) and horizontal (prior panel) stare decisis. By invoking United States v. Archer, the court framed its task as identifying controlling precedent and applying it, rather than reassessing first principles.
    • Vagueness: Under United States v. Gruezo, § 70502(d)(1)(B) gives ordinary notice: if the master does not make a nationality/registry claim when asked, the vessel is treated as stateless for MDLEA jurisdiction.
    • Miranda-based due process: Gruezo and United States v. Rioseco treat routine high-seas interdiction questioning as noncustodial in the ordinary case; hence no constitutional requirement for Miranda warnings at that stage, and guilty pleas may waive certain as-applied complaints about pre-plea conduct (via United States v. Castillo).
    • EEZ / “high seas”: United States v. Alfonso holds that EEZs are part of the “high seas” for the Felonies Clause and rejects importing international-law limits to narrow Congress’s power in the way urged.
    • Nexus: United States v. Campbell rejects a constitutional requirement that MDLEA prosecutions prove a U.S. nexus, relying on universal and protective principles and the statute’s notice function regarding drug trafficking on stateless vessels.
  2. Statutory jurisdiction: “request” means request—no “magic words” requirement. The pivotal statutory holding addresses what qualifies as a “request” under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B). The defendants argued the Coast Guard must ask a formulaic question such as “Do you claim nationality for the vessel?” The court rejected this as inconsistent with the statute’s text, which requires only that an authorized U.S. officer make a “request” for a claim of nationality/registry.

    On the facts, asking the master “What is the nationality of your ship or vessel?” was treated as a sufficient request. Because the master did not claim a nationality for the vessel, the jurisdictional definition of a “vessel without nationality” was met, satisfying the MDLEA “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” requirement.

  3. Joint operations and platform choice: using a Dutch ship did not undermine U.S. jurisdiction. The court rejected the argument that jurisdiction failed because the interdiction was conducted from a Dutch naval vessel. Its reasoning was threefold:
    • Text: nothing in the MDLEA bars U.S. officers from conducting operations from foreign vessels; § 70502(d)(1)(B) focuses on who makes the request (an authorized U.S. officer), not the vessel’s flag.
    • Facts: the operation was “100 percent law enforcement-wise” the U.S. Coast Guard—U.S. spotting aircraft; U.S. flags on the pursuit assets; U.S. Coast Guard personnel performed boarding, questioning, and law-enforcement actions.
    • International cooperation instruments: the opinion noted treaty frameworks enabling joint teams and embarked officers, including the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and the multilateral Agreement Concerning Co-Operation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime and Air Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in the Caribbean Area.

3.3. Impact

Although “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision crystallizes two operationally significant propositions for MDLEA litigation in the Eleventh Circuit:

  • No rigid script for nationality inquiries under § 70502(d)(1)(B): The court’s reading favors functional compliance. So long as officers make a clear request seeking the vessel’s nationality/registry, jurisdiction can attach if the master fails to claim it. This reduces the likelihood that defendants can create jurisdictional defects by challenging phrasing rather than substance.
  • Joint interdictions remain jurisdictionally stable: The opinion signals that platform-sharing and multinational maritime patrols (e.g., U.S. law enforcement embarked on allied vessels) will not, without more, defeat MDLEA jurisdiction where U.S. officers perform the relevant statutory acts.
  • Constitutional challenges remain largely closed terrain: By relying on United States v. Alfonso (EEZ) and United States v. Campbell (nexus), the decision reinforces that the most common modern constitutional attacks on the MDLEA are presently nonstarters in this circuit absent higher-court change.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

MDLEA “jurisdiction”
Under the MDLEA, “jurisdiction” is a statutory condition that the government must satisfy—most commonly by proving the vessel is “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” including if it is stateless. The Eleventh Circuit (citing United States v. De La Garza) treats this as a limit akin to subject-matter jurisdiction in effect, meaning it is a threshold issue.
“Vessel without nationality” under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B)
A vessel is treated as stateless if, when an authorized U.S. officer asks for the vessel’s nationality/registry, the master fails to make a claim. Statelessness matters because it expands U.S. enforcement authority on the high seas.
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
An EEZ is a maritime zone up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal state’s baseline where the coastal state has resource-related rights. It is not the same as “territorial waters.” Under United States v. Alfonso, the EEZ is treated as part of the “high seas” for Congress’s Felonies Clause power in this context.
Felonies Clause
Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 allows Congress to define and punish felonies on the “high Seas.” The Eleventh Circuit’s MDLEA cases interpret this power broadly enough to encompass drug trafficking on stateless vessels, including in EEZs as described in United States v. Alfonso.
Miranda “custody” in maritime interdictions
Miranda warnings are required for custodial interrogation. Eleventh Circuit precedent (e.g., United States v. Rioseco, applied via United States v. Gruezo) generally treats routine Coast Guard interdiction questioning as noncustodial in ordinary circumstances.
Prior-panel-precedent rule
Under United States v. Archer, a later panel must follow earlier panel holdings unless the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit en banc overrules or effectively abrogates them. This is why the panel treated many arguments as already resolved.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the defendants’ MDLEA conspiracy convictions and the denial of their motions to dismiss. The opinion’s most concrete doctrinal contribution is its straightforward textual holding that § 70502(d)(1)(B) requires only a “request” for nationality—without mandated phrasing—and that asking “What is the nationality of your ship or vessel?” suffices. It also reinforces that cooperative, treaty-backed interdictions conducted by U.S. Coast Guard personnel from an allied vessel do not undermine MDLEA jurisdiction.

More broadly, the decision consolidates the Eleventh Circuit’s current MDLEA landscape: core constitutional challenges (vagueness, Miranda-based theories, EEZ-as-not-high-seas claims, and nexus requirements) remain foreclosed by entrenched precedent, notably United States v. Gruezo, United States v. Alfonso, and United States v. Campbell.