MDLEA Sentencing on Stateless High-Seas Cocaine Voyages: Gross-Weight Proof for Threshold Quantity and Narrow Minor-Role Relief for Couriers

I. Introduction

United States v. Armando Antonio Sumoza-Padron is a consolidated, non-precedential Eleventh Circuit decision affirming the sentences of three Venezuelan nationals—Armando Antonio Sumoza-Padron, Jose Manuel Rizzo-Zabala, and Arnaldo Enrique Hidalgo-Pernalete— who pleaded guilty in the Southern District of Florida to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine on the high seas under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. § 70503.

The Coast Guard intercepted a stateless “go-fast” vessel roughly 98 nautical miles southeast of the Dominican Republic and discovered 17 bales that field-tested positive for cocaine. At sentencing, (1) two defendants sought a minor-role reduction, and (2) the third contested whether the government proved at least 450 kilograms of cocaine, a key Guidelines threshold under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). All three also raised MDLEA constitutional challenges.

The central issues on appeal were: (a) whether precedent foreclosed constitutional attacks on MDLEA prosecutions for stateless-vessel conduct lacking a U.S. nexus; (b) whether the district court clearly erred in finding the 450-kilogram threshold satisfied based on a DEA report reflecting gross weight; (c) whether the district court clearly erred in denying minor-role reductions; and (d) whether a low-end Guidelines sentence of 135 months was substantively unreasonable.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed all three 135-month sentences. It held:

  • Constitutional challenges: Foreclosed by binding precedent, including United States v. Alfonso, United States v. Campbell, and United States v. Canario-Vilomar.
  • Drug quantity (Hidalgo-Pernalete): No clear error in finding at least 450 kilograms where a DEA report reflected approximately 614 kilograms gross, allowing a reasonable inference that the net weight still exceeded 450 kilograms.
  • Minor-role reductions (Sumoza-Padron and Rizzo-Zabala): No clear error in denying reductions given the large load and the defendants’ responsibility as couriers in the charged relevant conduct, consistent with United States v. Rodriguez De Varon.
  • Substantive reasonableness (Sumoza-Padron): The low-end Guidelines sentence was reasonable under § 3553(a), consistent with United States v. Osorio-Moreno and related precedent.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standard-of-review framework

  • United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2015): Cited for the government’s burden to prove drug quantity by a preponderance of the evidence and the rule that estimates cannot be “merely speculative.” The panel used Azmat to frame why a documentary weight record can suffice without mathematical certainty.
  • United States v. Tigua, 963 F.3d 1138 (11th Cir. 2020): Cited for clear-error review of role-in-the-offense factual findings, reinforcing that appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence where the district court’s view is plausible.
  • United States v. Osorio-Moreno, 814 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2016): Cited for abuse-of-discretion review of substantive reasonableness and the “definite and firm conviction” framing for clear errors of judgment at sentencing.
  • United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948): Cited for the classic definition of clear error—appellate reversal only when left with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”

2. MDLEA constitutional challenges

  • United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024): The panel treated Alfonso as dispositive on whether MDLEA falls within Congress’s power under the Felonies Clause to define and punish certain conduct on the high seas, foreclosing the defendants’ challenge.
  • United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014): Cited for rejecting the argument that MDLEA prosecutions require a proven nexus to the United States, including analysis under both the Felonies Clause and Due Process.
  • United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025): Reinforced Campbell on the lack-of-nexus argument, further cementing that defendants on stateless vessels cannot demand proof of U.S. territorial connection as a constitutional prerequisite.

3. Drug-quantity proof and reliability of sentencing information

  • United States v. Ghertler, 605 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2010): Cited for the rule that a defendant claiming sentencing reliance on “false or unreliable information” bears the burden to show the challenged evidence is materially false or unreliable. The panel used Ghertler to reject attacks that merely raised unanswered questions about the DEA record.
  • U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a): Though not a “case,” it functioned as key authority for the proposition that sentencing courts may consider relevant information “without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence,” answering the argument that the DEA report had to be formally admitted.

4. Minor-role doctrine for couriers

  • United States v. Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc): The controlling framework. The panel emphasized the two-part inquiry: (i) compare the defendant’s role to the relevant conduct for which he was held accountable; (ii) where discernable, compare to other participants in that relevant conduct. It also highlighted De Varon’s teaching that drug quantity is “material” in courier cases and that some conspiracies have no minor participants.
  • United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020): Applied to reject comparisons to unknown bosses/financiers. The panel relied on its holding that district courts need not consider the culpability of unknown conspirators and should focus on those “identifiable or discernable” from the evidence tied to the defendant’s relevant conduct.
  • United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2016): Cited to acknowledge a limiting principle: a minor-role reduction cannot be categorically denied based solely on drug quantity. The panel distinguished the case by finding the district court relied on responsibility and the circumstances of transport, with drug quantity as evidence of entrusted responsibility rather than the only reason.

5. Substantive reasonableness

  • United States v. Dixon, 901 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2018): Cited for the proposition that only the “rare sentence” is substantively unreasonable and that within-Guidelines sentences are ordinarily expected to be reasonable.
  • United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2014): Cited for the “well below the statutory maximum” indicator of reasonableness. The panel contrasted 135 months with the statutory maximum of life (via 46 U.S.C. § 70506 and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii)).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. MDLEA constitutional challenges treated as closed questions

The court’s first move was methodological: it did not relitigate MDLEA’s constitutionality on the merits because existing Eleventh Circuit precedent controlled. By invoking United States v. Alfonso, it treated the Felonies Clause challenge as resolved. By invoking United States v. Campbell and United States v. Canario-Vilomar, it treated the “no U.S. nexus” argument as already rejected under both Article I and Due Process analyses. In effect, the opinion functions as an application-of-precedent decision that signals continued stability of MDLEA enforcement against stateless vessels in this circuit.

2. Drug quantity: gross-weight documentation can support the 450-kilogram threshold

The Guidelines enhancement turns on whether the defendant trafficked “450 kilograms or more of Cocaine” (U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (Nov. 2021)). Hidalgo-Pernalete attempted to create doubt by focusing on uncertainty in how the DEA arrived at “614 kilograms” and by noting the report reflected gross weight including packaging.

The panel approved the district court’s approach as non-speculative for three core reasons:

  1. Magnitude cushion: Even gross weight exceeded the threshold by more than 150 kilograms; the district court could reasonably infer that removing packaging would not erase that margin.
  2. Sentencing evidentiary flexibility: Under U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a), the report did not need to be “admitted” under trial evidence rules to be considered at sentencing.
  3. Burden allocation under reliability doctrine: Under United States v. Ghertler, Hidalgo-Pernalete needed to show material falsity or unreliability, not merely speculate that the agency “guessed.” The prosecutor’s representation that she asked the DEA “to weigh it” supported reliability.

In practical terms, the opinion endorses a common-sense inferential method: when the record reflects a gross weight far above a key threshold, a district court may find the threshold met absent concrete evidence of error.

3. Minor-role reductions: relevant-conduct focus and skepticism toward “everyone is minor” theories

For Sumoza-Padron and Rizzo-Zabala, the panel adhered to United States v. Rodriguez De Varon’s two-step role analysis. The decision highlights two recurring Eleventh Circuit themes in maritime courier cases:

  • Relevant conduct is the charged transport conspiracy: The court rejected arguments asking it to compare defendants to unseen “bosses, planners, and financiers.” Under United States v. Cabezas-Montano, unknown conspirators are not part of the comparison set unless supported by evidence making them “identifiable or discernable.”
  • Drug quantity as evidence of entrusted responsibility: While United States v. Cruickshank prevents categorical denial based solely on quantity, the panel treated the large load and hazardous open-ocean transport as indicating a meaningful level of trust and responsibility.

The opinion also underscores De Varon’s point that not every multi-person scheme must have a “minor participant.” Where three couriers together carry an extremely large quantity across “hundreds of miles of empty ocean,” the district court may rationally find that none are “minor” relative to each other in the relevant conduct actually attributed to them.

4. Substantive reasonableness: low-end Guidelines plus deterrence rationale

Applying United States v. Osorio-Moreno, United States v. Dixon, and United States v. Dougherty, the panel affirmed Sumoza-Padron’s 135-month sentence as substantively reasonable because it was (i) at the low end of the Guidelines range (135–168 months), (ii) far below the statutory maximum of life, and (iii) grounded in plausible § 3553(a) considerations—seriousness, deterrence, and the scale of trafficking. The panel also rejected an unwarranted-disparity claim because the cited comparators were not “clearly similar,” and because the co-conspirators received the same sentence.

C. Impact

Although designated “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision has practical, near-term significance in MDLEA sentencing litigation within the Eleventh Circuit:

  • MDLEA constitutional defenses remain uphill: The opinion signals that Felonies Clause and “no nexus” challenges are routinely disposed of on precedent grounds (particularly after United States v. Alfonso and United States v. Canario-Vilomar).
  • 450-kilogram threshold disputes require concrete rebuttal: Defendants who challenge quantity based on chain-of-custody paperwork, gross/net distinctions, or “approximate” labels will likely need affirmative proof (e.g., contrary weights, demonstrable inconsistencies) rather than rhetorical uncertainty to meet Ghertler’s material-falsity standard.
  • Minor-role reductions remain narrow for maritime couriers: The opinion reinforces that a defendant cannot expand the “comparison group” to hypothetical organizers absent record evidence, and that very large loads transported under risky conditions can support denial even where the defendant is “just a courier.”
  • Within-Guidelines sentences for large-load maritime cocaine cases are difficult to overturn: The panel’s reliance on the “low end of the range” and “below the statutory maximum” indicators reflects a strong presumption of reasonableness in practice.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • MDLEA / “stateless vessel” jurisdiction: A vessel is treated as “stateless” when it lacks a recognized nationality (e.g., no flag and no one claims nationality). Under the MDLEA, stateless vessels on the high seas can fall within U.S. jurisdiction, enabling prosecution in U.S. courts.
  • Felonies Clause: A constitutional provision empowering Congress to define and punish felonies committed on the high seas. In this circuit, existing precedent treats MDLEA drug trafficking on the high seas as within that power.
  • “Nexus” to the United States: Some legal regimes require a connection between conduct and the prosecuting nation. The Eleventh Circuit has held that MDLEA prosecutions of stateless-vessel drug trafficking do not require a proven U.S. nexus to satisfy the Felonies Clause or Due Process.
  • Preponderance of the evidence (sentencing): At sentencing, the government must prove disputed facts (like drug weight) more likely than not—lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
  • Gross vs. net weight: “Gross” includes packaging. “Net” is the drug alone. Here, because the gross weight exceeded the threshold by a large margin, the court allowed an inference that net weight still cleared the threshold.
  • Minor-role reduction (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2): A two-level decrease for defendants substantially less culpable than others in the relevant conduct. Under United States v. Rodriguez De Varon, the focus is what the defendant was held accountable for and, secondarily, identifiable participants in that same relevant conduct.
  • Clear error vs. abuse of discretion: Clear-error review is highly deferential for factual findings (drug weight, role). Abuse of discretion governs the overall reasonableness of the sentence under § 3553(a), also deferential—especially for within-Guidelines sentences.

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s consolidated decision affirms that, in MDLEA high-seas cases involving stateless vessels, constitutional attacks on Congress’s authority and nexus-based due process challenges remain foreclosed by circuit precedent. On sentencing, the opinion endorses pragmatic proof of the 450-kilogram Guidelines threshold where a reliable agency record shows gross weight far above the cutoff, and it reiterates that minor-role reductions for maritime couriers are limited by the relevant-conduct framework of United States v. Rodriguez De Varon and the refusal to compare defendants to speculative, unproven “higher-ups.” Finally, it illustrates the difficulty of overturning low-end, within-Guidelines sentences for large-quantity maritime cocaine trafficking on substantive-reasonableness grounds.