MDLEA “Request” for Nationality Requires No Magic Words; Joint/Foreign-Platform Interdictions Do Not Defeat Jurisdiction

Case: United States v. Manuel Melo (consolidated with codefendants Yesid Degoberto Epieyu Epieyu and Ivan Escobosa Diaz)
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date: 2026-09-15
Disposition: Convictions affirmed; denial of motions to dismiss affirmed (Opinion “NOT FOR PUBLICATION”)

I. Introduction

This consolidated appeal arose from a December 22, 2021 maritime interdiction in Caribbean waters roughly 142 nautical miles north of Aruba. A U.S. maritime patrol aircraft detected a “go-fast” vessel traveling a known drug-trafficking route with three persons aboard and visible packages and fuel barrels on deck. The vessel displayed no indicia of nationality (no flag or markings). A nearby Dutch naval vessel, the HNLMS Holland, operating with an embarked team of U.S. Coast Guard officers under multilateral counterdrug cooperation, deployed a small boat and helicopter (both flying U.S. Coast Guard flags) to stop the go-fast.

After attempted flight and jettisoning of packages, the helicopter disabled the go-fast’s engines. U.S. Coast Guard officers boarded, questioned the crew, and recovered 35 bales of cocaine (about 1,486 kg). The defendants pled guilty to MDLEA conspiracy (46 U.S.C. §§ 70506(b), 70503(a)(1)) but preserved appellate challenges attacking (1) the constitutionality of the MDLEA and (2) statutory jurisdiction—particularly whether the government proved the “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” element by showing the go-fast was “without nationality.”

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding the constitutional attacks were foreclosed by binding precedent and that jurisdiction was satisfied because the master failed to make a nationality claim after being asked the vessel’s nationality. The court also rejected the argument that use of a Dutch platform rendered the interdiction non-U.S. or jurisdictionally defective.

II. Summary of the Opinion

• Constitution: The defendants’ vagueness, Miranda/due process, EEZ “high seas,” and “nexus to the United States” challenges are all foreclosed by binding Eleventh Circuit precedent.
• MDLEA jurisdiction (statelessness): The government met its burden under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B) because a U.S. Coast Guard interpreter asked the master, in Spanish, “What is the nationality of your ship or vessel?” and the master failed to claim nationality for the vessel (he stated only that he was Colombian).
• No “magic words” requirement: The MDLEA requires a “request” for a claim of nationality; it does not mandate a particular formula (such as “Do you claim nationality?”).
• Foreign vessel platform: The use of the Dutch vessel Holland did not undermine jurisdiction where U.S. officers executed the law enforcement actions and the operation occurred under multilateral agreements authorizing such cooperation.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

1) Prior-panel-precedent constraint

The court began by invoking United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008), for the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule: once a panel has decided an issue, later panels must follow it unless overruled by the Supreme Court or the court en banc. This framing is decisive—most constitutional arguments fail not on first principles in this opinion but because earlier circuit decisions already resolved them.

2) Vagueness challenge foreclosed: “nationality/registry” clarity

The defendants argued § 70502(d)(1)(B) is vague because it does not require officers to explain what it means to “make a claim of nationality or registry.” The court relied on United States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2023), which rejected the same argument, holding the statute provides sufficient notice that failing to claim nationality upon request renders the vessel stateless for MDLEA jurisdiction. Gruezo itself cited earlier rejections of vagueness attacks on MDLEA predecessor provisions: United States v. Mena, 863 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1989), and United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982). Those cases supply doctrinal continuity: the jurisdictional statelessness mechanism has long been treated as constitutionally determinate.

3) Miranda/due process challenge foreclosed: interdiction questioning is not “custody”

The defendants contended the MDLEA is unconstitutional because it allows jurisdictional consequences (statelessness) without Miranda-like warnings about those consequences. Again, United States v. Gruezo controlled, and Gruezo rested on United States v. Rioseco, 845 F.2d 299 (11th Cir. 1988), which held routine Coast Guard stop/boarding/inspection on the high seas does not ordinarily constitute custodial detention triggering Miranda warnings.

The opinion also noted a plea-based limitation discussed in United States v. Castillo, 899 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2018): a valid guilty plea bars appeals attacking case-related government conduct that occurred before the plea (as distinct from facial attacks on the statute). The court nonetheless treated the Miranda theory as foreclosed on the merits by precedent.

4) EEZ-as-“high seas” for the Felonies Clause foreclosed

Defendants argued Congress’s Article I Felonies Clause power (“Felonies committed on the high Seas”) cannot reach conduct in another nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The court treated this as directly controlled by United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), which held “the EEZ is part of the ‘high seas’ for purposes of the Felonies Clause” and that international law does not limit Congress’s Felonies Clause power in this setting. The opinion reinforced that United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 269 (2025), applied Alfonso to reject similar EEZ-based challenges.

5) No U.S. nexus requirement foreclosed

The defendants’ “no nexus to the United States” due process/Felonies Clause argument was foreclosed by United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014), which held the MDLEA is a constitutional exercise of Felonies Clause authority even without a U.S. nexus, relying on universal and protective principles and emphasizing that the MDLEA provides clear notice that drug trafficking on stateless vessels on the high seas is universally condemned. The court noted additional circuit reinforcement in United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020), and United States v. Canario-Vilomar.

6) Jurisdiction as a subject-matter limit and standard of review

On statutory jurisdiction, the opinion used United States v. De La Garza, 516 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2008), to characterize the MDLEA “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” requirement as a congressionally imposed limit on courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction, analogized to diversity’s amount-in-controversy requirement. It also cited United States v. Alfonso for de novo review of jurisdictional dismissals.

7) Guilty plea does not bar these challenges

The court cited Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174 (2018), to explain that a guilty plea does not bar a constitutional challenge to the statute of conviction that questions the government’s power to prosecute based on admitted conduct. It cited United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002), for the proposition that jurisdictional arguments cannot be forfeited or waived—supporting review even after pleas.

8) The defendants’ reliance on an unpublished decision

The defendants invoked United States v. Guerro, 789 F. App’x 742 (11th Cir. 2019), arguing the Coast Guard failed to follow a required “questioning procedure.” The court distinguished Guerro as nonbinding and factually different: in Guerro officers made no request for nationality at all, whereas here the interpreter explicitly asked the vessel’s nationality.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Statutory jurisdiction turns on a functional “request,” not a scripted catechism

The statutory question was whether the go-fast was a “vessel without nationality” under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B): a vessel where the master “fails, on request of an officer of the United States authorized to enforce applicable provisions of United States law, to make a claim of nationality or registry.”

The defendants attempted to transform “on request” into a rigid interrogation requirement—insisting officers must ask, verbatim, “Do you claim nationality for the vessel?” The panel rejected this as inconsistent with the MDLEA’s text. The statute requires a “request,” but “does not dictate what specific form that ‘request’ must take.” The interpreter’s question—“What is the nationality of your ship or vessel?”—was a direct request for a nationality claim. Because the master responded only with his personal nationality (Colombian) and did not claim the vessel’s nationality/registry, the jurisdictional condition was met.

2) Operational facts supported U.S. enforcement authority despite a Dutch platform

The defendants also argued jurisdiction failed because the interdiction was conducted from a Dutch vessel. The court rejected this on three reinforcing grounds:

• No MDLEA textual bar: Nothing in the MDLEA prohibits U.S. officers from conducting interdictions using a foreign partner’s vessel as the platform, so long as the statutory “request” is made by a U.S. officer authorized to enforce U.S. law.
• Evidence of U.S.-led law enforcement action: The small boat and helicopter flew U.S. Coast Guard flags; the interdiction team on the small boat comprised solely U.S. Coast Guard officers; a U.S. aircraft detected the go-fast; and a U.S. Coast Guard officer was on the helicopter that disabled the engines. The record supported the characterization that, “100 percent law enforcement-wise,” the operation was U.S. Coast Guard.
• Treaty-based cooperation: The court pointed to the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Arts. 17 and 9) and the “Agreement Concerning Co-Operation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime and Air Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in the Caribbean Area” (Apr. 10, 2003), which expressly contemplates cooperation, including “joint teams” and embarking officers on partner vessels.

3) Constitutional claims disposed of by precedent rather than re-litigation

The opinion’s constitutional section is primarily an application of stare decisis within the circuit:

• Vagueness: foreclosed by United States v. Gruezo (and earlier MDLEA-predecessor cases).
• Miranda/due process warnings during interdiction: foreclosed by United States v. Gruezo and United States v. Rioseco.
• EEZ limitations on Felonies Clause power: foreclosed by United States v. Alfonso (and reinforced by United States v. Canario-Vilomar).
• Nexus requirement: foreclosed by United States v. Campbell (and reinforced by United States v. Cabezas-Montano and United States v. Canario-Vilomar).

C. Impact

1) A practical clarification for MDLEA interdictions: “request” is ordinary language

Even as an unpublished opinion, the decision is a useful indicator of how Eleventh Circuit panels are likely to treat “request” challenges under § 70502(d)(1)(B). It discourages defenses premised on “magic words” and supports a functional approach: if officers ask, in substance, for the vessel’s nationality/registry, the statutory “request” requirement is satisfied.

2) Reinforcement of cooperative maritime enforcement models

The ruling also reinforces that modern counterdrug operations often occur through partnered platforms and mixed assets. The court’s reasoning suggests defendants will face an uphill battle arguing that the presence of a foreign hull (here, a Dutch naval vessel) undermines U.S. enforcement authority where U.S. officers carry out the relevant law enforcement acts and cooperation is treaty-backed.

3) Continued foreclosure of broad constitutional attacks in the Eleventh Circuit

The opinion underscores that major constitutional avenues—EEZ/high seas theories, Miranda-based interdiction theories, nexus requirements, and vagueness attacks on the statelessness framework—remain closed in this circuit absent Supreme Court intervention or en banc reconsideration.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• MDLEA: A federal statute criminalizing drug trafficking on certain vessels, including “vessels without nationality,” even when conduct occurs outside U.S. territory.
• “Vessel without nationality” (stateless vessel): A vessel treated as lacking any recognized national registration or protection. Under § 70502(d)(1)(B), this includes a vessel whose master fails to claim nationality/registry when asked by an authorized U.S. officer.
• Why “statelessness” matters: Stateless vessels are a key jurisdictional gateway under the MDLEA; once statelessness is established, the vessel becomes “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” for MDLEA purposes.
• EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone): An area up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal state’s baseline where the coastal state has special resource rights. The Eleventh Circuit (via United States v. Alfonso) treats the EEZ as part of the “high seas” for Congress’s Felonies Clause power in this context.
• Miranda custody vs. routine maritime questioning: Miranda warnings are generally required for custodial interrogation. The Eleventh Circuit (via United States v. Rioseco) views routine interdiction questioning on the high seas as normally not custodial.
• “Nexus” argument: A claim that due process or Article I requires a connection between the defendant’s conduct and the United States. The Eleventh Circuit (via United States v. Campbell) rejects a nexus requirement for MDLEA prosecutions involving stateless vessels on the high seas.
• Subject-matter jurisdiction in MDLEA cases: In this circuit, the “vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction” element functions as a statutory limit on the court’s power to hear the case (see United States v. De La Garza), so it is litigated via motions to dismiss and reviewed de novo.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Manuel Melo affirms MDLEA convictions by applying entrenched Eleventh Circuit precedent to reject constitutional challenges and by clarifying—at least as a practical adjudicative matter—that § 70502(d)(1)(B)’s “on request” language does not impose a rigid script for nationality questioning. A direct inquiry such as “What is the nationality of your ship or vessel?” suffices, and a master’s failure to claim nationality/registry supports statelessness and thus MDLEA jurisdiction. The decision further signals judicial acceptance of treaty-backed, joint maritime enforcement operations, even when conducted from a foreign partner’s vessel, so long as U.S. officers perform the statutory jurisdiction-triggering acts.