MDLEA Reaffirmed: Foreign EEZs Are “High Seas” Under the Felonies Clause; Non-Confirmation Creates “Vessel Without Nationality”; No U.S. Nexus Required; Amendment 833 Not Retroactive

I. Introduction

This published, consolidated decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit arises from the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”) prosecutions of Angelo Martinez, Eric Manuel Suero Terrero, and Justo Matos Pena following the interdiction of a “go-fast” vessel carrying approximately 375 kilograms of cocaine roughly 158 nautical miles southeast of Isla Beata, Dominican Republic. When boarded, Martinez (as master) claimed Colombian nationality for the vessel, but Colombia could neither confirm nor deny registry. The United States treated the craft as a “vessel without nationality” and prosecuted under the MDLEA.

The appeal presented recurring MDLEA defenses: (1) whether Congress’s Felonies Clause power reaches conduct in a foreign nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”); (2) whether international law limits Congress’s ability to define “stateless” vessels (including when a claimed flag state does not confirm nationality); and (3) whether due process requires a U.S. nexus. Suero Terrero also challenged sentencing, arguing he deserved a minor-role reduction and that post-sentencing Guideline changes (effective November 1, 2025) should apply retroactively.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in full. It held:

  • Defendants’ constitutional challenges to MDLEA jurisdiction are foreclosed by binding circuit precedent, particularly United States v. Alfonso and United States v. Canario-Vi-lomar.
  • A foreign nation’s EEZ is part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes, and international law does not limit the Felonies Clause.
  • The MDLEA’s definition of “vessel without nationality” (including non-confirmation by the claimed nation) is constitutional, and international law cannot restrict Congress’s chosen definition for MDLEA enforcement.
  • A U.S. nexus is not required for MDLEA prosecutions of high-seas drug trafficking on stateless vessels; the due-process nexus argument was also raised too late.
  • The district court did not clearly err in denying Suero Terrero a minor-role adjustment, and Guideline Amendment 833 is substantive and therefore not retroactive on direct appeal under circuit law.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Extraterritorial MDLEA jurisdiction, EEZs, and the Felonies Clause

  • United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2706 (2025): The controlling authority. The panel relied on Alfonso for two propositions that dispose of the “EEZ is not high seas” theory: (i) an EEZ is “part of the ‘high seas’ for purposes of the Felonies Clause,” and (ii) “international law does not limit the Felonies Clause.” This opinion essentially operationalizes Alfonso as a rule of decision: once an interdiction occurs in a foreign EEZ (not territorial waters), Felonies Clause power is available, and MDLEA enforcement there is “proper.”
  • United States v. Canario-Vi-lomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 269 (2025): Cited as a second, recent reaffirmation both of the EEZ/high-seas holding and of Congress’s authority to define “stateless vessel” without being constrained by international law.
  • United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2012): Invoked by defendants but confined by the court to its context: territorial waters, and an Offences Clause challenge. The panel emphasized Bellaizac-Hurtado’s express distinction that Congress has “additional constitutional authority” on the high seas, including the Felonies Clause, and that the circuit has “always upheld” high-seas drug trafficking convictions under that power.
  • United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2003): These cases undergird the district court’s reliance on the “protective principle” framework (i.e., extraterritorial jurisdiction when conduct threatens security or governmental functions). While the panel ultimately resolves the constitutional questions through binding precedent (Alfonso/Canario-Vi-lomar), these earlier cases function as doctrinal scaffolding for why high-seas drug trafficking is jurisdictionally exceptional.

2. Stateless vessels and non-confirmation by the claimed flag state

  • United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982): Provides the baseline: international law “generally prohibits” asserting jurisdiction over foreign vessels on the high seas, but stateless vessels are different. The opinion, via Campbell, reprises Marino-Garcia’s characterization of stateless vessels as “international pariahs.”
  • United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014): Supplies the key stateless-vessel principle used here: Congress may extend U.S. criminal jurisdiction to stateless vessels in international waters engaged in controlled-substance distribution.
  • United States v. Canario-Vi-lomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 269 (2025): Treated as dispositive that the MDLEA’s “vessel without nationality” definition—covering situations where the master claims registry and the claimed nation does not “affirmatively and unequivocally” confirm—does not become unconstitutional merely because defendants contest whether customary international law would label the vessel “stateless.”

3. No nexus requirement and issue preservation

  • Walker v. Jones, 10 F.3d 1569 (11th Cir. 1994): Used to reject consideration of the nexus-based due-process argument raised for the first time on appeal.
  • United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024); United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir 2020); United States v. Canario-Vi-lomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 269 (2025): Cited for the proposition that MDLEA prosecutions under the Felonies Clause do not require proof of a nexus to the United States. The court also pointed to Congress’s findings in 46 U.S.C. § 70501 that high-seas drug trafficking presents a “specific threat” to U.S. security and well-being.

4. Sentencing: minor role and retroactivity of Guideline amendments

  • United States v. Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert denied, 528 U.S. 976 (1999): The controlling “De Varon factors” framework for minor-role determinations: compare the defendant to (i) his relevant conduct and (ii) other participants in that relevant conduct.
  • United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Boyd, 291 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2002): Reinforce deferential clear-error review and district-court discretion on role assessments.
  • United States v. Alvarez-Coria, 447 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2006): Confirms defendant’s burden (preponderance) for minor-role relief.
  • United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942 (11th Cir. 2015): Clarifies that comparison to other participants is limited to those identifiable and involved in the relevant conduct attributed to the defendant, not a larger conspiracy.
  • United States v. Jerchower, 631 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2011): Governs whether Guideline amendments apply on direct appeal as “clarifying” versus “substantive,” and provides the multi-factor test the panel applied to Amendment 833.

5. Binding-precedent rule

  • In re Lambrix, 776 F.3d 789 (11th Cir. 2015): The mechanism for resolving the constitutional issues: the prior-panel-precedent rule binds later panels unless overruled by the Supreme Court or en banc court. Lambrix is the formal basis for repeatedly stating “Alfonso binds us” and rejecting attempts to relitigate settled MDLEA issues.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. EEZs as “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes

The opinion’s operative constitutional move is categorical: it treats foreign EEZs—waters beyond territorial seas but within 200 nautical miles—as “high seas” within the meaning of the Felonies Clause, following United States v. Alfonso. This matters because defendants sought to redefine “high seas” by importing customary international law limits (and by analogy to an Offences Clause case).

The court refuses that importation. It distinguishes United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado as (a) territorial waters and (b) the Offences Clause, and then applies Alfonso’s two-part holding: (i) EEZs fall within the Felonies Clause’s “high seas” concept for Congress’s power “to define and punish” felonies there; and (ii) international law does not limit that Clause. Once those propositions are accepted, “as-applied” EEZ challenges collapse.

2. MDLEA “vessel without nationality” definition and international law

Defendants argued the MDLEA’s statutory definition of statelessness is unconstitutional because it allegedly exceeds customary international law—specifically, by treating a vessel as “without nationality” when the claimed flag state neither confirms nor denies nationality.

The court’s reasoning is two-step and precedent-driven:

  1. Under Eleventh Circuit MDLEA jurisprudence, stateless vessels are jurisdictionally exceptional (“international pariahs”) and may be subjected to U.S. jurisdiction on the high seas. This principle is rooted in United States v. Marino-Garcia and reaffirmed in United States v. Campbell.
  2. Even if defendants dispute whether non-confirmation equals statelessness under customary international law, United States v. Canario-Vi-lomar holds that international law cannot limit Congress’s Felonies Clause authority to define “stateless vessel” for MDLEA purposes. The panel therefore treats the statutory definition in 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C) as constitutionally valid, and Colombia’s non-confirmation as sufficient.

3. Due process and the “nexus” argument

The panel rejects the nexus argument on two independent grounds:

  • Procedural forfeiture: the issue was raised for the first time on appeal, and under Walker v. Jones the court does not entertain it.
  • Merits foreclosed by precedent: even if reached, United States v. Alfonso, United States v. Campbell, United States v. Cabezas-Montano, and United States v. Canario-Vi-lomar reject the premise that the Felonies Clause requires a U.S. nexus for MDLEA offenses on stateless vessels on the high seas.

The opinion also underscores a legislative-judgment rationale: Congress has expressly found that high-seas drug trafficking threatens U.S. security and societal well-being, 46 U.S.C. § 70501—supporting the notion that the jurisdictional reach is not arbitrary in due-process terms even absent case-specific U.S.-directed conduct.

4. Minor-role reduction and Amendment 833

On sentencing, the court applies the clear-error standard and the United States v. Rodriguez De Varon framework. It emphasizes two facts that commonly drive De Varon outcomes for maritime couriers:

  • Relevant conduct alignment: Suero Terrero’s offense level reflected the conduct he actually performed—transporting a massive quantity of cocaine along an international trafficking route—making it difficult to show he was “substantially less culpable” within the relevant-conduct frame.
  • Comparative culpability is not dispositive: even if he was the least culpable among the three crew members, De Varon cautions that none of the participants must be “minor,” and being less culpable does not automatically entitle a reduction.

The court then addresses Guideline Amendment 833 (effective Nov. 1, 2025), which added language to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(e)(2)(B) suggesting role reductions are “generally warranted” for low-level trafficking functions such as couriers. Applying United States v. Jerchower, the panel holds the amendment is substantive (not merely clarifying) because it changes Guideline text, announces an expansion of when § 3B1.2 applies, is not listed as retroactive in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c), and effectively departs from circuit precedent emphasizing comparison to other participants in the relevant conduct.

Accordingly, the amendment does not apply retroactively on direct appeal, and the sentence stands.

C. Impact

  • MDLEA jurisdictional defenses in the Eleventh Circuit narrow further: This decision confirms that, post-United States v. Alfonso, EEZ-based challenges are effectively nonstarters on direct appeal absent Supreme Court or en banc intervention.
  • International-law limits are cabined: By reiterating that “international law does not limit the Felonies Clause,” the opinion reduces the practical utility of customary international law arguments—both for geographic scope (EEZ/high seas) and for statutory definitions (statelessness).
  • Nexus arguments remain foreclosed: Litigants should expect nexus-based due process challenges to be rejected as a matter of precedent, and, procedurally, must raise any such argument in the district court to avoid forfeiture.
  • Sentencing: Amendment 833 will matter prospectively, not retroactively: For defendants sentenced before Nov. 1, 2025, this opinion signals that Amendment 833 generally cannot be leveraged on direct appeal in the Eleventh Circuit as a “clarifying” change. Future defendants sentenced under the amended text, however, may have stronger arguments for minor-role treatment in courier-like roles—subject to district court factfinding.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Felonies Clause: The Constitution gives Congress power “to define and punish” felonies on the “high seas.” The Eleventh Circuit reads this power broadly enough to support MDLEA prosecutions in foreign EEZs.
  • Offences Clause vs. Felonies Clause: The Offences Clause (also in Article I, § 8, cl. 10) concerns “Offences against the Law of Nations” and is more directly tied to international law. The Felonies Clause, as applied here, is treated as not limited by international law in the same way.
  • Territorial waters vs. EEZ vs. high seas: Territorial waters are generally within 12 nautical miles of a coastal state and receive stronger sovereign protections. An EEZ extends up to 200 nautical miles and grants certain resource rights, but (under Eleventh Circuit precedent) does not bar the United States from treating those waters as “high seas” for Felonies Clause/MDLEA enforcement.
  • “Vessel without nationality” (stateless vessel) under the MDLEA: A vessel is treated as stateless when its claimed flag state does not “affirmatively and unequivocally” confirm nationality. Stateless vessels are subject to broader enforcement jurisdiction.
  • Prior-panel-precedent rule: A later appellate panel must follow earlier circuit decisions unless the Supreme Court or the circuit sitting en banc changes the law. That rule—cited via In re Lambrix—explains the opinion’s repeated “foreclosed by precedent” conclusions.
  • Minor-role reduction (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2): A sentencing decrease for defendants “substantially less culpable” than the average participant, assessed using the De Varon framework (relevant conduct comparison and, where appropriate, comparison to other identifiable participants in that relevant conduct).
  • Clarifying vs. substantive Guideline amendments: “Clarifying” changes can sometimes be used on appeal to interpret older sentences; “substantive” changes generally cannot. Under United States v. Jerchower, Amendment 833 was deemed substantive and thus non-retroactive here.

V. Conclusion

The decision’s significance is less about new doctrinal invention than about cementing the Eleventh Circuit’s post-United States v. Alfonso framework: foreign EEZs count as “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes; international law does not constrain Congress’s MDLEA reach or its statutory definition of a “vessel without nationality”; and no U.S. nexus is required for high-seas stateless-vessel drug trafficking. On sentencing, the court reinforces the deference owed to district courts under United States v. Rodriguez De Varon and clarifies that Amendment 833 is substantive and therefore not retroactive on direct appeal.