MDLEA Reach Confirmed: Foreign EEZ Treated as “High Seas,” No U.S. Nexus Required, and Statelessness Established by Failure to Claim Nationality

I. Introduction

United States v. Angel Luvi-Ramirez (consolidated with appeals by Jose Hernandez and Wilmar Mosquera) is an Eleventh Circuit, non-argument, unpublished decision affirming MDLEA conspiracy convictions arising from a Caribbean interdiction roughly 125 nautical miles off the Dominican Republic.

The Coast Guard encountered a “go-fast” vessel with no indicia of nationality, observed packages being thrown overboard, disabled the vessel, and boarded it. Jose Hernandez identified himself as the master and refused to make a claim of nationality for the vessel. The defendants pleaded guilty to conspiracy under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”) after the district court denied their motion to dismiss on constitutional grounds.

On appeal, the defendants renewed two constitutional arguments: (1) that because the interdiction occurred in the Dominican Republic’s exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”), Congress lacked power under the Constitution’s Felonies Clause; and (2) that due process (and the Felonies Clause) required a nexus between their conduct and the United States. Luvi-Ramirez separately attempted to challenge the constitutionality and factual application of a different MDLEA “statelessness” provision, but did so for the first time on appeal and contrary to the record developed in his plea.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit granted the government’s motion for summary affirmance and affirmed the convictions. The court held that:

  • Binding circuit precedent treats a foreign nation’s EEZ as part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes, and rejects any limitation on Congress’s Felonies Clause power derived from customary international law.
  • Binding circuit precedent also forecloses arguments that the MDLEA requires a U.S. nexus to prosecute noncitizens on stateless vessels on the high seas, and that such prosecutions violate due process.
  • Luvi-Ramirez’s newly raised arguments targeting 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C) failed under plain-error review because the United States exercised jurisdiction under § 70502(d)(1)(B) (failure to claim nationality), as stipulated in the plea proffer.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1969)

The court relied on Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis for the standard governing summary disposition. Summary affirmance is appropriate where one party’s position is “clearly right as a matter of law” and there is “no substantial question” about the outcome, or where the appeal is frivolous. The panel applied that framework to conclude that existing Eleventh Circuit law squarely controlled the constitutional issues presented.

2. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2 d 12 06 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc)

The opinion invoked Bonner v. City of Prichard to clarify that pre-October 1, 1981 Fifth Circuit decisions remain binding in the Eleventh Circuit. This matters because Groendyke is a former Fifth Circuit decision and thus authoritative in the Eleventh Circuit.

3. United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025)

United States v. Canario-Vilomar supplied two key points:

  • The standard of review: de novo review of subject-matter jurisdiction and constitutionality.
  • Substantive reinforcement that an MDLEA “nexus” challenge is foreclosed by circuit precedent, and discussion of the EEZ as a modern maritime concept that did not exist at the founding—supporting the court’s rejection of arguments that the Felonies Clause is cabined by modern international-law concepts.

4. United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024)

United States v. Alfonso was the opinion’s principal authority on the EEZ issue. It held that other countries’ EEZs are “part of the ‘high seas’ for purposes of the Felonies Clause,” and it rejected the argument that Congress’s Felonies Clause authority is limited by customary international law. The panel treated Alfonso as dispositive of the defendants’ first constitutional challenge.

5. United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014)

United States v. Campbell controlled the due process and nexus arguments. The opinion quoted Campbell for two propositions:

  • Congress may extend U.S. criminal jurisdiction to “any stateless vessel in international waters engaged in the distribution of controlled substances.”
  • Prosecuting noncitizens captured on the high seas while drug trafficking does not offend due process because the MDLEA provides clear notice and drug trafficking on stateless vessels is universally condemned.

By invoking Campbell, the panel framed the nexus/due process challenge as settled law rather than an open constitutional question.

6. United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008)

United States v. Archer provided the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule: the court remains bound by earlier decisions unless overturned by the Supreme Court or by the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc. This rule explains why the panel treated Alfonso and Campbell as controlling even if defendants urged reconsideration.

7. United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation modified)

United States v. Lejarde-Rada supplied the four-part test for plain-error review (error; plainness; effect on substantial rights; effect on the fairness/integrity/public reputation of proceedings). This framework became critical to Luvi-Ramirez’s late-raised arguments.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory architecture: MDLEA jurisdiction hinges on “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States”

The court began with the MDLEA’s text: it criminalizes drug possession with intent to distribute and conspiracy to do so on board “a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” See 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), (e)(1); 70506(b), and it applies extraterritorially. See § 70503(b).

The key jurisdictional concept is a “vessel without nationality,” which the MDLEA includes within “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” See § 70502(c)(1)(A). The opinion then recited the statutory paths to “without nationality,” including:

  • § 70502(d)(1)(B): the master fails, on request, to make a claim of nationality or registry.
  • § 70502(d)(1)(C): a claim is made but the claimed nation does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert nationality.

2. Felonies Clause power extends to the “high seas,” and the Eleventh Circuit treats a foreign EEZ as “high seas” for that purpose

The defendants argued the Felonies Clause could not support MDLEA enforcement in the Dominican Republic’s EEZ because, under customary international law, an EEZ is not “high seas.” The court rejected this as foreclosed by United States v. Alfonso, which both (i) classifies foreign EEZ waters as “high seas” for Felonies Clause analysis and (ii) rejects importing customary international-law limits into Congress’s Felonies Clause authority.

The opinion further underscored that the EEZ is “relatively modern” and did not exist at the time of the Constitution’s adoption, aligning with the court’s interpretive move in Alfonso and Canario-Vilomar: modern maritime zones do not necessarily narrow the constitutional phrase “high seas” as used in Article I.

3. No nexus requirement for MDLEA prosecutions of stateless vessels on the high seas; due process satisfied by notice and universal condemnation

The defendants’ second constitutional argument—that due process and/or the Felonies Clause require a U.S. nexus—was treated as settled by United States v. Campbell and reaffirmed in United States v. Canario-Vilomar. The panel reiterated that prosecuting noncitizens captured on the high seas while trafficking drugs does not offend due process because the MDLEA provides clear notice and drug trafficking on stateless vessels is prohibited and condemned by all nations.

4. Luvi-Ramirez’s § 70502(d)(1)(C) challenge failed because the case proceeded under § 70502(d)(1)(B) and the issue was raised too late

Luvi-Ramirez attempted to attack § 70502(d)(1)(C) (claim made, but claimed nation does not confirm) as inconsistent with international law and claimed insufficient evidence that the Dominican Republic failed to confirm nationality. The court assumed arguendo that he adequately raised these issues, but applied plain-error review because he raised them for the first time on appeal.

The court’s decisive reasoning was record-based: Luvi-Ramirez stipulated in the plea proffer that the vessel’s master (Jose Hernandez) refused to make any nationality claim. That factual admission placed the case within § 70502(d)(1)(B), not (C). As a result, there was no error—plain or otherwise—because Luvi-Ramirez attacked the wrong jurisdictional provision, and he did not separately argue that § 70502(d)(1)(B) was unconstitutional or unsupported by the evidence.

C. Impact

  • Reinforcement of MDLEA reach in foreign EEZs: Even as an unpublished summary affirmance, the decision operationalizes binding published precedent (Alfonso) by treating an EEZ as “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes, reducing the practical viability of EEZ-based MDLEA jurisdictional challenges in the Eleventh Circuit.
  • Continued rejection of nexus arguments: The opinion confirms that, in this circuit, defendants on stateless vessels in international waters cannot rely on a lack of U.S. connection to defeat MDLEA prosecutions, because Campbell remains controlling.
  • Plea proffers as jurisdictional guardrails: The court used defendants’ stipulated facts to determine the operative statutory basis for statelessness. This signals that carefully drafted (and carefully reviewed) factual proffers can effectively foreclose later jurisdictional or constitutional reframing.
  • Appellate posture matters: By applying plain-error review to late-raised statutory-constitutionality and sufficiency arguments—and emphasizing the mismatch between the argument and the record—the opinion illustrates how issue preservation and record alignment can be outcome-determinative.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • MDLEA (Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act): A federal law allowing the United States to prosecute certain drug crimes committed on vessels, including conduct occurring outside U.S. territory, so long as the vessel is “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”
  • Felonies Clause: A constitutional grant of power allowing Congress “[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas.” Defendants often challenge whether the location of interdiction qualifies as “high seas.”
  • Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): A maritime area extending up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal state where that state has certain resource-related rights. It is not the same as territorial waters. In this circuit’s Felonies Clause analysis, a foreign EEZ is treated as “high seas.”
  • Stateless (or “without nationality”) vessel: Under the MDLEA, a vessel can be treated as stateless if, among other grounds, the master fails to claim nationality when asked (§ 70502(d)(1)(B)). Statelessness is important because it triggers U.S. jurisdiction under the MDLEA.
  • Nexus requirement: A claimed constitutional due process requirement that the defendant’s conduct have a meaningful connection to the United States. Eleventh Circuit precedent rejects this requirement for MDLEA prosecutions involving stateless vessels on the high seas.
  • Plain error: A demanding appellate standard applied to issues not preserved in the district court. The defendant must show a clear legal mistake that affected substantial rights and seriously undermined the proceeding’s fairness or integrity.
  • Summary affirmance: An expedited appellate disposition used when the result is clear under existing law and there is no substantial question for full briefing or argument.

V. Conclusion

This decision affirms MDLEA conspiracy convictions by applying binding Eleventh Circuit precedent in two core ways: (1) it treats a foreign EEZ as part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes and rejects limits derived from customary international law; and (2) it reiterates that no U.S. nexus is required to prosecute drug trafficking on stateless vessels in international waters, consistent with due process.

For practitioners, the case’s most instructive feature is procedural and record-driven: a defendant cannot successfully mount an appellate challenge premised on one statutory jurisdictional pathway (§ 70502(d)(1)(C)) when his own plea proffer establishes jurisdiction under another (§ 70502(d)(1)(B)), particularly under plain-error review. In the broader MDLEA landscape, the opinion exemplifies how, in the Eleventh Circuit, constitutional challenges to MDLEA jurisdiction in EEZ interdictions and nexus-based due process theories remain largely closed by precedent.