MDLEA Presentment Delays Do Not Justify Dismissal; EEZ Is “High Seas” Under the Felonies Clause

I. Introduction

United States v. Franklin Dominguez (11th Cir. Feb. 4, 2026) is an unpublished per curiam decision affirming Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”) convictions arising from an interdiction of a “go-fast” vessel in the Caribbean Sea roughly 77 nautical miles southeast of Isla Beata, Dominican Republic. Dominguez and a codefendant were found near drifting cocaine bales (213.6 kg total) aboard a vessel displaying no indicia of nationality; neither occupant identified a master or claimed nationality.

On appeal, Dominguez pressed three principal issues: (1) whether a 24-day delay between detention at sea and initial appearance required dismissal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5 or under the “outrageous government conduct” doctrine (or supervisory powers); (2) whether Congress lacked authority under the Constitution’s Felonies Clause to reach conduct occurring within another nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”); and (3) whether the government failed to establish statutory jurisdiction under the MDLEA’s “vessel without nationality” provisions.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board. It held that even assuming the delay was “unnecessary,” dismissal of the indictment was not an appropriate remedy under Rule 5(a), and the delay was not “outrageous” (nor did post-offense detention conduct fit the outrageous-conduct doctrine’s scope). It further held Dominguez’s EEZ-based constitutional challenge was foreclosed by binding circuit precedent establishing that the EEZ falls within the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes. Finally, it held the vessel was stateless under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B) because no master was identified and no nationality claim was made—facts Dominguez also stipulated were sufficient to satisfy MDLEA jurisdiction.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024)
    The court relied on Alfonso for two key propositions: (i) standards of review (de novo on constitutional and subject-matter jurisdiction questions; abuse of discretion on non-jurisdictional dismissal rulings), and (ii) the core constitutional holding that “the EEZ is part of the ‘high seas’ for purposes of the Felonies Clause.” Dominguez’s as-applied challenge was therefore treated as already decided.
  • United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025)
    Used to reinforce that EEZ arguments (and any “nexus” due-process argument) are foreclosed. The court quoted Canario-Vilomar on the EEZ’s “modern vintage” and on the circuit’s rejection of a nexus requirement under the MDLEA (supported by “universal and protective principles”).
  • United States v. Hurtado, 89 F.4th 881 (11th Cir. 2023)
    The central comparator for the Rule 5 delay. Hurtado held a 48-day presentment delay in an MDLEA case was not unnecessarily long (or, in any event, did not warrant dismissal), emphasizing humane treatment, short time from port to presentment, and lack of tactical advantage. Dominguez’s 24-day delay—half as long—was treated as even less compelling.
  • United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020)
    Provided (i) the multi-factor framework for evaluating whether delay is “unnecessary” under Rule 5(a); (ii) the statement of Rule 5(a)’s purpose (preventing coercive “third-degree” tactics before judicial presentment), and corresponding remedy (exclusion/suppression of evidence obtained during such delay); and (iii) the critical holding that “the Fourth Amendment does not apply” to arrests of non-citizen/non-resident aliens in international waters, making Rule 5(a) the proper lens rather than a constitutional probable-cause-timing claim.
  • United States v. Purvis, 768 F.2d 1237 (11th Cir. 1985)
    Cited alongside Cabezas-Montano for factors relevant to evaluating presentment delay.
  • United States v. Mendoza, 473 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1973) and Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc)
    Mendoza was cited for the proposition that Rule 5 violations lead to inadmissibility of evidence (a suppression remedy). Bonner explains why a Fifth Circuit case pre-1981 is binding in the Eleventh Circuit.
  • United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2007) and United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2011)
    These cases framed the “outrageous government conduct” doctrine: it targets “fundamentally unfair” conduct, but—per Jayyousi—must relate to the defendant’s “underlying or charged criminal acts,” not post-offense detention conditions. That limitation was dispositive here.
  • United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1995)
    Dominguez invoked this out-of-circuit authority to argue courts can dismiss indictments via “supervisory powers.” The panel found it unhelpful because even Matta-Ballesteros ties dismissal (absent a statutory/constitutional violation) to “the most shocking and outrageous” misconduct—an extreme standard not met here.
  • United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc)
    Used for the abandonment/forfeiture rule: issues not raised in the initial appellate brief are deemed abandoned. The panel applied this to Dominguez’s Speedy Trial Act references.
  • United States v. Nunez, 1 F.4th 976 (11th Cir. 2021)
    Reinforced the MDLEA’s elements and jurisdictional structure and supported the conclusion that the statutory jurisdictional showing was satisfied.
  • United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024) (also on review standards)
    The panel also cited Alfonso for the abuse-of-discretion review applicable to non-jurisdictional dismissal rulings.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Rule 5(a) delay: even “unnecessary” does not equal “dismissal”

The court treated Rule 5(a) as primarily an evidentiary-prophylactic rule: its purpose is to deter coercive interrogation and “third-degree” tactics before a defendant sees a judicial officer. Relying on United States v. Cabezas-Montano and United States v. Hurtado, the panel emphasized that the traditional remedy for a Rule 5 violation is suppression of evidence obtained during an improper delay—not dismissal of the indictment.

On the facts, the court compared the 24-day delay to the 48-day delay in United States v. Hurtado. The court stressed: (i) the long distance to Miami (about 1,000 nautical miles), (ii) the short time between arrival and presentment (next day), (iii) the absence of mistreatment or interrogation, and (iv) the absence of any suggestion that the delay was used to gain a tactical advantage. Those considerations made dismissal particularly mismatched to Rule 5’s policy goals.

2. Rule 5(b) and the Fourth Amendment: no constitutional backstop for nonresident aliens seized abroad

Dominguez attempted to reframe the claim via Rule 5(b) and the general constitutional principle requiring a prompt probable-cause determination (often discussed as a “48-hour” concept in domestic arrests). The court responded that, under United States v. Cabezas-Montano, “the Fourth Amendment does not apply” to arrests by the United States of a non-citizen/non-resident alien in international waters. As a result, the “correct analytical framework” remained Rule 5(a), and (again) dismissal was not the proper remedy on this record.

3. Outrageous government conduct: must connect to the charged criminal acts

The panel applied United States v. Ciszkowski and, more decisively, United States v. Jayyousi to reject the “outrageous conduct” theory. The alleged misconduct—detention and delayed presentment—occurred after the drug smuggling conduct was complete. Under Jayyousi, such post-offense detention conduct does not qualify because it is not “government intrusion into [the] underlying criminal conduct.” The court also cited United States v. Hurtado to underscore that even materially longer delays in comparable MDLEA contexts had been held “far from outrageous” when defendants were treated humanely and no confession-extraction motive existed.

4. EEZ and the Felonies Clause: foreclosed by binding circuit law

The constitutional claim was framed as: conduct in another nation’s EEZ is not on the “high Seas,” so Congress cannot reach it via the Felonies Clause. The panel held that argument is foreclosed by United States v. Alfonso and United States v. Canario-Vilomar, which treat the “high seas” (for Article I purposes) as beginning where territorial waters end, with no carveout for EEZs. The court also reiterated that customary international law does not limit Congress’s Felonies Clause power in the manner Dominguez proposed (as Alfonso had already explained).

Dominguez’s due process “nexus” argument also failed because circuit precedent holds the MDLEA does not require a nexus between the prohibited conduct and the United States.

5. Statutory jurisdiction: “vessel without nationality” established by failure to claim

Under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(1)(A) and § 70502(d)(1)(B), a vessel may be treated as “without nationality” when the “master or individual in charge” fails to make a claim of nationality or registry. The panel held the government met this burden because Dominguez and his codefendant stipulated the vessel had no indicia of nationality and neither identified a master or claimed nationality when questioned. The court cited United States v. Cabezas-Montano (two opportunities to identify the master/claim nationality sufficed) and United States v. Nunez to confirm this is enough for MDLEA jurisdiction—especially given Dominguez’s express stipulation that the facts satisfied § 70502(c).

C. Impact

Although unpublished, the decision is a clear signal of how the Eleventh Circuit will continue to handle three recurring MDLEA litigation fronts:

  • Presentment-delay challenges: Even when a delay appears operationally driven rather than exigency-driven, the court will focus on Rule 5’s purpose and will treat suppression—not dismissal—as the relevant remedy absent coercion, interrogation, or tactical advantage.
  • EEZ-based constitutional challenges: The opinion confirms that United States v. Alfonso and United States v. Canario-Vilomar effectively close the door on arguing that EEZ waters are outside the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes in this circuit.
  • Stateless-vessel jurisdiction: The decision reinforces that jurisdiction can be established (and practically insulated) through stipulations and through the simple, repeated failure to identify a master or make a nationality claim when prompted.

Operationally, the case may also reduce incentives for defendants to seek the extraordinary sanction of dismissal for maritime detention delays and may refocus litigation (where available) toward concrete suppression arguments tied to evidence obtained during a delay.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • MDLEA (Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act): A federal statute criminalizing certain drug trafficking on the water, including on “vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” even far from U.S. shores.
  • Felonies Clause (“high Seas” power): The Constitution authorizes Congress “to define and punish” felonies “on the high Seas.” In this circuit (per Alfonso), “high seas” begins where another nation’s territorial waters end, including within the EEZ.
  • Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): A zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal baseline where a coastal state has certain resource-related rights. It is not the same as “territorial waters.” The Eleventh Circuit treats EEZ waters as “high seas” for Felonies Clause analysis.
  • Rule 5(a) “presentment”: The requirement to bring an arrested person before a magistrate judge “without unnecessary delay.” The traditional consequence of a violation is suppression of evidence obtained during an improper delay—not automatic dismissal of charges.
  • “Outrageous government conduct” doctrine: A rarely successful due process theory requiring fundamentally unfair conduct tied to obtaining the conviction and (in the Eleventh Circuit) related to the charged criminal conduct itself, not merely post-offense detention issues.
  • “Vessel without nationality” (stateless vessel): If no one in charge claims a nationality/registry when asked—and the vessel shows no indicia—U.S. law treats it as stateless, bringing it within MDLEA jurisdiction.
  • “Nexus” requirement: Some extraterritorial criminal statutes require a connection to the United States. The Eleventh Circuit’s MDLEA precedent generally does not.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Franklin Dominguez consolidates the Eleventh Circuit’s MDLEA trajectory on three points: (1) presentment delays at sea—absent coercion, interrogation, mistreatment, or tactical advantage—do not support the extraordinary remedy of dismissing an indictment; (2) EEZ waters are treated as part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes, foreclosing common constitutional challenges; and (3) MDLEA statutory jurisdiction is readily satisfied when a vessel bears no indicia of nationality and no master or nationality claim is provided when questioned—especially where the defendant stipulates to those facts.