MDLEA Jurisdiction Reaffirmed: Foreign EEZ Treated as “High Seas,” Silence on Nationality Creates Statelessness, and Allied Interdiction Does Not Defeat U.S. Prosecution

Precedents Cited

1) United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024)

Alfonso controlled the central constitutional argument. The defendants contended that Colombia’s EEZ is not the “high seas,” and therefore the MDLEA—as an exercise of the Felonies Clause power—could not be applied. The panel treated Alfonso as dispositive, quoting its holding that the term “high seas” includes EEZs and that MDLEA enforcement in EEZs is proper. Thus, the court resolved the Felonies Clause challenge through direct application of binding circuit authority rather than a fresh analysis of international-law categories.

2) United States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2023)

Gruezo served two functions:

• Statutory jurisdiction: It provided the framework for determining when a vessel is “without nationality” and thus subject to U.S. jurisdiction under the MDLEA. The panel relied on Gruezo to confirm that a master’s failure to make a nationality claim upon request renders the vessel stateless for MDLEA purposes.
• Vagueness: It foreclosed the argument that the MDLEA fails to give fair notice about the consequences of not claiming nationality. The panel quoted Gruezo for the proposition that the statute is “sufficiently clear” that, without a claim upon request, the vessel is considered stateless.

3) United States v. Hurtado, 89 F.4th 881 (11th Cir. 2023)

The court cited Hurtado as an example of the routine nature of international cooperation in MDLEA interdictions. The citation supported the court’s practical point: joint operations with foreign allies are “commonplace,” undermining the notion that Dutch involvement is jurisdictionally disqualifying.

4) United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025)

Canario-Vilomar was used in two ways:

• Operational cooperation: Like Hurtado, it reinforced that allied participation is normal in maritime narcotics interdictions.
• No nexus required: It supplied the controlling statement that MDLEA offenses need not have a nexus to the United States because the statute’s extraterritorial reach is supported by universal and protective principles.

5) United States v. Iguaran, 821 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2016)

Henriquez and Acosta-Pinedo invoked Iguaran to argue that the Eleventh Circuit should not have ordered a limited remand. The panel declined to revisit that procedural decision, noting that a prior remand order had already resolved the point, effectively treating it as settled for purposes of the appeal.

6) United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997)

Noriega controlled the “reverse Miranda” theory. The panel applied it in two steps:

• To the extent defendants asserted a facial due-process attack on the MDLEA, circuit precedent foreclosed it.
• To the extent they asserted an as-applied challenge, the court held the claim was waived by guilty pleas.

7) Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174 (2018)

The panel cited Class to clarify that a guilty plea does not bar a defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction. This allowed the court to reach (and reject) the Felonies Clause and other constitutional arguments that were not waived by the pleas, while still finding certain as-applied due-process arguments waived.

Legal Reasoning

1) Constitutional authority under the Felonies Clause (EEZ treated as “high seas”)

The court framed Congress’s Article I, § 8, cl. 10 powers as three “distinct grants”—Piracies, Felonies (on the high seas), and Offences against the law of nations—citing United States v. Alfonso. It then characterized the MDLEA as an exercise of the Felonies Clause power and, following Alfonso, held that the relevant waters (a foreign EEZ) still qualify as “high seas” for that purpose. The key move is categorical: once EEZs are included within “high seas,” the constitutional objection fails without needing to show any territorial link to the United States.

2) Statutory jurisdiction via “vessel without nationality” (silence equals failure to claim)

The MDLEA applies only if the vessel is “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” One route is statelessness, including where “the master or individual in charge fails, on request of an officer of the United States … to make a claim of nationality or registry.” The district court found—based on officer testimony and Coast Guard documentation—that Liriano-Mercado identified himself as master, was asked whether he wished to make a nationality claim, and remained silent, even after repeated requests.

Applying clear-error review to that factual finding, the panel held it was adequately supported, and then—under Gruezo—treated that silence as satisfying § 70502(d)(1)(B). The doctrinal consequence is strong: when properly requested, non-response can be enough to establish statelessness and therefore MDLEA jurisdiction.

3) Jurisdiction unaffected by Dutch participation in the interdiction

The defendants argued jurisdiction failed because the Netherlands “conducted” the enforcement action. The panel rejected this primarily on the facts: the defendants’ own proffers acknowledged that the U.S. Coast Guard assumed tactical control of the Dutch patrol boat and carried out the boarding. Legally, the court emphasized the absence of any authority prohibiting allied cooperation and noted that such cooperation appears routinely in MDLEA cases (citing United States v. Hurtado and United States v. Canario-Vilomar). The holding effectively treats allied involvement as jurisdictionally “unremarkable” so long as the statutory predicates for MDLEA jurisdiction are met.

4) Due process: vagueness, “reverse Miranda,” and nexus

• Vagueness: The court applied Gruezo to reject three asserted ambiguities (what counts as a claim, timing for foreign confirmation, and translation/document demands). The panel’s bottom line was that the statute provides adequate notice that failure to claim nationality upon request triggers statelessness for jurisdictional purposes.
• “Reverse Miranda”: The panel treated the request-for-nationality context as not constitutionally requiring a warning that silence could facilitate later prosecution. The facial attack was foreclosed by Noriega; the as-applied attack was deemed waived by the guilty pleas (also under Noriega).
• No nexus requirement: Relying on Canario-Vilomar, the court reiterated that MDLEA prosecutions do not require proof of a U.S. nexus because universal and protective principles support extraterritorial application.

Impact

Although designated “Not for Publication,” the opinion is significant as a consolidation-style application of multiple strands of Eleventh Circuit MDLEA doctrine in one place, reinforcing several practical propositions likely to shape charging decisions and litigation strategy in the circuit:

• EEZ prosecutions are constitutionally stable in the Eleventh Circuit: Defendants interdicted in a foreign EEZ face an uphill battle on Felonies Clause grounds after Alfonso and its application here.
• Silence can be jurisdictionally dispositive: The opinion underscores that, once a qualifying officer makes the request, the master’s failure to respond can establish statelessness—making evidentiary disputes about the boarding dialogue and documentation central in contested cases.
• Joint interdictions are insulated: The court’s treatment of Dutch participation signals that defendants cannot defeat U.S. jurisdiction merely by highlighting multinational operations, a common feature of maritime interdictions.
• Due-process defenses continue to narrow: With vagueness and nexus arguments repeatedly foreclosed, and “reverse Miranda” arguments blocked (or waived after pleas), MDLEA defense litigation in this circuit will likely focus on (i) the factual record of the nationality inquiry, and (ii) preservation issues before entering guilty pleas.