MDLEA Jurisdiction Reaffirmed: EEZ Treated as “High Seas,” and No-Master Crews Need Not Be Asked to Claim Nationality

1. Introduction

This consolidated appeal arises from Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”) prosecutions of Jesus Alberto Hernandez Osorio, Oscar Carreno Fernandez, and Luis Jose Alfonzo Rodriguez, who pled guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine aboard a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction, in violation of 46 U.S.C §§ 70503(a)(1), 70506(a) & (b) and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B).

The factual proffers established that the defendants were found off the coast of Venezuela on a go-fast vessel transporting 955 kilograms of cocaine (over a ton) destined for the United States. On appeal, they attacked (i) the validity of the indictment and MDLEA jurisdiction on multiple constitutional and statutory grounds, and (ii) their below-guidelines 75-month sentences, arguing they were entitled to minor-role reductions.

The panel’s opinion is primarily a precedent-application decision: it consolidates and applies several recent Eleventh Circuit holdings on MDLEA due process challenges, EEZ geography, stateless vessels, foreign cooperation in interdictions, and minor-role sentencing analysis.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board. It held that most jurisdictional and due process arguments were foreclosed by binding precedent—rejecting vagueness, nexus, Miranda, and EEZ/high-seas challenges. It further concluded that the government sufficiently established statutory jurisdiction because the defendants refused to identify any master/captain, and the circumstances indicated they operated as equals; under controlling law, Coast Guard officers were not required to proceed to ask for a claim of nationality where no master or individual in charge exists. The court also rejected the contention that the Netherlands’ involvement in interdiction undermined U.S. jurisdiction, noting routine and treaty-based international cooperation.

Finally, the court held that the district court did not clearly err in denying minor-role reductions, given the defendants’ integral participation in jointly navigating a vessel carrying 955 kilograms of cocaine and being held accountable only for that conduct—particularly in light of the substantial downward variance already imposed (75 months versus a 108–135 month advisory range).

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Result)

1) Binding precedent and standard-of-review framework

• United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024): supplied both the standard of review for jurisdictional dismissals and (critically) the holding that a nation’s EEZ is part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes—foreclosing the defendants’ Venezuela-EEZ argument.
• United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008): reinforced the prior-panel-precedent rule; the panel relied on Archer to explain why it could not revisit foreclosed MDLEA arguments absent Supreme Court or en banc intervention.
• United States v. Morris, 131 F.4th 1288 (11th Cir. 2025): reminded that unpublished decisions are not binding, used to discount reliance on an unpublished case.
• United States v. Grimon, 923 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2019) and Fed. R. App. P. 28(j): used to frame abandonment/waiver principles and the mechanism to alert the court to new authorities.

2) MDLEA due process and constitutional challenges

• United States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 178 (2023): directly foreclosed (i) the MDLEA void-for-vagueness theory premised on the meaning of “make a claim of nationality or registry,” and (ii) the Miranda-based argument that Coast Guard officers must advise the master about consequences of failing to claim nationality.
• Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and United States v. Rioseco, 845 F.2d 299 (11th Cir. 1988): Rioseco (cited via Gruezo) provided the doctrinal premise that routine stop/boarding/inspection on the high seas is not a custodial interrogation triggering Miranda—supporting rejection of the defendants’ warnings claim.
• United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020): supplied the already-settled proposition that MDLEA prosecutions do not require a U.S. nexus for due process, and it also served as a comparator case on how Coast Guard questioning can establish statelessness.
• United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-5506 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2025): reaffirmed Alfonso and the no-nexus rule, strengthening the panel’s “foreclosed” conclusion.

3) EEZ as “high seas” under the Felonies Clause

• United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024): the centerpiece authority. The panel treated Alfonso as dispositive on the argument that conduct in Venezuela’s EEZ fell outside the “high seas” requirement, reiterating Alfonso’s rule that the EEZ is part of the “high seas” for Article I, § 8, cl. 10 Felonies Clause purposes and that “international law does not limit the Felonies Clause.”

4) Statelessness and Coast Guard questioning

• United States v. Nunez, 1 F.4th 976 (11th Cir. 2021): the controlling authority for the panel’s key statutory-jurisdiction holding. Nunez recognized that vessels may have no master/individual in charge, and in that scenario § 70502(d)(1)(B)’s request/response mechanism does not apply; officers are not required to ask the crew to make a claim of nationality where no master exists. The panel applied Nunez to the defendants’ refusal to identify any captain and the “equals” circumstance.
• United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020): used to distinguish a different scenario—where individuals pointed at each other as master—prompting officers to ask if anyone wished to make a claim of nationality. The panel emphasized that Nunez governs where no one identifies a master and the crew appears equal.
• United States v. Guerro, 789 F. App'x 742 (11th Cir. 2019): discounted as unpublished and therefore non-binding (per Morris), in favor of Nunez as binding precedent.
• United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024): cited for the proposition that the government bears the burden of establishing statutory MDLEA subject-matter jurisdiction requirements.

5) Foreign participation in interdictions

• United States v. Hurtado, 89 F.4th 881 (11th Cir. 2023): supported the proposition that right-of-approach questioning to ascertain nationality in international waters may be conducted “as a matter of course,” including in operations involving foreign vessels and U.S. law enforcement detachments.
• United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025): provided an additional example of foreign assets (Dutch) in MDLEA interdiction workflows.

6) Minor-role sentencing doctrine

• United States v. De Varon, 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc): supplied the two-principle framework (relevant conduct; comparison to other participants in that relevant conduct), and the rule that drug quantity can be “material” and potentially “dispositive” in extreme cases.
• United States v. Valois, 915 F.3d 717 (11th Cir. 2019) and United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2016): emphasized totality-of-circumstances analysis; prohibited a one-factor-only approach; and validated denial of minor-role reductions in MDLEA cases involving large quantities where defendants were integral to transport.
• United States v. Martin, 803 F.3d 581 (11th Cir. 2015) and United States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2023): foreclosed comparing the defendant to broader, uncharged conspirators; comparison is limited to participants in the relevant conduct attributed at sentencing.
• United States v. Boyd, 291 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2002) and United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2016): reinforced deference to district courts on this fact-intensive determination under clear-error review.
• United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc) and United States v. Jews, 74 F.4th 325 (11th Cir. 2023): framed when guideline commentary can be relied upon; here, commentary was used because neither party contested its validity.
• United States v. Jerchower, 631 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2011): provided the doctrine for applying guideline amendments on appeal (clarifying vs. substantive).

B. Legal Reasoning

1) “Foreclosed” MDLEA constitutional/due process attacks

The opinion’s first move is methodological: it identifies which arguments are already decided by the Eleventh Circuit and therefore cannot be relitigated by a later panel. Applying United States v. Archer, the court treats the following as categorically foreclosed:

• Void for vagueness (rejected in United States v. Gruezo);
• No nexus to the United States (rejected in United States v. Cabezas-Montano and reaffirmed in United States v. Alfonso and United States v. Canario-Vilomar);
• EEZ is not “high seas” (rejected as a matter of first impression in United States v. Alfonso, then reaffirmed);
• Miranda warnings required at boarding (addressed through United States v. Gruezo and the underlying maritime stop doctrine of United States v. Rioseco).

Notably, the panel does not re-derive the constitutional theory; it applies vertical and intra-circuit stare decisis to treat these issues as settled.

2) Statelessness: refusing to identify a master can end the inquiry

The defendants’ most fact-dependent argument was that the government failed to establish statutory jurisdiction by proving the vessel was “without nationality.” The MDLEA’s text matters here:

A “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” includes “a vessel without nationality,” including where the master or individual in charge fails, upon request, to make a claim of nationality or registry. 46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(1)(A), (d)(1)(B).

The panel applies United States v. Nunez to conclude that § 70502(d)(1)(B)’s “request of the master” mechanism presupposes there is a master or individual in charge aboard the vessel. Where (i) Coast Guard officers ask each person who is the master/captain and (ii) each refuses to answer, and the circumstances indicate equality/no hierarchy, Nunez treats the vessel as having “no master or individual in charge who could make a verbal claim of registry,” relieving officers of any further obligation to ask the crew to make a nationality claim.

The court also rejects the attempt to leverage United States v. Cabezas-Montano for a stricter questioning requirement. Cabezas-Montano involved equivocal behavior (pointing at each other), prompting additional nationality-claim questions; the panel reads Nunez as clarifying that in the “no master/equal crew” setting, the additional question is not required.

3) EEZ geography: jurisdiction survives even if interdicted in Venezuela’s EEZ

The defendants argued the MDLEA required “high seas” conduct and that an EEZ is not the high seas. The panel treats this as directly answered by United States v. Alfonso: for Felonies Clause purposes, the EEZ remains part of the “high seas,” and international law does not constrict the Clause. The court therefore holds MDLEA enforcement in EEZs is constitutionally proper and the indictment need not be dismissed on that ground.

4) Foreign involvement: assistance does not defeat U.S. prosecution

The panel treats foreign participation—here, alleged Netherlands involvement—as a practical reality of maritime drug interdiction and a legally permissible mode of operation. Citing United States v. Hurtado and United States v. Canario-Vilomar, it underscores that right-of-approach questioning and interdiction coordination can involve foreign vessels/assets without negating U.S. jurisdiction.

The court also situates this in treaty practice, referencing the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and the Caribbean regional cooperation agreement as context supporting cooperative enforcement.

5) Sentencing: minor-role reductions denied under De Varon’s constrained comparator set

The sentencing analysis hews closely to United States v. De Varon:

• Relevant conduct focus: the defendants were held responsible for transporting 955 kilograms on the vessel they manned—not for the broader trafficking organization. That focus makes their role “integral” to the charged conduct.
• Comparator limitation: under United States v. Martin and United States v. Gruezo, the court rejects comparisons to unknown upstream manufacturers/owners/masterminds and downstream U.S. recipients who were not charged in the case and not part of the relevant-conduct set.
• Totality of circumstances: the panel highlights that the district court did not rely solely on drug quantity (avoiding the error identified in United States v. Cruickshank), but considered the defendants’ shared navigation responsibilities and execution of the transport plan.

The panel also notes the district court’s significant downward variance (75 months) as reinforcing the reasonableness of the sentencing outcome even while denying the role reduction.

C. Impact

• Statelessness determinations become more durable in “no captain” scenarios: The opinion reinforces that refusal to identify a master—combined with evidence of equality among crew—fits squarely within United States v. Nunez, minimizing opportunities to force additional nationality-claim questioning or evidentiary hearings absent a concrete factual dispute.
• EEZ challenges are increasingly non-starters: By treating United States v. Alfonso and United States v. Canario-Vilomar as dispositive, the court signals continued resistance to constitutional line-drawing that would exclude EEZ interdictions from the Felonies Clause/MDLEA.
• International cooperation is affirmed as legally routine: The rejection of the “Netherlands involvement” argument, anchored in United States v. Hurtado, supports operational reliance on multinational assets and layered command-and-control structures.
• Minor-role reductions remain difficult for large-load maritime couriers: The opinion continues the trend (e.g., United States v. Valois) that where defendants jointly operate a drug-laden vessel and are sentenced on that limited conduct, minor-role relief is hard to obtain.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• MDLEA “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States”: A statutory gateway. If the vessel qualifies (including by being “without nationality”), U.S. courts can hear the case even when the interdiction happens far from U.S. territory.
• “Vessel without nationality” (stateless vessel): In MDLEA practice, this can be established when no valid claim of nationality/registry exists. Under United States v. Nunez, if there is no master/individual in charge aboard, Coast Guard officers need not ask the rest of the crew to make a claim.
• Right-of-approach questioning: Routine questions at sea to determine a vessel’s nationality and authority to board; treated as permissible “as a matter of course” in international waters (see United States v. Hurtado).
• Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): A maritime zone beyond the territorial sea where a coastal state has certain resource rights. Under United States v. Alfonso, the EEZ is still treated as part of the “high seas” for Congress’s Felonies Clause power in this context.
• Felonies Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10): Grants Congress authority to define and punish felonies committed on the high seas—used as a constitutional foundation for the MDLEA.
• Minor-role reduction (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2): A sentencing decrease for defendants substantially less culpable than the average participant in the relevant conduct. Under United States v. De Varon, the comparison is mainly to the conduct and participants actually attributed to the defendant at sentencing, not a broader unseen conspiracy.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision affirms MDLEA convictions and sentences for three defendants apprehended on a go-fast vessel carrying 955 kilograms of cocaine, rejecting a wide array of dismissal theories and upholding denial of minor-role reductions. The opinion’s significance lies less in novel doctrine than in its consolidated reaffirmation of controlling rules:

• MDLEA enforcement in a foreign nation’s EEZ remains constitutionally valid under United States v. Alfonso.
• Due process attacks based on vagueness, lack of nexus, and Miranda are foreclosed by United States v. Gruezo, United States v. Cabezas-Montano, and their progeny.
• When no one identifies a master and the crew appears equal, officers need not solicit a nationality claim; statutory jurisdiction is satisfied under United States v. Nunez.
• Foreign assistance in interdictions does not vitiate U.S. jurisdiction, consistent with United States v. Hurtado.
• For large-load maritime couriers held accountable only for their transport conduct, minor-role reductions remain difficult under United States v. De Varon and United States v. Valois.

In the broader legal landscape, the decision reflects the Eleventh Circuit’s steady consolidation of MDLEA doctrine: expansive constitutional reach in maritime zones, operational flexibility through multinational cooperation, and a sentencing approach that treats large-quantity transport crews as integral participants in the relevant conduct.