MDLEA Jurisdiction Preserved When No Master Is Identified and Foreign Partners Assist Interdiction

I. Introduction

United States v. Oscar Jose Carreno Fernandez (consolidated with appeals by Jesus Alberto Hernandez Osorio and Luis Jose Alfonzo Rodriguez) is an Eleventh Circuit decision affirming MDLEA convictions and below-guidelines sentences arising from the interdiction of a go-fast vessel off the coast of Venezuela carrying 955 kilograms of cocaine. All three defendants pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine on a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction, in violation of 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), 70506(a) & (b) and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B).

The appeal raised two clusters of issues:

  • Indictment/jurisdiction challenges: alleged due process defects (void-for-vagueness, no U.S. nexus, Miranda), whether an EEZ is “high seas,” whether Dutch/Netherlands participation undermined jurisdiction, and whether the vessel was sufficiently proven “without nationality.”
  • Sentencing: whether each defendant deserved a minor role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board. It held that most constitutional and statutory attacks were foreclosed by binding circuit precedent, reaffirmed that MDLEA enforcement extends to a foreign nation’s EEZ, rejected the contention that foreign (Netherlands) assistance strips U.S. jurisdiction, and concluded that the vessel was properly treated as without nationality where the Coast Guard asked who was master/captain and each defendant refused to answer. On sentencing, the court held the district judge did not clearly err in denying minor-role reductions given the defendants’ equal participation in jointly navigating a vessel transporting over a ton of cocaine, while also noting the court’s substantial downward variance to 75 months.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standard of review, binding precedent, and issue preservation

  • United States v. Alfonso (subject-matter jurisdiction components of a motion to dismiss reviewed de novo).
  • United States v. De Varon, United States v. Boyd, and United States v. Cruickshank (clear-error framework and district court discretion for minor-role determinations; reversal only with a “definite and firm conviction” of mistake).
  • United States v. Archer (prior-panel-precedent rule; later panels are bound absent Supreme Court or en banc abrogation).
  • United States v. Morris (unpublished decisions are not binding).
  • United States v. Grimon and Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) (abandonment and post-briefing authority notice practice).

2. MDLEA jurisdiction and “vessel without nationality”

  • United States v. Cabezas-Montano: upheld statelessness jurisdiction where the boarding team asked if anyone wished to make a claim of nationality and no one responded, and the defendants gave nonresponsive conduct about who was master. The court in the present case distinguished it as a scenario where the Coast Guard did ask about master/captain but received no answers, placing the analysis under the later rule of United States v. Nunez.
  • United States v. Nunez: the pivotal authority here. It recognized that some vessels have no master or individual in charge; where no one claims to be master/in charge and facts show the crew are “equals,” § 70502(d)(1)(B)’s “fails to make a claim” pathway does not require officers to ask the crew to make a nationality/registry claim. Nunez also held an evidentiary hearing is not required absent disputed jurisdictional facts or a proffer of contrary evidence.
  • United States v. Guerro: treated as noncontrolling because it is unpublished, reinforcing the panel’s reliance on Nunez as binding authority.

3. EEZ/high seas, nexus, vagueness, and Miranda

  • United States v. Alfonso: held, as a matter of first impression, that a nation’s EEZ is part of the “high seas” for Article I Felonies Clause purposes, and that international law does not limit the Felonies Clause in this context. This decision is used to reject the defendants’ “Venezuela EEZ is not high seas” argument.
  • United States v. Canario-Vilomar: reaffirmed Alfonso (including the EEZ/high seas holding) and prior precedent that due process does not require a U.S. nexus for MDLEA prosecutions.
  • United States v. Gruezo: rejected a void-for-vagueness challenge to MDLEA procedures on nationality claims, and rejected Miranda-based arguments that would impose advisal duties about the consequences of failing to make nationality claims.
  • Miranda v. Arizona and United States v. Rioseco: Rioseco is invoked (via Gruezo) for the proposition that routine Coast Guard boarding/inspection on the high seas is not custodial in the way that triggers Miranda requirements.

4. Foreign assistance and cooperative maritime enforcement

  • United States v. Hurtado: recognized that right-of-approach questioning in international waters is permissible and may occur in cooperative settings (e.g., a British vessel with U.S. law enforcement detachment), consistent with treaties, MDLEA, and international law.
  • United States v. Canario-Vilomar: provided an additional example involving a Dutch maritime aircraft and coordinated interdiction, used here to normalize Netherlands involvement.

5. Minor-role doctrine and guideline interpretation

  • United States v. Valois: reaffirmed that defendants bear the burden and that large-quantity maritime transport can support denial of minor-role reductions even if not categorically disqualifying.
  • United States v. Martin and United States v. Gruezo: limited the comparison group for minor-role analysis to participants involved in the defendant’s relevant conduct; defendants cannot claim minor role by pointing to an uncharged “broader scheme.”
  • United States v. Dupree and United States v. Jews: addressed when courts may rely on guideline commentary; the panel notes both parties relied on commentary and did not contest its validity.
  • United States v. Jerchower: applied for the rule that the guidelines in effect at sentencing generally govern, and only “clarifying” amendments may apply on appeal. The court also emphasized abandonment of any retroactivity argument regarding the 2025 amendment.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Foreclosure by binding precedent

The court’s first move was methodological: because of United States v. Archer, the panel treated several defenses as unavailable absent en banc or Supreme Court change. Thus, the panel rejected:

  • void-for-vagueness (foreclosed by United States v. Gruezo);
  • no-nexus due process argument (foreclosed by United States v. Alfonso, United States v. Cabezas-Montano, and United States v. Canario-Vilomar);
  • EEZ is not “high seas” (foreclosed by United States v. Alfonso, reaffirmed by United States v. Canario-Vilomar);
  • Miranda warnings required during boarding (foreclosed by United States v. Gruezo, relying on United States v. Rioseco).

2. Statelessness finding without a follow-up “claim nationality” question

The core jurisdictional holding operationalizes United States v. Nunez: because the Coast Guard asked each defendant whether he was the master/captain and each refused to answer, and record facts supported that the crew were “equals” (no hierarchy), the officers were not required to proceed to a separate request that someone make a claim of nationality. On this view, the statutory “request-and-failure” mechanism in 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B) is triggered only when there is a master/individual in charge aboard who can respond in that capacity.

The panel also relied on Nunez to reject the demand for an evidentiary hearing: absent identified disputed facts or a proffer of contrary evidence, the district court acted within its discretion in declining to conduct one.

3. Foreign partner involvement does not negate U.S. jurisdiction

The court treated Netherlands involvement as legally unremarkable. Drawing on United States v. Hurtado and United States v. Canario-Vilomar, the panel emphasized that cooperative interdictions and right-of-approach questioning in international waters are consistent with treaties and accepted practice. The opinion further anchored this conclusion in the cited multinational agreements, including the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and the Agreement Concerning Co-Operation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime and Air Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in the Caribbean Area.

4. Minor-role reductions: “integral” participation in a large maritime transport

Applying United States v. De Varon and its two guiding principles, the panel upheld denial of minor-role reductions because:

  • The defendants’ relevant conduct was the transportation/possession-with-intent scheme aboard the vessel itself, not the larger uncharged trafficking enterprise (reinforced by United States v. Martin and United States v. Gruezo).
  • The district court found each defendant’s conduct to be “same/equal,” with no evidence of a captain or hierarchy, consistent with the proffers and PSIs.
  • The court considered multiple factors (not just drug quantity), but the extraordinary amount of cocaine (955 kg) powerfully supported the conclusion that each crewmember’s role was essential to the venture (consistent with De Varon and United States v. Valois).

The panel also noted that, although the Sentencing Commission amended the guidelines in 2025 (including U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(e)(2) (2025)), defendants did not argue retroactivity and thus abandoned the issue (citing United States v. Grimon and referencing Fed. R. App. P. 28(j)).

C. Impact

  • Operational clarity for MDLEA boardings: The decision reinforces a practical jurisdictional rule (from United States v. Nunez)—when no one will identify a master/captain and facts show an egalitarian crew structure, officers need not ask the crew to make a nationality claim before treating the vessel as stateless.
  • Stability of EEZ-based MDLEA prosecutions: By applying United States v. Alfonso and United States v. Canario-Vilomar, the court strengthens the predictability that EEZ interdictions remain within the constitutional “high seas” conception for MDLEA enforcement in the Eleventh Circuit.
  • Validation of multinational interdiction architecture: The panel’s treatment of Netherlands involvement, coupled with its treaty discussion and reliance on United States v. Hurtado, supports continued use of partner-state assets without jeopardizing U.S. prosecutions.
  • Sentencing signal in large-quantity maritime cases: The opinion fits within a pattern (e.g., United States v. Valois) that large-quantity maritime transport commonly defeats minor-role claims, especially where the crew members are equally involved and held accountable only for the load they transported.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • MDLEA “statutory jurisdiction”: Not “jurisdiction” in the personal-jurisdiction sense, but a statutory prerequisite—whether the vessel fits categories such as “vessel without nationality” under 46 U.S.C. § 70502.
  • “Vessel without nationality”: A vessel can be treated as stateless if it lacks recognized nationality indicators (flag/documents/registration) and, in certain scenarios, if a master/in-charge fails to make a nationality claim when requested. Under United States v. Nunez, if there is no master/in charge (crew are equals and nobody claims command), the Coast Guard is not required to solicit a nationality claim from the crew.
  • Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): A maritime zone beyond a nation’s territorial sea where the coastal state has certain resource rights. In this circuit, an EEZ is treated as part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause analysis in MDLEA cases (per United States v. Alfonso).
  • “Nexus” to the United States: Some crimes require a connection to the prosecuting state. The Eleventh Circuit’s MDLEA precedent holds due process does not require a U.S. nexus for the drug-trafficking conduct covered by the statute.
  • Minor-role reduction: A sentencing decrease for a defendant “substantially less culpable” than average participants. Under United States v. De Varon, the key comparison is to the defendant’s own relevant conduct and the identifiable participants in that conduct—not unseen organizers in the broader drug trade.

V. Conclusion

The decision consolidates and applies Eleventh Circuit MDLEA doctrine in a fact pattern common to maritime cocaine interdictions: a large load, a small crew, no identified captain, and international cooperation. Its principal significance is the reaffirmation that (1) EEZ interdictions remain prosecutable as “high seas” under circuit law; (2) due process defenses premised on vagueness, Miranda, or lack of U.S. nexus are foreclosed by precedent; (3) under United States v. Nunez, refusal to identify a master in an “equals” crew supports statelessness jurisdiction without a further nationality-claim request; and (4) minor-role reductions remain difficult to obtain for crew members jointly navigating ton-quantity shipments, even where the sentencing court varies downward.