MDLEA Jurisdiction: No “Magic Words” Needed for a Nationality Request; Use of a Foreign Vessel Does Not Defeat U.S. Jurisdiction

I. Introduction

This consolidated Eleventh Circuit decision concerns three codefendants—Manuel Melo, Yesid Degoberto Epieyu Epieyu, and Ivan Escobosa Diaz— who pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”), 46 U.S.C. §§ 70506(b), 70503(a)(1).

The interdiction occurred in waters north of Aruba on a known trafficking route. A Dutch naval vessel (the HNLMS HOLLAND) carried a U.S. Coast Guard law-enforcement team. After a chase involving jettisoning of bales and helicopter fire disabling the engines, U.S. Coast Guard officers boarded a “go-fast” vessel displaying no flag or markings. When questioned in Spanish as to the vessel’s nationality—“What is the nationality of your ship or vessel?”—the identified master did not claim nationality for the vessel (stating only that he was Colombian).

The defendants sought dismissal of the indictment on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds. The principal issues on appeal were: (1) whether the MDLEA is unconstitutional on multiple theories (vagueness, Miranda-based due process, EEZ/high seas limits, and nexus), and (2) whether the district court lacked MDLEA “jurisdiction” because the Coast Guard’s nationality question was allegedly inadequate and because the operation used a Dutch ship.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed both the convictions and the denial of the motions to dismiss. It held:

  • All constitutional challenges were foreclosed by binding circuit precedent, including United States v. Gruezo, United States v. Alfonso, and United States v. Campbell.
  • Statutory jurisdiction under the MDLEA was satisfied because the go-fast was a “vessel without nationality” under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B): asking the master “What is the nationality of your ship or vessel?” constituted a sufficient “request” for a claim of nationality or registry, and the master’s failure to make such a claim rendered the vessel stateless for MDLEA purposes.
  • The use of a Dutch vessel as a platform did not negate jurisdiction: the “request” was made by U.S. officers, the interdiction was operationally U.S.-led, and multilateral agreements supported the cooperative law-enforcement posture.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Prior-panel-precedent rule and constitutional foreclosure

The court’s threshold move was institutional: it invoked United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008), to apply the prior-panel-precedent rule. Under Archer, a later panel must follow earlier panel holdings unless overruled by the Supreme Court or by the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc. This effectively dictated the outcome of the defendants’ constitutional arguments, as the panel identified direct Eleventh Circuit authority rejecting each theory.

2. Vagueness challenge rejected under United States v. Gruezo

The defendants argued that the MDLEA is unconstitutionally vague because it does not require the Coast Guard to explain what it means to “make a claim of nationality or registry.” The court treated this as identical to the challenge rejected in United States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2023), which held § 70502(d)(1)(B) provides sufficient notice that failure to claim nationality upon request renders a vessel stateless. Gruezo also relied on earlier vagueness rejections in United States v. Mena, 863 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1989), and United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982), reinforcing that the MDLEA lineage has repeatedly survived vagueness attacks.

3. Miranda-based due process argument rejected under Gruezo, United States v. Rioseco, and United States v. Castillo

The panel again relied on United States v. Gruezo for the proposition that Miranda warnings are not required during routine high-seas interdictions because they generally do not amount to custodial interrogation for Miranda purposes. The opinion, tracking Gruezo, cited United States v. Rioseco, 845 F.2d 299 (11th Cir. 1988), which held that routine Coast Guard stops and inspections on the high seas normally do not trigger Miranda.

The panel also echoed Gruezo’s plea-waiver principle for case-specific misconduct claims, citing United States v. Castillo, 899 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2018): a valid guilty plea forecloses appeals based on pre-plea, case-related government conduct (as opposed to facial challenges to the statute of conviction).

4. EEZ/high seas argument rejected under United States v. Alfonso and United States v. Canario-Vilomar

The defendants contended that Congress’s Felonies Clause power (“Felonies committed on the high Seas”) does not reach conduct in another nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”). The panel relied on United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), which held that “the EEZ is part of the ‘high seas’ for purposes of the Felonies Clause in Article I of the Constitution,” and further that international law does not limit Congress’s Felonies Clause authority in the way defendants urged.

The panel also cited United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 269 (2025), as confirmation that Alfonso is being applied to reject similar arguments.

5. “Nexus to the United States” argument rejected under United States v. Campbell and related cases

The defendants asserted that due process and Article I require a nexus between their conduct and the United States. The panel treated this as squarely foreclosed by United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014), which held the MDLEA is a valid exercise of the Felonies Clause and does not violate due process even without a U.S. nexus, invoking universal/protective principles and the notice function of the statute as applied to stateless vessels.

The panel further cited United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020), and United States v. Canario-Vilomar as additional Eleventh Circuit reiterations that the nexus argument is foreclosed.

6. Jurisdictional framing under United States v. De La Garza and standards under United States v. Alfonso

For the statutory question, the court followed Eleventh Circuit doctrine treating the MDLEA’s “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” element as a congressionally imposed limit on subject-matter jurisdiction. It cited United States v. De La Garza, 516 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2008), analogizing the MDLEA jurisdictional provision to an amount-in-controversy requirement.

It also cited United States v. Alfonso for de novo review of MDLEA jurisdictional dismissals and constitutional challenges (with plain-error review for constitutional arguments raised for the first time on appeal).

7. Guilty plea and non-waivable jurisdiction references: Class v. United States and United States v. Cotton

The panel noted that the guilty pleas did not bar constitutional challenges to the statute of conviction or jurisdictional challenges. It cited Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174 (2018), for the principle that a guilty plea does not inherently waive a constitutional attack on the statute of conviction, and United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002), for the proposition (as characterized by the panel) that jurisdictional defects cannot be forfeited or waived.

8. Non-binding contrast: United States v. Guerro (unpublished)

On the key statutory point—whether the Coast Guard asked the “right” question—the defendants relied on United States v. Guerro, 789 F. App’x 742 (11th Cir. 2019) (non-published). The panel rejected reliance on Guerro as non-binding and, more importantly, distinguished it: Guerro involved a failure to make any request for nationality. Here, the Coast Guard did ask for the vessel’s nationality; thus, the statutory “request” requirement was met.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Constitutional issues resolved by precedent rather than fresh balancing

The opinion is structured to avoid re-litigating constitutional first principles. By design, the panel’s analysis is largely precedential: each constitutional claim is matched to a directly on-point Eleventh Circuit case. This is significant because the opinion portrays the MDLEA constitutional landscape in this circuit as settled across multiple doctrinal fronts: clarity/vagueness, Miranda custody, the geographic scope of the Felonies Clause (including EEZs), and due process/nexus.

2. The “request” requirement under § 70502(d)(1)(B) does not impose a script

The opinion’s most concrete doctrinal contribution is its textual reading of 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B). The defendants attempted to convert “on request” into a requirement that U.S. officers ask a particular formula (“Do you claim nationality for the vessel?”). The panel refused, emphasizing that the statute requires a “request” but “does not dictate what specific form that ‘request’ must take.”

On the facts, the question “What is the nationality of your ship or vessel?” was treated as a sufficient request for a claim of nationality. When the master did not claim nationality for the vessel, § 70502(d)(1)(B) was satisfied, rendering the craft a “vessel without nationality” and therefore a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”

3. Operational platform (Dutch ship) is irrelevant if the statutory actor is a U.S. officer

The defendants argued that jurisdiction failed because the interdiction was conducted from a Dutch naval ship. The panel rejected that argument as a matter of statutory text and factual record:

  • Textually, nothing in the MDLEA prohibits U.S. enforcement activity from being conducted using a foreign platform; the key statutory requirement is that an “officer of the United States” make the request.
  • Factually, the interdiction was carried out by U.S. Coast Guard officers (including the boarding team and the interpreter), with U.S. Coast Guard flags displayed, and with U.S. assets involved (the spotting aircraft and Coast Guard presence on the helicopter).
  • Contextually, multilateral agreements—including the “Agreement Concerning Co-Operation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime and Air Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in the Caribbean Area” (Apr. 10, 2003, Treaty No. I-55538) and the “United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances” (Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95)—were cited as authorizing joint maritime counter-narcotics efforts.

C. Impact

Although designated “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” (and thus not intended as binding precedent), the opinion is meaningful in three practical ways for MDLEA litigation in the Eleventh Circuit:

  1. “No magic words” for statelessness inquiries: The decision reinforces a low formal threshold for the § 70502(d)(1)(B) “request.” Defendants can be expected to argue “script” and “warning” theories; this opinion indicates that ordinary-language questions about vessel nationality suffice, so long as they functionally request a claim of nationality or registry.
  2. Joint operations and foreign platforms: The decision signals that cooperative interdictions—where U.S. Coast Guard teams embark on allied ships—will not be treated as jurisdictionally suspect merely due to platform nationality, provided U.S. officers perform the statutory acts and the operation is authorized.
  3. Continued closure of constitutional lanes: By cataloging the binding cases that foreclose vagueness, Miranda, EEZ/high seas, and nexus challenges, the opinion underscores that, in this circuit, MDLEA defenses will more often rise or fall on factual disputes about statelessness and the sufficiency of the “request” and response—rather than on broad constitutional invalidation theories.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • MDLEA: A federal statute allowing the United States to prosecute certain drug trafficking crimes committed at sea, including outside U.S. territorial waters, when the vessel falls within statutory categories.
  • “Vessel without nationality” (stateless vessel): Under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B), if the vessel’s master is asked to provide the vessel’s nationality/registry and fails to make a claim, the vessel is treated as stateless—bringing it within U.S. prosecutorial jurisdiction.
  • “Request” under § 70502(d)(1)(B): The statute requires a request for a nationality/registry claim but does not prescribe specific words. The functional inquiry is whether officers asked for the vessel’s nationality in a way that calls for a claim.
  • EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone): A maritime zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal state’s baseline where the coastal state has special economic rights. Under United States v. Alfonso, the Eleventh Circuit treats the EEZ as part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes.
  • Miranda custody at sea: Routine maritime stops/boardings typically are not considered “custody” for Miranda purposes in this circuit, meaning officers ordinarily need not give Miranda warnings before asking basic questions during interdictions.
  • Nexus requirement: Some extraterritorial criminal statutes require a connection to the United States. Under United States v. Campbell, the MDLEA (at least for stateless-vessel scenarios) does not.
  • Prior-panel-precedent rule: Once a panel decision resolves an issue, later panels are bound unless the Supreme Court or an en banc Eleventh Circuit changes the law.

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed these MDLEA convictions by (1) applying binding precedent to reject a suite of constitutional challenges and (2) reading § 70502(d)(1)(B) according to its text: a “request” for nationality need not track a specific script, and asking “What is the nationality of your ship or vessel?” suffices. The court also made clear that the operational use of a foreign naval vessel in a cooperative, treaty-supported interdiction does not undermine MDLEA jurisdiction where U.S. officers perform the statutory request and enforcement actions.