MDLEA Jurisdiction in Foreign EEZs: “High Seas” Includes EEZs; Statelessness by Silence; Joint Interdiction with Foreign Allies Does Not Defeat Jurisdiction

I. Introduction

This consolidated Eleventh Circuit decision (non-published) addresses challenges brought by three defendants—Tony Rafael Henriquez, Jose Antonio Acosta-Pinedo, and Julio Javier Liriano-Mercado—convicted under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) for (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine while on board a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction and (2) possession with intent to distribute cocaine while on board a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction.

The core disputes were jurisdictional and constitutional: whether Congress may reach conduct occurring within Colombia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ); whether the government proved the vessel was “without nationality” under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B); whether the Netherlands’ participation in interdiction undermined U.S. jurisdiction; and whether due process was violated through alleged vagueness, failure to give “reverse Miranda” warnings, and the absence of a U.S. nexus.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed all convictions. It held: (1) under binding circuit precedent, “high seas” includes EEZs, so the MDLEA’s application in Colombia’s EEZ does not exceed Congress’s Felonies Clause power; (2) the vessel was stateless because the master (Liriano-Mercado) failed to make a claim of nationality when asked, satisfying 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B); (3) cooperative enforcement with the Netherlands did not defeat jurisdiction where U.S. Coast Guard officers assumed tactical control and conducted the boarding; and (4) due-process objections were foreclosed or waived, including vagueness (rejected in prior precedent), “reverse Miranda” theories (foreclosed/waived), and any nexus requirement (rejected under universal/protective principles).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024)
    • Role in this opinion: Dispositive on the Felonies Clause argument. The court relied on Alfonso’s holding that the term “high seas” includes EEZs, making MDLEA enforcement in EEZs constitutionally proper.
    • Doctrinal effect: Converts what defendants framed as a constitutional limitation (EEZ vs. high seas) into a settled interpretive rule in this circuit: for Article I, § 8, cl. 10 “Felonies Clause” analysis, EEZ conduct is treated as occurring on the “high seas.”
  • Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174 (2018)
    • Role in this opinion: Cited for the proposition that a guilty plea does not bar a defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction.
    • Practical framing: The court used Class to confirm the defendants could press certain constitutional challenges despite guilty pleas—though later it held some due-process theories were waived as “as applied” challenges (under separate circuit precedent).
  • United States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2023)
    • Role in this opinion: Central to statutory jurisdiction and vagueness. Gruezo guided (i) the framework for “vessel without nationality” under the MDLEA and (ii) rejection of vagueness attacks.
    • Statelessness rule applied: When the master fails, upon request, to make a claim of nationality or registry, the vessel can be deemed stateless under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B)—and thus subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
    • Vagueness rule applied: The MDLEA provides sufficient notice that failing to make a claim of nationality upon request can render the vessel stateless for MDLEA jurisdiction.
  • United States v. Iguaran, 821 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2016)
    • Role in this opinion: Raised by Henriquez and Acosta-Pinedo to challenge the propriety of a limited remand. The panel declined to revisit that issue because a prior remand order in the same appeal had already decided it.
    • Procedural significance: The case illustrates how appellate procedure can constrain later arguments: once the court has authorized a limited remand, litigants generally cannot relitigate the remand’s legitimacy at the merits stage.
  • United States v. Hurtado, 89 F.4th 881 (11th Cir. 2023)
    • Role in this opinion: Cited as an example that cooperation with foreign partners is commonplace in MDLEA interdictions.
  • United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025)
    • Role in this opinion: Twofold: (i) supports the proposition that foreign cooperation is typical and unremarkable in MDLEA enforcement, and (ii) forecloses the argument that due process requires a nexus between the defendants’ conduct and the United States.
    • Nexus rule reaffirmed: The MDLEA may be applied without proving a U.S. nexus because its extraterritorial reach is supported by universal and protective principles.
  • United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997)
    • Role in this opinion: Used to dispose of the “reverse Miranda” theory: (i) any facial challenge is foreclosed by circuit precedent, and (ii) any as-applied challenge was held waived by guilty pleas.
    • Structural impact: Noriega functions here as a gatekeeping precedent controlling what kinds of due-process challenges survive a guilty plea and what the circuit has already rejected.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Constitutional reach: EEZ treated as “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes

The defendants’ principal constitutional claim was that Congress’s Article I power “to define and punish felonies committed on the high Seas” cannot reach conduct in a foreign nation’s EEZ. The court rejected this by treating the question as settled by United States v. Alfonso, which held that “high seas” includes EEZs. As a result, the panel concluded the MDLEA’s application in Colombia’s EEZ did not exceed Congress’s Felonies Clause authority.

2. Statutory jurisdiction: Statelessness established by the master’s silence

The MDLEA applies only if the offense occurs on a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” One route is if the vessel is “without nationality.” Under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B), a vessel can be deemed without nationality when the master or individual in charge fails, on request, to make a claim of nationality or registry.

After a limited remand evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Liriano-Mercado identified himself as master but remained silent when asked whether he wished to make a nationality claim. The panel held that factual finding was not clearly erroneous and—following United States v. Gruezo—that such silence satisfies § 70502(d)(1)(B), rendering the vessel stateless and within MDLEA jurisdiction.

3. Operational cooperation: Foreign participation does not divest U.S. courts of jurisdiction

Henriquez and Acosta-Pinedo argued that the Netherlands, not the United States, “enforced” the MDLEA. The panel treated this as factually and legally defective: the defendants’ own proffers acknowledged Coast Guard tactical control and that U.S. personnel carried out the boarding. Legally, the court emphasized that they cited no authority barring allied cooperation and noted such cooperation is routine in MDLEA cases (citing United States v. Hurtado and United States v. Canario-Vilomar).

4. Due process challenges: Foreclosed or waived

The panel rejected three due-process theories:

  • Void-for-vagueness: Foreclosed by United States v. Gruezo, which held the MDLEA provides adequate notice that failing to make a nationality claim upon request can render a vessel stateless for MDLEA jurisdiction.
  • “Reverse Miranda” requirement: The panel—citing United States v. Noriega—held that any facial challenge is foreclosed by circuit precedent, and any as-applied challenge was waived by guilty pleas.
  • Nexus to the United States: Foreclosed by United States v. Canario-Vilomar, reiterating that no U.S. nexus is required because universal and protective principles support the MDLEA’s extraterritorial reach.

C. Impact

  • EEZ prosecutions become harder to contest (in this circuit): By adhering to United States v. Alfonso, the court reinforces that MDLEA cases arising in foreign EEZs can proceed without a constitutional “high seas” obstacle in the Eleventh Circuit.
  • Silence-as-statutory-trigger for statelessness is operationally powerful: The decision confirms that a master’s nonresponse to a nationality inquiry can be enough for statelessness, meaning jurisdiction may turn on brief shipboard exchanges memorialized in Coast Guard “case packages” and officer testimony.
  • Joint interdictions remain insulated from jurisdictional attack: The opinion signals that allied maritime cooperation—so long as U.S. officers play a substantial enforcement role—will not readily create a jurisdictional defect.
  • Due process arguments face steep precedent barriers: Vagueness, “reverse Miranda,” and nexus-based theories are treated as largely settled against defendants in MDLEA litigation within the circuit, shaping defense strategy toward factual disputes (e.g., who was the master, what was asked, what was said) rather than broad constitutional challenges.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
A maritime zone (typically up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal state’s baseline) where the coastal state has certain resource-related rights. This opinion—following circuit precedent—treats conduct in an EEZ as occurring on the “high seas” for the MDLEA’s constitutional analysis under the Felonies Clause.
Felonies Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10)
The constitutional authority for Congress to “define and punish” certain maritime crimes, including “Felonies committed on the high Seas.” The MDLEA is treated as an exercise of that power in this circuit.
“Vessel without nationality” (stateless vessel)
Under the MDLEA, a vessel can be treated as stateless—and thus subject to U.S. jurisdiction—if, when asked, the master fails to make a claim of nationality or registry (46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B)). In practical terms, not answering the nationality question can be jurisdictionally decisive.
Void for vagueness
A due-process doctrine requiring criminal laws to provide fair notice of prohibited conduct and standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement. Here, prior circuit precedent held the MDLEA provides adequate notice about the consequences of failing to claim nationality.
“Reverse Miranda” warning
A proposed warning telling detainees that remaining silent when asked about nationality could later be used to establish U.S. criminal jurisdiction. The court rejected this theory as foreclosed/waived under circuit precedent.
Nexus requirement
A claimed due-process requirement that the defendant’s conduct have a connection to the United States before U.S. prosecution is permissible. The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held the MDLEA does not require such a nexus.

V. Conclusion

The decision affirms MDLEA convictions by applying settled Eleventh Circuit rules: conduct in a foreign EEZ may be treated as occurring on the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes (United States v. Alfonso); statutory jurisdiction is established where the master fails to make a nationality claim upon request, rendering the vessel stateless (United States v. Gruezo); allied cooperation in interdictions does not defeat U.S. jurisdiction; and common due-process challenges—vagueness, “reverse Miranda,” and nexus— are foreclosed or waived under controlling precedent (United States v. Gruezo, United States v. Noriega, United States v. Canario-Vilomar). The opinion’s significance lies less in creating new doctrine than in tightening the practical path for MDLEA prosecutions arising from EEZ interdictions and multi-nation operations.