MDLEA Jurisdiction in Foreign EEZs: EEZ Treated as “High Seas,” Congress Not Limited by Customary International Law, and State Department Certifications Do Not Trigger Confrontation Rights

Case: United States v. Jose Antonio Rodriguez (consolidated with United States v. Jorman Jose Goitia and United States v. Daribel Sanchez)
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date: February 12, 2026
Disposition: Convictions affirmed; sentence affirmed (minor-role adjustment denied).
Publication Status: Not for publication (but applies and reinforces binding circuit precedent).

1) Introduction

These consolidated appeals arise from Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”) prosecutions against three codefendants—Jorman Jose Goitia, Daribel Sanchez, and Jose Antonio Rodriguez—captured on a “go-fast” vessel carrying cocaine in waters approximately 169 miles southeast of Isla Beata (Dominican Republic). The vessel displayed no indicia of nationality. When approached by the U.S. Coast Guard, the occupants threw packages overboard. The Coast Guard recovered 15 bales (386 kg “sea weight”), field-tested positive for cocaine.

The central legal disputes concerned the constitutional and statutory reach of the MDLEA in maritime zones near foreign states: whether the Act may be enforced in another country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”); whether the MDLEA’s statutory definition of a “vessel without nationality” unconstitutionally expands beyond customary international law; and whether due process and confrontation rights restrict MDLEA prosecutions absent any nexus to the United States or where jurisdiction is established by a State Department certification. Goitia separately challenged the denial of a minor-role reduction at sentencing under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.

2) Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board. It held that binding precedent foreclosed: (i) the argument that an EEZ is not part of the “high seas” for purposes of Congress’s Felonies Clause power; (ii) the contention that 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C)—treating a vessel as “without nationality” when the claimed flag state neither confirms nor denies registry—exceeds Congress’s constitutional authority; (iii) the due process claim that MDLEA prosecutions require a U.S. nexus; and (iv) the Confrontation Clause challenge to the State Department’s jurisdiction certification. The panel also affirmed the district court’s denial of Goitia’s minor-role adjustment under the en banc framework of United States v. Rodriguez De Varon.

3) Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Controlled the Outcome)

  • United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024)
    Role in this opinion: The controlling constitutional holding that “the EEZ is part of the ‘high seas’ for purposes of the Felonies Clause.” The panel treated Alfonso as dispositive on the EEZ issue and on the broader point that customary international law does not limit Congress’s Article I, § 8, cl. 10 (“Felonies Clause”) authority in this context.
  • United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025)
    Role in this opinion: (1) Reaffirmed Alfonso’s EEZ rule and enforced the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule; (2) foreclosed the challenge to § 70502(d)(1)(C) as “ultra vires” (including the “neither confirm nor deny” statelessness category); and (3) described nexus-based due process arguments as “plainly foreclosed.”
  • Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174 (2018)
    Role in this opinion: Clarified that a guilty plea does not bar a defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction. This allowed the panel to reach (and reject as foreclosed) the constitutional MDLEA arguments despite the plea agreements.
  • United States v. Nunez, 1 F.4th 976 (11th Cir. 2021)
    Role in this opinion: Provided the core statutory framing of the MDLEA offense and jurisdictional structure: possession with intent to distribute on a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” including “vessels without nationality.”
  • United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014)
    Role in this opinion: Reinforced that MDLEA prosecutions do not require a U.S. nexus because universal and protective principles support the Act’s extraterritorial reach.
  • Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d at 588, 607
    Role in this opinion: Used for two propositions: (1) State Department certifications establishing MDLEA jurisdiction do not violate the Confrontation Clause and are not inadmissible hearsay; (2) in the sentencing context, it supported denial of minor-role reductions for crew members transporting large quantities where their conduct is integral to the charged activity.
  • United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2016)
    Role in this opinion: Supported both (1) the Confrontation Clause rejection regarding MDLEA jurisdiction certifications, and (2) the standard for reviewing role adjustments (“choice between two permissible views” rarely clear error).
  • United States v. Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
    Role in this opinion: The governing framework for U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 minor-role determinations. Central rule applied here: a defendant’s role is evaluated primarily against the relevant conduct attributed to him at sentencing—not against a larger uncharged conspiracy.
  • United States v. Boyd, 291 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2002)
    Role in this opinion: Emphasized the district court’s “considerable discretion” in role determinations.
  • United States v. Martin, 803 F.3d 581 (11th Cir. 2015)
    Role in this opinion: Limited “participants” for comparison to those involved in the relevant conduct attributed to the defendant.
  • United States v. Valois, 915 F.3d 717 (11th Cir. 2019)
    Role in this opinion: Reinforced denial of minor-role reductions in similar maritime drug-trafficking scenarios and supported the panel’s conclusion that the district court’s factual view was permissible.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) EEZ enforcement and the Felonies Clause (“high seas” includes EEZs).
Defendants framed the EEZ as outside “high seas” under customary international law and therefore outside Congress’s power “to define and punish … Felonies on the high Seas.” The panel did not re-litigate the historical or international-law debate; it treated the matter as settled by United States v. Alfonso, which held that, for constitutional purposes, “high seas” begin where territorial waters end, without “special carveout zones” such as the modern EEZ. The panel further relied on Alfonso’s rejection of the argument that customary international law constrains Congress’s Felonies Clause authority. Under the prior-panel-precedent rule, the panel was bound to apply Alfonso (as reaffirmed in United States v. Canario-Vilomar).

2) “Vessel without nationality” and § 70502(d)(1)(C)’s “neither confirm nor deny” category.
Sanchez and Rodriguez argued that their claim of Colombian nationality prevented the vessel from being “stateless” under international law, and that Congress cannot expand statelessness beyond customary international law. The MDLEA, however, provides that a vessel is “without nationality” when a claim of registry is made and “the claimed nation of registry does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert” nationality. The panel again relied on Canario-Vilomar, which held that Congress’s definitional choice in § 70502(d)(1)(C) is not constitutionally barred by customary international law because international law does not limit Congress’s Felonies Clause power (per Alfonso). On the facts, Colombia “could neither confirm nor deny” registration, fitting squarely within § 70502(d)(1)(C).

3) Due process nexus not required for MDLEA prosecutions.
Goitia argued that prosecuting him without contacts to the United States violates due process. The panel rejected this as foreclosed, citing United States v. Campbell and Canario-Vilomar for the proposition that the MDLEA’s extraterritorial reach is supported by universal and protective principles and does not require a U.S. nexus.

4) Confrontation Clause and State Department certifications of jurisdiction.
Goitia also contended that he could not meaningfully challenge the State Department’s certification used to establish MDLEA jurisdiction, violating the Confrontation Clause. The panel relied on Cabezas-Montano and United States v. Cruickshank, which hold that introducing the Secretary of State certification to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction under the MDLEA does not violate the Confrontation Clause and is not inadmissible hearsay.

5) Minor-role adjustment (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2) properly denied.
Goitia claimed he was less culpable than higher-level conspirators. Applying United States v. Rodriguez De Varon, the district court (and the panel) focused on the relevant conduct attributed to Goitia—transporting the 386 kg on the boat—rather than broader uncharged conduct. The panel emphasized that Goitia was one of only three participants in the charged activity and was not “less culpable than most other participants” in that relevant conduct. Given the drug quantity and the centrality of the transport role, and in light of deference to the district court’s factfinding (Boyd; Cruickshank), the panel found no clear error.

C. Impact

Although designated “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision is important as a practical signal of how the Eleventh Circuit is implementing its recent, binding MDLEA jurisprudence.

  • EEZ challenges will fail in this circuit absent en banc or Supreme Court change. By expressly invoking Alfonso and Canario-Vilomar, the panel reinforces that EEZ-based jurisdictional attacks are now categorically foreclosed in the Eleventh Circuit.
  • Customary international law is not a limiting principle for Congress in these MDLEA contexts (as the circuit now frames it). Litigants who rely on international-law definitions (e.g., statelessness) face the threshold barrier that, under Alfonso/Canario-Vilomar, such norms do not constrain Congress’s Felonies Clause power as applied by the MDLEA.
  • “No nexus” due process arguments remain nonstarters. The panel’s reliance on Campbell and Canario-Vilomar keeps the Eleventh Circuit aligned with its long-standing position that MDLEA prosecutions do not require defendant contacts with the United States.
  • State Department certifications remain insulated from Confrontation Clause attack. The decision reaffirms a stable evidentiary pathway for the government to establish the flag-state response “conclusively” via certification.
  • Minor-role relief remains difficult for maritime couriers when the relevant conduct is the shipment they crewed. The opinion underscores the continuing force of De Varon’s “relevant conduct” focus, limiting comparison to the charged/attributed conduct rather than unnamed organizers or financiers.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

  • MDLEA (Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act): A federal statute criminalizing drug trafficking on certain vessels on the ocean, including foreign or stateless vessels, when statutory jurisdictional conditions are met.
  • Felonies Clause (U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 10): Gives Congress power to define and punish felonies “on the high seas.” The key fight here is what counts as “high seas.”
  • Territorial waters vs. EEZ: Territorial waters are generally the coastal belt where a nation has strongest sovereign control; an EEZ extends farther (up to 200 nautical miles) where a coastal state has certain resource-related rights. The Eleventh Circuit’s controlling precedent treats the EEZ as part of “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes.
  • “Vessel without nationality” (statelessness) under the MDLEA: Even if a crew claims a nationality, the vessel can be treated as “without nationality” under § 70502(d)(1)(C) if the claimed nation does not “affirmatively and unequivocally” confirm it.
  • State Department “certification” of jurisdiction: The MDLEA allows the government to conclusively prove a foreign nation’s registry response via certification. Eleventh Circuit precedent treats that certification as not violating the Confrontation Clause.
  • Due process “nexus” requirement: Some defendants argue it is unfair to prosecute them in the U.S. without a U.S. connection. The Eleventh Circuit’s MDLEA cases reject that requirement.
  • Minor-role adjustment (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2): A sentencing reduction for someone substantially less culpable than most participants. Under De Varon, the comparison is mainly to the conduct the defendant is actually held accountable for (here, crewing a vessel carrying 386 kg), not to uncharged “higher-ups.”

5) Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision affirms MDLEA convictions and a sentence by applying a now-settled (within the circuit) set of jurisdictional and constitutional rules: (1) a foreign EEZ is treated as part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes (United States v. Alfonso), (2) Congress may define “vessel without nationality” in § 70502(d)(1)(C) without being constrained by customary international law (United States v. Canario-Vilomar), (3) no U.S. nexus is required for due process (United States v. Campbell), and (4) State Department certifications do not violate confrontation rights (Cabezas-Montano; United States v. Cruickshank). On sentencing, the panel reaffirms that maritime courier defendants face an uphill climb for minor-role relief under United States v. Rodriguez De Varon when their relevant conduct is the very shipment they crewed.