MDLEA Jurisdiction in a Foreign EEZ: EEZ Treated as “High Seas,” Statelessness Shown by No Master, and Foreign-Assisted Interdiction Permitted

I. Introduction

This consolidated Eleventh Circuit decision resolves challenges brought by three defendants—Jesus Alberto Hernandez Osorio, Oscar Carreno Fernandez, and Luis Jose Alfonzo Rodriguez—each of whom pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine while aboard a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction, in violation of 46 U.S.C §§ 70503(a)(1), 70506(a) & (b) and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B).

The stipulated proffers described a “go-fast vessel” interdicted off the coast of Venezuela transporting 955 kilograms of cocaine bound for the United States. Despite their guilty pleas, defendants sought dismissal of their indictments on multiple jurisdictional and constitutional grounds, and separately challenged their below-guidelines 75-month sentences, claiming entitlement to minor-role reductions.

Key issues included: (1) whether the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”) is void for vagueness; (2) whether due process requires a U.S. nexus; (3) whether Miranda warnings were required during boarding; (4) whether interdiction in Venezuela’s Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”) falls outside the “high seas”; (5) whether Dutch/Netherlands involvement undermines U.S. jurisdiction; (6) whether the government sufficiently established that the vessel was “without nationality”; and (7) whether the sentencing court clearly erred in denying minor-role adjustments.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences. It held that defendants’ principal challenges were foreclosed by binding precedent, particularly as to vagueness, nexus, EEZ/high-seas treatment, and Miranda. It further rejected the remaining jurisdictional arguments, concluding that the Coast Guard established MDLEA jurisdiction because no one identified himself as master or captain and the circumstances indicated the men were equals—triggering the rule that the Coast Guard need not solicit a nationality claim in the absence of a master or individual in charge.

On sentencing, the court held the district court did not clearly err in denying minor-role reductions given the defendants’ equal participation in jointly navigating a vessel carrying an extraordinary quantity of cocaine, while also noting the district court’s significant downward variance.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standard of review and stare decisis framework

  • United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815, 820 (11th Cir. 2024): Used for (i) de novo review where dismissal implicates subject-matter jurisdiction under the MDLEA, and (ii) the court’s articulation of Congress’s Article I powers relevant to maritime drug enforcement.
  • United States v. De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 937 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc), United States v. Boyd, 291 F.3d 1274, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2002), United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182, 1192 (11th Cir. 2016): Provide the role-reduction framework and the “considerable discretion”/clear-error lens governing minor-role decisions.
  • United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008): The prior-panel-precedent rule is central to the court’s analysis; most defendant arguments are rejected because earlier published decisions control.
  • United States v. Morris, 131 F.4th 1288, 1293 n.3 (11th Cir. 2025): Unpublished decisions are not binding; used to discount reliance on nonprecedential authority.
  • United States v. Grimon, 923 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2019): Issues not raised in the initial brief are abandoned; applied to the defendants’ failure to argue retroactivity of the 2025 guidelines amendment.

    • 2. MDLEA jurisdiction, stateless vessels, and EEZ/high seas

    • United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020): Demonstrates that the Coast Guard may establish statelessness when asked-for nationality claims are not made; also cited (via later cases) to reject a nexus requirement. The panel distinguishes it: in Cabezas-Montano there was confusion over who was master, so officers asked if anyone wished to claim nationality; here, no one identified a master and circumstances suggested equality.
    • United States v. Nunez, 1 F.4th 976 (11th Cir. 2021): The most decisive jurisdictional precedent for the facts here. Nunez recognizes some vessels have no master or individual in charge; in that scenario, § 70502(d)(1)(B) applies only when such a person is aboard, and the Coast Guard is not required to ask the crew to make a nationality claim. The opinion applies Nunez to hold jurisdiction established where each defendant refused to answer who was master/captain and record evidence indicated they were equals.
    • United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024) and United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025): Control the EEZ argument. Alfonso held—as a matter of first impression—that a nation’s EEZ is part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes, making MDLEA enforcement in EEZs proper; Canario-Vilomar reaffirmed it. This opinion treats defendants’ “EEZ is not high seas” theory as foreclosed.

    3. Due process, vagueness, nexus, and Miranda at sea

    • United States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 178 (2023): Forecloses the void-for-vagueness argument; the MDLEA gives adequate notice that failure to make a nationality claim upon request can render a vessel stateless. Also rejects the Miranda-based theory that officers must warn of consequences of failing to claim nationality.
    • Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and United States v. Rioseco, 845 F.2d 299, 302-03 (11th Cir. 1988): Rioseco (cited in Gruezo) supports the rule that routine maritime stop/boarding/inspection on the high seas is not necessarily “custodial” such that Miranda warnings are required.
    • Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d at 587, and Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 818 n.4, and Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th at 1382-83: Foreclose the argument that due process requires the charged MDLEA conduct to have a nexus to the United States.

    4. Foreign cooperation in interdictions

    • United States v. Hurtado, 89 F.4th 881 (11th Cir. 2023): Supports the proposition that right-of-approach questioning and coordination can involve foreign vessels and law enforcement detachments; such cooperation is consistent with international law, treaties, and the MDLEA. This opinion uses Hurtado to reject the claim that Netherlands involvement defeats jurisdiction.
    • Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374: Also illustrates foreign participation (Dutch maritime patrol aircraft spotting) within lawful MDLEA enforcement coordination.

    5. Sentencing (minor role) and guideline interpretation

    • United States v. Valois, 915 F.3d 717, 731-33 (11th Cir. 2019): Reinforces that transporting large quantities of cocaine in MDLEA cases often supports denial of minor-role reductions, even if not categorically disqualifying.
    • United States v. Martin, 803 F.3d 581, 591 (11th Cir. 2015) and United States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th 1284, 1294 (11th Cir. 2023): Limit the comparator group to participants involved in the defendant’s relevant conduct; defendants cannot rely on the broader trafficking network to prove minor role.
    • United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc) and United States v. Jews, 74 F.4th 1325, 1327 n.2, 1328 (11th Cir. 2023): Address when courts may rely on guideline commentary. The panel notes no party disputed the commentary’s validity, so it considered and deferred to it.
    • United States v. Jerchower, 631 F.3d 1181, 1184-85 (11th Cir. 2011): Governs application of guideline amendments on appeal (clarifying vs. substantive), though the panel ultimately finds any retroactivity issue abandoned and, in any event, not outcome-determinative here.

    B. Legal Reasoning

    1. Why most dismissal arguments failed: binding precedent and the prior-panel rule

    The court’s core methodological move is straightforward: once it identifies earlier published Eleventh Circuit decisions directly addressing each claim, Archer requires adherence absent Supreme Court or en banc intervention. The opinion therefore treats the vagueness challenge (Gruezo), nexus/due process challenge (Cabezas-Montano as reaffirmed by Alfonso and Canario-Vilomar), the EEZ/high-seas challenge (Alfonso and Canario-Vilomar), and the Miranda theory (Gruezo and Rioseco) as already decided.

    2. Statelessness and statutory jurisdiction: applying Nunez to “no master” facts

    The defendants’ principal “fact-specific” argument was that the government did not establish the vessel was “without nationality” under 46 U.S.C. § 70502. The court rejected this by focusing on the boarding officers’ questions and the defendants’ collective non-responsiveness:

    • Officers asked each defendant whether he was the master or captain.
    • Each defendant refused to answer.
    • The record otherwise indicated the men were equals aboard the vessel.

    Under Nunez, if no master or individual in charge is aboard (or identifiable), the Coast Guard is not required to ask for a nationality claim. The opinion treats the defendants’ refusal to identify a master—combined with evidence of equal roles—as bringing the case within Nunez, not within the factual posture of Cabezas-Montano (where officers specifically asked if anyone wished to claim nationality because the crew gestured at one another as master).

    The court also relied on Nunez to reject any asserted entitlement to an evidentiary hearing, emphasizing the absence of identified disputed jurisdictional facts or proffered evidence that could change the outcome.

    3. Foreign involvement (Netherlands) does not divest jurisdiction

    The panel reasoned that the defendants offered no authority establishing that foreign assistance renders an interdiction unlawful or negates U.S. jurisdiction under the MDLEA. It instead treated foreign cooperation as routine and legally recognized, citing Hurtado and Canario-Vilomar. It additionally grounded this conclusion in the cooperative structure of relevant international agreements noted in the opinion (including the U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic and a Caribbean regional cooperative agreement), reinforcing that such multinational operations are contemplated rather than prohibited.

    4. Sentencing: why denial of minor-role reductions was not clearly erroneous

    Applying De Varon and its two guiding principles, the court focused on (i) the defendants’ role in the relevant conduct for which they were held accountable, and (ii) their role compared to others involved in that same relevant conduct.

    • Relevant conduct: Each defendant was held accountable for transporting/possessing 955 kilograms of cocaine aboard the vessel—conduct the district court found they jointly undertook.
    • Comparator group: The district court properly compared each defendant primarily to the other two crewmembers in this case, not to hypothetical upstream organizers or downstream distributors (Martin; Gruezo).
    • Totality of circumstances: The panel accepted the district court’s findings that the three defendants engaged in the “same” or “equal” offense conduct, navigated together, and executed the plan given to them, with “no evidence otherwise.”

    The panel emphasized that large drug quantity can be a “material consideration” (De Varon), but it also credited the district court for not relying on quantity alone, consistent with Cruickshank and Valois. The district court’s substantial downward variance (from a 108–135 month range to 75 months) further underscored that the sentencing court exercised individualized discretion even while denying minor-role reductions.

    C. Impact

    1. MDLEA enforcement in EEZs remains settled in the Eleventh Circuit

    By treating the EEZ argument as squarely foreclosed by Alfonso (and reaffirmed by Canario-Vilomar), the opinion reinforces a now-stabilized Eleventh Circuit rule: interdictions in a foreign EEZ may be treated as occurring on the “high seas” for Felonies Clause/MDLEA purposes. This narrows a once-common defense avenue and signals that future challenges must target higher courts or seek en banc reconsideration rather than panel-level relief.

    2. “No master” scenarios: Nunez’s practical enforcement rule is decisive

    The most operationally significant portion of the opinion is its application of Nunez: when no one identifies as master/captain and the circumstances show an “equals” situation, the Coast Guard need not proceed to ask the crew to make a nationality claim. This reduces the risk that defendants can manufacture jurisdictional disputes by coordinated silence on the question of command.

    3. Multinational interdiction coordination is affirmed as ordinary

    The rejection of the Netherlands-based challenge signals that defendants should not expect jurisdictional leverage from multinational operational details (spotting, tracking, approach, questioning, or coordination), so long as the interdiction fits within accepted right-of-approach practice and treaty-cooperative frameworks recognized in cases like Hurtado.

    4. Minor-role reductions remain difficult in large-load maritime courier cases

    On sentencing, the opinion continues a consistent trend: in MDLEA cases involving very large quantities and small crews, district courts have broad discretion to deem each crewmember “integral,” making minor-role reductions hard to obtain absent concrete evidence of a materially lesser function within the relevant-conduct group.

    IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

    • MDLEA (“Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act”): A federal statute criminalizing certain drug trafficking conduct on covered vessels, including stateless vessels, even when far from U.S. territory.
    • “Vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” / “vessel without nationality”: The MDLEA reaches stateless vessels. A vessel may be treated as stateless if no valid nationality claim is made in the statutorily recognized ways (documents, flag, or verbal claim by the master/individual in charge).
    • Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) vs. “high seas”: An EEZ is a maritime zone adjacent to a coastal state where it has certain resource-related rights. Under United States v. Alfonso, for Felonies Clause purposes, an EEZ is treated as part of the “high seas,” allowing MDLEA enforcement there.
    • Right-of-approach / right-of-visit questioning: Routine questions by maritime law enforcement (sometimes with international cooperation) to determine a vessel’s nationality status, which affects enforcement authority.
    • “Nexus” argument: A claim that the Constitution requires a connection between the defendants’ conduct and the United States. Eleventh Circuit precedent holds no such nexus is required for MDLEA drug trafficking crimes.
    • Minor role reduction (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2): A sentencing decrease for defendants substantially less culpable than the average participant in the relevant conduct. Courts focus on what the defendant actually did and whom he can properly be compared to within that same relevant conduct.

    V. Conclusion

    This decision is a consolidation and application of controlling Eleventh Circuit MDLEA doctrine: EEZ interdictions remain within MDLEA reach; due process does not require a U.S. nexus; the statute is not void for vagueness on nationality-claim procedures; and routine maritime enforcement does not inherently trigger Miranda. Most notably on the facts, the opinion applies United States v. Nunez to uphold statutory jurisdiction where no crewmember identifies a master/captain and the record supports an “equals” inference—meaning the Coast Guard need not ask the crew to make a nationality claim. On sentencing, the court reinforces that crewmembers jointly navigating a vessel carrying an extreme quantity of cocaine can reasonably be deemed integral to the offense, supporting denial of minor-role reductions under De Varon and related cases.