MDLEA Jurisdiction in a Foreign EEZ: EEZ Treated as “High Seas,” No U.S. Nexus Required for Stateless Vessels, and § 70502(d)(1)(C) Challenges Fail Where Jurisdiction Rests on § 70502(d)(1)(B)

1. Introduction

This consolidated, unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision arises from interdiction of a “go-fast” vessel in April 2023 roughly 125 nautical miles off the Dominican Republic. The vessel had no indicia of nationality, carried fuel drums and visible packages, and its occupants jettisoned packages when approached by the United States Coast Guard. After warning shots and disabling fire, the Coast Guard boarded and found defendants Jose Hernandez (identified as the master), Angel Luvi-Ramirez, and Wilmar Mosquera. Hernandez refused to make any claim of nationality or registry.

A federal grand jury charged the defendants under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) with conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute cocaine aboard a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction. After the district court denied a motion to dismiss challenging the constitutionality of the MDLEA as applied—principally on the theory that the alleged conduct occurred in the Dominican Republic’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and lacked a U.S. nexus—the defendants pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count. On appeal, they renewed those constitutional challenges; Luvi-Ramirez added new arguments about the constitutionality and evidentiary basis of 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit granted the government’s motion for summary affirmance. The court held that the defendants’ principal constitutional arguments were foreclosed by binding circuit precedent: (1) a foreign nation’s EEZ is treated as part of the “high seas” for purposes of Congress’s power under the Felonies Clause, and customary international law does not limit that power; and (2) the MDLEA does not require a nexus to the United States for prosecution of drug trafficking on stateless vessels on the high seas.

As to Luvi-Ramirez’s additional attacks on § 70502(d)(1)(C), the court applied plain-error review and found no error because the record established U.S. jurisdiction under § 70502(d)(1)(B) (failure to make a nationality/registry claim), not under § 70502(d)(1)(C).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

  • Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1969): The court relied on Groendyke to justify summary disposition where one party’s position is clearly correct as a matter of law or the appeal is frivolous. This provided the procedural vehicle for affirming without full merits briefing or argument.
  • Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2 d 12 06 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc): Cited to explain why Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October 1, 1981 (including Groendyke) bind the Eleventh Circuit.
  • United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025): Supplied standards of review (de novo for subject-matter jurisdiction and constitutionality) and reinforced that an EEZ is a “relatively modern” concept; also cited for rejecting an “identical nexus challenge” as foreclosed by precedent.
  • United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024): Directly controlled the “EEZ is not the high seas” argument by holding that other countries’ EEZs are “part of the ‘high seas’ for purposes of the Felonies Clause,” and that customary international law does not limit Congress’s Felonies Clause authority. Also cited for plain-error standards when an issue is raised for the first time on appeal.
  • United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014): Controlled the due-process/nexus argument. Campbell upheld Congress’s authority to reach drug trafficking on stateless vessels in international waters and held that prosecuting noncitizens captured on the high seas does not offend due process because the MDLEA provides clear notice and drug trafficking is universally condemned.
  • United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008): Provided the court’s binding-precedent rule: panels must follow prior Eleventh Circuit decisions unless overruled by the Supreme Court or by the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc.
  • United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2003): Supplied the four-part plain-error framework (error, plainness, effect on substantial rights, and serious effect on judicial integrity).

3.2 Legal Reasoning

  1. MDLEA statutory coverage and “vessel without nationality.” The court began with the MDLEA’s core jurisdictional hook: the prohibition applies to conduct on board “a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” including “a vessel without nationality.” It then recited the statutory definitions in 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1), emphasizing that a vessel is “without nationality” when the master fails, upon request, to make a claim of nationality or registry (§ 70502(d)(1)(B)).
  2. EEZ-based constitutional challenge (Felonies Clause). The defendants argued that because the interdiction occurred in the Dominican Republic’s EEZ, it was not on the “high seas,” and that customary international law constrained Congress’s power. The panel rejected this as foreclosed by United States v. Alfonso, which held that a foreign EEZ is treated as “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes and that customary international law does not limit the Felonies Clause authority in this context.
  3. No-nexus constitutional challenge (Due Process / Felonies Clause). The defendants argued that due process (and the Felonies Clause) required a connection to the United States. The panel again treated this as foreclosed—principally by United States v. Campbell—which upholds MDLEA prosecutions of noncitizens on stateless vessels in international waters without requiring proof of a U.S. nexus.
  4. Luvi-Ramirez’s new § 70502(d)(1)(C) arguments fail on the record and under plain-error review. Luvi-Ramirez attacked § 70502(d)(1)(C) (the “claimed nation does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert nationality” provision) and argued the evidence was insufficient to satisfy it. The panel found no error because jurisdiction was not grounded in (C) at all: the plea proffers and stipulations established that the master (Hernandez) refused to make any claim, placing the vessel squarely within § 70502(d)(1)(B). Because the predicate factual and legal premise for Luvi-Ramirez’s (C)-based arguments was wrong, he could not show any “error,” let alone a “plain” one.

3.3 Impact

  • Operational confirmation of EEZ interdictions under the MDLEA in the Eleventh Circuit. While unpublished, the decision illustrates the court’s continued, routine application of Alfonso: defendants cannot defeat MDLEA jurisdiction merely by characterizing the interdiction location as a foreign EEZ.
  • Reinforcement that nexus arguments remain nonstarters for stateless-vessel cases. The panel’s reliance on Campbell underscores that, within this circuit, due process challenges premised on lack of U.S. connection are foreclosed when the vessel is stateless under the MDLEA.
  • Charging and plea-proof significance: which statelessness subsection matters. The disposition highlights a practical litigation point: challenges to § 70502(d)(1)(C) are irrelevant if the facts establish statelessness under § 70502(d)(1)(B) (failure to claim). Plea admissions and stipulations can decisively lock in the jurisdictional theory.
  • Appellate posture matters. New statutory-constitutionality theories raised only in a brief’s “summary of argument,” without developed argument or authority, are vulnerable—especially under plain-error review and where the record defeats the premise.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

MDLEA
A federal law that criminalizes drug trafficking on certain vessels, including “stateless” vessels, even when the conduct occurs outside U.S. territory.
Felonies Clause
A constitutional grant of power allowing Congress “[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas.” The key fight here was whether a foreign EEZ counts as “high seas” for this purpose.
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
Waters beyond a nation’s territorial sea extending up to 200 nautical miles from its baseline, where the coastal nation has certain resource-related rights. The Eleventh Circuit treats such waters as “high seas” for Felonies Clause analysis in MDLEA cases.
“Vessel without nationality” (stateless vessel)
Under the MDLEA, a vessel is treated as stateless when, among other situations, the master fails to make a nationality/registry claim when asked (§ 70502(d)(1)(B)). Statelessness is crucial because it triggers U.S. jurisdiction under the MDLEA.
Nexus requirement
A claimed constitutional limit requiring some connection between the defendant’s conduct and the United States. The Eleventh Circuit’s MDLEA cases hold that no such nexus is required for drug trafficking on stateless vessels on the high seas.
Plain error
A demanding standard used when an argument is raised for the first time on appeal. The appellant must show an obvious error that likely affected the outcome and seriously undermines the fairness or integrity of the proceedings.
Summary affirmance
An expedited appellate disposition used when the outcome is legally clear under controlling precedent, making full appellate proceedings unnecessary.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit summarily affirmed the MDLEA conspiracy convictions because controlling precedent foreclosed the defendants’ two central constitutional theories: a foreign EEZ is treated as “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes, and the MDLEA does not require a U.S. nexus for stateless-vessel prosecutions. The court also rejected Luvi-Ramirez’s late-breaking attack on § 70502(d)(1)(C) because jurisdiction rested on § 70502(d)(1)(B)—the master’s refusal to claim nationality—making the (C)-focused arguments beside the point and eliminating any showing of error under plain-error review.