MDLEA Jurisdiction in a Foreign EEZ: EEZ Treated as “High Seas,” No Nexus Required for Stateless-Vessel Drug Conspiracies

Case: United States v. Wilmar Mosquera (consolidated with appeals by Angel Luvi-Ramirez and Jose Hernandez)
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date: March 27, 2026 (per curiam; not for publication)

I. Introduction

This consolidated Eleventh Circuit decision addresses recurring constitutional challenges to the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”), 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501–08, when the Coast Guard interdicts suspected drug-trafficking vessels outside U.S. territorial waters. The appellants—Angel Luvi-Ramirez, Jose Hernandez, and Wilmar Mosquera—pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine on a vessel “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”

The interdiction occurred in April 2023, roughly 125 nautical miles off the Dominican Republic. After the Coast Guard pursued and disabled a “go-fast” vessel, Hernandez identified himself as the master and refused to make a claim of nationality. The United States treated the vessel as “without nationality,” recovered bales of cocaine thrown overboard, and prosecuted the crew under the MDLEA.

The key issues on appeal were constitutional: (1) whether Congress’s power under the Felonies Clause allows MDLEA prosecutions in another nation’s exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”), and (2) whether due process (or the Felonies Clause) requires a U.S. “nexus” to the offense. Luvi-Ramirez also attempted to raise a late-breaking statutory-constitutional attack targeting the MDLEA’s definition of “vessel without nationality” in § 70502(d)(1)(C), plus an insufficiency argument tied to that subsection.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit granted the government’s motion for summary affirmance and upheld the convictions. The court held that both primary constitutional challenges were foreclosed by binding precedent:

  • A foreign state’s EEZ is treated as part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes, and the Felonies Clause is not constrained by customary international law in the way appellants argued.
  • The MDLEA may be applied to drug trafficking on stateless vessels on the high seas without a nexus to the United States, consistent with due process and Congress’s Article I power.

As to Luvi-Ramirez’s additional arguments attacking § 70502(d)(1)(C), the court rejected them under plain-error review because the case did not turn on that subsection at all. The vessel was treated as stateless under § 70502(d)(1)(B) (failure to make a nationality claim), based on the plea stipulations.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The opinion is largely an exercise in vertical and horizontal stare decisis: it affirms because prior Eleventh Circuit decisions have already resolved the same constitutional theories.

1. Summary affirmance framework

  • Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1969): Supplies the standard for summary disposition where a party’s position is “clearly right as a matter of law” or the appeal is frivolous. The panel uses Groendyke to justify resolving the appeal without full merits briefing or argument because precedent leaves “no substantial question” about outcome.
  • Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2 d 12 06 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc): Explains why pre-October 1, 1981 Fifth Circuit precedent (including Groendyke) is binding in the Eleventh Circuit.

2. Standards of review and procedural posture

  • United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025): Cited for de novo review of subject-matter jurisdiction and constitutionality of a criminal statute, and for rejecting an “identical nexus challenge” to the MDLEA.
  • United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024): Supplies (i) plain-error review when issues are raised first on appeal, (ii) background on EEZs, and (iii) the key holding that EEZs are part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes and that Congress’s Felonies Clause power is not limited by customary international law in the asserted manner.
  • United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2003): Provides the four-part plain-error framework (error; plainness; effect on substantial rights; effect on integrity/reputation of proceedings).
  • United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008): Reinforces the prior-panel precedent rule—the panel must follow earlier decisions unless overruled by the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit en banc, or undermined to abrogation.

3. Substantive MDLEA constitutional holdings

  • United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014): The main authority for rejecting nexus and due process challenges for stateless vessels on the high seas. Campbell stands for the proposition that Congress may extend U.S. criminal jurisdiction to stateless vessels in international waters trafficking controlled substances, and that due process is satisfied because the MDLEA gives clear notice and the conduct is universally condemned.

How these precedents drive the result: Alfonso resolves the “EEZ ≠ high seas” and “customary international law limits Felonies Clause” theories; Campbell and Canario-Vilomar resolve the “no U.S. nexus violates due process/Article I” theory; Archer prevents the panel from revisiting those holdings. With those doors closed, Groendyke supplies the procedural vehicle for immediate affirmance.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory jurisdiction under the MDLEA

The MDLEA criminalizes possessing with intent to distribute controlled substances, and conspiring to do so, while on board “a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” The statute applies extraterritorially. Critically, “a vessel without nationality” is included in “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” The statute then enumerates several ways a vessel may qualify as “without nationality” in 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1).

On the facts stipulated in the plea agreements, Hernandez (as master) refused to make a claim of nationality. That fact matches § 70502(d)(1)(B): a vessel is without nationality where “the master or individual in charge fails, on request of an officer of the United States . . . , to make a claim of nationality or registry.”

2. The Felonies Clause and the EEZ argument

Appellants argued the interdiction site—within the Dominican Republic’s EEZ—could not be treated as “high seas,” and that customary international law constrained Congress’s Felonies Clause authority. The panel rejected the argument because United States v. Alfonso held the opposite: for Felonies Clause purposes, an EEZ is part of the “high seas,” and Congress’s power is not limited by customary international law in the manner asserted.

3. Due process / nexus argument

Appellants also argued that because they were foreign nationals engaged in conduct with no connection to the United States, due process (and/or the Felonies Clause) barred prosecution absent a nexus. The panel treated this as foreclosed by United States v. Campbell and reaffirmed in United States v. Canario-Vilomar, which uphold MDLEA prosecutions of drug trafficking on stateless vessels on the high seas without requiring a U.S. nexus.

The court’s rationale (via Campbell) is notice- and condemnation-based: trafficking controlled substances on stateless vessels in international waters is universally prohibited; the MDLEA provides clear notice that such conduct can be prosecuted; therefore applying the statute does not offend due process.

4. Luvi-Ramirez’s late § 70502(d)(1)(C) attack fails on the record

Luvi-Ramirez attempted to challenge § 70502(d)(1)(C) (the “claimed nation does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert nationality” provision), claiming it reaches vessels that are not stateless under international law and that evidence was insufficient to show the Dominican Republic failed to confirm nationality.

The panel resolved this on straightforward grounds under plain-error review: there was no “error” because § 70502(d)(1)(C) was not the jurisdictional hook used here. The defendants stipulated the master refused to make any nationality claim, which fits § 70502(d)(1)(B). Because Luvi-Ramirez did not argue § 70502(d)(1)(B) was unconstitutional or unsupported, his § 70502(d)(1)(C) arguments could not undermine the conviction.

C. Impact

Although the opinion is “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” and therefore does not itself announce new binding precedent, it is significant for what it confirms operationally in the Eleventh Circuit:

  • EEZ interdictions remain firmly within MDLEA reach in this circuit, because EEZ waters are treated as “high seas” for Felonies Clause analysis under Alfonso.
  • Nexus arguments are effectively unavailable for stateless-vessel MDLEA cases in the Eleventh Circuit, given Campbell and Canario-Vilomar.
  • Record-driven jurisdictional categorization matters: where the master declines to claim nationality, § 70502(d)(1)(B) provides a clean statutory basis; appellate attempts to reframe the case under § 70502(d)(1)(C) can fail simply because they do not match the stipulated facts.
  • Procedural posture can be decisive: issues raised for the first time on appeal face plain-error review (Alfonso; Lejarde-Rada), making it difficult to obtain relief unless the alleged error is obvious and outcome-determinative.

Practically, the decision signals continued receptiveness to government motions for summary affirmance in MDLEA appeals that repackage arguments already rejected by circuit precedent.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • MDLEA (Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act): A federal statute that criminalizes certain drug-trafficking conduct on vessels and expressly applies outside U.S. territory, so long as the vessel is “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”
  • “Vessel without nationality” (stateless vessel): A vessel treated as belonging to no country for jurisdictional purposes. Under § 70502(d)(1)(B), if the master fails (when asked) to claim nationality or registry, the vessel is stateless under the statute.
  • Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): An area extending up to 200 nautical miles from a country’s coast where that country has certain resource-related rights. It is not the same as “territorial waters.” In this circuit, the EEZ is treated as “high seas” for the Felonies Clause analysis discussed in Alfonso.
  • Felonies Clause: Article I, § 8, cl. 10 empowers Congress “[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas.” Defendants often invoke it to argue Congress cannot criminalize certain extraterritorial maritime conduct; the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly upheld MDLEA applications under this power in the circumstances described.
  • “Nexus” requirement: The idea that the crime must have a connection to the United States (e.g., U.S. victims, U.S. territory, U.S. markets) before U.S. courts can prosecute it. Campbell holds such a nexus is not required for drug trafficking on stateless vessels on the high seas.
  • Plain error review: A demanding appellate standard applied when an argument was not properly raised in the trial court. The appellant must show an obvious legal error that likely affected the outcome and seriously undermined the integrity of the proceedings.

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit summarily affirmed the MDLEA conspiracy convictions because binding precedent foreclosed the defendants’ core constitutional claims: interdictions in a foreign EEZ may be treated as occurring on the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes, and MDLEA prosecutions of stateless vessels do not require a U.S. nexus to satisfy due process. The decision also illustrates a practical appellate lesson: jurisdictional attacks must match the statutory basis actually used and the facts stipulated—here, the master’s refusal to claim nationality placed the case squarely under § 70502(d)(1)(B), rendering § 70502(d)(1)(C)-focused arguments beside the point.