MDLEA Enforcement in a Foreign EEZ: EEZ Treated as “High Seas,” Statelessness Definition Upheld, and No U.S. Nexus Required

1. Introduction

This consolidated Eleventh Circuit decision addresses recurring constitutional and jurisdictional attacks on prosecutions under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”) arising from cocaine interdictions at sea. The defendants—codefendants Jorman Jose Goitia, Daribel Sanchez, and Jose Antonio Rodriguez—were apprehended on a “go-fast” vessel roughly 169 miles southeast of Isla Beata (Dominican Republic). The vessel displayed no indicia of nationality. As the Coast Guard approached, the men discarded packages overboard; 15 bales were recovered (386 kg “sea weight”), field-testing positive for cocaine.

Key issues on appeal included:

• EEZ issue: Whether the MDLEA may be constitutionally enforced in a foreign country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”), which defendants argued is not “high seas” under the Constitution’s Felonies Clause.
• Statelessness definition issue: Whether 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C) impermissibly expands U.S. jurisdiction by treating a vessel as “without nationality” when the claimed flag state can neither confirm nor deny registry.
• Due process / nexus: Whether due process requires a nexus between the defendants’ conduct and the United States for MDLEA prosecution.
• Confrontation Clause: Whether reliance on the State Department certification of jurisdiction violates confrontation rights.
• Sentencing: Whether Goitia was entitled to a minor-role adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board. It held that recent binding circuit precedent foreclosed defendants’ constitutional challenges:

• The EEZ is treated as part of the “high seas” for purposes of Congress’s power under the Felonies Clause; thus MDLEA enforcement in an EEZ is constitutional.
• Congress may define “vessel without nationality” in the MDLEA to include a vessel where a claimed registry is not affirmatively and unequivocally confirmed by the claimed nation; customary international law does not limit Congress’s Felonies Clause authority.
• No nexus to the United States is required for MDLEA prosecutions; due process is not violated by extraterritorial application in these circumstances.
• Use of State Department certification to prove jurisdiction does not violate the Confrontation Clause.
• The district court did not clearly err in denying Goitia a minor-role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Controlled the Outcome)

1) “High seas” includes EEZs for Felonies Clause purposes

• United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024) — The central controlling authority. The panel applied Alfonso’s holding that “the EEZ is part of the ‘high seas’ for purposes of the Felonies Clause in Article I of the Constitution,” rejecting the argument that modern maritime zones carve out constitutional limits on Congress’s power. Alfonso also rejected the claim that customary international law constrains Felonies Clause power.
• United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025) — Reinforced Alfonso, described the EEZ as “relatively modern vintage,” and reiterated that Alfonso binds later panels under the prior-panel-precedent rule.

2) MDLEA “vessel without nationality” definition upheld (including § 70502(d)(1)(C))

• United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025) — Directly rejected the same ultra vires argument directed at “the inclusion of vessels for which a claimed nation can neither confirm nor deny registration [§ 70502(d)(1)(C)].” The court relied on Alfonso’s conclusion that customary international law does not limit Congress’s Felonies Clause authority.
• United States v. Nunez, 1 F.4th 976 (11th Cir. 2021) — Provided statutory framing: the MDLEA prohibits drug trafficking on a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” including “vessels without nationality.”

3) No due-process nexus required for MDLEA prosecutions

• United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014) — Cited (via Canario-Vilomar) for the proposition that MDLEA prosecutions do not require a nexus to the United States because “universal and protective principles support its extraterritorial reach.”
• United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025) — Characterized similar nexus arguments as “plainly foreclosed” by Eleventh Circuit precedent.

4) State Department certification and the Confrontation Clause

• Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020) — Held that introducing a Secretary of State certification to establish MDLEA extraterritorial jurisdiction neither violates the Confrontation Clause nor constitutes inadmissible hearsay.
• United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2016) — Cited to the same effect; also later used in the sentencing section for clear-error review principles.

5) Guilty plea does not bar constitutional challenge to statute of conviction

• Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174 (2018) — The court invoked Class for the procedural point that a guilty plea does not, by itself, bar a defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction on appeal.

6) Minor-role reduction doctrine (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2)

• United States v. Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc) — The decisive framework: a role reduction is assessed primarily against the relevant conduct for which the defendant was held accountable, not against an uncharged “larger conspiracy.”
• United States v. Boyd, 291 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2002) — Emphasized district court discretion in role determinations.
• United States v. Martin, 803 F.3d 581 (11th Cir. 2015) — Limited the comparator group: only participants involved in the relevant conduct attributed to the defendant may be considered.
• Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Valois, 915 F.3d 717 (11th Cir. 2019) — Applied to reject minor-role reductions for maritime couriers transporting large quantities where their conduct is integral to the offense.
• United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2016) — Clear-error review language: where the record supports the court’s view, choosing among permissible interpretations rarely constitutes clear error.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) EEZ as “high seas” under the Felonies Clause

The defendants tried to constitutionalize a distinction between “high seas” and a foreign EEZ, arguing an EEZ is not “high seas” under customary international law. The court rejected this by applying binding precedent: United States v. Alfonso held that, for Article I’s Felonies Clause, “high seas” begins where territorial waters end—without modern “special carveout zones” like the EEZ. Thus, because the interdiction occurred far beyond territorial waters, the MDLEA’s application fell within Congress’s constitutional power as construed by Alfonso.

2) Statelessness definition and Congress’s authority

Sanchez and Rodriguez argued their vessel was not “stateless” under international law because all three claimed Colombian nationality. But under the MDLEA, a vessel can be treated as “without nationality” if the claimed nation “does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert” nationality—codified at 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C). Here, Colombia could neither confirm nor deny registry, triggering statutory statelessness and U.S. jurisdiction. The court’s constitutional analysis was straightforward: United States v. Canario-Vilomar, relying on United States v. Alfonso, held customary international law does not limit Congress’s Felonies Clause power to define statelessness for MDLEA purposes.

3) Due process and absence of a U.S. nexus

Goitia’s due-process challenge rested on the absence of “minimum contacts” with the United States. The panel applied binding precedent rejecting a nexus requirement in MDLEA cases: under United States v. Campbell and reaffirmed in United States v. Canario-Vilomar, MDLEA’s extraterritorial reach is supported by “universal and protective principles,” and due process does not require a U.S. connection for these maritime drug offenses.

4) Confrontation Clause and State Department certification

The MDLEA makes the foreign nation’s response “proved conclusively by certification” of the Secretary of State. 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(2). Goitia argued he was denied confrontation because he could not challenge that certification. The court applied Eleventh Circuit precedent—Cabezas-Montano and United States v. Cruickshank—holding such certifications, used to establish jurisdictional facts for MDLEA extraterritorial jurisdiction, do not violate the Confrontation Clause and are not inadmissible hearsay.

5) Sentencing: minor-role reduction denied

The district court evaluated Goitia’s minor-role request under United States v. Rodriguez De Varon. Critically, De Varon prevents role comparisons to hypothetical “higher-echelon” conspirators if the defendant was not held accountable for their broader conduct. Goitia was held accountable for the 386 kilograms on the vessel, and the relevant participants were essentially the three crew members charged. Given the quantity, the essential transportation role, and the district court’s findings that his role was similar to codefendants, the panel found no clear error.

C. Impact

• MDLEA prosecutions in EEZs are stabilized in the Eleventh Circuit: This decision operationalizes United States v. Alfonso and United States v. Canario-Vilomar by treating EEZ interdictions as constitutionally within “high seas” enforcement authority.
• Statelessness challenges face steep odds: So long as the claimed flag state does not “affirmatively and unequivocally” assert nationality, § 70502(d)(1)(C) will continue to support jurisdiction in the Eleventh Circuit, even if defendants argue international-law “statelessness” differs.
• No-nexus due-process arguments remain foreclosed: Defendants apprehended far from U.S. waters should expect Campbell/Canario-Vilomar to defeat minimum-contacts theories in this circuit.
• Certifications remain litigation-resistant: Confrontation Clause attacks on State Department jurisdiction certifications remain barred by Cabezas-Montano and United States v. Cruickshank.
• Courier role reductions remain difficult: The opinion reflects the entrenched De Varon approach: maritime couriers moving large loads, held accountable only for the load they carried, rarely qualify as “minor” compared to the relevant conduct participants.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): A maritime band extending up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal state’s baseline where the coastal state has certain resource-related rights. It is not the same as “territorial waters.”
• Territorial waters vs. high seas: Territorial waters are the coastal state’s near-shore sovereign waters (often up to 12 nautical miles). “High seas” are waters beyond territorial seas. Under United States v. Alfonso, the Eleventh Circuit treats EEZs as part of “high seas” for the Felonies Clause analysis.
• Felonies Clause: The Constitution grants Congress power “to define and punish ... Felonies on the high Seas.” This is the principal constitutional hook for MDLEA criminalization in international waters.
• “Vessel without nationality” (MDLEA): A statutory concept that includes not only traditionally stateless vessels, but also vessels where the claimed flag state does not confirm nationality (including “neither confirm nor deny” responses) under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C).
• State Department certification: A formal certification used to conclusively prove the foreign state’s response regarding nationality under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(2). In the Eleventh Circuit, its use to establish MDLEA jurisdiction does not violate confrontation rights.
• Safety valve: A statutory mechanism allowing sentences below a mandatory minimum if specified criteria are met (here referenced via 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)).
• Minor-role adjustment (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2): A guideline reduction for defendants substantially less culpable than most other participants in the relevant conduct. Under United States v. Rodriguez De Varon, courts focus on the conduct the defendant was held accountable for, not a broader uncharged organization.

5. Conclusion

This decision does not chart new doctrinal territory so much as it consolidates and applies the Eleventh Circuit’s recent MDLEA framework: (1) an EEZ is treated as “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes (United States v. Alfonso); (2) Congress’s MDLEA statelessness definition—especially § 70502(d)(1)(C)—is not constrained by customary international law (United States v. Canario-Vilomar); (3) due process does not require a U.S. nexus for MDLEA prosecution (United States v. Campbell); (4) State Department certifications do not violate the Confrontation Clause (Cabezas-Montano; United States v. Cruickshank); and (5) maritime courier defendants face an uphill battle for minor-role reductions under the De Varon relevant-conduct approach.