McGirt-Based Jurisdictional Defects Cannot Be Collaterally Litigated at Federal Sentencing Absent a Complete Denial of Counsel

I. Introduction

In United States v. Campbell (10th Cir. May 5, 2026), the Tenth Circuit addressed whether a federal sentencing court may disregard a defendant’s prior Oklahoma state convictions when calculating the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range on the theory that, under McGirt v. Oklahoma, the state courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the defendant is an Indian and the underlying conduct occurred in Indian country.

The defendant, Kalin Marie Campbell, an enrolled member of the Osage Nation, pleaded guilty in federal court to a drug-trafficking conspiracy. The key sentencing issue was whether her three prior Oklahoma state convictions—none of which had been vacated or reversed—could be counted in her Criminal History Category under the Guidelines, despite her argument that they were “void” for lack of state-court jurisdiction.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed. It held that Campbell could not collaterally attack the validity of her outstanding state convictions at a federal sentencing hearing for an unrelated federal offense on the basis of alleged jurisdictional defects tied to McGirt v. Oklahoma. Because the convictions had not been vacated or reversed, and because they were not obtained in violation of her right to counsel, the district court properly counted them in calculating her Criminal History Category under U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.1 and 4A1.2 (including commentary note 6). The resulting Guidelines range was therefore not procedurally unreasonable, and there was no abuse of discretion.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295 (2005)

    The opinion treats Johnson as the controlling statement of the governing rule: during federal sentencing, collateral attacks on prior state convictions are “off-limits” except for challenges alleging a conviction was obtained in violation of the right to appointed counsel. The panel uses Johnson to reject Campbell’s attempt to create an additional exception for alleged subject-matter-jurisdiction defects under McGirt.

  • U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.1; 4A1.2 & cmt. 6

    These provisions provide the mechanical rule for criminal history scoring and the key exclusion: convictions that have been “reversed or vacated” or “ruled constitutionally invalid in a prior case” are not counted. The panel emphasizes that Guidelines commentary note 6 also disclaims any new right to collaterally attack prior convictions at sentencing, beyond what other law already recognizes.

  • United States v. Maloid, 71 F.4th 795 (10th Cir. 2023)

    Cited to confirm that Guidelines commentary “governs” unless unconstitutional, contrary to statute, or plainly inconsistent with the guideline text. This supports treating note 6 as authoritative in limiting collateral attacks at sentencing.

  • McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. 894 (2020)

    Campbell relied on McGirt to argue that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction over crimes by Indians in Indian country, rendering her state convictions void. The panel’s use of McGirt is narrower: it stresses that McGirt did not itself vacate past convictions and expressly anticipated that postconviction challenges would be subject to “state and federal limitations.” Thus, McGirt supplies a potential merits theory for a proper postconviction forum, but not a vehicle for relitigating jurisdiction inside an unrelated federal sentencing hearing.

  • United States v. Mayfield, 810 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1987)

    This case underwrites the court’s rejection of the notion that a conviction is automatically “void from its inception” due to lack of jurisdiction. The panel quotes Mayfield for the proposition that a jurisdictional defect does not nullify a conviction until a reviewing court with authority says so. That matters because Campbell’s convictions remained outstanding and unvacated.

  • Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545 (2011)

    Used to label Campbell’s attempt as a “collateral attack,” i.e., an effort to undermine a conviction outside direct appeal. That framing is important because the controlling Supreme Court line (Custis, Daniels, Johnson) sharply restricts collateral attacks at federal sentencing.

  • Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374 (2001)

    Daniels supplies both the operative limitation (only a “sole exception” for complete denial of counsel) and the policy rationale (administrability and finality). The panel draws on Daniels to explain why broader collateral review at sentencing is disfavored.

  • United States v. Garcia, 42 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. 1994)

    Provides circuit-level confirmation that, “applying Custis,” the Tenth Circuit recognizes only the complete-denial-of-counsel exception. This forecloses Campbell’s invitation to expand the exception to include jurisdictional claims.

  • Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994)

    Campbell relied on language in Custis to argue that “jurisdictional defects” might be collaterally raised at sentencing. The panel rejects that reading by placing Custis in the context of later Supreme Court decisions (Daniels and Johnson) that describe the exception as limited to right-to-counsel violations. The panel also invokes Custis for its two key justifications: administrability (avoiding mini-trials over old convictions at sentencing) and finality (preserving the normal force of state judgments).

  • United States v. Hatley, 153 F.4th 1112 (10th Cir. 2025)

    Cited to illustrate that determining Indian-country jurisdiction can be fact- and law-intensive (e.g., disputes over Indian status). This supports the administrability concern: allowing McGirt-style jurisdiction collateral attacks at sentencing could require extensive investigation and record reconstruction.

  • State ex rel. Matloff v. Wallace, 497 P.3d 686 (Okla. Crim. App. 2021) and Pacheco v. Habti, 62 F.4th 1233 (10th Cir. 2023)

    These cases appear in a footnote to note an unresolved question (federal retroactivity of McGirt) while emphasizing it is unnecessary to decide here. The panel’s method is significant: it avoids expanding federal sentencing proceedings into a forum for retroactivity litigation because, even if McGirt were retroactive, the defendant still could not collaterally attack the convictions at sentencing under Johnson/Daniels.

  • Procedural-reasonableness and standard-of-review authorities: United States v. Hanrahan, 508 F.3d 962 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Gantt, 679 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Sanchez-Leon, 764 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2014); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); United States v. Conley, 89 F.4th 815 (10th Cir. 2023)

    These authorities frame the appellate lens: incorrect Guidelines calculation is procedural error, reviewed under abuse of discretion with de novo review of legal conclusions. They provide the structure for the panel’s conclusion that counting the convictions was not legal error.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Outstanding convictions are counted unless vacated/reversed (or previously declared constitutionally invalid).

    The court starts with the Guidelines rule: criminal history includes any prior sentence for unrelated conduct, with limited exclusions. Campbell’s convictions remained in place; no court had vacated or reversed them. Under this framework, the sentencing court’s job is not to decide whether the old judgment was wrong, but whether it is still legally operative for scoring.

  2. McGirt does not self-execute to void past convictions.

    The panel rejects Campbell’s “inferential leap” that McGirt v. Oklahoma automatically voids earlier state convictions involving Indians in Indian country. McGirt addressed the statutory status of reservation land for federal criminal law; it did not itself invalidate existing judgments and it anticipated normal postconviction constraints.

  3. Even a jurisdictional theory does not authorize a collateral attack at federal sentencing.

    The opinion treats Campbell’s argument as a collateral attack under Wall v. Kholi. It then applies the Supreme Court’s limitation (Daniels and Johnson): only convictions obtained with a complete denial of counsel can be collaterally challenged at federal sentencing. Campbell had counsel in each state case, so the only recognized exception is unavailable.

  4. Policy reinforces the narrow exception: administrability and finality.

    The court underscores why the exception remains narrow. Unlike a failure-to-appoint-counsel claim (often visible from the face of the record), Indian-country jurisdiction issues can require complicated fact finding and historical/legal analysis. Moreover, allowing federal sentencing courts to re-adjudicate the validity of state convictions would undermine state interests in the integrity and continuing effect of their judgments, even after a sentence is served.

C. Impact

United States v. Campbell significantly constrains the procedural use of McGirt in federal sentencing within the Tenth Circuit:

  • No McGirt-based “void judgment” shortcut at federal sentencing. Defendants cannot bypass state/federal postconviction channels by arguing that state convictions are jurisdictionally void and therefore must be ignored for criminal-history scoring.
  • Bright-line rule for Guidelines litigation. Unless the prior conviction has been vacated/reversed, or it falls within the complete-denial-of-counsel exception, it is counted under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2. This reduces sentencing uncertainty and limits evidentiary disputes.
  • Practical shift to postconviction strategy. Defendants seeking to prevent use of potentially invalid state convictions (including those arguably affected by McGirt) must pursue relief in the appropriate court first; federal sentencing is not the forum to litigate those merits.
  • Retroactivity questions remain parked. By expressly avoiding McGirt retroactivity, the court signals that—even if later resolved in defendants’ favor—that development would not itself open the door to federal-sentencing collateral attacks beyond the right-to-counsel exception.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Criminal History Category (Guidelines). A numerical score based on prior sentences that helps determine the advisory sentencing range.
  • Collateral attack. An attempt to invalidate a conviction in a different proceeding than direct appeal (here, trying to challenge state convictions during federal sentencing).
  • Subject-matter jurisdiction. A court’s authority to hear a type of case. Campbell claimed Oklahoma courts lacked authority over her crimes because they occurred in “Indian country” and she is an Indian.
  • Indian country (18 U.S.C. § 1151). A federal statutory term defining certain lands (including some reservations) where jurisdictional rules differ for crimes involving Indians.
  • The right-to-counsel exception. The narrow rule from Custis/Daniels/Johnson: at federal sentencing, you may collaterally challenge a prior conviction only if you were completely denied counsel (not merely alleging other constitutional or jurisdictional errors).
  • Finality and administrability. Courts prioritize stability of judgments and efficient sentencing. Expanding collateral review at sentencing would invite delays and fact-heavy relitigation of old cases.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Campbell reinforces a strict boundary between federal sentencing and postconviction litigation: alleged McGirt-based jurisdiction defects in prior state convictions do not make those convictions disregarded for federal criminal-history scoring unless and until a court of competent authority vacates or reverses them (or they fall within the narrow, complete-denial-of-counsel exception). The decision promotes uniformity in Guidelines administration, preserves the finality of state judgments, and channels McGirt-related challenges to the proper direct-appeal or postconviction forums.