McCudden v. Canisius Coll.: “Exclusively In‑Person” Specific-Promise Pleading Rule for COVID Tuition Refund Claims; Mandatory-Fee Claims May Proceed Where Services Are Inherently In-Person

I. Introduction

Case: McCudden v Canisius Coll., 2025 NY Slip Op 01539 (App Div, 4th Dept Mar. 14, 2025).
Parties: A Canisius College undergraduate student (plaintiff), on behalf of a putative class, against Canisius College (defendant).
Background: In March 2020, Canisius ceased in-person classes and transitioned to remote instruction due to COVID‑19. Plaintiff sought refunds of (i) tuition and (ii) mandatory fees for the Spring 2020 semester, asserting breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion.
Procedural posture: Defendant moved to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7). Supreme Court dismissed tuition-based contract relief and unjust enrichment (and conversion), but allowed the breach-of-contract claim to proceed as to mandatory fees. Plaintiff appealed (tuition contract + unjust enrichment). Defendant cross-appealed (mandatory fees).

Key issues: (1) What must a student plead to state a contract claim for tuition reimbursement based on the shift to remote learning? (2) What factual showing is required to plead unjust enrichment in this setting? (3) Are mandatory-fee claims treated differently from tuition claims?

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Department affirmed in full. It held:

  • Tuition / breach of contract (dismissed): Plaintiff failed to plead a nonconclusory implied contract requiring exclusively in-person instruction; absent a specific promise material to the student-school relationship, the tuition claim fails.
  • Unjust enrichment (dismissed): Plaintiff’s allegations that Canisius “saved money” or was enriched by moving online were conclusory; the complaint acknowledged Canisius provided in-person instruction initially and virtual services thereafter.
  • Mandatory fees / breach of contract (survives): The complaint sufficiently alleged that certain fee-funded services (as pleaded) could only be provided in-person; therefore, it was not “devoid of allegations” as to what services were owed in exchange for those fees.

A partial dissent would have reinstated the tuition-based contract claim and unjust enrichment, adopting a less demanding “generally in-person courses” implied-contract theory drawn from federal authority applying New York law.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. CPLR 3211 pleading framework

  • Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 (1994): Establishes the motion-to-dismiss standard—liberal construction, accept facts as true, and determine whether facts fit a cognizable legal theory. The majority used Leon to underscore that favorable inferences do not save claims resting on conclusory assertions.
  • Falso v Children & Family Servs., 227 AD3d 1466 (4th Dept 2024): Reaffirms Leon within the Fourth Department.
  • Connaughton v Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 29 NY3d 137 (2017): Clarifies that bare legal conclusions receive no deference and dismissal is warranted where facts do not support elements of a claim. The majority leaned heavily on Connaughton to characterize plaintiff’s contract and unjust enrichment allegations as conclusory.
  • Dissent additionally cited EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11 (2005) and Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v Bonderman, 31 NY3d 30 (2018) for the principle that ultimate proof is not assessed on a 3211(a)(7) motion—framing its view that plaintiff had pleaded enough to proceed to fact development.
  • Smith v Triad Mfg. Group, 255 AD2d 962 (4th Dept 1998) and Ciesinski v Town of Aurora, 202 AD2d 984 (4th Dept 1994): Cited to hold that plaintiff abandoned any challenge to dismissal of conversion by not briefing it.

2. Student-university contract doctrine; “specific promise” requirement

  • Rynasko v New York Univ., 63 F4th 186 (2d Cir 2023): A federal appellate decision applying New York law, recognizing implied contracts can arise from university materials and allowing claims where in-person services were plausibly promised (including discussion of a dance major for whom the change “dramatically altered” the contracted-for experience). The majority distinguished and declined to follow its “generally in-person courses” framing; the dissent adopted it.
  • Croce v St. Joseph's Coll. of N.Y., 219 AD3d 693 (2d Dept 2023): Central authority for the majority. The Fourth Department aligned with Croce in holding that, in this context, a tuition-based contract claim requires allegation of “a specific promise to provide the plaintiff with exclusively in-person learning,” not merely general marketing or expectations.
  • Keefe v New York Law School, 71 AD3d 569 (1st Dept 2010): Cited for the general proposition that the university-student relationship is contractual and can derive from published materials, but also for the “specific promise” and noninterference principles that limit judicial review of academic matters.
  • Maas v Cornell Univ., 94 NY2d 87 (1999) and Matter of Olsson v Board of Higher Educ. of City of N.Y., 49 NY2d 408 (1980): Cited by the majority to ground the policy of judicial restraint and deference in educational settings, supporting the insistence on a concrete, enforceable promise rather than vague educational expectations.
  • Matter of Hansbrough v College of St. Rose, 209 AD3d 1168 (3d Dept 2022): Further support for deference/noninterference in institutional decision-making.
  • Dissent also cited Matter of Carr v St. John's Univ., N.Y., 17 AD2d 632 (2d Dept 1962), affd 12 NY2d 802 (1962), to show New York recognizes implied student-school contracts in appropriate circumstances.
  • Dissent relied on Shapira v United Med. Serv., 15 NY2d 200 (1965) for the general proposition that the existence of an implied contract is usually a question of fact—arguing that the pleadings should not be dismissed where materials and conduct plausibly imply an obligation.
  • Dissent additionally cited Vought v Teachers Coll., Columbia Univ., 127 AD2d 654 (2d Dept 1987) to support that catalogs/representations can form part of the implied agreement.

3. Unjust enrichment standards and alternative pleading

  • Omar v Moore, 171 AD3d 1533 (4th Dept 2019): Holds that where a controlling contract has not been conceded or determined, unjust enrichment may be pleaded in the alternative to breach of contract. The Fourth Department accepted the availability of alternative pleading but found the elements not adequately alleged.
  • Mandarin Trading Ltd. v Wildenstein, 16 NY3d 173 (2011): Provides the three-part unjust enrichment test and warns against conclusory enrichment allegations. The court invoked Mandarin Trading Ltd. to find plaintiff’s “saved money” allegations insufficient.
  • Columbia Mem. Hosp. v Hinds, 38 NY3d 253 (2022): Cited alongside Mandarin Trading Ltd. for the governing unjust enrichment elements.
  • City of Olean v New York State Envtl. Facilities Corp., 213 AD2d 1018 (4th Dept 1995): Cited generally in the discussion of insufficient conclusory pleading on unjust enrichment.
  • Dissent cited Armstrong v Simon & Schuster, 85 NY2d 373 (1995) for the “minimal standard” to resist dismissal—arguing plaintiff met that threshold.

4. Dissent’s additional authorities on pleading posture

  • Burns v C.R.B. Holdings, Inc., 229 AD3d 1084 (4th Dept 2024): Reiterates 3211 standards.
  • The dissent also referenced federal and trial-level decisions following Rynasko (e.g., Yodice v Touro Coll. & Univ. Sys.; Meng v New Sch.; Carstairs v University of Rochester) to argue that in-person expectation theories have been accepted without requiring “exclusive” in-person promises. (These were used illustratively by the dissent, not adopted by the majority.)

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Tuition claim: the Fourth Department adopts a stringent “specific promise” rule

The majority’s core move is to treat COVID tuition refund claims as viable only where the plaintiff alleges a specific, material promise that the institution would provide exclusively in-person learning. General allegations—marketing emphasizing campus experience, course registration for in-person sections, or broad statements about hands-on learning—were held insufficient if they do not identify a concrete promise enforceable in contract.

Two rationales animate this:

  1. Contract specificity: New York’s student-school contract cases allow implied terms from bulletins/handbooks, but still require identifiable promises. Without that, a claim collapses into a grievance about educational “quality” or “value,” which New York courts resist adjudicating.
  2. Judicial restraint in education: Allowing claims based on a promise of “generally in-person” learning would force courts to “parse vague promises” and assess the relative value of remote vs. in-person education—precisely what the deference/noninterference line of cases seeks to avoid.

The majority treated plaintiff’s internship allegation as too narrow: even if an internship is in-person, the inability to participate in “one internship” did not plausibly establish a college-wide promise of an exclusively in-person educational experience material to the overall contract.

2. Relationship to Rynasko and Croce: choosing the New York intermediate appellate path

A key jurisprudential feature is the Fourth Department’s explicit choice between two competing frames:

  • The majority follows Croce v St. Joseph's Coll. of N.Y. (2d Dept), reading it to require a specific promise of “exclusively in-person learning.”
  • The dissent prefers Rynasko v New York Univ. (2d Cir), which it reads to allow an implied promise to provide “generally in-person courses” based on materials and conduct, leaving existence and scope of the implied contract for the factfinder.

The majority not only adopts Croce, but argues Croce implicitly rejected Rynasko’s more general promise theory by citing Rynasko while repeatedly emphasizing “exclusively in-person learning.” In effect, McCudden entrenches an intra-New York split in approach—resolving it (for the Fourth Department) in favor of Croce’s heightened specificity requirement at the pleading stage.

3. Unjust enrichment: conclusory “cost savings” allegations are insufficient

Although the court acknowledged unjust enrichment can be pleaded in the alternative when a controlling contract has not been conceded or determined, it dismissed the claim because the complaint did not plead nonconclusory facts showing enrichment. The decision is notable for requiring more than the intuitive assertion “remote learning cost less”: plaintiff had to plausibly allege how Canisius was enriched at plaintiff’s expense and why equity demands restitution, despite the undisputed provision of in-person instruction early in the semester and virtual services through term end.

4. Mandatory fees: a narrower, service-linked implied-contract theory survives

The court drew an important distinction between tuition and fees. For fees, the complaint identified categories of services supported by each fee (e.g., library, athletic facilities, ID card, transportation, graduation, transcripts; health and counseling; technology and online services). The majority held that, as pleaded, some of these services “could only be provided through in-person operation,” making the claim sufficiently definite. This allowed the fee claim to proceed even as tuition claims failed—signaling that fee refund litigation may turn on whether the fee is tied to discrete, concrete, and plausibly unavailable in-person services.

C. Impact

1. A clearer Fourth Department pleading rule for COVID tuition claims

McCudden creates a strong Fourth Department signal: a tuition refund claim premised on the COVID shift to remote instruction will likely be dismissed absent allegations identifying specific, material promises amounting to exclusively in-person learning obligations. Plaintiffs relying on generalized marketing, campus “experience” language, or mere enrollment in in-person sections may face early dismissal.

2. Fee claims remain a viable lane—if tethered to specific in-person services

The decision preserves a practical path forward for plaintiffs: mandatory-fee theories can survive where the complaint describes discrete services funded by the fees and plausibly alleges those services required in-person operations and were not delivered. Institutions can expect future pleadings to become more granular, mapping each fee to particular facilities/services and alleging unavailability, partial performance, or lack of substitute value.

3. Reinforcement of “educational deference” as a screening tool

The majority uses the deference/noninterference doctrine not merely as a merits principle but as a pleading-stage gatekeeper: if adjudicating the claim would require courts to value or compare educational modalities, the claim must rest on a sufficiently specific promise to avoid that judicial role. This rationale may extend beyond pandemic cases to other disputes where plaintiffs attempt to monetize changes in educational delivery without a concrete contractual commitment.

4. Doctrinal tension with federal applications of New York law persists

By openly choosing Croce over Rynasko, McCudden may widen the practical divergence between New York intermediate appellate courts and federal courts applying New York law. Litigants will likely intensify forum and precedent battles, and the “exclusive vs. general in-person” promise question may become a candidate for higher-court clarification.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss: The court assumes the complaint’s factual allegations are true and asks only whether they state a legally recognized claim. But it does not accept mere labels like “defendant promised in-person learning” unless supported by factual detail.
  • Implied contract (student-university context): Even without a signed contract, published materials (catalogs, handbooks) can create enforceable promises—if they are specific enough and material to the relationship.
  • “Specific promise” vs. “general expectation”: A promise like “Class X meets Mondays in Room Y with lab access” is closer to specific; a statement like “we offer an immersive campus experience” is more like an expectation. McCudden requires the former type (or its equivalent) for tuition-based claims.
  • Judicial deference to academic decisions: New York courts generally avoid second-guessing academic judgments and institutional choices. Here, the majority uses that principle to avoid evaluating the “value” of remote education compared with in-person education unless a concrete promise anchors the dispute.
  • Unjust enrichment: A fairness-based claim requiring plausible facts showing the defendant actually gained at plaintiff’s expense and that it would be inequitable to keep the gain. Conclusory “they saved money” allegations are not enough.
  • Alternative pleading: Plaintiffs can plead contract and unjust enrichment in the alternative when the controlling contract is not yet established, but they must still plead the elements of each claim with factual support.

V. Conclusion

McCudden v Canisius Coll. is a consequential Fourth Department decision in pandemic-era education litigation. It holds that tuition refund claims based on the move to remote learning must allege a specific, material promise of exclusively in-person education; generalized marketing and in-person scheduling expectations are insufficient. It also tightens unjust enrichment pleading by rejecting conclusory cost-savings theories. At the same time, it preserves mandatory-fee contract claims where the complaint links fees to discrete services plausibly deliverable only in person. The opinion thus both narrows tuition-based theories and clarifies a more concrete path for fee-based claims—while spotlighting an ongoing doctrinal divide between state intermediate appellate authority and federal interpretations of New York law.